{"id":363,"date":"2021-10-29T16:39:18","date_gmt":"2021-10-29T20:39:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/?page_id=363"},"modified":"2022-01-28T20:21:40","modified_gmt":"2022-01-29T01:21:40","slug":"russias-public-diplomacy-in-the-former-yugoslavia","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/research-and-policy\/back2school\/russias-public-diplomacy-in-the-former-yugoslavia\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s Public Diplomacy in the Former Yugoslavia"},"content":{"rendered":"

By: Isak Kulalic<\/p>\n

\"\"
Isak Kulalic is a second year Master’s in International Affairs candidate. He researches contemporary developments in the Western Balkans \/ Former Yugoslavia. Specifically, he analyzes the shifting regional roles played by actors including the EU and NATO from the West, and China and Russia to the East.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

When one thinks of countries which enact successful public diplomacy campaigns, Russia seldom comes to mind. Yet, as part of its attempts to re-attain global power status, Russia relies on various forms of public diplomacy in order to lay the groundwork for heightened international cooperation required to promote its global agendas. [1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Certain audiences have proven particularly receptive toward Russia\u2019s public diplomacy campaigns which \u201care focused on the Eurasian region, as well as with countries disillusioned with the West.\u201d [2]<\/sup><\/a> A region where this has proven especially true has been the former Yugoslavia; Russia\u2019s public diplomacy efforts toward the former Yugoslavia are largely centered on the position of the Balkans as a backdoor into Europe which Russia can use to gain access and influence over the EU. Russia\u2019s regional influence campaigns should be viewed as part of a much larger competition for global influence between Russia and numerous western states and institutions. [3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s public diplomacy toward the former Yugoslavia focuses on the following: 1) cultural and religious similarities between Russia and the region of interest, 2) Russian procurement of developmental aid to the region (as well as its more recent contributions of medical aid amidst the COVID-19 pandemic), 3) Russia\u2019s growing influence over regional media sources. In combination, these three factors have helped Russia to maintain a great deal of soft power over regional publics and governments alike. [4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Russian Public Diplomacy: Post Cold War<\/strong><\/p>\n

Following the Cold War, Russia has come to rely on its culture and natural attractions, in combination with its well broadcasted humanitarian assistance, in order to carry out its public diplomacy. [5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The 1990\u2019s were generally marked by a congruence between Russia\u2019s foreign policy and western norms given the country’s weak global position following its loss of the Cold War. Furthermore, during these year\u2019s Russia was attempting to build positive relations between itself and the United States and European Union. [6]<\/sup><\/a> However, as the 1990\u2019s dragged on, Russia\u2019s relations with the West began slowly to deteriorate; first, as a result of the Russo-Chechen War in 1994, and then more so during the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. [7]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

As Russia\u2019s economy began to grow in the late 1990\u2019s and early 2000\u2019s, Russia was able to invest more toward its public diplomacy campaigns. [8]<\/sup><\/a> Despite early signs of deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, the former nevertheless maintained a general openness toward the West and was even amicable toward the prospects of EU integration for Balkan and Eastern European states. [9]<\/sup><\/a> Changes in Russia\u2019s disposition grew as Russian policy makers began to perceive the integration of certain countries (notably Bulgaria and Croatia) into the European Union as a parallel to the NATO membership process. [10]<\/sup><\/a> Russia feared the eastward spread of NATO could lead to a new wave of \u2018color revolutions\u2019 nearer to its borders, thereby placing its own security at risk. [11]<\/sup><\/a> Russia\u2019s early responses to these trends consisted primarily of providing developmental aid to the energy sectors of Western Balkan states in order to sway them away from the EU and NATO. Despite the shift in attitudes, western policymakers paid scant attention to Russia\u2019s attempts at expanding its influence over former Soviet and former Yugoslav spaces.[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Culture and Religion: The Weaponization of Traditional Ties<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russia has long relied on cultural and religious linkages between itself and the Balkans as a source of soft power. [13]<\/sup><\/a> [14]<\/sup><\/a> In an 1880 speech celebrating the birth of Aleksander Pushkin, Fyodor Dostoevsky remarked that the destiny of Russia was to be found in its universality; \u201c\u2026 won not by sword, but by the strength of brotherhood\u2026\u201d [15]<\/sup><\/a> Namely, brotherhood between various Orthodox Christian societies.<\/p>\n

Following the Cold War, religion reasserted its influence over former Soviet and Yugoslav spaces. [16]<\/sup><\/a> [17]<\/sup><\/a> There is, however, an interesting paradox; in that, while the number of people in former Soviet and Yugoslav spaces who identify with Orthodox Christianity has risen in recent decades, data shows that Orthodox Christians tend to be less observant than those adhering to the Catholic faith. [18]<\/sup><\/a> Yet within Orthodox societies \u201c\u2026 there is a strong association between religion and national identity\u2026\u201d, in other words, with the reassertion of Orthodox Christianity in the former Yugoslavia, there has also been a growing tendency of people to identify their religious and national identities as one; i.e. being a \u2018true\u2019 Serbian, or a \u2018true\u2019 Montenegrin has become synonymous with ones identification as an Orthodox Christian.<\/p>\n

Narratives of Orthodox unity are channeled through the region\u2019s Orthodox churches, whose leaders \u2013 aside from being revered for their religious roles – are also seen as maintaining an air of credibility and trustworthiness in a region that is otherwise rife with underdevelopment, corruption, political and social tensions, and abounding uncertainty about what the future may hold. [19]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Despite the Cold War\u2019s brief interruption, Orthodox cultural and religious linkages between Russia and the Balkans have proven to be the longest lasting and most consistent source of Russian soft power in the former Yugoslavia. [20]<\/sup><\/a> Russia has actively pursued public diplomacy efforts aimed at propagating and exaggerating such linkages, particularly in Serbia and Montenegro.<\/p>\n

Russia actively targets the more conservative elements of Orthodox societies, who view the West apprehensively. [21]<\/sup><\/a> Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that one of the virtues of the Russian world has been its abilities to \u201c\u2026 retain those Christian values that were seen as lost elsewhere.\u201d [22]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, Russia relies on a series of narratives that are intended to pit the \u2018traditional\u2019 values of Orthodox societies against what is perceived as an increasingly \u2018morally decadent\u2019 west. [23]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

A particularly poignant talking point in this respect concerns homosexuality, which is seen as an affront to the aforementioned \u2018traditional\u2019 values. [24]<\/sup><\/a> The Kremlin has capitalized on the distaste of Orthodox societies toward the LGBTQ community through a public diplomacy narrative which portrays Western Europe as having backslid into moral decadence by having grown increasingly tolerant of homosexuality. [25]<\/sup><\/a> [26]<\/sup><\/a> By contrast, Russia portrays itself as resistant to such trends.<\/p>\n

Russia also portrays the EU as having compromised Europe as a bastion of Christianity by \u201c\u2026 accepting flows of refugees and economic migrants from the global South.\u201d [27]<\/sup><\/a> The rise of right wing populism across the European continent has provided receptive audiences for such narratives.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, Russia has sought to portray the integration of former Yugoslav countries into European and Western structures such as the EU, OSCE, and especially NATO as a form of modern-day imperialism being carried out by the West in order to defeat an otherwise unruly orthodox world and give rise to a greater Albania. [28]<\/sup><\/a> This narrative has been especially poignant with regards to relations between Serbia and Kosovo as Kosovo is viewed by many Serbs as being the location of the birthplace of Serbian Orthodoxy and thus a key part of the cultural identity of Serbia. [29]<\/sup><\/a> For many Serbs, Serbia is viewed as having lost a piece of its historical territory to the cleaving off of Kosovo from Serbia by NATO. By unequivocally aligning its position on Kosovo with those of Western Balkan states which refuse to acknowledge Kosovo\u2019s statehood, Russia has gained much fanfare amongst regional populaces.<\/p>\n

Where Russia cannot count on purely religious or historical ties between itself and Western Balkan audiences, the Kremlin has actively fostered ties with numerous Orthodox officials in the region who are know for their pro-Russian views \u2013 as well as their aversion towards the West \u2013 to disseminate Russian-friendly messages from the pulpit.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the Kremlin has incorporated several of Russia\u2019s oligarchs into its public diplomacy campaigns. One of them being Konstantin Malofeev. Malofeev has used his finances to create the St. Basil the Great Foundation, a Russian Orthodox charity which appears to be tightly integrated into the Kremlin\u2019s outreach operations in the Balkans. In addition to his charity, Malofeev also created a think tank called Katehon; In line with the general trend of Russia\u2019s disposition toward the Orthodox world, Katehon labels itself as committed to \u2018traditional values\u2019. [30]<\/sup><\/a> In actuality, Katehon serves as a tool for the dissemination of various anti-western conspiracy theories targeted at orthodox audiences. [31]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Aside from using the orthodox faith as a means of propagating pro-Russian narratives and sentiments, the Russian government has also engaged in Orthodox-based public diplomacy campaigns which are not explicitly anti-Western. Key among these has been Russia\u2019s role in aiding Serbia to build the country\u2019s largest Orthodox temple, the Church of St. Sava. [32]<\/sup><\/a> In showing his appreciation to the Russian government for having taken the initiative in the church\u2019s construction, Serbian president Aleksandar Vucic issued a statement proclaiming \u201c\u2026 thanks to all our Russian friends, we will never forget your work.\u201d [33]<\/sup><\/a> Another example took place in 2015, when the Russian government provided aid to Serbia in transporting the \u2018Holy Fire\u2019 \u2013 one of Orthodox Christianity\u2019s most holy ceremonies – from Jerusalem to Belgrade. [34]<\/sup><\/a> The patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox church responded by saying that Russia\u2019s role in the Holy Fire\u2019s transportation \u201c\u2026 as never before will show the Serbian people that light truly does come from the east.\u201d [35]<\/sup><\/a> Such messages not only reflect public sentiments, but also reinforce them as public audiences view their leader(s) as sympathetic to their views.<\/p>\n

Praise for Russia\u2019s support of the Serbian Orthodox faith has come from both authoritative and humble figures alike. In 2019, the small Serbian village of Banstor built a church unto which it bestowed the name \u2018Putin\u2019s Church\u2019. [36]<\/sup><\/a> When asked about the Church\u2019s name, the project’s initiator, Branko Simonovic, replied:<\/p>\n

\u201cthis church has acquired the official name of Putin\u2019s Church because Putin is a symbol of a new upright Russia, a Russia which Serbs have started to believe in once again.\u201d [37]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Such examples speak to the sheer effectiveness of the public diplomacy that Russia\u2019s has been able to implement in the Former Yugoslavia given its religious and historical ties to the region; When common people in distant parts of a nation can be so swayed as to willingly and joyfully dedicate their most sacrosanct institutions to a foreign leader, the effectiveness of public diplomacy can be argued to have reached its zenith; transcending policy and influencing societies most intimate aspects.<\/p>\n

Economic Investments as Public Diplomacy<\/strong><\/p>\n

As Russia\u2019s perceptions of the integration of former Yugoslav states into European structures became increasingly congruent with NATO\u2019s eastward expansion [38]<\/sup><\/a> – along with the potential security threats thus posed to Russia – the Kremlin began initiating its own developmental programs toward the Former Yugoslavia. These programs have been especially focused on energy sector development within the region’s economies. [39]<\/sup><\/a> Their strategic purpose has been to forestall the integration of Former Yugoslav states into European structures.<\/p>\n

Implementing economic tools is typically considered a form of sharp power<\/em>. Therefore, it might seem odd that economic investments would fall under the title of \u2018public diplomacy\u2019. Nevertheless, Russia\u2019s economic investments in the former Yugoslavia provide Russia with a significant source of soft power with regional populations.<\/p>\n

Following Yugoslavia\u2019s disintegration, the region’s countries have routinely experienced economic under-development. While several of the countries in question have long hoped that accession into the European Union would bring progress; persistent under-development has prevented countries such as Serbia and Montenegro from satisfying the minimum criteria required to be eligible for integration into the European Union. [40]<\/sup><\/a> As a result, local sentiments have grown increasingly \u2018euro skeptical\u2019 [41]<\/sup><\/a>, thus providing fertile ground for Russia to engage in various types of economic influence operations meant to further enhance it\u2019s standing with local publics.<\/p>\n

Russia has pursued a series of developmental projects targeting the energy sectors of local economies; or – to be more exact \u2013 the common people who rely on the energy sector for employment. For example, in 2008, Russian owned oil producer Gazprom acquired 51% of the Serbian oil refining firm NIS. [42]<\/sup><\/a> Likewise, Lukoil has made numerous investments into the oil industries of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. [43]<\/sup><\/a> In doing so, the Russian government effectively saved faltering firms, thereby preventing joblessness.<\/p>\n

In reality the scope of Russia\u2019s economic investments in the region usually fall short of official promises made to the region as well as to investors. [44]<\/sup><\/a> Nevertheless, Russia\u2019s investments in the energy sectors serve the following role; the reality is that Russia is not interested in extracting financial profits from the region so much as it is concerned with maintaining its influence over the regions governments and publics. Namely, \u201cRussian energy investment conveys Russian influence and helps build soft power, even if an investment is never fully realized\u2026\u201d. [45]<\/sup><\/a> Politicians \u2013 particularly corrupt ones – seeking to hold power within underdeveloped former Yugoslav countries jump at opportunities to welcome foreign economic investors; doing so allows them to distract from their own dealings and\/or incompetencies by pointing to the public goods that have come from their <\/em>deals with Russia. As a result, both the politicians in question and their Russian counterparts come to be seen as the saviors of\u00a0 otherwise faltering regions.<\/p>\n

For instance, in 2007 the Russian oil refining company, Zarubezhneft invested in the oil industry of Republika Srpska. [46]<\/sup><\/a> As a result, Russia gained control of oil refineries in the towns of Brod and Modrica. These two refineries have – by all accounts – been unprofitable. In fact, since 2016 alone, they have cost their investors some $60 million. [47]<\/sup><\/a> Despite being financial sinkholes, the Russian government has continuously financed the two refineries for the purpose of keeping the local populations employed, thereby building goodwill between itself and the population of Republika Srpska. [48]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, Russia has used its contributions in the region’s energy sectors as a means by which to mount the second tier of its public diplomacy toward the former Yugoslavia. Similar trends abound in the region’s tourism industries, and also increasingly in Montenegro\u2019s real-estate market.<\/p>\n

COVID Diplomacy<\/strong><\/p>\n

Apart from using its economic and developmental aid, Russia also provides the Western former Yugoslavian countries with medical aid and humanitarian assistance.<\/p>\n

Soft power is greatly bolstered when countries demonstrate a willingness to provide such aid; \u201cHelping other countries in a time of crisis always has notable implications. These implications are not necessarily material or economic benefits. Instead, they are more likely to be in the form of societal and psychological effects \u2013 effects that shape the perceptions of one country or nation about the other.\u201d [49]<\/sup><\/a> The COVID-19 pandemic has served to multiply the soft power that providing aid has afforded to Russia in the former Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n

Last Spring, as the COVID-19 pandemic swept across Europe, the European Union swiftly began devising plans for how to provide Europe\u2019s unprepared countries with the assistance for combatting it. Unfortunately for Western Balkan countries, they had been excluded from receiving any assistance from the European Union. [50]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The Western Balkan\u2019s governments, and publics, responded with outrage; shortly upon receiving the news on March 15, 2020, Serbian President Aleksander Vucic immediately lambasted the European Union. Publicly, he stated; \u201cEuropean solidarity does not exist\u201d [51]<\/sup><\/a> and proclaimed that Serbia would turn elsewhere for assistance. Russia heeded Vucic\u2019s call. [52]<\/sup><\/a> The collaboration which ensued between Serbia and Russia in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic was greatly enhanced due to previous agreements which were signed between the two countries in 2009 and 2012 concerning humanitarian response and cooperation. [53]<\/sup><\/a> [54]<\/sup><\/a> The latter agreement allowed for the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and the Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters<\/em> to coordinate with the Serbian Government in establishing the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center<\/em> in Nis, [55]<\/sup><\/a> the official purpose of which is to provide Serbian emergency responders with training on how best to respond to both natural and man-made humanitarian disasters. [56]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

As of April 2020, Moscow has sent at least 11 separate planes carrying various forms of medical aid to Belgrade. [57]<\/sup><\/a> Early aid shipments consisted primarily of personal protective equipment such as disinfectant solutions intended to sanitize the entrances of hospitals and apartment blocks. [58]<\/sup><\/a> [59]<\/sup><\/a> Russia\u2019s medical assistance was immediately met with much fanfare within Serbia from politicians and the public alike. [60]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Russia also sent troops to Serbia. Their orders were to help distribute aid throughout the country, as well as in Republika Srpska. [61]<\/sup><\/a> Much of the associated costs of distributing the medical aid were covered by the Russian financial company Sberbank. [62]<\/sup><\/a> Likewise, NIS; the aforementioned – Russian owned – Serbian gas company, collaborated with the Serbian natural gas distributor YugoRosGaz, to provide free fuel for the purpose of transporting the medical aid. [63]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Upon seeing what was occurring in its backyard, \u201cthe EU quickly reversed course\u201d [64]<\/sup><\/a> on its lack of policy toward the Western Balkans by pledging to provide the region with some $3.3 billion worth of pandemic related assistance. [65]<\/sup><\/a> While the aid which the EU promised, and subsequently provided, has far exceeded that of Russia, Serbian politicians have downplayed the European Union\u2019s efforts, opting instead to bolster Russia\u2019s role. [66]<\/sup><\/a> As a result, the public has come to see Russia as the more significant provider of pandemic relief.<\/p>\n

The European Union\u2019s aid to Serbia was further undermined when it came to vaccinating the region’s population. On December 30, 2020, the first shipment of Russian vaccines touched down at Belgrade\u2019s Nikola Tesla airport. The shipment consisted of 2,400 doses of Russia\u2019s Sputnik-19 vaccine. [67]<\/sup><\/a> In response to questions about Russia\u2019s provisions of COVID-19 vaccines to Serbia, the Serbian minister of innovation, Nenad Popovic, responded by saying that \u201c\u2026 the fact that we received the vaccines today shows how close our relations are.\u201d [68]<\/sup><\/a> Over the coming months, the Russian Government would supply Serbia with just under 300,000 doses of the vaccine. [69]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

While the actual number of Sputnik-19 doses which Russia has been able to provide to Serbia has fallen far short of the Kremlin\u2019s initial promises of as many as 2 million doses of the vaccine. [70]<\/sup><\/a> From the standpoint of public diplomacy, the old maxim \u2018From Russia with Love\u2019 has scarcely rang truer than in regards to Russian assistance to Serbia amidst the COVID-19 pandemic; Russia\u2019s medical aid to the country has served to reinforce narratives amongst the Serbian public that Russia is their friend and ally.<\/p>\n

The Media: A Booster Shot for public Diplomacy<\/strong><\/p>\n

While Russia\u2019s role in the former Yugoslavia is notable, the reality is that Russia faces constant competition for regional influence from a multitude of other actors including; the UN, NATO, OSCE, the United States, Turkey, multiple Gulf states, and \u2013 increasingly \u2013 China. Several of which far exceed Russia as regards their capacity to provide; in Serbia alone, Russian contributions to the country rank only 8th<\/sup> overall (with the European Union coming in first). [71]<\/sup><\/a> Likewise, Russia\u2019s investments in Bosnia\u2019s economy place Russia only as Bosnia\u2019s 5th<\/sup> largest financial contributor. [72]<\/sup><\/a> Similar trends abound throughout the region and are likely to grow as Russia\u2019s economy continues to stagger and security concerns nearer to its borders abound. [73]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Thus, the question remains; how does Russia manage to maintain positive public perceptions of its contributions to the Western Balkans over those of other actors? After all, one would expect the shiny veneer which public diplomacy affords Russia to eventually wear off.<\/p>\n

To make up for its deficiencies, Russia augments its influence operations via its regional media influence; the combination of Russian owned media outlets which operate in the region, such as Sputnik Serbia, [74]<\/sup><\/a> combined with Russia\u2019s growing role in Serbia\u2019s own state-run media outlets, (which have always been generous in their portrayal of Russia anyway), [75]<\/sup><\/a> has allowed Russia to bolster public perceptions of itself beyond what it\u2019s capacities otherwise warrant.<\/p>\n

The inability of Russia to clarify its stance on NATO\u2019s involvement in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990\u2019s, [76]<\/sup><\/a> combined with growing understandings of the significance of the \u201cCNN effects\u201d in allowing for state and non-state actors to influence international affairs, [77]<\/a><\/sup> led Russia to embark upon an international proliferation of news outlets for the purpose of disseminating Russian-friendly narratives globally, as well as to divert attention away from its many shortcomings. [78]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Aside from using its own media outlets as tools of exerting regional influence, Russia also influences the content provided to the region\u2019s publics by numerous regional media outlets as well; as a result of the Western Balkan\u2019s under-development, regional media outlets are commonly underfunded and hence unable to procure accurate and up to date information for their viewers. [79]<\/sup><\/a> Russia has seized upon this predicament by providing free content to Western Balkan news agencies via Russian news outlets. [80]<\/sup><\/a> [81]<\/sup><\/a> The content which Russia provides serves two purposes; the first is to influence pro-Russian sentiments among viewers, [82]<\/sup><\/a> the second is to further alienate the region\u2019s population from Western states and institutions by presenting their roles in the Western Balkans as being either less than they truly are, or otherwise as nefarious. These narratives in question include: 1) that the European Union is weak and unreliable, 2) that NATO is an aggressive and unfriendly force seeking to destabilize relations between Russia and Serbia, 3) that the West seeks to create a greater Albania through a plot to join Kosovo with its neighbor, to the ultimate detriment of Serbia, 4) Russia is the only truly reliable partner of Orthodox Christian peoples. [83]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Much of the media content which Russia provides to the Balkans consists of \u2018fake news\u2019 and disinformation, to which the Balkans are especially vulnerable:<\/p>\n

\u201c(the) open society institutes media literacy index<\/em> lists Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia as the European states least equipped to push back at fake news due to lagging educational systems and poor political literacy.\u201d [84]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

A large part of the reason for the regional inability to push back against fake news and disinformation has been due to concerted efforts on part of Serbia\u2019s politicians to undermine journalists who are dedicated to exposing the lies and corruption surrounding relations between regional politicians and Russia. Thus, Western Balkan societies lack exposure to much needed muckrakers.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s command over the dissemination of information to Western Balkan publics has allowed Russia to promote narratives which reinforce its contributions to the region whilst largely phasing out and even silencing news coverage which may be critical of Russia and would expose the true extent of Russia\u2019s capabilities – or lack thereof – to meaningfully contribute to regional development. In effect, Russia combines its own media outlets with its control over regional media in order to ensure that its public diplomacy ventures retain their shiny veneer despite their numerous shortcomings.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

What this paper has sought to portray is Russia\u2019s capabilities at carrying out effective public diplomacy operations in the former Yugoslavia. Russia relies on a combination of historical and cultural sentiments between Balkan audiences and the political and economic underdevelopment which abounds in the former Yugoslav region – combined with the apparent lack of a coherent policy amongst western actors for how to aid the regions political, economic, infrastructural, and social development \u2013 on which to mount effective public diplomacy campaigns.<\/p>\n

While Russia\u2019s public diplomacy in the Western Balkans has been effective – particularly amongst Orthodox Christian population\u2019s \u2013 there nevertheless remain certain caveats to bear in mind. First, not only do Russia\u2019s economic investments into the Former Yugoslavia fall far short of its competitors; but also, it appears that much of the region\u2019s publics do in fact acknowledge the EU as being better capable of aiding development in the Western Balkan\u2019s and would generally like to see their countries integrated into European economic and political structures (even though they commonly continue to believe the false narrative that Russia\u2019s contributions to the former Yugoslavia presently exceed those of western institutions such as the EU). [85]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

With regards to Russia\u2019s medical diplomacy amidst the COVID-19; despite the warm welcome which Russia received in Serbia, the Kremlin\u2019s efforts to provide the region with medical assistance amidst the pandemic were ultimately outshone by China. Simply put, China\u2019s rollout of its Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine quickly surpassed the rollout of Russia\u2019s Sputnik V vaccine at a 5:1 rate. [86]<\/sup><\/a> [87]<\/sup><\/a> As such, Serbian politicians quickly turned a cold shoulder to Russia in favor of continuing to cultivate closer bonds with China amidst the pandemic.[88]<\/sup><\/a> It remains to be seen if and how Russia will recover from this smite to its image.<\/p>\n

Despite such setbacks, Russia\u2019s public diplomacy campaigns toward the former Yugoslavia have been largely successful in the sense that they have allowed Russia to maintain positive public perceptions of its role in the region. Such perceptions toward Russia amount to tacit consent on part of the general population toward a resumption of relations between regional governments and the Kremlin, thereby reinforcing Russia\u2019s influence over the Former Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/sup><\/a> Velikaya, Anna A. \u201cThe Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Assistance,\u201d Rising Powers Quarterly, <\/em>Volume 3, Issue 3, 2018. https:\/\/risingpowersproject.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/vol3.3-velikaya.pdf.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/sup><\/a> Velikaya, Anna. \u201cRussia\u2019s Public Diplomacy: Historical Perspectives,\u201d University Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy, <\/em>February 3, 2020. https:\/\/uscpublicdiplomacy.org\/blog\/russias-public-diplomacy-historical-perspectives.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/sup><\/a> Velikaya, Anna A. \u201cThe Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Assistance,\u201d Rising Powers Quarterly, <\/em>Volume 3, Issue 3, 2018. https:\/\/risingpowersproject.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/vol3.3-velikaya.pdf.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cRussia in the Balkans,\u201d Russian Council for international Affairs. https:\/\/russiancouncil.ru\/en\/balkans#1.<\/em><\/p>\n

[7]<\/sup><\/a> Velikaya, Anna A. \u201cThe Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Assistance,\u201d Rising Powers Quarterly, <\/em>Volume 3, Issue 3, 2018. https:\/\/risingpowersproject.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/vol3.3-velikaya.pdf.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/sup><\/a> Osipova, Yelena. \u201cRussia\u2019s Public Diplomacy: In Search of Recognition (Part 1),\u201d University Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, <\/em>November 3, 2014. https:\/\/uscpublicdiplomacy.org\/blog\/russia%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy-search-recognition-part-1.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cRussia in the Balkans,\u201d Russian Council for international Affairs. https:\/\/russiancouncil.ru\/en\/balkans#1.<\/em><\/p>\n

[10]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/sup><\/a> Osipova, Yelena. \u201cRussia\u2019s Public Diplomacy: In Search of Recognition (Part 1),\u201d University Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, <\/em>November 3, 2014. https:\/\/uscpublicdiplomacy.org\/blog\/russia%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy-search-recognition-part-1.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/sup><\/a> Osipova, Yelena. \u201cRussia\u2019s Public Diplomacy: In Search of Recognition (Part 2),\u201d University Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, <\/em>November 5, 2014. https:\/\/uscpublicdiplomacy.org\/blog\/russia%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy-search-recognition-part-2.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/sup><\/a> Dostoevsky, Feyodor. \u201cCelebration of Pushkin\u2019s Birth,\u201d Speech Vault. http:\/\/www.speeches-usa.com\/Transcripts\/feyodor_dostoevsky-pushkin.html#:~:text=To%20a%20true%20Russian%2C%20Europe,fraternal%20aspiration%20to%20reunite%20mankind.<\/em><\/p>\n

[16]<\/sup><\/a> Saghal, Neha and Michael Lipka, \u201c9 key findings about religion and politics in Central and Eastern Europe,\u201d Pew Research Center, <\/em>May 10, 2017. https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/fact-tank\/2017\/05\/10\/9-key-findings-about-religion-and-politics-in-central-and-eastern-europe\/.<\/p>\n

[17]<\/sup><\/a> Milosevic, Mira. \u201cRussia\u2019s Weaponization of tradition: The Case of the orthodox Church in Montenegro,\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies, <\/em>September 25, 2020. https:\/\/www.csis.org\/blogs\/post-soviet-post\/russias-weaponization-tradition-case-orthodox-church-montenegro<\/p>\n

[18]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/sup><\/a> Milosevic, Mira. \u201cRussia\u2019s Weaponization of tradition: The Case of the orthodox Church in Montenegro,\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies, <\/em>September 25, 2020. https:\/\/www.csis.org\/blogs\/post-soviet-post\/russias-weaponization-tradition-case-orthodox-church-montenegro<\/p>\n

[20]<\/sup><\/a> Ambrosetti, Eleonore Tafuro. \u201cRussia Soft Power in the Balkans: A True Love Story?,\u201d Italian Institute for International Studies, <\/em>April 12, 2019. https:\/\/www.ispionline.it\/en\/pubblicazione\/russian-soft-power-balkans-true-love-story-22845<\/p>\n

[21]<\/sup><\/a> Saghal, Neha and Michael Lipka, \u201c9 key findings about religion and politics in Central and Eastern Europe,\u201d Pew Research Center, <\/em>May 10, 2017. https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/fact-tank\/2017\/05\/10\/9-key-findings-about-religion-and-politics-in-central-and-eastern-europe\/.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/sup><\/a> Akturk, Sener. \u201cFive Faces of Russia\u2019s Soft Power: Far Left, Far Right, Orthodox Christian, Russophone, and Ethnoreligions Networks,\u201d PONARS Eurasia, <\/em>November 2019. https:\/\/www.ponarseurasia.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/attachments\/Pepm623_Akturk_Nov2019_1.pdf<\/p>\n

[23]<\/sup><\/a> Ambrosetti, Eleonore Tafuro. \u201cRussia Soft Power in the Balkans: A True Love Story?,\u201d Italian Institute for International Studies, <\/em>April 12, 2019. https:\/\/www.ispionline.it\/en\/pubblicazione\/russian-soft-power-balkans-true-love-story-22845<\/p>\n

[24]<\/sup><\/a> Saghal, Neha and Michael Lipka, \u201c9 key findings about religion and politics in Central and Eastern Europe,\u201d Pew Research Center, <\/em>May 10, 2017. https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/fact-tank\/2017\/05\/10\/9-key-findings-about-religion-and-politics-in-central-and-eastern-europe\/.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/sup><\/a> Ambrosetti, Eleonore Tafuro. \u201cRussia Soft Power in the Balkans: A True Love Story?,\u201d Italian Institute for International Studies, <\/em>April 12, 2019. https:\/\/www.ispionline.it\/en\/pubblicazione\/russian-soft-power-balkans-true-love-story-22845<\/p>\n

[26]<\/sup><\/a> Bechev, Dimitar, \u201cUnderstanding Russia\u2019s Influence in the Western Balkan\u2019s,\u201d Hybrid CoE, <\/em>September 2018. https:\/\/www.hybridcoe.fi\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/Strategic-Analysis-2018-11-Beshev.pdf<\/p>\n

[27]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/sup><\/a> Ambrosetti, Eleonore Tafuro. \u201cRussia Soft Power in the Balkans: A True Love Story?,\u201d Italian Institute for International Studies, <\/em>April 12, 2019. https:\/\/www.ispionline.it\/en\/pubblicazione\/russian-soft-power-balkans-true-love-story-22845<\/p>\n

[29]<\/sup><\/a> Milosevic, Mira. \u201cRussia\u2019s Weaponization of tradition: The Case of the orthodox Church in Montenegro,\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies, <\/em>September 25, 2020. https:\/\/www.csis.org\/blogs\/post-soviet-post\/russias-weaponization-tradition-case-orthodox-church-montenegro<\/p>\n

[30]<\/sup><\/a> \u201dKatehon\u201d. https:\/\/katehon.com\/en\/about-us<\/p>\n

[31]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cSerbian president Thanks Russia for Help With Building Countries Main Temple,\u201d RuskiyMir, <\/em>August 21, 2020. https:\/\/russkiymir.ru\/en\/news\/276370\/<\/p>\n

[33]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[34]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cHoly Fire,\u201d OrthodoxWiki. https:\/\/orthodoxwiki.org\/Holy_Fire<\/em><\/p>\n

[35]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cFor the First Time in History, Holy Fire to be Delivered to Belgrade,\u201d Orthodox Christian, <\/em>April 8, 2015. https:\/\/orthochristian.com\/78552.html<\/p>\n

[36]<\/sup><\/a> Stojanovic, Dusan, \u201cAhead of Visit, Putin gets church in Serbia named after him,\u201d AP News, <\/em>January 14, 2019. https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/3d98bcf3c2804462885fac93d816aeae<\/p>\n

[37]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[38]<\/sup><\/a> Osipova, Yelena. \u201cRussia\u2019s Public Diplomacy: In Search of Recognition (Part 1),\u201d University Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, <\/em>November 3, 2014. https:\/\/uscpublicdiplomacy.org\/blog\/russia%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy-search-recognition-part-1.<\/p>\n

[39]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cRussia in the Balkans,\u201d Russian Council for international Affairs. https:\/\/russiancouncil.ru\/en\/balkans#1.<\/em><\/p>\n

[40]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cCommission Assesses and Sets out Reform Priorities for the Countries Aiming to Join the EU,\u201d European Commission, <\/em>October 7, 2020. https:\/\/www.wb6cif.eu\/2020\/10\/07\/commission-assesses-and-sets-out-reform-priorities-for-the-countries-aiming-to-join-the-eu\/#:~:text=Signal-,Commission%20assesses%20and%20sets%20out%20reform%20priorities%20for,aiming%20to%20join%20the%20EU&text=A%20credible%20enlargement%20policy%20is,increasing%20global%20challenges%20and%20divisions.<\/p>\n

[41]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cRussia in the Balkans,\u201d Russian Council for international Affairs. https:\/\/russiancouncil.ru\/en\/balkans#1.<\/em><\/p>\n

[42]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[43]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[44]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[45]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[46]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cRussia in the Balkans,\u201d Russian Council for international Affairs. https:\/\/russiancouncil.ru\/en\/balkans#1.<\/em><\/p>\n

[47]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[48]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[49]<\/sup><\/a> Krasnyak, Olga. \u201cFor Common Good: Russia\u2019s Public Diplomacy During the COVID-19 Era,\u201d University Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, <\/em>April 17, 2020. https:\/\/uscpublicdiplomacy.org\/blog\/common-good-russia%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy-during-covid-19-era<\/p>\n

[50]<\/sup><\/a> Walker, Shaun. \u201cCoronavirus Diplomacy: How Russia, China, and EU Vie to win over Serbia,\u201d The Guardian, <\/em>April 13, 2020. https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2020\/apr\/13\/coronavirus-diplomacy-how-russia-china-and-eu-vie-to-win-over-serbia<\/p>\n

[51]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[52]<\/sup><\/a> Conly, Heather A. and Dejana Saric. \u201cSerbia\u2019s Vaccine Influence in the Balkans,\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies, <\/em>March 24, 2021. https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/serbias-vaccine-influence-balkans<\/p>\n

[53]<\/sup><\/a> Samarukov, Maxim. \u201cVentilator Diplomacy in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Moscow Institute, <\/em>July 8, 2020. https:\/\/carnegie.ru\/2020\/07\/08\/ventilator-diplomacy-in-balkans-pub-81895<\/p>\n

[54]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cRussia-Serbian Humanitarian Center,\u201d Russia-Serbian Humanitarian Center. http:\/\/en.ihc.rs\/about<\/em><\/p>\n

[55]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[56]<\/sup><\/a> Velikaya, Anna A. \u201cThe Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Assistance,\u201d Rising Powers Quarterly, <\/em>Volume 3, Issue 3, 2018. https:\/\/risingpowersproject.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/vol3.3-velikaya.pdf.<\/p>\n

[57]<\/sup><\/a> Samarukov, Maxim. \u201cVentilator Diplomacy in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Moscow Institute, <\/em>July 8, 2020. https:\/\/carnegie.ru\/2020\/07\/08\/ventilator-diplomacy-in-balkans-pub-81895<\/p>\n

[58]<\/sup><\/a> Walker, Shaun. \u201cCoronavirus Diplomacy: How Russia, China, and EU Vie to win over Serbia,\u201d The Guardian, <\/em>April 13, 2020. https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2020\/apr\/13\/coronavirus-diplomacy-how-russia-china-and-eu-vie-to-win-over-serbia<\/p>\n

[59]<\/sup><\/a> Conly, Heather A. and Dejana Saric. \u201cSerbia\u2019s Vaccine Influence in the Balkans,\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies, <\/em>March 24, 2021. https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/serbias-vaccine-influence-balkans<\/p>\n

[60]<\/sup><\/a> Conly, Heather A. and Dejana Saric. \u201cSerbia\u2019s Vaccine Influence in the Balkans,\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies, <\/em>March 24, 2021. https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/serbias-vaccine-influence-balkans<\/p>\n

[61]<\/sup><\/a> Samarukov, Maxim. \u201cVentilator Diplomacy in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Moscow Institute, <\/em>July 8, 2020. https:\/\/carnegie.ru\/2020\/07\/08\/ventilator-diplomacy-in-balkans-pub-81895<\/p>\n

[62]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[63]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[64]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[65]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[66]<\/sup><\/a> Samarukov, Maxim. \u201cVentilator Diplomacy in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Moscow Institute, <\/em>July 8, 2020. https:\/\/carnegie.ru\/2020\/07\/08\/ventilator-diplomacy-in-balkans-pub-81895<\/p>\n

[67]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cSerbia praises Russia COVID vaccine as first shots administered,\u201d Reuters, <\/em>January 6, 2021. https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-health-coronavirus-serbia-russia-vacc\/serbia-praises-russian-covid-vaccine-as-first-shots-administered-idUSKBN29B1OG<\/p>\n

[68]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cSerbia receives new shipment of Russia\u2019s Sputnik V COVID-19 Vaccine,\u201d TASS, <\/em>January 29, 2021. https:\/\/tass.com\/world\/1250317<\/p>\n

[69]<\/sup><\/a> Conly, Heather A. and Dejana Saric. \u201cSerbia\u2019s Vaccine Influence in the Balkans,\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies, <\/em>March 24, 2021. https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/serbias-vaccine-influence-balkans<\/p>\n

[70]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cSerbia praises Russia COVID vaccine as first shots administered,\u201d Reuters, <\/em>January 6, 2021. https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-health-coronavirus-serbia-russia-vacc\/serbia-praises-russian-covid-vaccine-as-first-shots-administered-idUSKBN29B1OG<\/p>\n

[71]<\/sup><\/a> Rastovic, Milos. \u201cRussia\u2019s Soft Power in the Balkan\u2019s,\u201d World Policy, <\/em>July 13, 2017. http:\/\/worldpolicy.org\/2017\/07\/13\/russias-soft-power-in-the-balkans\/<\/p>\n

[72]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[73]<\/sup><\/a> Samorukov, Maxim. \u201cRussia and the Western Balkans: A Last Stand or More of the Same?,\u201d Carnegie Moscow Center, <\/em>September 04, 2019. https:\/\/carnegie.ru\/2019\/09\/04\/russia-and-western-balkans-last-stand-or-more-of-same-pub-79796<\/p>\n

[74]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cBalkan Media Scene and Russia influence,\u201d European Security Journal, <\/em>January 1, 2019. https:\/\/www.esjnews.com\/balkan-media-scene<\/p>\n

[75]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[76]<\/sup><\/a> Velikaya, Anna A. \u201cThe Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Assistance,\u201d Rising Powers Quarterly, <\/em>Volume 3, Issue 3, 2018. https:\/\/risingpowersproject.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/vol3.3-velikaya.pdf.<\/p>\n

[77]<\/sup><\/a> Kenton, Will. \u201cThe CNN Effect,\u201d Investopedia, <\/em>August 23, 2019. https:\/\/www.investopedia.com\/terms\/c\/cnneffect.asp<\/p>\n

[78]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[79]<\/sup><\/a> Rastovic, Milos. \u201cRussia\u2019s Soft Power in the Balkan\u2019s,\u201d World Policy, <\/em>July 13, 2017. http:\/\/worldpolicy.org\/2017\/07\/13\/russias-soft-power-in-the-balkans\/<\/p>\n

[80]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[81]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cBalkan Media Scene and Russia influence,\u201d European Security Journal, <\/em>January 1, 2019. https:\/\/www.esjnews.com\/balkan-media-scene<\/p>\n

[82]<\/sup><\/a> Metodelva, Asya. \u201cRussian Narrative proxies \u2013 The Unspoken Homegrown Threat in the Balkan\u2019s,\u201d The German Marshall Fund of the United States. https:\/\/www.gmfus.org\/sites\/default\/files\/Russian%20Narrative%20Proxies%E2%80%94The%20Unspoken%20Homegrown%20Threat%20In%20The%20Western%20Balkans.pdf<\/em><\/p>\n

[83]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[84]<\/sup><\/a> Himes, Annia and Paul Stromsky. \u201cRussia\u2019s Game in the Balkans,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <\/em>January 2019. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Stronski_Himes_Balkans_formatted.pdf.<\/p>\n

[85]<\/sup><\/a> Ambrosetti, Eleonore Tafuro. \u201cRussia Soft Power in the Balkans: A True Love Story?,\u201d Italian Institute for International Studies, <\/em>April 12, 2019. https:\/\/www.ispionline.it\/en\/pubblicazione\/russian-soft-power-balkans-true-love-story-22845<\/p>\n

[86]<\/sup><\/a> Conly, Heather A. and Dejana Saric. \u201cSerbia\u2019s Vaccine Influence in the Balkans,\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies, <\/em>March 24, 2021. https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/serbias-vaccine-influence-balkans<\/p>\n

[87]<\/sup><\/a> Oxturk, Talha. \u201cChina to send more COIVD-19 doses to Serbia,\u201d Anadolu Agency, <\/em>February 25, 2021. https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/en\/europe\/china-to-send-more-covid-19-vaccine-doses-to-serbia\/2157428<\/p>\n

[88]<\/sup><\/a> Velebit, Vuk. \u201cChina Has Overtaken Russia as Serbia\u2019s Great Ally,\u201d Balkan Insight, <\/em>July 8, 2020. https:\/\/balkaninsight.com\/2020\/07\/08\/china-has-overtaken-russia-as-serbias-great-ally\/<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By: Isak Kulalic Introduction When one thinks of countries which enact successful public diplomacy campaigns, Russia seldom comes to mind. Yet, as part of its attempts to re-attain global power status, Russia relies on various forms of public diplomacy in order to lay the groundwork for heightened international cooperation required to promote its global agendas. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19624,"featured_media":0,"parent":185,"menu_order":10,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/363"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19624"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=363"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/363\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":371,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/363\/revisions\/371"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/185"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=363"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}