{"id":398,"date":"2021-11-05T02:48:49","date_gmt":"2021-11-05T06:48:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/?page_id=398"},"modified":"2022-01-28T20:25:00","modified_gmt":"2022-01-29T01:25:00","slug":"how-the-american-media-landscape-is-polarizing-the-country","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/research-and-policy\/back2school\/how-the-american-media-landscape-is-polarizing-the-country\/","title":{"rendered":"How The American Media Landscape is Polarizing the Country"},"content":{"rendered":"

By: Flavia Roscini<\/p>\n

\"\"
Flavia Roscini is a MAIA candidate at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, specializing in International Communication. Her research interests include international and intercultural communication, climate security, environmental policy, US, UK, and EU affairs.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Introduction <\/strong><\/p>\n

Americans are more polarized than ever (fig. 1). The Pew Research Center illustrates the increasingly stark divide between partisans on important topics such as \u201cthe economy, racial justice, climate change, law enforcement, international engagement and a long list of other issues.\u201d[1]<\/sup><\/a> Partisans believe that their differences are not only about politics but also about \u201ccore American values.\u201d[2]<\/sup><\/a> In his book, Why We\u2019re Polarized<\/em>, Klein argues that the divisions between the two parties have grown over time, as people\u2019s social identities have slowly become intertwined with their political identities.[3]<\/sup><\/a> In a seminal paper on political division, Carothers and O\u2019Donohue confirm that a \u201cpowerful alignment of ideology, race, and religion renders America\u2019s divisions unusually encompassing and profound. It is hard to find another example of polarization in the world that fuses all three major types of identity divisions in a similar way.\u201d[4]<\/sup><\/a> An essential driver of this polarization is the changing media landscape in the U.S., particularly that of cable news and social media. Traditional and social media channels have exacerbated political polarization by spreading disinformation to their viewers, posing a threat to American democracy.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Figure 1. Pew Research Center<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Traditional Media<\/strong><\/p>\n

Media polarization has increased in the past half-decade (fig. 2), and both liberal and conservative partisan media are likely contributing to polarization in the U.S. Cable news networks – of which Fox News and MSNBC are frequent targets of media bias allegations – have become \u201cbirthing centers for polarizing rhetoric.\u201d[5]<\/sup><\/a> In the 21st<\/sup> century, modern Americans have access to a plethora of news sources, and the competition for audience and \u201cthe threat to journalistic business models\u201d has changed the way political news is produced and consumed.[6]<\/sup><\/a> Cable news is a business that runs on ratings and advertisements and, in order to capture people\u2019s attention, it needs to be engaging. It has, therefore, increasingly blurred the lines between information and entertainment. Fox News has established itself as the most-watched cable news network in the country by airing less news and more \u201copinions-about-the-news\u201d to garner larger audiences.[7]<\/sup><\/a> While this may negatively affect the American political system, it is profitable for founder Rupert Murdoch.[8]<\/sup><\/a> To compete, MSNBC has \u201cpumped up its ratings by recasting itself as a left-leaning riposte to Fox News.\u201d[9]<\/sup><\/a> It is important to note that although both MSNBC and Fox have strong viewpoints and \u2018opinion\u2019 hosts, the former lives in the world of fact while the latter \u201cspins its own reality.\u201d[10]<\/sup><\/a> According to Jones \u201cmuch of what we see on Fox News, especially in primetime, is not based in truth.\u201d[11]<\/sup><\/a> Fox News is therefore deliberately misleading the public while causing dissension.[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

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Figure 2. Vox. Estimated ideology by channel year: Each point corresponds to the estimated ideology of the news channels based on phrase usage, with 95% confidence bounds shaded.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The divisive tone of cable news has become the very nature of its appeal, and this type of journalism hardens polarization because \u201cthe more political media one consumes, the more warped their perspective of the other side becomes.\u201d[13]<\/sup><\/a> Partisans tend to view each other negatively because polarized media weaponizes the differences between political and social groups instead of emphasizing commonalities. This type of \u2018identity journalism\u2019 reinforces identity and binds people into communities. During the 2020 presidential election, Fox News\u2019 Tucker Carlson \u2013 television\u2019s most popular political host with an average of more than three million viewers a night \u2013 claimed that \u201cthe leaders of today\u2019s Democratic Party despise this country\u2026 we cannot let them run this nation because they hate it. Imagine what they would do to it.\u201d[14]<\/sup><\/a> His wording is carefully selected to categorize people into groups and create a shared sense of belonging to a threatened community. Byers believes that MSNBC also presents ideologically biased information, although in a less outrageous manner.[15]<\/sup><\/a> This tribal mentality – engrained in our evolutionary need to belong to a group – aims to oversimplify and distort \u201ccomplex problems by dividing the world into an \u2018us\u2019 and a \u2018them,\u2019 vilifying the latter.\u201d[16]<\/sup><\/a> This mindset can lead to irrational group favoritism and produce hostilities.<\/p>\n

Polarization is further exacerbated by echo chambers, spaces where \u201cthe reinforcing effect of media and beliefs drive people to wall themselves off from a wider range of media.\u201d[17]<\/sup><\/a> Having many news options available means that consumers can choose to hear messages that reinforce their beliefs while avoiding those from alternative points of view. For example, Fox News and MSNBC \u201conly tell us how right we are, and that\u2019s making us more extreme.\u201d[18]<\/sup><\/a> The more media people see that encourages them to think of themselves as part of a group, the deeper their identity roots become engrained, and the more resistant they are to change their views. Therefore, Klein hypothesizes that the solution may be for liberals to watch more of Fox News and for conservatives to tune into MSNBC.[19]<\/sup><\/a> However, studies have shown that hearing contrary opinions drives partisans towards \u201cnot just a deeper certainty in the rightness of their cause but more polarized policy positions.\u201d[20]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, rather than expanding viewpoints, hearing the other side\u2019s rhetoric entrenches viewers further in their political identities, as all arguments are perceived as biased and duplicitous.<\/p>\n

If left unchecked, cable news’s dissenting language and angry rhetoric will foster even stronger feelings of animosity toward the other side and impede any chances of conducting constructive conversations. It is important to note that certain partisans feel this way because<\/em>\u00a0they actively pay attention to politics and listen to cable news daily. The effects of partisan media on attitudes are concentrated primarily among those who already have extreme opinions. Although these shows may command a modest audience, they are influential because they have the right<\/em> audience. Those who watch these shows drive politics, as they are more partisan and politically involved. Thus, \u201cthese programs contribute to polarization not by shifting the center of the ideological distribution, but rather by lengthening the tails.\u201d[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Social Media<\/strong><\/p>\n

Most of the literature trying to explain how media bias affects voter opinion by generating misinformation and exacerbating political polarization has mainly focused on traditional media. However, there is increasing concern that social media sites are contributing to political polarization. The technology of communication in social media differs significantly from that of traditional broadcasting. While cable news communication is one-way, social media communication offers a two-way model, allowing anyone to easily produce and share content that immediately reaches global audiences. This makes it much more difficult for individuals to encounter accurate and reliable information online, as they observe \u201cdistilled signals from friends in their network without necessarily knowing the source.\u201d[22]<\/sup><\/a> Concerns about the negative societal consequences of the online spread of misinformation became widespread after the 2016 presidential election, during which \u2018fake news\u2019 was widely circulated on social media. Gu et al. define \u2018fake news\u2019 as \u201cthe promotion and propagation of news articles via social media\u201d that are \u201cpromoted in such a way that they appear to be spread by other users, as opposed to being paid-for advertising\u2026 designed to influence or manipulate users\u2019 opinions on a certain topic towards certain objectives.\u201d[23]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Social media platforms allow \u2018fake news\u2019 to be disseminated instantly on the internet and \u201camplified in partisan communities of like-minded individuals, where they go unchallenged due to ranking algorithms that filter out any dissenting voice.\u201d[24]<\/sup><\/a> These algorithms skew the variety of information people encounter online in favor of information that only supports personal beliefs. As a result, \u201cfilter bubbles\u201d may be formed and society may be more polarized ideologically, as it is less exposed to divergent viewpoints.[25]<\/sup><\/a> YouTube, whose algorithm like other platforms was designed to make people spend more time on the site, has radicalized people through inflammatory messaging. Facebook\u2019s very structure creates \u201cfilter bubbles,\u201d as users \u201chave to \u2018friend\u2019 others to see their posts, meaning they\u2019re less likely to see people outside of their real-life friends and family, who are more likely to have similar lives and viewpoints.\u201d[26]<\/sup><\/a> This may reinforce their existing beliefs, and they may thus become more extreme.[27]<\/sup><\/a> According to Isaac & Ember, Facebook went so far as to tweak its algorithms after the 2016 election to \u201cpromote posts from friends and family, and show far fewer posts from news outlets, which likely further contributed to filter bubbles and division.\u201d[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

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Figure 3. Pew Research Center<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In addition to algorithms that favor engagement, internet bots artificially amplify misinformation.[29]<\/sup><\/a> Social bots, which pose as real human users on platforms such as Twitter, Reddit, Facebook, and YouTube \u201cuse behaviors like excessive posting, early and frequent retweeting of emerging news, and tagging or mentioning influential figures in the hope they will spread the content to their thousands of followers\u201d and possibly alter their behavior.[30]<\/sup><\/a> A recent study found that 33% of the top shares of content from low-credibility sources were likely to be bots.[31]<\/sup><\/a> Therefore, humans are unknowingly contributing to the spread of misinformation by retweeting bots and fake news articles. The misinformation spread by bots can also be used to infiltrate political conversations. Leading up to the 2016 presidential election, 20 percent of all political tweets originated from bot accounts.[32]<\/sup><\/a> Though a majority of election-related social bots originated domestically,[33]<\/sup><\/a> the Mueller report confirmed Russian interference in the 2016 election via foreign social media bots that were spreading misinformation to the American public, further exacerbating the spread of political polarization in the U.S.[34]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Despite initial optimism that social media might enable people to consume more heterogeneous sources of information and lead to a more pluralistic debate, such forums exacerbate political polarization because of social network homophily.[35]<\/sup><\/a> \u2018Fake news\u2019 on social media is very difficult to detect, posing a challenge for social media users, moderators, and government agencies trying to mitigate its harmful effects.[36]<\/sup><\/a> A 2016 Pew Research Center study confirmed that 64 percent of U.S. adults say that \u201cfabricated news stories cause a great deal of confusion about the basic facts of current events\u201d and that they are unable to identify the bot as a source of misinformation, \u201cimplying that they cannot detect and disregard fake news.\u201d[37]<\/sup><\/a> As a result of ideological polarization, \u201cdiversity of opinions and arguments may be compromised, people in extremely homogenous groups may ignore facts that would prove their arguments wrong, and dissemination of online disinformation may raise.\u201d[38]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Threat to Democracy: January 6th, 2021<\/strong><\/p>\n

Wilson et al. argue that increases in \u201creal institutional polarization among political elites, partisan media, and social media meaningfully account for the intensification of false polarization among the electorate.\u201d[39]<\/sup><\/a> Additionally, \u201cpolitical elites have become both more polarized themselves and more incentivized to stoke polarization among voters, that partisan media selectively portrays political opponents in polarizing ways, and that via social media people actively contribute to shaping a political landscape that disproportionately reinforces and amplifies extremity and outrage.\u201d[40]<\/sup><\/a> Politicians further exacerbate polarization by fueling it with vitriolic political campaigns to demonize opponents, activate anger, and increase party loyalty.<\/p>\n

The rise in political polarization poses a threat to democracy. During the 2020 presidential election, political elites spread disinformation to falsely convince the American public that mail ballots would generate massive election fraud. Alongside Fox News and social media outlets, former President Trump repeatedly proclaimed that the election was stolen from him, and that Joe Biden\u2019s victory was illegitimate.[41]<\/sup><\/a> On January 6th, 2021, Trump supporters \u201cmarched to the Capitol, smashed windows and doors, stormed the building, assaulted police officers, stole federal property, and temporarily stopped members of Congress from certifying Biden\u2019s victory.\u201d[42]<\/sup><\/a> This was the ultimate \u201cpolarization of Americans turning against other Americans and engaging in violence that resulted in death and injury.\u201d[43]<\/sup><\/a> In an attempt to deflect blame, Trump supporters spread lies on social media and accused Antifa, the CIA, and others of committing the violent actions and the liberal media of falsely depicting the event.[44]<\/sup><\/a> These false narratives will reinforce existing beliefs that the system is unfair, and that the media are biased. If left unchecked, these beliefs \u201cwill affect views about the Biden presidency, the actions of a Democratic Congress, the condition of American democracy, and the future of the 2022 and 2024 elections.\u201d[45]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

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Figure 4. Vox<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

Both traditional news and social media channels exacerbate the spread of misinformation and therefore increase polarization among the U.S. public and political elite. Divisive cable news has real consequences, as it creates a vicious cycle in which journalists cover politics in a more polarized way, anticipating a more polarized audience\u2019s tastes, and creating a more polarized political reality. With the help of algorithms and bots, social media plays an important role in spreading misinformation and in allowing the public to \u201cbecome an active participant in creating and selectively amplifying narratives that shape realities.\u201d[46]<\/sup><\/a> This profoundly affects U.S. democracy and society because \u201cit is hard to bring the country together when each side has its own facts and attributions of responsibility.\u201d[47]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Social media platforms like Twitter have taken measures to mitigate the spread of misinformation, such as banning certain users\u2019 posting privileges. However, this will likely not stop the spread of misinformation, as bots will continue sharing fake news on their profiles, and misinformation will thus \u201ccontinue to divide Americans and poison our political environment.\u201d[48]<\/sup><\/a> Policymakers could try to identify all bots and eliminate them from networks, but this would be difficult to implement. Another option would be to introduce a \u2018counter bot\u2019 that sends signals at the other end of the spectrum to counteract the first bot. However, this may further exacerbate polarization and induce gridlock. A more effective strategy would be to reduce the number of bot followers by training people on the detection of fake news.[49]<\/sup><\/a> West argues that lawmakers should \u201cimpose accountability on social media sites to protect Americans from exhortations of violence and outright hate speech.\u201d[50]<\/sup><\/a> Additionally, cable news should aim to neutralize under a less controversial administration, allowing Americans to confront future challenges more effectively.<\/p>\n

If the public polarizes further, political and media elites will continue to fuel the division. Although party disagreement is an essential part of the political process, \u201cpolarization and animosity based on misconceptions of the other side threatens to misdiagnose problems, leading people to battle imagined enemies and distracting from opportunities for transformative reform.\u201d[51]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/span><\/a> Michael Dimock and Richard Wike, \u201cAmerica is exceptional in the nature of its political divide,\u201d NY Times<\/em>, November 13, 2020, https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/fact-tank\/2020\/11\/13\/america-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide\/.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/span><\/a> Ezra Klein, Why We\u2019re Polarized<\/em> (New York: Avid Reader Press, 2020).<\/p>\n

[4]<\/span><\/a> Andrew O\u2019Donohue, \u2018The Long Path of Polarization in the United States.\u2019 In Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization<\/em>, edited by Carothers Thomas and O\u2019Donohue Andrew, 65-92 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019).<\/p>\n

[5]<\/span><\/a> Margaret Sullivan, \u201c\u2018Birthing centers for polarizing rhetoric\u2019: The outsize influence of Fox, CNN and MSNBC,\u201d The Washington Post<\/em>, <\/em>May 26, 2019, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/lifestyle\/style\/birthing-centers-for-polarizing-rhetoric-the-outsize-influence-of-fox-cnn-and-msnbc\/2019\/05\/23\/2bcc429a-7cbe-11e9-8ede-f4abf521ef17_story.html.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/span><\/a> Ezra Klein, Why We\u2019re Polarized.<\/em><\/p>\n

[7]<\/span><\/a> Brian Stelter, \u201c\u2018We turned so far right we went crazy:\u2019 How Fox News was radicalized by its own viewers,\u201d CNN Business<\/em>, June 8, 2021, https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2021\/06\/08\/media\/fox-news-hoax-paperback-book\/index.html.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/span><\/a> Alessandra Stanley, \u201cHow MSNBC Became Fox\u2019s Liberal Evil Twin,\u201d The New York Times<\/em>, August 31, 2012, https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2012\/08\/31\/us\/politics\/msnbc-as-foxs-liberal-evil-twin.html.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/span><\/a> Tom Jones, \u201cNo, Fox News and MSNBC are not the same thing,\u201d Poynter, <\/em>February 1, 2021, \u00a0https:\/\/www.poynter.org\/newsletters\/2021\/no-fox-news-and-msnbc-are-not-the-same-thing\/.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/span><\/a> David Bauder, \u201cFox News\u2019 Tucker Carlson criticized for saying Democrats hate America,\u201d Associated Press<\/em>, <\/em>https:\/\/chicago.suntimes.com\/politics\/2020\/7\/7\/21316740\/fox-news-tucker-carlson-democrats-hate-america.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/span><\/a> Dylan Byers, \u2018Is MSNBC worse than Fox News?\u2019 Politico, <\/em>December 9, 2013, https:\/\/www.politico.com\/blogs\/media\/2013\/12\/is-msnbc-worse-than-fox-news-179175.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/span><\/a> Arash Emamzadeh, \u201c\u2018The Psychology of \u201cUs-vs-Them\u201d’ Psychology Today,\u201d Psychology Today,<\/em> https:\/\/www.psychologytoday.com\/us\/blog\/finding-new-home\/201908\/the-psychology-us-vs-them.<\/p>\n

[17]<\/span><\/a> Jay D Hmielowski, Myiah J Hutchens, and Michael A Beam, “Asymmetry of Partisan Media Effects?: Examining the Reinforcing Process of Conservative and Liberal Media with Political Beliefs,” Political Communication 37, no. 6 (2020): 852-68.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/span><\/a> Ezra Klein, Why We\u2019re Polarized.<\/em><\/p>\n

[19]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[21]<\/span><\/a> Matt Levendusky, \u201cAre Fox and MSNBC polarizing America?\u201d The Washington Post<\/em>, February 3, 2014, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/news\/monkey-cage\/wp\/2014\/02\/03\/are-fox-and-msnbc-polarizing-america\/.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/span><\/a> Marina Azzimonti and Marcos Fernandes, \u201cSocial Media Networks, Fake News, and Polarization,\u201d NBER Working Paper Series, <\/em>https:\/\/www.nber.org\/papers\/w24462.<\/p>\n

[23]<\/span><\/a> Lion Gu, Vladimir Kropotov, and Fyodor Yarochkin, \u201cThe Fake News Machine,\u201d Trend Labs, <\/em>https:\/\/documents.trendmicro.com\/assets\/white_papers\/wp-fake-news-machine-how-propagandists-abuse-the-internet.pdf.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/span><\/a> Joshua Tucker, Andrew Guess, Pablo Barber\u00e1, Cristian Vaccari, Alexandra Siegel, Sergey Sanovich, Denis Stukal, and Brendan Nyhan, \u201cSocial Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature,\u201d SSRN<\/em>, https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144139.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/span><\/a> Eli Pariser, \u2018Beware online filter bubbles,\u2019 TE<\/em>D<\/em>, https:\/\/www.ted.com\/talks\/eli_pariser_beware_online_filter_bubbles\/transcript.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/span><\/a> Rani Molla, \u201cSocial media is making a bad political situation worse,\u201d Vox<\/em>, November 10, 2020, \u00a0https:\/\/www.vox.com\/recode\/21534345\/polarization-election-social-media-filter-bubble.<\/p>\n

[27]<\/span><\/a> Cheuk Hang Au, Kevin K.W. Ho, and Chiu K.W. Dickson, \u201cThe Role of Online Misinformation and Fake News in Ideological Polarization: Barriers, Catalysts, and Implications,\u201d Information Systems Frontiers<\/em>, 2021, https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10796-021-10133-9.pdf.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/span><\/a> Mike Isaac and Sydney Ember, \u201cFacebook to Change News Feed to Focus on Friends and Family,\u201d The New York Times<\/em>, <\/em>June 29, 2016, https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2016\/06\/30\/technology\/facebook-to-change-news-feed-to-focus-on-friends-and-family.html.<\/p>\n

[29]<\/span><\/a> Tucker et al, \u201cSocial Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature.\u201d<\/p>\n

[30]<\/span><\/a> Chengcheng Shao, Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Onur Varol, Kai-Cheng Yang, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer, \u201cThe spread of low-credibility content by social bots,\u201d Nature Communications<\/em> 9, 4787, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1038\/s41467-018-06930-7.<\/p>\n

[31]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/span><\/a> Alessandro Bessi and Emilio Ferrara, \u201cSocial bots distort the 2016 US Presidential election online discussion. First Monday,\u201d First Monday<\/em>, Volume 21, Number 11 – 7 November 2016, https:\/\/firstmonday.org\/ojs\/index.php\/fm\/article\/download\/7090\/5653.<\/p>\n

[33]<\/span><\/a> Ludovic Rheault & Andreea Musulan, \u201cEfficient detection of online communities and social bot activity during electoral campaigns,\u201d Journal of Information Technology & Politics<\/em>, 18:3, 324-337, DOI: 10.1080\/19331681.2021.1879705.<\/p>\n

[34]<\/span><\/a> Robert S. Mueller, \u201cReport on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election,\u201d US Department of Justice<\/em>, March 2019, \u00a0https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/storage\/report.pdf.<\/p>\n

[35]<\/span><\/a> Christopher A. Bail, Lisa P. Argyle, Taylor W. Brown, John P. Bumpus, Haohan Chen, M. B. Fallin Hunzaker, Jaemin Lee, Marcus Mann, Friedolin Merhout, and Alexander Volfovsky, \u201cExposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization,\u201d PNAS<\/em>, September 11, 2018, www.pnas.org\/cgi\/doi\/10.1073\/pnas.1804840115.<\/p>\n

[36]<\/span><\/a> Marina Azzimonti and Marcos Fernandes, \u201cSocial Media Networks, Fake News, and Polarization.\u201d<\/p>\n

[37]<\/span><\/a> Michael Barthell, Amy Mitchell, and Jesse Holcomb, \u201cMany Americans Believe Fake News Is Sowing Confusion,\u201d Pew Research Center, <\/em>December 15, 2016, https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/journalism\/2016\/12\/15\/many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion\/.<\/p>\n

[38]<\/span><\/a> Cheuk Hang Au et al, \u201cThe Role of Online Misinformation and Fake News.\u201d<\/p>\n

[39]<\/span><\/a> Anne E Wilson, Victoria A Parker, Matthew Feinberg, \u201cPolarization in the contemporary political and media landscape,\u201d Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences<\/em>, Volume 34 2020, Pages 223-228, ISSN 2352-1546, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.cobeha.2020.07.005.<\/p>\n

[40]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[41]<\/span><\/a> Darrell M. West, \u201cThe Role of Misinformation in Trump\u2019s Insurrection,\u201d Brookings Institute<\/em>, <\/em>January 11, 2021, \u00a0<\/em>https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blog\/techtank\/2021\/01\/11\/the-role-of-misinformation-in-trumps-insurrection\/.<\/p>\n

[42]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[43]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[44]<\/span><\/a> Michael M. Grynbaum, Davey Alba and Reid J. Epstein, \u201cHow Pro-Trump Forces Pushed a Lie About Antifa at the Capitol Riot,\u201d NY Times, <\/em>March 1, 2021, https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/03\/01\/us\/politics\/antifa-conspiracy-capitol-riot.html.<\/p>\n

[45]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[46]<\/span><\/a> Ren\u00e9e DiResta, \u201cIt\u2019s Not Misinformation. It\u2019s Amplified Propaganda,\u201d The Atlantic, <\/em>October 9, 2021, https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/ideas\/archive\/2021\/10\/disinformation-propaganda-amplification-ampliganda\/620334\/.<\/p>\n

[47]<\/span><\/a> Darrell M. West, \u201cThe Role of Misinformation in Trump\u2019s Insurrection.\u201d<\/p>\n

[48]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[49]<\/span><\/a> Marina Azzimonti and Marcos Fernandes, \u201cSocial Media Networks, Fake News, and Polarization.\u201d<\/p>\n

[50]<\/span><\/a> Darrell M. West, \u201cThe Role of Misinformation in Trump\u2019s Insurrection.\u201d<\/p>\n

[51]<\/span><\/a> Anne E Wilson et al, \u201cPolarization in the contemporary political and media landscape.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By: Flavia Roscini Introduction Americans are more polarized than ever (fig. 1). The Pew Research Center illustrates the increasingly stark divide between partisans on important topics such as \u201cthe economy, racial justice, climate change, law enforcement, international engagement and a long list of other issues.\u201d[1] Partisans believe that their differences are not only about politics […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19624,"featured_media":0,"parent":185,"menu_order":13,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/398"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19624"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=398"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/398\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":430,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/398\/revisions\/430"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/185"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=398"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}