{"id":395,"date":"2021-11-05T02:59:46","date_gmt":"2021-11-05T06:59:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/?page_id=395"},"modified":"2022-01-28T20:14:49","modified_gmt":"2022-01-29T01:14:49","slug":"russias-ukraine-camping-trip-a-neorealist-constructivist-interpretation","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/research-and-policy\/back2school\/russias-ukraine-camping-trip-a-neorealist-constructivist-interpretation\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s Ukraine Camping Trip: A Neorealist-Constructivist Interpretation"},"content":{"rendered":"

By: Joseph \u201cTripp\u201d Callaway<\/p>\n

\"\"
Joseph “Tripp” Callaway is a MAIR candidate at the Pardee School of Global Studies. He received a BS in Human Geography from West Point in 2011 and is an active-duty U.S. Army Captain currently in training to become a Foreign Area Officer. His operational experiences include service in Afghanistan, Jordan, South Korea, and Greece.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Russia has been, to say the least, active in Eastern Europe in 2020 and 2021. While the rest of the world was focused almost exclusively on the COVID-19 pandemic and the U.S. election over the last year, Russia sought to improve its position in Belarus and leverage its Sputnik V shot as a vehicle for vaccine diplomacy across Europe.[1]<\/sup><\/a>, [2]<\/a><\/sup> At the same time, covert actions conducted several years ago by Russia against the Czech and Bulgarian arms industries have recently come to light, artificially inflating perceptions of Russia\u2019s recent external activity.[3]<\/sup><\/a> Russia\u2019s military moves in the vicinity of Ukraine in April, however, particularly captured Western attention. Its massive buildup, the largest since its initial invasion in 2014, involved over 100,000 troops and associated tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and aircraft.[4]<\/sup><\/a>, [5]<\/a><\/sup> Yet, just as quickly as the Russian military deployed its troops to the border with Ukraine (notably with a suspicious, seemingly intentional lack of operational security[6]<\/sup><\/a>), it suddenly withdrew its military personnel later the same month.[7]<\/sup><\/a> What motivated such Russian behavior, at a time when tensions with the West were already high? From an overarching international relations theoretical perspective, Russia\u2019s penchant for a structural realist lens when assessing policy options is likely to explain these actions. This neorealist preference can itself be explained by a constructivist examination of the Russian geopolitical worldview. With that in mind, a neorealist perspective would note that Russia was likely motivated by three political interests: advancing its influence in Belarus, pressuring Ukraine to accede to certain demands, and limiting the risk of a unifying altercation with NATO.<\/p>\n

Accounting for a state\u2019s preferred theoretical model of the world is (ironically) empirically useful when selecting an appropriate lens to examine state behavior. In the case of Russia, structural realism\/neorealism has a privileged position within the country\u2019s geopolitical thought, both in its academic community as well as its policy-making sphere. According to Professor Tatiana Romanova of St. Petersburg University\u2019s Department of European Studies, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe only paradigm that took firm root in Russia was (neo-)realism. There are a mere handful of representatives from the liberal, constructivist, or post-structural schools in Russia. Even now experts who teach international relations at leading Russian universities tell their students that there is only one approach, i.e. neo-realism. The rest is evil and is not meaningful for science.\u201d[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Today, the most popular Russian undergraduate international relations textbook focuses almost exclusively on theories of realism and maximizing \u201cnational interest,\u201d with no significant mention of liberalism or constructivism.[9]<\/sup><\/a> Experts such as former U.S. Special Representative to Ukraine Kurt Volker also note the elevation of power maximization in the context of the international structure at the expense of all else in the minds of Russian policy-makers, particularly President Putin, suggesting a neorealist bent.[10]<\/sup><\/a> Intuitively, this makes sense from the perspective of Russian history. After centuries of invasions from German, French, Swedish, and Mongol competitor states, Russian policy makers are acutely aware of the cost of being situated along the \u201cmilitary super highway\u201d of the Northern European Plain. Admittedly, this analytical framework does borrow the concept of socio-historical reflective worldviews from the constructivist school of thought.[11]<\/sup><\/a> However, this essay is not meant to be a dogmatic view of neorealist theory in the strictest sense. Rather, this constructivist-inspired interpretation of Russia\u2019s realist preference indicates the relevance of neorealism when examining the country\u2019s recent activities in detail. The two schools of thought, constructivism and neorealism, are not mutually exclusive in this case, but mutually supporting.<\/p>\n

Realism, under the context of Russia\u2019s constructed realist identity, provides direct explanations for Russia\u2019s motivations vis-\u00e0-vis Ukraine in 2021. According to the theory, states, especially great powers (which Russia self-identifies as under the tenants of constructivism), constantly seek power over rival states with the intent of becoming regional hegemons.[12]<\/sup><\/a> This occurs as states rationally leverage their inherent offensive capabilities to improve their chances of survival in the anarchic, self-help international system.[13]<\/sup><\/a> Again, one can see from Russian history, specifically military history, why such a philosophy of power maximization appeals to Russian leaders. This subsequently drives Russian national interests to dominate the key terrain of Eastern Europe today, just as it drove those same interests of Soviet and Tsarist leaders before them. These constructivist-realist tendencies lay the foundation for understanding the specifics of Russian behavior in Eastern Europe today, specifically with regards to Ukraine, Belarus, and the NATO-Russia relationship.<\/p>\n

U.S. media outlets often make the mistake of associating every unexpected event on the geopolitical stage, from North Korean missile and nuclear tests to Iranian covert action, as a \u201ctest\u201d for an American administration. This has been the case with U.S. media coverage over Russia\u2019s military activities near Ukraine as well.[14]<\/sup><\/a> It is more useful, however, to consider such activities within the context of said states\u2019 perceptions of global structures and national interests. For Russia, this means seeing the world through an anarchic systemic lens while attempting to advance the state\u2019s vital national interest of preserving the physical security of its European core. Belarus holds a crucial position to help achieve this interest, specifically by providing Russia with strategic depth and offensive opportunities (particularly with regards to the Suwalki Gap and the Baltic States) in the event of a land conflict with NATO. Any analysis of Russia\u2019s behavior towards Ukraine is incomplete without considering the implications for its relationship with Belarus.<\/p>\n

Russia has long sought closer ties with Belarus, from the establishment of an airbase to the political integration of the two countries under the auspices of the nebulous 1999 Union State Treaty (UST).[15]<\/sup><\/a> President Alexander Lukashenko, however, has consistently kept such Russian overtures, perceived as potential avenues of usurpation, at arm\u2019s length, particularly since the 2014 invasion of Crimea and Donbass.[16]<\/sup><\/a> However, with Lukashenko\u2019s crackdown on pro-democracy protestors since the rigged August 2020 Belarusian national election, he has lost his normal hedge against Russia, namely the on-again off-again economic support of the European Union and certain NATO members.[17]<\/sup><\/a> With this, Russia has a unique opportunity to maximize its power against NATO, particularly against Poland and the Baltics. Lukashenko now appears more willing than usual to go along with Putin\u2019s requests for further political and military integration in exchange for security and economic assistance.[18]<\/sup><\/a> A Russian airbase or, even more valuable, the subordination of Belarus\u2019s military to Russia\u2019s Western Military District, would be a crown jewel in terms of Russia\u2019s strategic depth and its ability to threaten NATO lines of communication to the Baltics. However, Russia must tread carefully to achieve these goals. As previously mentioned, Lukashenko recoiled at Russia\u2019s offensives into Ukraine in 2014, and still has not recognized Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea as legitimate. Had Russia invaded Ukraine again in April 2021, as some observers feared, this would have jeopardized Russia\u2019s efforts to maximize its power in the region, pushing Belarus and its ideal strategic real estate further from Putin\u2019s grasp. Instead, a show of force near Ukraine and subsequent withdrawal was deemed more useful by the Kremlin, opting to pursue its goal of power maximization in the region, rather than being myopically focused on achieving goals in Ukraine via military action.<\/p>\n

While it seems clear why Russia stopped short of an invasion, why did it pursue a dramatic show of force in the first place? This behavior can also be understood under a neorealist framework. As previously mentioned, the Russian military seemed to almost invite social media and traditional media attention to its recent deployment, in stark contrast to its secretive deployments in 2014 prior to the invasions of Crimea and Donbas. This seemed to suggest from the start that this deployment was intended as a public signaling mechanism instead of preparation for an actual invasion. What was such signaling meant to achieve? For one, it was likely meant to pressure Ukraine into resuming the flow of fresh water into Crimea. Since Russia\u2019s 2014 invasion, Ukraine has blocked the flow of the North Crimea Canal from the Dnieper River into the peninsula, thereby withholding 85% of Crimea\u2019s typical fresh water supply. The peninsula has faced drought ever since, leading to much animosity from Russia, which lacks domestic experience in desalination technology and cannot outsource such a solution due to international sanctions surrounding the occupation of Crimea.[19]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, Russia likely views its recent deployment as a means of demanding access to fresh water resources from Ukraine. As acquiring greater resources is a key source of national power, this motivation seems logically to fit into a neorealist framework.[20]<\/sup><\/a> It should be noted, however, that this signaling effort appears thus far not to have succeeded in restoring fresh water to Crimea.<\/p>\n

In addition to being a bid to increase its access to resources, Russia\u2019s military messaging was also meant to demonstrate NATO\u2019s impotence, cleaving Ukraine further from NATO\u2019s sphere of influence. While not actually imminent preparation for an invasion, Russia\u2019s drills on Ukraine\u2019s border communicated that it could<\/em> invade Ukraine if it deemed such action in its national interest. In spite of Ukrainian efforts to modernize its military in recent years with the help of NATO and U.S. security assistance, it is unlikely that it could withstand a concerted effort by Russia to seize key terrain, such as the source of the North Crimea Canal, if it deemed such action in its national interest.[21]<\/sup><\/a> In contrast to the image of confidence and strength Russia hoped to portray, pleas for NATO membership from President Zelensky of Ukraine served as a reminder of Ukraine\u2019s precarious position and lack of formal Article V collective defense assurances. NATO is unlikely to proceed with such a membership request, given the risk of including a state in conflict with Russia. Secretary General Jans Stoltenberg seemed to suggest as much by not echoing Zelensky\u2019s calls for a membership action plan (MAP) throughout the crisis.[22]<\/sup><\/a> Such dialogue also offered Russian diplomats an opportunity to remind NATO that any substantive push for Ukrainian membership would result in Russia escalating the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, a situation NATO wishes to avoid.[23]<\/sup><\/a> In addition, such dramatic surges and immobilization of troops serve to keep NATO and Ukraine tense and off balance.[24]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, Russia\u2019s exercises served as a means of further disabusing Ukraine of NATO\u2019s realistic willingness to militarily defend their territory in the event of a renewed major conflict with Russia, likely frustrating President Zelensky, cleaving Ukraine and the West further apart, and demonstrating Russia\u2019s relative power and NATO\u2019s relative impotence in their regional struggle.<\/p>\n

In addition to maximizing power by maintaining influence over Belarus and seeking future coercive power over Ukraine, Russia also sought to ensure it minimized NATO\u2019s collective power by avoiding activities in and around Ukraine that could unite the alliance members\u2019 disparate policy priorities. Today, NATO faces both macro and micro level divergence over its future policy directions. At the macro level, Western European and Mediterranean member states, such as Spain, Italy, and France, tend to place a greater emphasis on policies that seek to stem the flow of migrants into their territory and reduce the risk of Islamist terrorist activity within Europe. France has questioned NATO\u2019s relevance in general in recent years, with President Macron going so far as to warn that the alliance is drifting towards \u201cbrain death.\u201d[25]<\/sup><\/a> NATO\u2019s Eastern allies, by contrast, such as Poland, the Baltics, and Romania, see the alliance as far more relevant to their immediate security concerns, specifically that Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty is a necessary guarantee of their sovereignty in the face of expanding Russian power.[26]<\/sup><\/a> At the micro level, disputes such as the Greco-Turkish rift, Germany\u2019s Nord Stream II controversy, and Hungary and Poland\u2019s democratic backsliding serve to further discombobulate NATO.[27]<\/sup><\/a> Together, macro and micro rifts within the alliance serve Russia\u2019s interests, as they limit the group\u2019s ability to reach consensus on a number of matters, including its responses to Russian activities. Effectively, they degrade the combined power of the NATO alliance compared to Russia, which maintains a relatively flexible hand of unilateral military and political action.<\/p>\n

While a NATO military response to Russian maneuvers near Ukraine was unlikely, overly bold military action in Ukraine could have united the bickering allies of NATO in ways that recent Russian covert activities inside NATO states have not. It was clearly in Russia\u2019s interest to deny NATO such a rallying cry for the immediate future. Russia\u2019s withdrawal also still leaves the door open for it to intervene militarily in Ukraine later if conditions become more favorable. For example, the completion of Nord Stream II this year will provide greater leverage over Germany in coming years. Further, the escalation of any of the rifts examined above could provide an ideal opportunity for Russia to conduct further military action into Ukraine. For example, if the perennial Greco-Turkish feud were to spin into a kinetic conflict, Russia would likely have greater freedom to expand its offensive operations against Ukraine. Russia\u2019s decision to leave some equipment and permanently rebase some of the troops involved in its recent exercises close to the Ukrainian border suggests they are leaving the door open for such aggressive courses of action in the future.[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s recent efforts to intimidate Ukraine through military exercises near their shared border reflect a textbook neorealist effort to maximize power in a self-help system of anarchy. However, Russia\u2019s propensity for such a worldview can best be explained through a constructivist lens that accounts for both Russian history and its academic and policymaking traditions. In short, Russia has made it clear to the world that it interprets international relations through a neorealist framework, and the world should listen and assess Russian behavior accordingly. With that in mind, one can see that Putin and his government conducted these exercises as part of a wider effort to maximize state power across the region. Russian interests in integrating Belarus more fully into Moscow\u2019s political-military sphere, intimidating Ukraine, and maintaining NATO disunity all served to impact Putin\u2019s calculus as far as how to maximize state power as a whole. One could expect to see similar or more extreme behavior in the future, as the Kremlin has left some of its troops and much of its equipment from the exercises behind along its southwestern frontier.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/span><\/a> Vladimir Soldatkin, \u201cPutin Throws $1.5 Billion Lifeline to Embattled Belarus Leader,\u201d Reuters, September 15, 2020, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/belarus-election-russia-int\/putin-throws-1-5-billion-lifeline-to-embattled-belarus-leader-idUSKBN26521Z<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/span><\/a> \u201cEU Blasts \u2018Manipulation\u2019 Of Vaccine Info by Russia, China,\u201d Radio Free Europe \/ Radio Liberty, April 28, 2021, https:\/\/www.rferl.org\/a\/russia-china-eu-blasts-vaccine-disinfo\/31228285.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/span><\/a> Hana de Goeij and Andrew Higgins, \u201cRussia\u2019s Ties with West Fray Further After Czech Republic Expels Its Diplomats,\u201d The New York Times<\/em>, April 22, 2021, https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/04\/22\/world\/europe\/russia-czech-republic-spies-ammunition-depot-2014.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/span><\/a> Michael R. Gordon and Georgi Kantchev, \u201cSatellite Images Show Russia\u2019s Expanding Ukraine Buildup,\u201d The Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2021, https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/satellite-images-show-russias-expanding-ukraine-buildup-11618917238<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/span><\/a> Cyrus Newlin et al., \u201cUnpacking the Russian Troop Buildup along Ukraine\u2019s Border,\u201d CSIS, April 22, 2021, https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/unpacking-russian-troop-buildup-along-ukraines-border<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/span><\/a> Poline Tchoubar, \u201cVideos of Russian Military Exercises near Ukraine Border Spark Panic on Social Media,\u201d France 24, April 8, 2021, https:\/\/observers.france24.com\/en\/europe\/20210412-ukraine-russie-vid%C3%A9os-convois-militaires-russes-fronti%C3%A8re<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/span><\/a> Paul D. Shinkman, \u201cRussia Announces Withdrawal of Troops From Ukraine Border,\u201d U.S. News and World Report<\/em>, April 22, 2021, https:\/\/www.usnews.com\/news\/world-report\/articles\/2021-04-22\/russia-announces-withdrawal-of-troops-from-ukraine-border<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/span><\/a> Tatiana A. Romanova, \u201cNeoclassical Realism and Today\u2019s Russia,\u201d Russia in Global Affairs<\/em> 2012, no. 3 (September 2012), https:\/\/eng.globalaffairs.ru\/articles\/neoclassical-realism-and-todays-russia\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/span><\/a> Allen C. Lynch, \u201cRussian Realists on the Art of Diplomacy,\u201d The Russian Review<\/em> 79, no. 4 (October 2020): 654\u201357.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/span><\/a> Russia Withdraws Troops from Ukraine Border<\/em> (DW News, 2021), https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=dJy1I-S7abU<\/a>, 5:02.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/span><\/a> Alexander Wendt, \u201cAnarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,\u201d International Organization<\/em> 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391\u2013425.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/span><\/a> John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics<\/em> (New York: Norton, 2001), 29.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/span><\/a> Ibid, 30-31.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/span><\/a> James S. Robbins, \u201cUkraine Crisis May Be Putin\u2019s Test for the Biden Administration,\u201d USA Today, April 21, 2021, https:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/opinion\/2021\/04\/21\/russias-aggression-toward-ukraine-test-bidens-administration-column\/7279269002\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/span><\/a> Jeffrey Mankoff, \u201cWill Belarus Be the Next Ukraine?,\u201d Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2020, https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/belarus\/2020-02-05\/will-belarus-be-next-ukraine<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/span><\/a> Vessela Tcherneva et al., \u201cBelarus\u2019s Brutal Politics,\u201d ECFR\u2019s World in Thirty Minutes, March 5, 2021, https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/podcasts\/episode\/belaruss-brutal-politics\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[17]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/span><\/a> Soldatkin, \u201cPutin Throws $1.5 Billion Lifeline to Embattled Belarus Leader.\u201d<\/p>\n

[19]<\/span><\/a> Christian Mamo, \u201cInside Crimea\u2019s Water Crisis,\u201d Emerging Europe, April 2, 2021, https:\/\/emerging-europe.com\/news\/inside-crimeas-water-crisis\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/span><\/a> Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances<\/em> (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 22.<\/p>\n

[21]<\/span><\/a> \u201cU.S. Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine Information Page,\u201d accessed April 30, 2021, https:\/\/www.7atc.army.mil\/JMTGU\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/span><\/a> Roman Olearchyk and Michael Peel, \u201cUkraine Pressures NATO to Speed Path to Membership,\u201d The Financial Times, April 6, 2021, https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/e7dc0f67-fd63-4c2b-bcc3-fdbe06c4672a<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[23]<\/span><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/span><\/a> Cyrus Newlin et al., \u201cUnpacking the Russian Troop Buildup along Ukraine\u2019s Border.\u201d<\/p>\n

[25]<\/span><\/a> \u201cEmmanuel Macron Warns Europe: NATO Is Becoming Brain-Dead,\u201d The Economist, November 7, 2019, https:\/\/www.economist.com\/europe\/2019\/11\/07\/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/span><\/a> Andrew Michta, \u201cAll Not Quiet on NATO\u2019s Eastern Front,\u201d Carnegie Europe, June 28, 2016, https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/strategiceurope\/63934<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[27]<\/span><\/a> Anders \u00c5slund, \u201cWhat Will the Impact Be If Nord Stream 2 Is Completed?,\u201d The Atlantic Council, April 27, 2021, https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/in-depth-research-reports\/issue-brief\/what-will-the-impact-be-if-nord-stream-2-is-completed\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/span><\/a> Cyrus Newlin et al., \u201cUnpacking the Russian Troop Buildup along Ukraine\u2019s Border.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By: Joseph \u201cTripp\u201d Callaway Russia has been, to say the least, active in Eastern Europe in 2020 and 2021. While the rest of the world was focused almost exclusively on the COVID-19 pandemic and the U.S. election over the last year, Russia sought to improve its position in Belarus and leverage its Sputnik V shot […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19624,"featured_media":0,"parent":185,"menu_order":14,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/395"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19624"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=395"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/395\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":407,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/395\/revisions\/407"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/185"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=395"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}