Can we curb misinformation without censorship by redesigning the incentives that govern speech? Drawing on insights from market design, Marshall Van Alstyne’s research reframes misinformation as a pollution problem rather than one of falsity per se. When false or misleading claims create externalities, markets fail; when those costs can be internalized through voluntary, decentralized exchange, markets may clear without centralized adjudication of truth.
In this talk that presents both theory and evidence, Marshall will show how we might increase speech access, decrease misinformation, and remove any central body judging speech — consistent with First Amendment constraints. Results suggest a viable path for media reform and legal policy that preserves expressive freedom while improving information welfare in the marketplace of ideas.
Title: Fighting Misinformation and Repairing Trust through the Principles of Market Design
Date: Monday, October 5, 2026 @ 2:00p
Location: Rafik B. Hariri Building, 595 Commonwealth Ave. Room 424 Boston, MA 02215
Registration: https://forms.gle/6zPLLSNw27AejyKo8
Participants
Marshall Van Alstyne, Allen & Kelli Questrom Professor of Information Systems at Boston University’s Questrom School of Business
Organizations
MISI
COM
HAR