The Evolution of Contemporary Sino–Russian Relations in the 21st Century

Introduction

China and Russia are similar, illiberal regimes in a pro-West international order, and together they openly challenge Western superiority through a cooperative ‘limitless partnership.’^[1] This relationship is based on strategic necessity, friendship between the two Presidents, shared security interests, and a flexible alliance.^[2] They aim to dilute the influence of Western powers and grow their influence in the Global South.^[3] China’s collaboration with Russia helps expand Chinese influence and build alliances in the Global South, serving to enlarge China’s ‘circle of friends.’^[4] Presidents Xi and Putin both consider the expansion of NATO and the creation of groups like the Quad and AUKUS as hegemonic tools used by the US to enforce its will and preferred norms in international relations.^[5] This shared perspective allows China and Russia to work closely together for their security interests. China has always supported Russia’s security concerns regarding its shared border with Europe. China has been actively advocating this prior to the war in Ukraine, as made clear in their 12-points on the war in Ukraine like ending the Cold War mentality, reducing strategic risks, facilitating a stable international trade and stopping unilateral sanctions to name a few.^[6] For all these common allegations, China-Russia relations are very flexible and lack binding obligations, informal yet formal. They rest on 4 pillars: ^[7]

1. An enemy in the US
2. Similar geopolitical interests in the Global South and Asia-Pacific
3. Thriving illiberal (authoritarian) regimes
4. Economic unison– Chinese manufacturing and Russian resources

This paper will examine the China-Russia relationship in the 21^st century, focusing on their strategic, economic, geopolitical, and defense interests at the multilateral level.

History

The last 75 years of relations between China and Russia have been volatile, moving from violence to alliance to friendship.^[8] During China’s ‘Century of Humiliation,’ the period from 1839-1945 wherein Imperial and early-Republican China was exploited and plundered by outside powers through the Opium Wars, unequal treaties, and Japanese invasion, Tsarist Russia also invaded and conquered Chinese land in Manchuria.^[9] However, after both countries were unified under communist regimes, the Chinese Communist Party and the USSR established formal ties in October 1949.^[10] The diplomatic ties resulted in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which initiated their cooperation on security, socioeconomic, political, and defensive issues. It also facilitated cultural exchanges, allowed Chinese students to move to the USSR, and brought Soviet industrialists to invest in China.^[11]

The death of Stalin in 1953 and the rise of Khrushchev led to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in what is known as the Sino-Soviet Split. Ideologically, Khrushchev and Mao had different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev wanted to de-Stalinize and promote peace, whereas Mao was a communist revolutionary and militantly inclined in nature. This led to an armed conflict in 1969 at the Zhenbao/Damamskii Island between the two countries, which led the Chinese to normalize their relations with the US.^[12] The failure of the Chinese Great Leap Forward and ignoring the Russian 5 Year Plans aggravated the relations.^[13] China was not taking orders from a bipolar hegemon.

In the 1980s, under Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping, a détente was successfully brokered with the USSR that focused on foreign policy rather than communist ideology. This led to the 1989 Sino-Soviet Summit where Soviet leader Gorbachev travelled to China, marking the revival of diplomatic relations shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1991, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin travelled to Moscow and negotiated a resolution to the border dispute.^[14] These developments led to a ‘partnership of strategic coordination’ through the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in Border Areas Between China and USSR, with  military personnel along the Sino-Soviet border.^[15] Another agreement, the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, led to the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Russia joined.^[16] In 2005, the two countries  undertook their first joint military exercise, called the Peace Mission.^[17] Celebrating the 10^th anniversary of The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2011 evolved the relations between the two states to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation.’^[18]

Current State

Multilateralism

China and Russia are exploiting the success of their economies and the slow decline of the West based on their shared vision of a multipolar world.^[19] China and Russia are “allies,” but they haven’t formalized their alliance via a treaty. Still, this informal but very real strategic partnership is widely seen by countries like the US as a threat to European and Pacific security.^[20] Xi and Putin are close both personally and ideologically. Both the Presidents have met each other more than 42 times– more than either of them have met with any other leader.^[21] They widely praise each other’s initiatives like China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. They promote each other’s agenda in multilateral platforms, particularly the UN, to oppose the US. In the United Nations Security Council, China and Russia do not oppose one another and back each other with their veto powers. Since 2004, China and Russia have vetoed only with the  support of the other.^[22]

China supports Russia’s stance against the expansion of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly for Eastern European states bordering Russia like Ukraine and Georgia.^[23] They have formed their own institutions like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to help them connect with the Global South by promoting reform of the international financial system– trying to de-dollarize the world economy and challenge US hegemony.^[24] They have used these platforms to promote their joint interests and convince other countries to view Sino-Russian influence positively by televising and printing biased news with the limited capacity that Russia and China possess.^[25]

In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China and Russia have enjoyed equal power sharing and have unofficially held joint leadership for the past 20 years.^[26] The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has built Sino-Russian relations into a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.’^[27] As China’s economic and political influence has grown, Russia has only become more involved in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, making it a powerful multilateral organization with 4 nuclear powers- Russia, China, India and Pakistan, and status as the largest regional organization based on both population and physical size.^{[28] [29]} Within the SCO, Russia concentrates on security concerns whereas China concentrates on economic and political cooperation. After the annexation of Crimea, China and Russia blocked a few of each other’s proposals within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization like the Energy Club, Business Council, University Programme, Free Trade Area and a Development Bank.^[30] The details of these disagreements are unknown as they happened behind closed doors. However, Russia does not oppose Chinese use of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to promote its Belt and Road Initiative, but rather supports it alongside its own Eurasian Economic Union.^[31]

Geopolitics and International Political Economy

China believes that prioritization of economic freedom and power is the key to creating a stable environment. This is complemented by Russian commitment to investing in and diversifying Chinese energy sources and infrastructure to avoid future instability caused by disruptions in trade routes.^[32] Russia sells China cheap gas and invests in Chinese nuclear energy, clean coal, and renewable resources with the goal of eventually ending Chinese dependency on Russian energy. Both countries cooperate in the Arctic to ensure control over the sea routes.^[33]

Since the annexation of Crimea, Sino-Russian economic relations have deepened. When the US and the EU imposed sanctions on Russia, Russia and China signed new agreements related to economics and defense. This materialized as the Eurasian Economic Union, an organization led by Russia and linked with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.^[34] In 2015, China and Russia brokered a $400 billion natural gas deal.^[35] Since then China and Russia have been vital trade partners with a record annual trade value of $237 billion in 2024.^[36] Economically, China has the upper hand as Russia is dependent on China. China is Russia’s biggest trade partner, but Russia is China’s 6^th biggest trade partner.^[37] Russia is dependent on Chinese firms, foreign direct investments, and banks for its energy and communications sector development.^[38] Russia’s trade with China is 26% of its total trade volume of $681 billion, whereas China’s trade with Russia is only 3% of its total trade volume of $5.89 trillion.^[39]

For Sino-Russian economic relations, energy is key as China is the largest consumer of energy in the world and Russia is a major producer of energy. International political economy experts call this ‘complementary economies’.^[40] After the Ukraine War, the West imposed import bans on Russian oil. China responded by increasing their imports of it by 49%, valued at $76.4 billion in 2022.^[41] More than 50% of Russian exports to China are energy exports.^[42] After the declaration of the ‘no limits partnership’ in 2022 China and Russia signed an energy deal worth $117 billion, providing China with 10 billion cubic meter oil and gas per year till 2032.^[43]

The 40-year deal between Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy extraction company, and China’s National Petroleum Corporation have reduced their reliance on the US Dollar.They are instead using Euros for international trade and local currencies for bilateral trade.^[44] China and Russia are searching for alternatives against the US SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) mechanisms by using the EU’s INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) system and designing their own like the Chinese CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) and Russian SPFS (System of Transfer of Financial Messages).^{[45] [46]}

China and Russia recently increased their efforts in the Arctic, creating security concerns for other Arctic states. Global warming is causing the ice to melt at the poles, creating new, shorter shipping routes and exposing vital natural resources. The Arctic is strategically significant for Russia and China because it links both countries. China and Russia want to exploit the Northern Sea Route around the polar circle, a route which also attracts the Western powers.^[47] China and Russia are working to link the Siberian rivers to the sea through the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects.^[48] Both are trying to shape the geopolitical environment in the Arctic to favor themselves.^[49] China wants to incorporate the Arctic into its New Silk Road and Russia wants to turn the arctic sea route just off of its coast into a major global trade route.^[50]

China has shifted its exports away from the European Union and towards Russia in a show of solidarity. China has been a major supplier of consumer and capital goods to Russia since the war in 2022, making Russia dependent on China. ^[51] This dependency puts Russia into the role of an ‘economic vassal’ when dealing with China. Russia’s war economy cannot sustain Trump’s tariffs in the coming months. The Sino-Russian relations in the economic realm are highly positive and complementary, challenging US interest and European security.

Defense

Russia has greater military power than China–it has a larger nuclear arsenal and China buys significant amounts of military equipment from Russia. Both countries have increased their defense cooperation since 2014 and are working together on missile systems and space warfare, among other things.^[52] Russia has been China’s sole arms contractor since the 1950s.^[53] Since their first joint military exercise in 2003, Sino-Russian drills have increased in time and size, bolstering mutual trust between them.^[54] They signaled their friendship to the world in 2022 by jointly flying bombers near Japan when former US President Biden was in Tokyo.^[55] Arms sale agreements between the two countries have been increasing since. The West viewed China’s procurement of six battalions of Russian S-400 air defense systems for $1.9 billion as a great security concern.^{[56] [57]} This was followed by China purchasing 24 Su-35 fighter planes for $2 billion.^[58] Similar to other nuclear powers, China and Russia stress the strict implementation of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). Both advocate for the suspension of joint nuclear missions and banning the placement of weapons outside a nuclear state’s own sovereign territory, a clear challenge to the US’s basing of nuclear weapons in other NATO countries.^[59] China and Russia view the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as essential to global security.^{[60] [61]}

Europe

Sino-Russian relations pose a threat to the integration of Eastern Europe with the West (EU and NATO).^[62] Although China is the European Union’s biggest trade partner, it plays a crucial role in supporting Russia in the conflict with Ukraine.^[63]  China has successfully promoted the Russian narrative on the war while increasing trade and acting as a buffer against Western sanctions and isolating policies.^[64] The situation in Ukraine brought China and Russia together by creating an ‘economic lifeline,’ creating a free flow of essential goods, and expanding military ties.^[65]

The Balkans’ occupy a strategic location as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and have become a playground for great power politics in recent years, with the West accusing China and Russia of meddling in the region. For Russia, the Balkans are key to secure a future without Western intervention. China and Russia are firmly against the addition of any Balkan country to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the other side, Europe views Russia and its aggressive expansion as its greatest security threat. While China and Russia agree on many things, economic involvement in the European Union is where their interests diverge. China supports Russian foreign policy against the European Union but has no issue with the European Union expanding– with exception being the Balkans and the borders of Russia– more nations joining the EU gives China more economic leverage in the European market.^[66]

Even beyond military concerns, Balkan countries joining the European Union would conflict with Russian interests, as those countries would have to comply with EU’s rules and regulations regarding trade. Currently, Russia benefits from unique trade agreements with Balkan countries, but their joining the European Union would likely result in more sanctions and voices against Russia and China.^[67] Despite China’s growing presence and Russian influence, the European Union remains the dominant actor in the Balkans through financial aid and political assistance, with some Balkan states already EU members. Since the Ukraine War, Russia’s position in the region has been increasingly challenged. China’s economic engagement in the Balkans is not entirely aligned with Russia, and presents an obstacle for both Russia and the EU, contributing to a complex power dynamic.

Conclusion

Russia needs China to achieve its geopolitical goals, a realization made obvious since the Ukraine War.^[68] The Ukraine War benefits China, as it keeps the West occupied in Eastern Europe rather than the Indo-Pacific. Though China advocated for peace via its 12-point paper on Ukraine, it knows that a long war will distract the West from China and allow it to prosper in the Indo-Pacific. China is wary of Russia’s tendency to aggravate NATO countries on nuclear matters, such as by placing warheads in Belarus in 2023 and 2025. A full on conflict with NATO would be against China’s economic interests and negatively impact its supply chain.^[69] For China, Russia is a crucial geopolitical ally, but Russia is only useful to China if it remains stable.^{[70] [71]} Similarly, Russia is important to China as it has been successful in preventing Western military buildup on the shared border with former Soviet states.^[72] Cooperation is paramount for the Sino-Russian geopolitical goal of a multipolar world.^[73]

In the future, China and Russia will develop a robust institutionalized defense partnership with scheduled consultations, drills, and exercises that would serve as the framework for a joint defense against potential security threats.^[74] Russia’s Mass production of Mi-26 helicopters, along with 40N6 missiles for the S-400, S-500, and S-350 Vityaz systems, and the D-30KP2, AL-31F, and AL-41F aircraft engines, and Su-57 fighter planes, led China to purchase approximately $1 billion worth of arms from Russia in 2017.^[75] With China’s technological advancement and Russia’s production capabilities, the Sino-Russian relationship has the potential to threaten Western security in Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Arctic.^[76]

Endnotes

[1] Vasselier, A., Sabanadze, N. and Wiegand, G. (2024) “China-Russia alignment: A threat to Europe’s security”, Merics. (Online) Available at: https://merics.org/en/report/china-russia-alignment-threat-europes-security (Accessed: 04 April 2025).

[2] ibid. Vasselier et al. (2024)

[3] ibid. Vasselier et al. (2024)

[4] ibid. Vasselier et al. (2024)

[5] ibid. Vasselier et al. (2024)

[6] ibid. Vasselier et al. (2024)

[7] Rumer, E. (2024) “Taiwan and the limits of the Russia-China Friendship”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Online) Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/08/taiwan-and-the-limits-of-the-russia-china-friendship?lang=en (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[8] Radin, A. et al. (2021) “China-Russia Cooperation: Determining Factors, Future Trajectories, Implications for the United States”, RAND Corporation.

[9] Fong, C. and Maizland, L. (2024) “China and Russia: Exploring ties between two authoritarian powers”, Council on Foreign Relations. (Online) Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-russia-relationship-xi-putin-taiwan-ukraine (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[10] Hart, B. (2022) “How has the China-Russia relationship evolved?”, ChinaPower Project. (Online) Available at: https://chinapower.csis.org/history-china-russia-relations/ (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[11] Collier, C. (2018) “China and Russia’s relationship: A Q&A and Timeline”, TCU Magazine. (Online) Available at: https://magazine.tcu.edu/winter-2018/china-russia-global-impact/ (Accessed: 22 April 2025); Hart (2022) op. cit.

[12] ibid. Hart (2022)

[13] Collier (2018) op. cit.

[14] Hart (2022) op. cit.

[15] ibid. Hart (2022)

[16] ibid. Hart (2022)

[17] ibid. Hart (2022)

[18] ibid. Hart (2022)

[19] Vasselier et al. (2024) op. cit.

[20] Fong and Maizland (2024) op. cit.

[21] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[22] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[23] Besliu, R. (2022) “Russia’s partnership with China is the sign of a new world”, Green European Journal. (Online) Available at: https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/russias-partnership-with-china-is-the-sign-of-a-new-world/ (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[24] Fong and Maizland (2024) op. cit.

[25] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[26] Seiwert, E. (2021) “Sino-Russian relations: Inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, 9DASHLINE. (Online) Available at: https://www.9dashline.com/article/sino-russian-relations-inside-the-shanghai-cooperation-organisation (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[27] ibid. Seiwert (2021)

[28] ibid. Seiwert (2021)

[29] ibid. Seiwert (2021)

[30] ibid. Seiwert (2021)

[31] ibid. Seiwert (2021)

[32] Lo, B. (2008) “Russia-China: Axis of convenience”, Centre for European Reform. (Online) Available at: https://www.cer.eu/in-the-press/russia-china-axis-convenience (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[33] ibid. Lo (2008)

[34] Smeltz, D. et al. (2021) “Russians see greater reward than risk in closer relations with China”, Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (Online) Available at: https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/russians-see-greater-reward-risk-closer-relations-china?stream=world&gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=15638830524 (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[35] Carpenter, T.G. (2015) “Turbulent Triangle: US, Russia, China Relations”, CATO Institute. (Online) Available at: https://www.cato.org/commentary/turbulent-triangle-us-russia-china-relations?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=85808169 (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[36] Kong, L. (2025) “Trump’s desire to ‘un-unite’ Russia and China is unlikely to work – in fact, it could well backfire”, DCReport.org. (Online) Available at: https://www.dcreport.org/2025/04/17/trumps-desire-to-ununite-russia-and-china-is-unlikely-to-work/ (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[37] Fong and Maizland (2024) op. cit.

[38] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[39] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[40] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[41] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[42] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[43] Besliu (2022) op. cit.

[44] ibid. Besliu (2022)

[45] ibid. Besliu (2022)

[46] Fong and Maizland (2024) op. cit.

[47] ibid. Kobzeva (2022)

[48] ibid. Kobzeva (2022)

[49] ibid. Kobzeva (2022)

[50] ibid. Kobzeva (2022)

[51] Graham, N. (2024) “Chinese exports have replaced the EU as the Lifeline of Russia’s economy”, Atlantic Council. (Online) Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/chinese-exports-have-replaced-the-eu-as-the-lifeline-of-russias-economy/ (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[52] Fong and Maizland (2024) op. cit.

[53] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[54] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[55] ibid. Fong and Maizland (2024)

[56] Carpenter (2015) op. cit.

[57] Malle, S. (2017) “Russia and China in the 21st century. Moving towards cooperative behavior”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 8(2), 136-150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2017.02.003 (Original work published 2017).

[58] ibid. Malle (2017)

[59] Guseletov, B. (2019) “Sino-Russian Relations Soar to Unprecedented Hights”, China Focus. (Online) Available at: http://www.cnfocus.com/sino-russian-relations-soar-to-unprecedented-hights/ (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[60] ibid. Guseletov (2019)

[61] ibid. Guseletov (2019)

[62] Vasselier et al. (2024) op. cit.

[63] ibid. Vasselier et al. (2024)

[64] ibid. Vasselier et al. (2024)

[65] ibid. Vasselier et al. (2024)

[66] Bagheri, A. and Bagheri, S. (2020) “The balance of power in the Balkans”, Harvard International Review. (Online) Available at: https://hir.harvard.edu/balkans-balance-of-power/ (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[67] ibid. Bagher and Bagheri (2020)

[68] Vasselier et al. (2024) op. cit.

[69] ibid.Vasselier et al. (2024)

[70] Lukin, A. (2018) “China and Russia: The New Rapprochement”, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.

[71] ibid. Lukin (2018)

[72] ibid. Lukin (2018)

[73] ibid. Lukin (2018)

[74] Kofman , M. (2020) “The Emperors League: Understanding Sino-Russian defense cooperation”, War on the Rocks. (Online) Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-emperors-league-understanding-sino-russian-defense-cooperation/ (Accessed: 22 April 2025).

[75] ibid. Kofman (2020)

[76] ibid. Kofman (2020)

Kabir Hasan Khan is a Master of Arts candidate in International Affairs at Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, specializing in Diplomacy. His academic focus lies at the intersection of diplomacy, negotiations and statecraft, global governance, and international development and policy making. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Politics and International Relations from the University of Nottingham, UK, where he gained a strong foundation in global security, public policy, and international politics. Kabir is a Dean’s Ambassador at Boston University, representing the Pardee School and supporting student engagement and outreach initiatives. His professional and volunteer experience spans healthcare access initiatives, electoral politics, curriculum development, and cultural heritage programming. He has coordinated healthcare teams serving rural communities in India, supported national election campaigns, and worked on public health awareness and education initiatives in collaboration with NGOs. His academic and professional trajectory is a reflection of his commitment to advancing diplomacy, global equity, and sustainable development.

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