By Emma Liu
Abstract
German-Russian relations have been on the center stage of Europe for over a century. The vicissitude of the bilateral relationship has long been an integral feature of modern European politics. From Bismarck to Hitler, from Brandt to Merkel, generations of German leadership have approached its powerful eastside neighbor via various philosophies and practices per the changing political, strategic, and economic environment. Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022 brought the relationship to a historical low in the post-war era. What is the current situation of German-Russian relations? What is the way ahead for Berlin and Moscow? What can the Scholz administration learn from the historical experience when it seeks to forge a new foreign policy strategy toward Russia in a time of crisis? This paper attempts to address these questions by contemplating the historical and political background of the relationship, analyzing the current challenges, and proposing some viable policy recommendations for the German government as it navigates the shifting dynamics of the bilateral relations.
Historical/Political Background
There is hardly any relationship between two states that is more dramatic than that of Germany and Russia, which has been full of ups and downs throughout modern history. Following a cyclical pattern from alliance to war, rapprochement to strain, and cooperation to conflict, German-Russian relations have helped to define European history for the past 150 years.
From the Balance of Power to Two World Wars
The German-Russian relations in the late 19th century were marked by a delicate peace via the balance of power that was maintained through an extremely intricate multilayer alliance system devised by Otto von Bismarck, the mastermind of realpolitik and the first Chancellor of the German Empire. Shortly after the German unification in 1871, Germany successfully formed the League of the Three Emperors with Austria-Hungary and Russia. They aimed to alleviate the rivalry between Germany’s two neighbors while reducing the chance of Russia allying with Germany’s enemy, France.[1]
However, the intensified competition between Austria and Russia in the Balkans eventually led to the dissolution of the League and a new alliance between Germany and Russia. This alliance was then followed by a Franco-Russian alliance that would provide mutual military aid in the event of a German attack.[2] Amid the air of fear and ambition, the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the summer of 1914 and a series of miscalculations triggered between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, European powers (including Germany and Russia on the opposite sides) were entangled in a complex alliance web in what is now known as the Great War.[3]
The 1920s witnessed a warm rapprochement between the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia through the Treaty of Rapallo, under which both countries established friendly diplomatic relations.. [4] In 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (USSR) signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact claiming non-aggression towards each other while dividing up Eastern Europe between the two..[5] One month later, Germany invaded Poland and partitioned the country with the USSR.[6] Yet, the non-aggression agreement between Berlin and Moscow was rapidly broken by Hitler’s ambition. Germany’s full-scale invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 propelled the latter to join the Allies, fighting alongside the United States (U.S.), Britain, and other countries against the Axis powers, and brought Germany to a fateful defeat during World War II (WWII).[7]
From Hallstein Doctrine to Ostpolitik
Following its fiasco in WWII, Germany and its capital, Berlin, were divided into two entities—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany), which was under the control of the U.S., Britain, and France, and the German Democratic Republic (DDR or East Germany) controlled by the Soviet Union.[8] Claiming to be the sole legitimate heir of the German Reich and speaker of the German people, the government of the FRG refused to recognize the German Democratic Republic and implemented the strict “Hallstein Doctrine” that the FRG would not establish diplomatic relations with other states (except for the USSR) that recognized the DDR.[9]
Encountering backfire over time, the old doctrine gave way to “Neue Ostpolitik” (“new eastern policy”) during the 1960s, championed by the new FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt. Brandt believed that collaboration with the communist countries would foster trade and people-to-people exchange and would undermine the communist regime in the DDR in the long run.[10] The “Ostpolitik” and a series of subsequent treaties (such as the Four Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971 and the Basic Treaty in 1972) successfully helped West Germany bring about a rapprochement with East Germany and improve relations with the USSR, Poland, and other eastern bloc communist states.[11] To a larger extent, it also contributed to the eventual end of the Cold War.
Eleven months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany finally saw the reunification of its territory and people on October 3, 1990.[12] Russia’s support for German unification became a symbol of another historical reconciliation between the two countries after the bloodiest war in human history.[13] Building on this positive momentum, Germany established a strategic partnership with Russia that centered on energy, particularly natural gas.[14] In a pragmatic sense, Germany needs energy from Russia while Russia needs the German market and investment to develop its energy sector.
From the 1990s until the early 2010s, the overall German-Russian relations progressed steadily despite some hurdles, such as Russia’s authoritarian rule, the Chechen Wars, and Berlin’s support for NATO’s expansions.[15] Germany, as Russia’s most important trade and economic partner, acted as the facilitator between Russia and the West. In 2010, the European Union (EU) and Russia launched the Partnership for Modernization, which aimed to advance economic and judicial reform in Russia.[16] Meanwhile, Moscow responded positively to the Berlin-proposed Meseberg Initiative, which tended to resolve standing conflicts by creating a Russian-EU foreign policy and security committee.[17] In 2012, Germany helped Russia obtain its World Trade Organization membership, leading the annual bilateral trade to over 80 billion euros in the same year.[18]
Russia’s Annexation of Crimea in 2014
In 2014, Russia supported the separatist groups in the Donbas war in eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea.[19] In its wake, German-Russian relations took a sharp, negative turn. Berlin became a leading voice for harsh economic sanctions against Moscow, to which the Kremlin responded with a ban on food imports from the EU.[20] On the diplomatic front, Germany, along with France, Russia, and Ukraine, set up the Normandy Format to seek a peaceful resolution.[21] Nevertheless, given the seemingly irreconcilable positions of Moscow and Kyiv, the Minsk agreements produced by the Normandy Format failed to stop the fighting and turned virtually powerless to prevent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Merkel’s Legacy
Regarded as one of the greatest German leaders in the postwar era, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who served in the office from 2005 until 2021, was a decisive figure in buttressing the German-Russian partnership during the early 21st century. However, Merkel’s Russian policy has long been criticized as “too soft” by the West.[22] During her tenure, Germany cut its military spending to a minimum while increasing its energy dependence on Russian gas to a record high, from 36 percent imported in 2010 to 65 percent by 2020.[23]
The crux of Merkel’s appeasement approach toward Russia is the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline which she approved in 2015 after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.[24] The $11.6 billion project aimed to deliver gas directly from Russia to northern Germany by building a pipeline under the Baltic Sea.[25] This project made Europe more dependent on Russian gas by doubling the amount of gas delivered by Nord Stream 1. Higher energy dependence increased Europe’s vulnerability and the Kremlin’s leverage in the event of Russia’s aggression. The pipeline also allowed Russian gas to bypass Ukraine, which will potentially lose $2 billion in transit fees.[26] For these reasons, the U.S. and other European countries, such as Poland and Ukraine, have strongly opposed the project. However, as an astonishingly naïve view expressed in a recently released 2021 top-secret security assessment on the pipeline, the Merkel administration argued that the possibility of a scenario where Russia cut its gas flow to Europe would be very low, and German regulators would be able to simply intervene and reason with the Russians if Gazprom violated the delivery contracts or EU law.[27] Unfortunately, the reality was just the opposite. After serving for sixteen years, Merkel willingly left office in 2021 with her highly controversial mark on German-Russian relations that tainted her reputation and tested her successor, Olaf Scholz.
Current Play/Challenges
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, relations between Berlin and Moscow have almost completely reversed from their positive status since the end of the Cold War.
Security
Two days after Russia invaded Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that the German government would send 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stinger surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine shortly after it approved the military aid by the Netherlands and Estonia.[28] Immediately after, on February 27, Scholz delivered his famous “Zeitenwende” speech.[29] In the speech, he declared that Russia’s war in Ukraine was a “turning point” threatening the post-war order and promised that Germany would scale up its support for Ukraine, rethink its relationship with Russia, and spend two percent of its GDP matching the NATO’s pledged standard “from now on.”[30] Yet, in contrast to the grand speech was Berlin’s inability to live up to its promises and wide criticism and pressure from Kyiv and the allies.[31] The most notable episode was Germany’s postponed delivery of its promised state-of-the-art Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, contingent upon the condition of the U.S. delivery of its Abram tanks.[32]
Besides the concern that sending advanced weapons to Ukraine would risk escalating the war, Germany’s initial reluctance to send weapons was due largely to its historical legacy, public opinion, and domestic politics. The country’s catastrophic WWII past and the post-war pacifist and Ostpolitik policies have nurtured across major political parties a deep sense of self-restraint from wars, a policy of not sending weapons to countries at war, and, among the German people, a conscious devotion to peace.[33] Sensitive to Germany being a leader in military affairs and worried about a potential confrontation with Russia, half of the German public opposed sending tanks to Ukraine, a country that Germany used to wreak havoc on. Inter- and intra-party divisions over this issue also grew wide.[34] Hence, it is understandable that the Scholz administration had a hard time realizing Germany’s “Zeitenwende” moment overnight.
Nevertheless, after a long halt, Germany did deliver what it promised. As the war marched into its second year, Berlin finally supported Kyiv with eighteen Leopard 2 tanks along with additional support from other EU states (such as Poland), thirty-one Abrams tanks from Washington, and fourteen Challenger 2 tanks from London.[35] In March 2023, Berlin approved a new arms package worth 2.7 billion euros (approximately $2.95 billion) to Kyiv, making it the largest military aid package from Germany to Ukraine since the beginning of the war.[36]
The series of decisions by Berlin marked a profound transposition in Germany’s foreign and security policy—particularly, a shift away from its longstanding defense policy after WWII of not exporting lethal weapons into a conflict zone while, in general, a shift in its role in Europe.[37]
Economic Sanctions
More than military aid, Germany has responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with ten sanction packages under the banner of the EU, aiming to impose severe consequences on Russia’s aggression and to undermine its ability to continue the war.
Financial Sector
In an effort to limit Russia’s access to its war funding, the EU, alongside the U.S., UK, and Canada, has excluded major Russian banks, including SberBank (Russia’s largest financial institution) and Alfa Bank (Russia’s largest private bank), from the international financial messaging system SWIFT.[38] The EU has also prohibited all transactions with the Russian central bank and froze all its assets, disrupting Moscow’s attempt to save its depreciating currency.[39]
Energy Sector
The focal point of economic sanctions is the energy sector, the primary pillar of the Russian economy. Several rounds of sanctions on imports of Russian products, especially oil and coal, have been put in place. After initially rejecting the idea, the Scholz administration, in June of 2022, eventually came onto the board with the EU’s partial embargo on imports of Russian oil, including seaborne imports of crude oil and petroleum products.[40] In addition, Germany, along with Poland, voluntarily pledged to ban oil imports from Russia by pipeline, which was exempt from the EU’s sanctions.[41]
Although no EU sanctions have targeted Russian gas due to Europe’s heavy reliance on the specific product, Chancellor Scholz decided to suspend the certification process for the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline in February 2022, a big turn-around from Merkel’s legacy and the chancellor’s own attitude months before.[42] Moreover, Germany has strived to reduce its energy dependency on Russia by securing natural gas sources from other places, such as Norway and the Netherlands, building its infrastructure for the import of liquefied natural gas from the U.S. and Qatar, and temporarily reactivating coal and oil-fired power plants.[43] By the end of June 2022, Germany’s gas import from Russia only counts for about 25 percent of its total need compared to 55 percent prior to the war.[44]
Due to the widely applied sanctions and Berlin’s effort to reduce its energy reliance on Moscow, bilateral trade between the two countries plummeted. By February 2023, the first full year of the war, Germany’s imports from Russia decreased by more than 90 percent. Specifically, Germany’s imports of Russian oil and gas dropped by 99.8 percent, from 2.2 billion euros to 4.2 million euros.[45] Coal imports decreased by 92.5 percent.[46] Meanwhile, Germany’s exports to Russia saw a similar decline of 60.5 percent, from 2.1 billion euros to 800 million euros.[47]
In retaliation to Western sanctions, Moscow gradually reduced the flow of gas through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which is the biggest gas pipeline between Russia and Western Europe, to 20 percent of its capacity for “equipment repairs” in July 2022.[48] Two months later, Russia halted the gas supply completely, claiming no gas supply resumption until the sanctions are lifted.[49] The shortage of gas and the resulting soaring price caused a Europe-wide energy crisis that made the winter of 2022-2023 particularly harsh. The widespread energy crisis also exacerbated the food crisis in Europe as farmers would reduce their production due to the skyrocketed gas price.[50]
Other Measures
In the transport sector, the EU has banned Russian road transport companies from entering the EU except for agricultural products and food.[51] In February 2022, the EU closed all its airspace to Russian aircraft of all kinds and prohibited the export of goods or technology in the aviation and space industry to Russia.[52] In terms of individual visa restriction, key individuals involved in Russia’s aggression, including politicians, diplomats, oligarchs, and military officials, were denied access to the EU.[53]
As the European Commission is currently preparing for its 11th sanction package, Germany, teamed up with Poland and some other EU states, is pushing for new sanctions on Russian civil nuclear energy activities, diamond imports, and the provision of information and communication technology services to Russian state firms.[54]
Information Operation
Russian Disinformation Campaign
Russia’s disinformation operation attempting to influence German public opinion and policymaking is nothing new. It can be traced back to the Cold War era. From 2015 to 2021, studies have found more than 700 Russian campaigns targeting Germany on issues ranging from immigration to human rights to elections.[55] The war in Ukraine set up the perfect stage for Russia to wave its notorious massive disinformation campaign to Germany and across Europe.
Several studies showed that many comments calling out on Zelenskyy’s appeal or criticizing the German government’s policy against Russia on the websites of German major media outlets, such as Der Spiegel, were not posted “by Germans.” Instead, they were created by “pro-Kremlin trolls” using random usernames (such as “zw9s,” “nzjdMFpV,” etc.).[56] Their comments would then be picked up by RIA Novosti, a news agency under the state-owned media company Russia Today (RT), and published in its pro-Russia/anti-West propaganda articles.[57] While the German public was facing the energy crisis and soaring gas prices, the Kremlin beefed up its disinformation campaign to exploit public anxiety and deepen the existing gap among the political parties over Germany’s policy toward Russia. Narratives attempting to paint the European energy crisis and people’s suffering from the energy shortage as a consequence of the West’s sanctions against Russia flooded over social media.[58]
Another goal of Russian fake news and social media campaigns was to create a false impression that the German public opposed its government’s support of Ukraine, which is the opposite of the fact. According to a poll conducted by German public broadcaster ARD in 2022, 86 percent of Germans see Russia as a global security threat.[59] Another poll by Deutschlandtrend showed that 37 percent of respondents considered the sanctions against Moscow were not tough enough, and only 23 percent saw them too strict.[60]
Cybersecurity
In the Spring of 2015, Russian hackers attacked the internal computer system of the Bundestag, the German parliament, stealing more than 16 gigabytes of data which included confidential emails from lawmakers.[61] Chancellor Merkel’s own constituency office was also under attack with emails from 2012 to 2015 being stolen.[62] Merkel described the attack as “outrageous.” “Nevertheless,” she said, “I will continue to strive for a good relationship with Russia, because I believe that there is every reason to always continue these diplomatic efforts.”[63]
Unfortunately, the former chancellor’s goodwill was not received in an equal manner by the Kremlin. After the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s cyberattack only intensified and became more politicized. Whenever the German government made an important decision against Russia, the number of Russian cyberattacks on German targets surged. A case in point was the increased attacks on German companies, airports, financial institutions, and government agencies following Chancellor Scholz’s decision to deliver Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.[64] In February 2023, Germany’s interior minister warned that “The cybersecurity concerns have been exacerbated by the war. The attacks of pro-Russia hackers have increased [….] We are in competition with ever new manners of attack and technologies.”[65] So far, the German government has expanded its Federal Office for Information Security to advance the security authorities’ capacity to tackle the long-lasting issue.[66]
Conclusion
As Russia’s aggression in Ukraine fundamentally altered the balance of power in Europe, the Scholz administration is tasked with the tough mission of developing a clear, sensible strategy as to how to redefine German-Russian relations and Berlin’s role on the continent. Germany, once again, standing at a historical watershed, ponders the way ahead.
Lessons Learned
From the country’s historical and current experience of dealing with Russia, specifically the Putin regime, some essential lessons can be distilled for the German government.
First and foremost, Russia’s war in Ukraine has shown that the half-century-long Ostpolitik and Merkel’s legacy in German foreign policy toward Russia are no longer feasible. Political reconciliation through economic cooperation has become impossible with the Putin regime in the context of an aggressive war. Contrary to the original intention of bringing Russia closer to the West through economic interdependence, Germany’s energy dependence on Russia has become the most vulnerable spot for the Kremlin to exploit for its militaristic ambition. The failure of the Minsk agreements to stop the wars and Moscow’s intensified retaliatory cyberattacks have further exposed the weakness of the German-Russian “strategic partnership.” Tolerance and appeasement in Merkel’s era should be replaced by systematic, robust countermeasures. However, it is equally important to distinguish between those responsible for war crimes and the general Russian people and culture.
In the meantime, Germany should adapt its post-war pacifist security policy standing to the new strategic imperatives in Europe. While it is crucial to sustain the moral foundation of Germany’s foreign policy, the German government should look beyond its dark past and into the future, where the peace and prosperity of Europe demand Berlin to play a bigger, more decisive role in this historical juncture.
Policy Proposals
Based on the analysis above, a series of policy recommendations are proposed for the German government to manage its ongoing relationship with Russia.
- In terms of security, Germany should sustain and gradually strengthen its support to Ukraine through military aid, personnel training, and military cooperation with NATO allies. It is in Germany’s interest and the interest of Europe for Germany to adjust its pacifist defense policy and take a more assertive position in line with that of its NATO allies against Russia’s aggression. That being said, a gradual adjustment will be more practical for the country’s domestic dynamics than a dramatic turn-around.
- Regarding the energy sector, Germany should continue the current approach to offset the negative impact of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline shutoff and reduce its energy dependence on Russia by diversifying its energy sources and suppliers. Furthermore, the Scholz administration should expedite the renewable energy reform laid out in the Easter Package. By boosting green power production and encouraging renewable energy sources such as wind and solar, Germany should speed up its energy transition to achieve a nearly 100 percent renewable power supply by 2035.[67]
- In terms of economic sanctions and trade, Berlin should uphold the existing sanctions against Russia and actively participate in discussions on new ones if needed, with a clear goal of thwarting Russia’s capabilities to continue the war. Meanwhile, considering the trajectory of the war, Germany should explore new overseas markets for German exports while diversifying its supply chain of essential goods with like-minded allies and partners in Europe, America, Indo-Pacific, and Africa.
- In the field of cybersecurity, the Scholz administration should build momentum upon the current awareness of the gravity of the issue through a proactive approach. The government should enhance the legal infrastructure to counter malicious cyberattacks, increase investments in personnel training and software/hardware upgrades in public service, and develop a national emergency response and recovery plan, minimizing Russia’s cyberattacks targeting German organizations and individuals.
- In the face of Russia’s sophisticated disinformation campaigns, the German government should develop and implement effective counter-disinformation campaigns. Note that a historical grievance is a powerful tool used by Moscow to manipulate the minds of the people and justify its aggressive behaviors. Given Germany’s role in WWII and NATO, Berlin should take special caution against this tactic. The Scholz administration should maintain Germany’s long-standing sincere repentance of WWII, particularly of its invasions of Russia and other post-Soviet states, and organize thought-through campaigns based on historical facts. This will also potentially help Berlin gain moral support from the Russian people who are against the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine.
- Despite the current hostility, diplomacy always plays a crucial role in managing future German-Russian relations. The Scholz administration should selectively engage the Kremlin in addressing shared global challenges, such as the global pandemic, climate change, and environmental issues. The German government should enhance its public diplomacy efforts, strengthen people-to-people contact, maintain and advance cultural and educational exchanges, and further its support to Russian civil society and human rights activists.
- In the long term, the German government should keep its Russia strategy flexible and pragmatic, ready to adjust it to different political, strategic, and economic circumstances possibly generated by a new leader after Vladimir Putin in Russia. After all, as history has shown, one regime’s responsibility for waging the war should not entail a perpetual punishment or isolation of the nation and its people.
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[2] Ibid, p. 35.
[3] William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond: An International History Since 1900, 6th Edition, Oxford University Press, NY: New York, pp. 49-52.
[4] Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, “The Treaty of Rapallo Signed,” April 16, 1922, https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619171#:~:text=April%2016%2C%201922%20during%20the,them%20and%20expansive%20economic%20cooperation.
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[7] Ibid, pp. 177-185.
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[11] Ibid.
[12] “German Reunification: ‘It Was Nothing Short of a Miracle’,” United States Institute of Peace, February 01, 2021, https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/german-reunification-it-was-nothing-short-miracle.
[13] Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Germany: From Estranged Partners to Good Neighbors,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 06, 2018, https://carnegiemoscow.org/2018/06/06/russia-and-germany-from-estranged-partners-to-good-neighbors-pub-76540.
[14] Kirsten Westphal, “German-Russian Gas Relations in face of the Energy Transition,” Russian Journal of Economics 6(4): 406-423, December 14, 2020, https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.55478.
[15] Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Germany: From Estranged Partners to Good Neighbors.”
[16] “Partnership for Modernisation (Finalised), Delegation of the European Union to Russia, July 13, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/russia/eu_russia/tech_financial_cooperation/partnership_modernisation_facility/index_en.htm.
[17] Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Germany: From Estranged Partners to Good Neighbors.”
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[19] Edward Hunter Christie, “Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?” NATO Review, July 13, 2015, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/07/13/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/index.html.
[20] Edward Hunter Christie, “Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?” NATO Review, July 13, 2015, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/07/13/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/index.html.
[21] Patrick Wintour, “Ukraine Tensions: What Is the Normandy Format and Has It Achieved Anything?” The Guardian, January 26, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/26/ukraine-russia-tensions-what-is-the-normandy-format-and-has-it-achieved-anything.
[22] Oliver Noyan, “Merkel Defense Legacy of Her Russia Policy Amid Ukraine War,” Euractiv, June 08, 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/merkel-defends-legacy-of-her-russia-policy-amid-ukraine-war/.
[23] Silvia Amaro, “With Putin’s War in Europe, the Legacy of Germany’s Merkel Is Now Being Seen in a Very Different Light,” CNBC, March 14, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/14/russia-ukraine-legacy-of-germanys-angela-merkel-is-seen-differently.html.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Liz Cookman, “Nord Stream 2: Why Russia’s Pipeline to Europe Divides the West,” Al Jazeera, January 25, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/25/ukraine-russia-what-is-nord-steam-2-and-why-is-it-contentious.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Hans Von Der Burchard, “Only 4 Months Before War, Germany Claimed Russian Gas Pipeline Posed No Risk,” Politico, October 13, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-release-merkel-era-assessment-saying-nord-stream-russia-gas-pose-no-risk/.
[28] In a Major Shift, Germany Will Send Weapons to Ukraine,” Associated Press, February 26, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-business-economy-olaf-scholz-7c992cb1668842279b890c5d81c54f6a.
[29] “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag, 27 February 2022 in Berlin,” The Federal Government, February 27, 2022, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378.
[30] Erika Solomon, “’Condemn to Lead’ Europe, German Chancellor Struggles for Impact,” The New York Times, September 02, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/02/world/europe/germany-scholz-eu.html.
[31] Noah DeMichele, “Zeiten-When? Scholz Needs to Stop Standing in the Way of Germany’s Foreign-Policy Turning Point,” Atlantic Council, February 23, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/zeiten-when-scholz-needs-to-stop-standing-in-the-way-of-germanys-foreign-policy-turning-point/.
[32] “Experts React: The West Finally Sends In the Tanks. What Will They Mean for Ukraine’s Fight?” Atlantic Council, January 25, 0223, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/tanks-germany-leopards-us-abrams-ukraine/.
[33] Steven Erlanger and Erika Solomon, “Germany’s Reluctance on Tanks Stems from Its History and Its Politics,” The New York Times, January 22, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/22/world/europe/germany-tanks-history.html.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Philip Oltermann, “Germany Leopard 2 Tanks Now in Ukraine, Berlin Confirms,” The Guardian, March 28, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/28/german-leopard-2-tanks-now-in-ukraine-berlin-confirms#:~:text=Germany’s%20much%2Dawaited%20shipment%20of,German%20defence%20ministry%20has%20confirmed.
[36] Erika Solomon and Christopher F. Schuetze, “Germany Announces Its Biggest Military Aid Package Yet for Ukraine,” The New York Times, May 13, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/13/world/europe/ukraine-germany-zelensky-weapons.html
[37] Jenny Hill, “Why Germany Isn’t Sending Weapons to Ukraine,” BBC News, January 28, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60155002.
[38] “Fact Sheet: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe and Immediate Cost on Russia,” The White House, April 06, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/06/fact-sheet-united-states-g7-and-eu-impose-severe-and-immediate-costs-on-russia/.
[39] “EU Sanctions Against Russia Explained,” European Council, and Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#individual.
[40] Alexander Drozdov, “European Union Imposes Partial Ban on Russian Oil,” CSIS, June 08, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-union-imposes-partial-ban-russian-oil.
[41] Clifford Krauss, “Europe’s Russian Oil Ban Could Overhaul Global Energy Market,” The New York Times, June 01, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/01/business/energy-environment/europe-russia-oil-global-energy.html.
[42] David McHugh, “Germany’s Chancellor Suspends Nord Stream 2 Amid Ukraine Tensions, But What Is It?” PBS, February 22, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/germanys-chancellor-suspends-nord-stream-2-amid-ukraine-tensions-but-what-is-it.
[43] Carole Nakhle, “Germany’s Scramble to Revamp Its Energy Policy,” GIS, October 17, 2022, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/germany-gas/.
[44] Philip Oltermann, “How Reliant is Germany – And the Rest of Europe – on Russian Gas?”
[45] “German Imports from Russia Down Over 90% in War’s 1st Year,” Associated Press, April 13, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-trade-economy-sanctions-gas-energy-378b061e50829fb37591db4a475e536c.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Kirsten Grieshaber, “Russia Cuts Gas Through Nord Stream 1 to 20% of Capacity,” Associated Press, July 27, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-germany-d040fce8b07abc2ab6bb2cbf31a0df47.
[49] “Gas Flows to Europe Won’t Resume Until Sanctions Lifted: Russia,” Al Jazeera, September 05, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/5/russian-gas-flows-halted-until-europe-lift-sanctions.
[50] Huileng Tam, “Some Farmers in Europe Are Shutting Operations and Reducing Production Because of the Energy Crunch, Adding to the Global Food Crisis,” Insider, September 08, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/food-energy-gas-crisis-europe-farmers-shut-operations-reduce-production-2022-9.
[51] “EU Sanctions Against Russia Explained,” European Council, and Council of the European Union.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Silvia Amaro, “Germany, Poland and Others are Pushing for New Sanctions on Russian Nuclear Energy,” CNBC, April 19, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/19/germany-poland-and-others-are-pushing-for-new-sanctions-on-russias-nuclear-energy.html.
[55] Janosch Delcker, “Russian Disinformation Looms Large over German Winter,” DW, September 12, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/russian-disinformation-threat-looms-large-over-cold-german-winter/a-63096336.
[56] Ilya Koval, “How Russian Fake News Paints ‘the Germans’,” DW, January 22, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/how-russian-fake-news-paints-the-germans/a-64394917.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Janosch Delcker, “Russian Disinformation Looms Large over German Winter.”
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Hans Von Der Burchard, “Merkel Blames Russia for ‘Outrageous’ Cyberattack on German Parliament,” Politico, May 13, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/merkel-blames-russia-for-outrageous-cyber-attack-on-german-parliament/.
[62] “Angela Merkel Says She Is ‘Pained’ by Russian Hacking,” BBC News, May 13, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52650756.
[63] Hans Von Der Burchard, “Merkel Blames Russia for ‘Outrageous’ Cyberattack on German Parliament.”
[64] Kate Connolly, “German Minister Warns of ‘Massive’ Danger from Russian Hackers,” The Guardian, February 26, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/26/german-minister-warns-of-massive-danger-from-russian-hackers.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Carole Nakhle, “Germany’s Scramble to Revamp Its Energy Policy,” GIS, October 17, 2022, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/germany-gas/.