William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, and Michael J. Meurer
New research arguing for new policies to address serial collusion in various industries, including guidance to antitrust enforcers about how to better understand and combat serial collusion facilitated by patents.
New analysis of the Qualcomm decision in terms of how Qualcomm’s commitments to license its standard-essential patents on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) terms bear on the antitrust analysis and how FRAND might have been used to better justify finding an antitrust duty-to-deal with competitors.
After the Supreme Court ruled that courts should not automatically enter injunctions against patent infringers, some commentators feared that the decision would hinder innovation and growth in the U.S. More than ten years later, this paper examines the data to see whether those fears came true.
This paper explores what happens when standard-essential patents (SEPs) go to court. The authors found that, contrary to their expectations, SEPs are more likely to be held valid than non-SEP patents, but they are significantly less likely to be infringed. In other words, SEPs, once in court, do not seem to be all that essential. One cause, the authors found, comes from the assertion of SEP patent rights by so-called patent trolls, which has implications in policy debates over both SEPs and patent trolls.