{"id":764,"date":"2023-05-11T08:04:40","date_gmt":"2023-05-11T12:04:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/?page_id=764"},"modified":"2023-05-16T22:10:04","modified_gmt":"2023-05-17T02:10:04","slug":"a-game-of-tradeoffs-natos-engagement-with-the-asia-pacific","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/opinions\/a-game-of-tradeoffs-natos-engagement-with-the-asia-pacific\/","title":{"rendered":"Op-Ed: A Game of Tradeoffs: NATO\u2019s Engagement with the Asia-Pacific"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"\"
Osaka, Japan. Photo by Arthur Mazi via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

By Diya Ashtakala\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

NATO\u2019s 2022 Strategic Concept identified China as a \u201c<\/span>strategic challenge<\/b><\/a>.\u201d The document highlights the threats that China poses to the alliance. NATO is aware of China\u2019s position as a rising power, dominating global markets and a key trading partner, while also aware of the security implications of China\u2019s growing cyber capabilities and its territorial complications with Taiwan. NATO views China as a challenger to the rules-based order it seeks to preserve.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Given NATO\u2019s approach to China, its members have engaged in increasingly formalized security relationships with Asia-Pacific countries: Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. This decision by NATO has many pros, but is not without its cons. NATO countries need to understand that actual engagement with the region requires greater military capabilities. They need to assess the scope of this engagement while considering the security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region.\u00a0 For NATO, it is a game of tradeoffs.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Gains<\/b><\/h5>\n

NATO\u2019s engagement with the Asia-Pacific region is complicated <\/span>by China on several fronts, but offers opportunities. <\/span>While Europe continues to face the repercussions of the war in Ukraine, which is an attack on the country\u2019s sovereignty, the question of Taiwan\u2019s sovereignty looms. China\u2019s strategy towards Taiwan can impact maritime security as China continues to engage in <\/span>gray zone activities<\/span><\/a> such as military exercises around Taiwan. If China were to invade Taiwan, the repercussions could be felt in Europe as well, as China is the European Union\u2019s (EU) <\/span>largest trading partner<\/span><\/a>. The President of the United States, Joe Biden, <\/span>stated<\/span><\/a> that the United States would come to Taiwan\u2019s defense if China launches an unprovoked attack. China continues to seek <\/span>reunification and a One China policy, <\/span><\/a>which will be critical in shaping NATO\u2019s engagement with Taiwan. While Taiwan and NATO do not have formal diplomatic relations, NATO and Taiwan have collaborated on <\/span>academic programs<\/span><\/a>, with NATO seeking to better understand the situation in Taiwan and its abilities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

NATO has always had its issues with Russia, and China\u2019s close relationship with Russia does not make that better. China has and continues to maintain a stance of neutrality on the war in Ukraine. Early on, China rebuked that Russia is not the only actor to blame. The West is also to blame, <\/span>particularly the United States<\/span><\/a>. Further raising the stakes for NATO, China not only participated in <\/span>Vostok exercises with Russia<\/span><\/a>, but China\u2019s People\u2019s Liberation Army was accused of <\/span>stealing intellectual property<\/span><\/a> related to Europe\u2019s military capability. The Asia-Pacific region can be crucial to NATO if it seeks to establish a system of checks and balances.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

NATO has already laid the groundwork for this through the <\/span>Partnership Interoperability Initiative<\/span><\/a>. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, the four Asia-Pacific partners, are part of this initiative. These four nations have growing capabilities and have acquired strategic assets to bolster their defenses against China. They are critical to any future operations that NATO may decide to explore in the region to counter China\u2019s growing dominance.<\/span><\/p>\n

China\u2019s advanced cyber capabilities are common knowledge. The U.S. and its allies, including NATO, released a White House Statement accusing China of<\/span> \u201cirresponsible and destabilizing behavior in cyberspace.\u201d<\/span><\/a> The Asia-Pacific allies have also faced similar concerns and attacks from China, impacting the region\u2019s critical infrastructure. NATO\u2019s best bet is to engage with these allies in order to establish intelligence sharing and reconnaissance activities. Exploring avenues of cooperation between the two may create a joint response to China\u2019s cyber-attacks, transcending regional boundaries.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Costs\u00a0<\/b><\/h5>\n

While the Asia-Pacific region might be strategically important for NATO, are the region\u2019s security concerns a NATO problem? In its purpose, NATO states, \u201cNATO strives to secure a lasting peace in <\/span>EUROPE<\/b>…\u201d NATO was and continues to be viewed as a Euro-Atlantic alliance, even if it seeks to expand its influence. This raises the question: Is NATO solely for the Euro-Atlantic or does it want to become something much larger?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

NATO may be a one-of-a-kind security alliance in the current international realm, but the Asia-Pacific region has multiple security frameworks. First, the region has the <\/span>AUKUS<\/span><\/a>, a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Second, Australia is provided with nuclear-powered submarines by two prominent NATO countries. Finally, the Indo-Pacific region has the <\/span>Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)<\/span><\/a> and the <\/span>Trilateral Partnership<\/span><\/a>. While an Asian security alliance similar to NATO might be just a dream, it\u00a0 does not have to include NATO.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Even if NATO does continue to pursue interests with its Asia-Pacific partners, what does NATO intend to do to counter China\u2019s territorial movements? Although NATO\u2019s military personnel is close to <\/span>3.5 million,<\/span><\/a> China is estimated to have close to <\/span>two million active personnel<\/span><\/a>. NATO may have the upper hand in terms of personnel, but must consider a number of other factors. Will NATO allies really want to increase their commitment to a region that is not the primary focus of NATO\u2019s security interests? Even if NATO can counter the Chinese military power, any conflict will inevitably impact NATO.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In the case of Taiwan, the U.S. has made promises to the country, while diametrically opposing them in official statements.\u00a0 In the <\/span>National Security Strategy 2022<\/span><\/a>, the White House states, \u201cWe oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence.\u201d This stance will prove to be decisive for NATO and an influential factor in how it addresses the Taiwan issue. It is also important to note that while both are cases of territorial interests, <\/span>Taiwan and Ukraine are not the same<\/span><\/a>. They are contrastingly different in their own issues. For example, unlike Ukraine, Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations. Taiwan is also not in a geopolitical environment that has an alliance like NATO. Another point to note is that while the US and Taiwan have the <\/span>Taiwan Relations Act<\/span><\/a>, no such act exists between the US and Ukraine. Given the different security challenges, NATO requires tailored approaches each for Russia and China.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

NATO\u2019s Dilemma<\/b><\/h5>\n

NATO must clearly define what it will do with its Asia-Pacific partners. The engagement might help NATO respond to the strategic challenge and threats posed by China. The Partnership Interoperability Initiative is a step forward in this direction. However, does NATO have a contingency plan if it is ever required to provide military assistance to its partners? Taiwan and Ukraine are different issues, and it is critical for NATO to see it that way. The Euro-Atlantic alliance needs to decide what its next steps are \u2013 engage further or maintain distance. <\/span>Despite the challenges posed by the complex security challenges in the region, NATO should promote cooperation amongst its allies through knowledge sharing and reconnaissance activities. NATO and its allies can work together to build a joint response to a possible confrontation with China.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\"\"
Diya Ashtakala is a graduate student in the MAIA program specializing in Security Studies. Her research interests include nuclear deterrence, cybersecurity, and alliances and security frameworks. She is from Bangalore, India.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\n

Bibliography\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

Amaro, Silvia. \u201cChina Overtakes U.S. as Europe\u2019s Main Trading Partner for the First Time.\u201d CNBC, February 16, 2021. https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2021\/02\/16\/china-overtakes-us-as-europes-main-trade-partner.html.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cBiden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.Pdf.\u201d Accessed March 12, 2023. https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/10\/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cFull Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.\u201d Accessed March 12, 2023. https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/eng\/zxxx_662805\/202210\/t20221025_10791908.html.<\/span><\/p>\n

House, The White. \u201cFACT SHEET: Implementation of the Australia \u2013 United Kingdom \u2013 United States Partnership (AUKUS).\u201d The White House, April 5, 2022. https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/statements-releases\/2022\/04\/05\/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus\/.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014. \u201cQuad Joint Leaders\u2019 Statement.\u201d The White House, May 24, 2022. https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/statements-releases\/2022\/05\/24\/quad-joint-leaders-statement\/.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014. \u201cThe United States, Joined by Allies and Partners, Attributes Malicious Cyber Activity and Irresponsible State Behavior to the People\u2019s Republic of China.\u201d The White House, July 19, 2021. https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/statements-releases\/2021\/07\/19\/the-united-states-joined-by-allies-and-partners-attributes-malicious-cyber-activity-and-irresponsible-state-behavior-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china\/.<\/span><\/p>\n

United States Department of State. \u201cJoint Statement on the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Foreign Ministerial Meeting.\u201d Accessed March 12, 2023. https:\/\/www.state.gov\/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-japan-republic-of-korea-trilateral-foreign-ministerial-meeting\/.<\/span><\/p>\n

United States Department of State. \u201cJoint Statement on the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Foreign Ministerial Meeting.\u201d Accessed March 12, 2023. https:\/\/www.state.gov\/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-japan-republic-of-korea-trilateral-foreign-ministerial-meeting\/.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kusa, Iliya. \u201cChina\u2019s Strategic Calculations in the Russia-Ukraine War | Wilson Center.\u201d Accessed March 12, 2023. https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/blog-post\/chinas-strategic-calculations-russia-ukraine-war.<\/span><\/p>\n

NATO. \u201cPartnership Interoperability Initiative.\u201d NATO. Accessed March 12, 2023. https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_132726.htm.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014. \u201cRelations with Asia-Pacific Partners.\u201d NATO. Accessed November 13, 2022. https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_183254.htm.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cNATO 2022 – Strategic Concept.\u201d Accessed March 12, 2023. https:\/\/www.nato.int\/strategic-concept\/.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reuters. \u201cChina to Send Troops to Russia for \u2018Vostok\u2019 Exercise.\u201d <\/span>Reuters<\/span><\/i>, August 17, 2022, sec. China. https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/chinese-military-will-send-troops-russia-joint-exercise-2022-08-17\/.<\/span><\/p>\n

Scobell, Andrew, and Lucy Stevenson-Yang. \u201cChina Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.\u201d United States Institute of Peace. Accessed March 12, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2022\/03\/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sempa, Francis P. \u201cThe Difference Between Ukraine and Taiwan,\u201d January 31, 2022. https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2022\/01\/the-difference-between-ukraine-and-taiwan\/.\u00a0<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

shape.nato.int. \u201cThe Power of NATO\u2019s Military.\u201d Accessed March 12, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/shape.nato.int\/page11283634\/knowing-nato\/episodes\/the-power-of-natos-military.aspx<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Statista. \u201cBiggest Armies in the World by Personnel 2022.\u201d Accessed May 9, 2023. https:\/\/www.statista.com\/statistics\/264443\/the-worlds-largest-armies-based-on-active-force-level\/.\u00a0<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Wang, Ann, and Fabian Hamacher. \u201cTaiwan Officer Reveals Details of Rare Interaction with NATO | Reuters,\u201d January 12, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/taiwan-officer-reveals-details-rare-interaction-with-nato-2023-01-11\/.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Diya Ashtakala\u00a0 NATO\u2019s 2022 Strategic Concept identified China as a \u201cstrategic challenge.\u201d The document highlights the threats that China poses to the alliance. NATO is aware of China\u2019s position as a rising power, dominating global markets and a key trading partner, while also aware of the security implications of China\u2019s growing cyber capabilities and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19928,"featured_media":751,"parent":393,"menu_order":5,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"page-templates\/no-sidebars.php","meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/764"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19928"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=764"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/764\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":846,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/764\/revisions\/846"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/393"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/751"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=764"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}