Photo by Random Instiute via Unsplash
By Frank Jiaqi Wang
Abstract
Latin America has historically been an arena of both involvement and rivalry among the world’s major powers. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine offered the U.S. geopolitical claim over the region as part of its own sphere of interests, leading to the expansion of American hegemony and the decline of European influence in the Western Hemisphere. Two centuries later, during the Trump administration, the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine reemerged as a dominant element in U.S. strategy towards Latin America, paving the way for aggressive and hostile policies from Washington and further allowing China, a newcomer with significant strategic interests, to rapidly establish a stable presence in the region during a period of declining U.S. involvement and influence. With the Biden Administration’s policies signaling America’s return to the regional stage and engagement with regional partners through strategic initiatives and dialogues, Latin America is once again witnessing the competitive coexistence of great powers, which can profoundly impact the region’s political and economic future. This paper not only assesses the content and effectiveness of U.S. policies and initiatives in light of China’s growing involvement, but also highlights the foreign policy intellect and insights of Latin American countries in navigating great power competition and shaping regional dynamics.
Introduction
Not long after the inauguration of Donald Trump, the Monroe Doctrine, which had cast a looming shadow over the relationship between the United States (U.S.) and Latin America for two centuries, made its grand return to Washington’s foreign policy agenda. Rex Tillerson, the first Secretary of State under the Trump administration, stated that the doctrine “[is] as relevant today as it was the day it was written,” marking a sharp contrast to the previous administration’s firm rejection of the ideal.[1] Such rhetoric was further prolonged when John Bolton, Trump’s National Security Adviser, stated that “the Monroe Doctrine is alive and well” when speaking to the Bay of Pigs veterans in 2019.[2] Building upon symbolic rhetoric and controversial narratives, the Trump administration’s approach to Latin America was occupied by hostile immigration policy targeting Mexico and Central American countries, continued aggressive sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela, unilateral termination of assistance programs to the Northern Triangle, and protectionist policy on regional trade. [3]
Four years of Trump-era policies resulted in long-lasting consequences. While both the credibility and popularity of Washington in Latin America have experienced rapid decline, Beijing’s quest for regional influence has gained significant momentum. China has become the top trading partner of South America and formed free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru.[4] At the same time, China has invested in key sectors of Latin American economies and secured twenty-one partnerships to build the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) within the region.[5]
The Biden administration is facing two objectives in Latin America to maintain the geopolitical advantage: restore American prestige and counter China’s regional influence. To optimize and reconfigure the U.S. approach to Latin America, President Biden has been prioritizing strategic engagement and regional cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in key areas ranging from trade, investment, and development to migration response, democracy promotion, and climate change. Oliver Stuenkel argues that “Trump drove Latin America into China’s arms. Biden has a chance to wrest it back.”[6] Multiple factors are at play to assess the development of U.S.-Latin American relations and to further decide whether the Biden administration could indeed “wrestle Latin America back” from Beijing’s embrace and realign the region with the U.S. sphere of influence, including the strength of diplomatic and economic engagement, and the degree of regional security challenges. Moreover, the pragmatic foreign policies and overall perception of “great power competition” by Latin American countries can identify the problematic nature of the “wrestling back” rhetoric and offer additional insights into the changing geopolitical scenery.
Biden’s Clearing of the Trump-era Shadow: Developments and Limitations
President Biden proclaimed in his inaugural address that the U.S. “will repair [its] alliances and engage with the world once again, not to meet yesterday’s challenges, but today’s and tomorrow’s.”[7] Having traveled to the region sixteen times while serving as Vice President, Biden has leveraged his deep ties with Latin America as part of his overall effort to bring an end to the “incompetence and neglect” that characterized the previous Trump administration’s regional policy, both rhetorically and in practice.[8] The nationalistic, transactional, and antagonistic policies of the Trump era were replaced by Biden’s foreign policy principles of partnership, responsibility, and mutual respect.[9] While the Biden administration’s diplomatic engagement with Latin America has shown welcoming progress, it has also encountered persisting internal and external challenges in correcting the course of development for U.S.-Latin America relations.
The Return of a “Good Neighbor”: From Coercion to Cooperation
Transitioning from Trump’s coercive rhetoric and policy actions to Biden’s call for active engagement and cooperation can minimize the growing distance between the U.S. and Latin America. President Biden has shown a cooperative stance on the Northern Triangle and Mexico and allocated $4 billion to these Latin American countries to combat crime, unemployment, and poverty. These measures have provided additional room for continued dialogue on addressing the root causes of mass migration and could relieve the pressures of all parties involved.[10] Moreover, the Biden administration has opposed Trump’s “sanctions-centered” and “illusory warmongering” approach to Venezuela and lifted restrictions on the country, which has eased bilateral hostility and further enabled political concessions from Nicolás Maduro’s government while addressing migration and human rights.[11]
As for economic cooperation, the Biden administration has strengthened economic ties with Latin America, advancing both a policy priority to promote regional prosperity and a strategic measure to mitigate China’s growing influence in areas such as trade and investment. At the 2022 Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, Biden announced the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), which aims to “tackle economic inequality, foster regional economic integration and good jobs, and restore faith in democracy.”[12] While stressing the need for more resilient supply chains and inclusive trade, the leaders of APEP member states have recently declared the launch of a new investment platform for financing sustainable infrastructure, an accelerator program for investment to entrepreneurs, grants for migrants and host communities, workforce development in digital technology, and a climate financing fund.[13]
On paper, the APEP could upscale Biden’s engagement with Latin America by offering potentially viable alternatives to Beijing’s approach to investment and development rather than labeling it a “debt trap” and citing a lack of transparency, further promoting regional integration with substantial input and influence from the U.S. Furthermore, combined with refreshing changes in diplomatic stance on other priorities, the APEP and other initiatives that the U.S. may offer could enable mutually beneficial progress at the negotiating table, and also elevate U.S. standing in the region as a responsible neighbor.
A Rocky Path: Criticisms and Challenges
Biden’s dedication and practical efforts to engage with Latin American countries has experienced several limitations and will continue to be tested by various factors. First and foremost, the risk of neglecting Latin America as a foreign policy priority is still present. For the Biden administration, the regions of focus in formulating dedicated and responsive foreign policies thus far have been Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East, in order to meet the urgent needs of regional allies and counter geopolitical foes in conflicts at present and in the foreseeable future. As a result, the momentum for concrete initiatives and commitments that President Biden has initiated in those parts of the world has not been mirrored in Latin America. Tim Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia who serves on the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, has criticized the Biden administration for lacking “heft” in its approach to Latin America.[14] When the Biden administration engages with Latin America, there are controversies surrounding the lack of preparedness and inclusiveness.
For example, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, along with the leaders of Honduras, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, chose not to attend the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles in protest against the Biden administration’s decision to not invite Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua due to the countries’ human rights records.[15] Such a decision by the Biden administration, both controversial and unilateral in nature,has caused discontent among regional partners and created unwanted roadblocks on Washington’s pathway to normalizing relations with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, three countries that are integral to the U.S.-Latin American relations and to the region as a whole. Perhaps the most critical shortcoming of U.S. diplomatic efforts in Latin America has been the lack of American ambassadors on the ground. Despite the US-Latin American relationship being at a critical juncture, the Senate has not yet confirmed ambassadors to Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, Barbados, and The Bahamas, which are all key countries in the region. The White House has been slow to name an ambassador in some cases, which has led to criticisms of the Biden administration’s regional policy and could further jeopardize Washington’s will of engagement.[16]
At the same time, there are uncertainties surrounding the overall effectiveness and practicability of the Biden administration’s deliverables to Latin American partners. Although the Biden administration has praised the APEP as a landmark initiative to both strengthen regional partnerships and compete with China, there has been a lack of response from the administration to rally and integrate American firms. Ed Brzytwa, the vice president of international trade at the Consumer Technology Association (CTA), stated that the CTA filed comments to Global Affairs Canada on APEP because the Biden administration had not sought their input.[17] The APEP also lacks firm agreements, negotiations, and commitments on market access, which could stall the elimination of tariffs and the increase in trade flows.[18] Furthermore, Brazil and Argentina, two of the region’s largest economies, remain outside of the APEP club, which adds further questions on the full potential of the program.[19]
Competing with China in the development realm presents a crucial challenge for Washington in its efforts, both at present and in the long term, to win over Latin American countries from Beijing’s network. China has been largely successful in coordinating both state-owned enterprises and private firms, and combining public and private financial resources to finalize projects and further advance strategic objectives for overseas development.[20] On the other hand, the U.S. continues to encounter significant challenges in mobilizing capital from the private sector to achieve foreign policy.[21] Such a disparity could explain why Beijing’s programs, namely the BRI, are gaining traction in a region that highly prioritizes development while Washington-led initiatives, including the APEP, lack the momentum to compete, and further result in diplomatic consequences unfavorable to the U.S. Existing data shows that Latin American countries where China economically surpassed the U.S. were 26 percentage points less inclined to vote in alignment with Washington than other member states at the United Nations.[22]
Lastly, democracy promotion, which matches Biden’s progressive mindset and thus occupies significant space in the administration’s foreign policy, can be counterproductive when Washington attempts to cooperate with Latin American countries. Elements of democracy often appear in Biden’s diplomatic statements and the administration’s approach to both political and economic engagement with regional partners,as seen when the U.S. President called for a Latin America that is “secure, prosperous and democratic, from Canada’s northernmost reaches to the southern tip of Chile” at the Summit of the Americas.[23] The Biden administration’s strong emphasis on promoting democracy not only attaches political conditionality to its engagement with Latin America but could also lead to accusations, especially from non-democratic countries in the region that have a troubled past with the U.S., that Washington is interfering with Latin American countries’ domestic affairs. In contrast, Beijing’s principle of non-intervention and support for “South-South cooperation” in both diplomacy and development will receive more support.
The Building Blocks of Beijing’s Foothold: Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela
Both the Trump and Biden administrations have treated Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as undemocratic and aggressive foes, with no foreseeable or significant improvement in their respective multilateral relationships. Beijing, on the other hand, saw this as a grand opening to strengthen its own regional network within Latin America and further reshape the region to its favor and against Washington’s liking. Such a development greatly restrains, if not overwhelms, the current Biden administration’s efforts to unseat China in the fierce regional competition.
Cuba is a case with various implications. The government of Miguel Díaz-Canel has continued to foster closer security relations with China. Recent developments have seen the two partners strengthening intelligence cooperation and planning to build a joint military training facility on the island nation, further challenging U.S. military establishments in the region.[24] In addition, with the continuation of the U.S. embargo, Havana is heavily dependent on Beijing for trade, investment, and economic assistance.
Nicaragua, which re-established diplomatic ties with China in 2021, joined the BRI a year later, and signed a Free Trade Agreement in August 2023, demonstrates both the fast-paced nature and effectiveness of China’s deepening foothold in Latin America. Following the deterioration of U.S.-Nicaragua relations, Beijing has signed multi-million-dollar infrastructure deals with Managua.[25] Such agreements have led to the reconstruction and expansion of the Punta Huete International Airport, the construction of a solar plant, a hydroelectric project, the expansion of coastal highways, and the development of new rail lines.[26] At the same time, Beijing has fostered close political ties with the Ortega government, further expanding its influence in Latin America, which continues to challenge the U.S. sphere.[27]
Following Venezuelan President Maduro’s state visit to Beijing in September 2023, Venezuela-China ties were significantly upgraded to an “all-weather” partnership, a privileged position in China’s diplomatic circle that only a limited number of countries were to receive.[28] The meeting between President Maduro and President Xi Jinping concluded with deepened cooperation between Caracas and Beijing in BRI development projects and across various sectors ranging from trade to education.[29] At the same time, Venezuela has been the biggest borrower of Chinese loans for energy and infrastructure projects, valued at approximately $60 billion, which doubled the amount borrowed by Brazil.[30]
Through deepening ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, China has been able to establish a firm foothold in the region. As the relations between the U.S. and these three key regional powers continue to sour, the latter’s connection with and dependence on Beijing will continue to strengthen. As a result, the current administration, and perhaps future administrations, will encounter additional hardships in “wrestling” with China.
The Latin American View: From Diplomatic Pragmatism to Non-Alignment
Previous decades saw U.S. hegemony establishing a solid influence over Latin America, which strengthened the region’s dependence on Washington. The current geopolitical landscape in the region differs not only due to China’s growing influence, which has undermined the U.S.-centric framework, but also because of diversity and flexibility in the foreign policy intellect of Latin American countries to fulfill their own national interests while balancing great power competition in an increasingly multipolar world. This is especially apparent in the cases of Brazil and Chile.
Brazil, under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), has been balancing ties with both Beijing and Washington without favoring one power over the other. The Lula administration views the U.S. as a trustworthy ally for foreign direct investment, shared democratic values, and cooperation in the fields of security and challenges. Similarly, they see China as a key partner in trade, complementary investment, diplomatic coordination, and cooperation through BRICS.[31] In addition, President Lula has undertaken symbolic state visits to both Washington and Beijing in early 2023, further signifying Brazil’s willingness to strengthen ties with both powers despite the ongoing power competition.
Chile, under President Gabriel Boric, is just as relevant in determining Latin American countries’ pragmatic position on U.S.-China competition. Maintaining close ties with both Beijing and Washington is important for Santiago, considering that China is Chile’s top trading partner, while the U.S. is its primary source of investment.[32] Chile has continued to forge a close partnership with Beijing through the BRI, particularly technological cooperation via the Digital Silk Road while remaining a key member of the APEP.[33] In addition, downturns in the U.S.-China competition could directly impact Chile. For example, a decrease in demand for Chinese goods resulting from U.S. tariffs could cause China to require less copper, leading to decreased exports from Chile.[34]
Latin America at present should not be characterized as a geopolitical possession to be “wrestled back,” but rather a primary example of Active Non-Alignment (ANA). ANA prioritizes the national interests of Latin American countries and diversification of Latin America’s relations with other countries and regions, in the Global South or elsewhere, rather than accepting the stances of any of the great powers in competition or conflict and subjugating to pressures.[35] The reality facing both Beijing and Washington is that more countries in Latin America, and other parts of the world, have chosen an independent and pragmatic approach in their ongoing competition for influence. These countries seek to derive benefits from partnerships with both powers while maintaining neutrality and minimizing risks when responding to sensitive geopolitical issues. As a result, the “wrestling” geopolitical rhetoric seems less suitable, and more emphasis should be placed on the foreign policies of Latin American countries.
Conclusion: The Future Power Dynamics in Latin America
U.S.-China relations are changing rapidly. So are the power dynamics in Latin America. Both the U.S. and China will continue to actively compete for influence and a foothold in such a developing region. For Washington, despite the Biden administration’s firm belief in engagement with Latin America, the lack of efficient focus and resources to drive development programs, and Beijing’s deepening partnerships with strategically significant countries made it unlikely that the U.S. will easily prevail anytime soon. However, the Biden administration should avoid additional criticism towards China, as it will show deprecation and weakness.[36] Instead, it should continue to revitalize its Latin American policy to offer regional partners alternatives with concrete frameworks and benefits.
At the same time, it is critical for both American and Chinese leadership and policymakers to acknowledge that Latin America is not merely a geopolitical arena for a prolonged U.S.-China standoff but rather an independent region with the potential for long-term partnerships. Competition can drive progress but does not necessarily require taking sides. More Latin American countries have started to demonstrate significant diplomatic wisdom and pragmatism in approaching both the U.S. and China as equal partners rather than aligning with one and not the other. This is a reality that Beijing and Washington should accept. Therefore, neither China nor the U.S. should “wrestle” Latin America from each other’s embrace. As the U.S. and China continue to coexist in Latin America, countries in the region should assess foreign policy decisions based on national interests rather than geopolitical influence and potentially serve as mitigators in the ongoing great power competition.
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[5] Ibid
[6] Stuenkel, Oliver. “Trump Drove Latin America into China’s Arms.” Foreign Affairs, November 13, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2020-11-13/trump-drove-latin-america-chinas-arms
[7] “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World.” The White House Briefing Room, February 4, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world.
[8] Camilleri, Michael. “Joe Biden, Friend of Latin America.” The Dialogue: Leadership of the Americas, December 9, 2020. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/joe-biden-amigo-de-america-latina.
[9] Ibid
[10] Mahmoud, Sodfa Mohamed. “Biden and the US-China rivalry in Latin America.” Trends Research, February 17, 2021. https://trendsresearch.org/research.php?id=630&title=Biden_and_the_US-China_rivalry_in_Latin_America
[11] Ibid. Alvarez, Priscilla. “Biden Administration Banks on New Venezuela Strategy as US Grapples with Mass Migration.” CNN Politics, November 3, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/03/politics/biden-administration-venezuela-mass-migration/index.html#:~:text=For%20years%2C%20the%20US%20was,Venezuela%2C%20marking%20a%20significant%20breakthrough
[12] Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.” Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity
[13] Ibid
[14] Bade, Gavin. “Biden’s Missing Latin America Agenda.” Politico, August 4, 2023. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-nightly/2023/08/04/bidens-missing-latin-america-agenda-00109934/a>.
[15] Kendrick, Matthew. “Biden’s Pivot to Asia Risks Neglecting Latin America.” Global Politics, Morning Consult Pro, May 31, 2022. https://pro.morningconsult.com/trend-setters/bidens-china-pivot-and-latin-america.
[16] Wilner, Michael, and Jacqueline Charles. “Across the Americas, crises roil without U.S. ambassadors on the ground.” The Miami Herald, November 5, 2023. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article281400948.html
[17] Bade, “Biden’s Missing Latin America Agenda.
[18] Smith, Tori. “Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Is Unlikely to Expand Trade.” American Action Forum, March 2, 2023. https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity-is-unlikely-to-expand-trades.de/EN/Press/2022/02/PE22_N010_51.html”>https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/02/PE22_N010_51.html.
[19] Feinberg, Richard E. “A Path Forward for the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.” Global Americans, January 31, 2023. https://theglobalamericans.org/2023/01/a-path-forward-for-the-americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity.
[20] Urdinez , Francisco. “Economic Displacement: China’s Growing Influence in Latin America.” Wilson Center, June 16, 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/economic-displacement-chinas-growing-influence-latin-america
[21] Ibid
[22] Ibid
[23] End, Aurelia, and Shaun Tandon. “Biden Calls for Democracy, Not ‘debt-Trap,’ in Americas Summit.” Barron’s, November 3, 2023. https://www.barrons.com/news/biden-calls-for-democracy-not-debt-trap-in-americas-summit-0bc52f59
[24] Lazarus, Leland. “China’s Ties to Cuba and Growing Presence in Latin America Raise Security Concerns in Washington, Even as Leaders Try to Ease Tensions.” The Conversation, July 7, 2023. https://theconversation.com/chinas-ties-to-cuba-and-growing-presence-in-latin-america-raise-security-concerns-in-washington-even-as-leaders-try-to-ease-tensions-208645
[25] MacDonald, Scott B. “China and Nicaragua’s Deepening Embrace.” China Brief Volume: 23 Issue: 21, November 20, 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/china-and-nicaraguas-deepening-embrace
[26] Ibid
[27] Ibid
[28] “China upgrades relationship with Venezuela to “all weather” partnership.” Associated Press, September 13, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/china-venezuela-relationship-all-weather-0c9122e6e69c29ebe1a99356d1a4560a.
[29] Ibid
[30] Roy, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America.”
[31] Berg, Ryan C., and Carlos Baena. “The Great Balancing Act: Lula in China and the Future of U.S.-Brazil Relations.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 19, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/great-balancing-act-lula-china-and-future-us-brazil-relations.
[32] Holmes, Steven. “Competing Visions for Economic & Security Partnership in the Pacific—What Role for LAC?” The Dialogue: Leadership of the Americas, September 22, 2022. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/competing-visions-for-economic-security-partnership-in-the-pacific-what-role-for-lac/.
[33] Fernández, Pamela Aróstica. “Chile’s Once-Pioneering Relationship with China Is Turning into Dependency.” The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), August 18, 2022. https://merics.org/en/chiles-once-pioneering-relationship-china-turning-dependency.
[34] Ibid
[35] Heine, Jorge. “Non-Alignment Is Back in the Global South, Albeit in a Different Incarnation.” Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, February 27, 2023. https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2023/02/27/non-alignment-is-back-in-the-global-south-albeit-in-a-different-incarnation/.
[36] Stuenkel, “Trump Drove Latin America Into China’s Arms.”