{"id":1549,"date":"2024-05-06T10:03:12","date_gmt":"2024-05-06T14:03:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/?page_id=1549"},"modified":"2024-05-06T14:39:42","modified_gmt":"2024-05-06T18:39:42","slug":"repositioning-the-geopolitical-chessboard-assessing-washingtons-latin-america-strategy-and-its-impact-on-u-s-china-regional-competition","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/research-and-policy\/repositioning-the-geopolitical-chessboard-assessing-washingtons-latin-america-strategy-and-its-impact-on-u-s-china-regional-competition\/","title":{"rendered":"Repositioning the Geopolitical Chessboard: Assessing Washington\u2019s Latin America Strategy and Its Impact on U.S.-China Regional Competition"},"content":{"rendered":"

Photo by Random Instiute via Unsplash<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

By Frank Jiaqi Wang<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n

Latin America has historically been an arena of both involvement and rivalry among the world\u2019s major powers. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine offered the U.S. geopolitical claim over the region as part of its own sphere of interests, leading to the expansion of American hegemony and the decline of European influence in the Western Hemisphere. Two centuries later, during the Trump administration, the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine reemerged as a dominant element in U.S. strategy towards Latin America, paving the way for aggressive and hostile policies from Washington and further allowing China, a newcomer with significant strategic interests, to rapidly establish a stable presence in the region during a period of declining U.S. involvement and influence. With the Biden Administration\u2019s policies signaling America\u2019s return to the regional stage and engagement with regional partners through strategic initiatives and dialogues, Latin America is once again witnessing the competitive coexistence of great powers, which can profoundly impact the region\u2019s political and economic future. This paper not only assesses the content and effectiveness of U.S. policies and initiatives in light of China\u2019s growing involvement, but also highlights the foreign policy intellect and insights of Latin American countries in navigating great power competition and shaping regional dynamics.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Not long after the inauguration of Donald Trump, the Monroe Doctrine, which had cast a looming shadow over the relationship between the United States (U.S.) and Latin America for two centuries, made its grand return to Washington\u2019s foreign policy agenda. Rex Tillerson, the first Secretary of State under the Trump administration, stated that the doctrine \u201c[is] as relevant today as it was the day it was written,\u201d marking a sharp contrast to the previous administration\u2019s firm rejection of the ideal.[1]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span> Such rhetoric was further prolonged when John Bolton, Trump\u2019s National Security Adviser, stated that \u201cthe Monroe Doctrine is alive and well\u201d when speaking to the Bay of Pigs veterans in 2019.<\/span>[2]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span> Building upon symbolic rhetoric and controversial narratives, the Trump administration\u2019s approach to Latin America was occupied by hostile immigration policy targeting Mexico and Central American countries, continued aggressive sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela, unilateral termination of assistance programs to the Northern Triangle, and protectionist policy on regional trade.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>[3]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Four years of Trump-era policies resulted in long-lasting consequences. While both the credibility and popularity of Washington in Latin America have experienced rapid decline, Beijing\u2019s quest for regional influence has gained significant momentum. China has become the top trading partner of South America and formed free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru.<\/span>[4]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span> At the same time, China has invested in key sectors of Latin American economies and secured twenty-one partnerships to build the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) within the region.[5]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The Biden administration is facing two objectives in Latin America to maintain the geopolitical advantage: restore American prestige and counter China\u2019s regional influence. To optimize and reconfigure the U.S. approach to Latin America, President Biden has been prioritizing strategic engagement and regional cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in key areas ranging from trade, investment, and development to migration response, democracy promotion, and climate change. Oliver Stuenkel argues that \u201cTrump drove Latin America into China’s arms. Biden has a chance to wrest it back.\u201d<\/span>[6]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Multiple factors are at play to assess the development of U.S.-Latin\u00a0 American relations and to further decide whether the Biden administration could indeed \u201cwrestle Latin America back\u201d from Beijing\u2019s embrace and realign the region with the U.S. sphere of influence, including the strength of diplomatic and economic engagement, and the degree of regional security challenges. Moreover, the pragmatic foreign policies and overall perception of \u201cgreat power competition\u201d by Latin American countries can identify the problematic nature of the \u201cwrestling back\u201d rhetoric and offer additional insights into the changing geopolitical scenery.<\/span><\/p>\n

Biden\u2019s Clearing of the Trump-era Shadow: Developments and Limitations<\/strong><\/p>\n

President Biden proclaimed in his inaugural address that the U.S. \u201cwill repair [its] alliances and engage with the world once again, not to meet yesterday\u2019s challenges, but today\u2019s and tomorrow\u2019s.\u201d[7]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Having traveled to the region sixteen times while serving as Vice President, Biden has leveraged his deep ties with Latin America as part of his overall effort to bring an end to the \u201cincompetence and neglect\u201d that characterized the previous Trump administration\u2019s regional policy, both rhetorically and in practice.[8]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The nationalistic, transactional, and antagonistic policies of the Trump era were replaced by Biden\u2019s foreign policy principles of partnership, responsibility, and mutual respect.[9]<\/span><\/a><\/span> While the Biden administration\u2019s diplomatic engagement with Latin America has shown welcoming progress, it has also encountered persisting internal and external challenges in correcting the course of development for U.S.-Latin America relations.<\/p>\n

The Return of a \u201cGood Neighbor\u201d: From Coercion to Cooperation<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Transitioning from Trump\u2019s coercive rhetoric and policy actions to Biden\u2019s call for active engagement and cooperation can minimize the growing distance between the U.S. and Latin America. President Biden has shown a cooperative stance on the Northern Triangle and Mexico and allocated $4 billion to these Latin American countries to combat crime, unemployment, and poverty. These measures have provided additional room for continued dialogue on addressing the root causes of mass migration and could relieve the pressures of all parties involved.[10]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Moreover, the Biden administration has opposed Trump\u2019s \u201csanctions-centered\u201d and \u201cillusory warmongering\u201d approach to Venezuela and lifted restrictions on the country, which has eased bilateral hostility and further enabled political concessions from Nicol\u00e1s Maduro\u2019s government while addressing migration and human rights.[11]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

As for economic cooperation, the Biden administration has strengthened economic ties with Latin America, advancing both a policy priority to promote regional prosperity and a strategic measure to mitigate China\u2019s growing influence in areas such as trade and investment. At the 2022 Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, Biden announced the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), which aims to \u201ctackle economic inequality, foster regional economic integration and good jobs, and restore faith in democracy.\u201d[12]<\/span><\/a><\/span> While stressing the need for more resilient supply chains and inclusive trade, the leaders of APEP member states have recently declared the launch of a new investment platform for financing sustainable infrastructure, an accelerator program for investment to entrepreneurs, grants for migrants and host communities, workforce development in digital technology, and a climate financing fund.[13]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

On paper, the APEP could upscale Biden\u2019s engagement with Latin America by offering potentially viable alternatives to Beijing\u2019s approach to investment and development rather than labeling it a \u201cdebt trap\u201d and citing a lack of transparency, further promoting regional integration with substantial input and influence from the U.S. Furthermore, combined with refreshing changes in diplomatic stance on other priorities, the APEP and other initiatives that the U.S. may offer could enable mutually beneficial progress at the negotiating table, and also elevate U.S. standing in the region as a responsible neighbor.<\/p>\n

A Rocky Path: Criticisms and Challenges<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Biden\u2019s dedication and practical efforts to engage with Latin American countries has experienced several limitations and will continue to be tested by various factors. First and foremost, the risk of neglecting Latin America as a foreign policy priority is still present. For the Biden administration, the regions of focus in formulating dedicated and responsive foreign policies thus far have been Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East, in order to meet the urgent needs of regional allies and counter geopolitical foes in conflicts at present and in the foreseeable future. As a result, the momentum for concrete initiatives and commitments that President Biden has initiated in those parts of the world has not been mirrored in Latin America. Tim Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia who serves on the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, has criticized the Biden administration for lacking \u201cheft\u201d in its approach to Latin America.[14]<\/span><\/a><\/span> When the Biden administration engages with Latin America, there are controversies surrounding the lack of preparedness and inclusiveness.<\/p>\n

For example, Mexican President Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador, along with the leaders of Honduras, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, chose not to attend the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles in protest against the Biden administration\u2019s decision to not invite Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua due to the countries\u2019 human rights records.[15]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Such a decision by the Biden administration, both controversial and unilateral in nature,has caused discontent among regional partners and created unwanted roadblocks on Washington\u2019s pathway to normalizing relations with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, three countries that are integral to the U.S.-Latin American relations and to the region as a whole. Perhaps the most critical shortcoming of U.S. diplomatic efforts in Latin America has been the lack of American ambassadors on the ground. Despite the US-Latin American relationship being at a critical juncture, the Senate has not yet confirmed ambassadors to Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, Barbados, and The Bahamas, which are all key countries in the region. The White House has been slow to name an ambassador in some cases, which has led to criticisms of the Biden administration\u2019s regional policy and could further jeopardize Washington\u2019s will of engagement.[16]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, there are uncertainties surrounding the overall effectiveness and practicability of the Biden administration\u2019s deliverables to Latin American partners. Although the Biden administration has praised the APEP as a landmark initiative to both strengthen regional partnerships and compete with China, there has been a lack of response from the administration to rally and integrate American firms. Ed Brzytwa, the vice president of international trade at the Consumer Technology Association (CTA), stated that the CTA filed comments to Global Affairs Canada on APEP because the Biden administration had not sought their input.[17]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The APEP also lacks firm agreements, negotiations, and commitments on market access, which could stall the elimination of tariffs and the increase in trade flows.[18]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Furthermore, Brazil and Argentina, two of the region\u2019s largest economies, remain outside of the APEP club, which adds further questions on the full potential of the program.[19]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Competing with China in the development realm presents a crucial challenge for Washington in its efforts, both at present and in the long term, to win over Latin American countries from Beijing\u2019s network. China has been largely successful in coordinating both state-owned enterprises and private firms, and combining public and private financial resources to finalize projects and further advance strategic objectives for overseas development.[20]<\/span><\/a><\/span> On the other hand, the U.S. continues to encounter significant challenges in mobilizing capital from the private sector to achieve foreign policy.[21]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Such a disparity could explain why Beijing\u2019s programs, namely the BRI, are gaining traction in a region that highly prioritizes development while Washington-led initiatives, including the APEP, lack the momentum to compete, and further result in diplomatic consequences unfavorable to the U.S. Existing data shows that Latin American countries where China economically surpassed the U.S. were 26 percentage points less inclined to vote in alignment with Washington than other member states at the United Nations.[22]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Lastly, democracy promotion, which matches Biden\u2019s progressive mindset and thus occupies significant space in the administration\u2019s foreign policy, can be counterproductive when Washington attempts to cooperate with Latin American countries. Elements of democracy often appear in Biden’s diplomatic statements and the administration’s approach to both political and economic engagement with regional partners,as seen when the U.S. President called for a Latin America that is \u201csecure, prosperous and democratic, from Canada’s northernmost reaches to the southern tip of Chile\u201d at the Summit of the Americas.[23]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The Biden administration\u2019s strong emphasis on promoting democracy not only attaches political conditionality to its engagement with Latin America but could also lead to accusations, especially from non-democratic countries in the region that have a troubled past with the U.S., that Washington is interfering with Latin American countries\u2019 domestic affairs. In contrast, Beijing\u2019s principle of non-intervention and support for \u201cSouth-South cooperation\u201d in both diplomacy and development will receive more support.<\/p>\n

The Building Blocks of Beijing\u2019s Foothold: Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have treated Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as undemocratic and aggressive foes, with no foreseeable or significant improvement in their respective multilateral relationships. Beijing, on the other hand, saw this as a grand opening to strengthen its own regional network within Latin America and further reshape the region to its favor and against Washington\u2019s liking. Such a development greatly restrains, if not overwhelms, the current Biden administration\u2019s efforts to unseat China in the fierce regional competition.<\/p>\n

Cuba is a case with various implications. The government of Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel has continued to foster closer security relations with China. Recent developments have seen the two partners strengthening intelligence cooperation and planning to build a joint military training facility on the island nation, further challenging U.S. military establishments in the region.[24]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In addition, with the continuation of the U.S. embargo, Havana is heavily dependent on Beijing for trade, investment, and economic assistance.<\/p>\n

Nicaragua, which re-established diplomatic ties with China in 2021, joined the BRI a year later, and signed a Free Trade Agreement in August 2023, demonstrates both the fast-paced nature and effectiveness of China\u2019s deepening foothold in Latin America. Following the deterioration of U.S.-Nicaragua relations, Beijing has signed multi-million-dollar infrastructure deals with Managua.[25]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Such agreements have led to the reconstruction and expansion of the Punta Huete International Airport, the construction of a solar plant, a hydroelectric project, the expansion of coastal highways, and the development of new rail lines.[26]<\/span><\/a><\/span> At the same time, Beijing has fostered close political ties with the Ortega government, further expanding its influence in Latin America, which continues to challenge the U.S. sphere.[27]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Following Venezuelan President Maduro\u2019s state visit to Beijing in September 2023, Venezuela-China ties were significantly upgraded to an \u201call-weather\u201d partnership, a privileged position in China\u2019s diplomatic circle that only a limited number of countries were to receive.[28]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The meeting between President Maduro and President Xi Jinping concluded with deepened cooperation between Caracas and Beijing in BRI development projects and across various sectors ranging from trade to education.[29]<\/span><\/a><\/span> At the same time, Venezuela has been the biggest borrower of Chinese loans for energy and infrastructure projects, valued at approximately $60 billion, which doubled the amount borrowed by Brazil.[30]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Through deepening ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, China has been able to establish a firm foothold in the region. As the relations between the U.S. and these three key regional powers continue to sour, the latter’s connection with and dependence on Beijing will continue to strengthen. As a result, the current administration, and perhaps future administrations, will encounter additional hardships in \u201cwrestling\u201d with China.<\/p>\n

The Latin American View: From Diplomatic Pragmatism to Non-Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\n

Previous decades saw U.S. hegemony establishing a solid influence over Latin America, which strengthened the region\u2019s dependence on Washington. The current geopolitical landscape in the region differs not only due to China\u2019s growing influence, which has undermined the U.S.-centric framework, but also because of diversity and flexibility in the foreign policy intellect of Latin American countries to fulfill their own national interests while balancing great power competition in an increasingly multipolar world. This is especially apparent in the cases of Brazil and Chile.<\/p>\n

Brazil, under President Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva (Lula), has been balancing ties with both Beijing and Washington without favoring one power over the other. The Lula administration views the U.S. as a trustworthy ally for foreign direct investment, shared democratic values, and cooperation in the fields of security and challenges. Similarly, they see China as a key partner in trade, complementary investment, diplomatic coordination, and cooperation through BRICS.[31]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In addition, President Lula has undertaken symbolic state visits to both Washington and Beijing in early 2023, further signifying Brazil\u2019s willingness to strengthen ties with both powers despite the ongoing power competition.<\/p>\n

Chile, under President Gabriel Boric, is just as relevant in determining Latin American countries\u2019 pragmatic position on U.S.-China competition. Maintaining close ties with both Beijing and Washington is important for Santiago, considering that China is Chile\u2019s top trading partner, while the U.S. is its primary source of investment.[32]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Chile has continued to forge a close partnership with Beijing through the BRI, particularly technological cooperation via the Digital Silk Road while remaining a key member of the APEP.[33]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In addition, downturns in the U.S.-China competition could directly impact Chile. For example, a decrease in demand for Chinese goods resulting from U.S. tariffs could cause China to require less copper, leading to decreased exports from Chile.[34]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Latin America at present should not be characterized as a geopolitical possession to be \u201cwrestled back,\u201d but rather a primary example of Active Non-Alignment (ANA). ANA prioritizes the national interests of Latin American countries and diversification of Latin America\u2019s relations with other countries and regions, in the Global South or elsewhere, rather than accepting the stances of any of the great powers in competition or conflict and subjugating to pressures.[35]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The reality facing both Beijing and Washington is that more countries in Latin America, and other parts of the world, have chosen an independent and pragmatic approach in their ongoing competition for influence. These countries seek to derive benefits from partnerships with both powers while maintaining neutrality and minimizing risks when responding to sensitive geopolitical issues. As a result, the \u201cwrestling\u201d geopolitical rhetoric seems less suitable, and more emphasis should be placed on the foreign policies of Latin American countries.<\/p>\n

Conclusion: The Future Power Dynamics in Latin America <\/strong><\/p>\n

U.S.-China relations are changing rapidly. So are the power dynamics in Latin America. Both the U.S. and China will continue to actively compete for influence and a foothold in such a developing region. For Washington, despite the Biden administration\u2019s firm belief in engagement with Latin America, the lack of efficient focus and resources to drive development programs, and Beijing\u2019s deepening partnerships with strategically significant countries made it unlikely that the U.S. will easily prevail anytime soon. However, the Biden administration should avoid additional criticism towards China, as it will show deprecation and weakness.[36]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Instead, it should continue to revitalize its Latin American policy to offer regional partners alternatives with concrete frameworks and benefits.<\/p>\n

At the same time, it is critical for both American and Chinese leadership and policymakers to acknowledge that Latin America is not merely a geopolitical arena for a prolonged U.S.-China standoff but rather an independent region with the potential for long-term partnerships. Competition can drive progress but does not necessarily require taking sides. More Latin American countries have started to demonstrate significant diplomatic wisdom and pragmatism in approaching both the U.S. and China as equal partners rather than aligning with one and not the other. This is a reality that Beijing and Washington should accept. Therefore, neither China nor the U.S. should \u201cwrestle\u201d Latin America from each other\u2019s embrace. As the U.S. and China continue to coexist in Latin America, countries in the region should assess foreign policy decisions based on national interests rather than geopolitical influence and potentially serve as mitigators in the ongoing great power competition.<\/p>\n

\n
\"\"
Frank Wang is a recipient of the dual degree BA\/MAIA with a specialization in diplomacy. His academic focus encompasses East Asian international relations, US-China relations, and Chinese foreign policy. Frank is currently conducting research on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China\u2019s approach to global governance. He is also dedicated to exploring the fields of international law and intercultural communication.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\n

Bibliography<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/span><\/a> Long, Tom. \u201cFrom Trump to Biden in Latin America\u201d, NACLA Report on the Americas, 53:3 (Summer 2021). https:\/\/nacla.org\/news\/2021\/05\/26\/trump-biden-latin-america.\u00a0<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

[2]<\/span><\/a> Kirk, John, and Stephen Kimber. Fifty Years after Chile\u2019s Coup, the Region Still Not Safe from US Meddling, Al Jazeer, September 11, 2023, www.aljazeera.com\/opinions\/2023\/9\/11\/fifty-years-after-chiles-coup-the-region-still-not-safe-from-us-meddling<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

[3]<\/span><\/a> Shifter, Michael. \u201cUS Foreign Policy toward Latin America.\u201d The Dialogue: Leadership of the Americas, June 8, 2018. <\/span>https:\/\/www.thedialogue.org\/analysis\/us-foreign-policy-toward-latin-america\/<\/span><\/a>; \u201cNorthern Triangle of Central America: The 2019 Suspension and Reprogramming of U.S. Funding Adversely Affected Assistance Projects.\u201d U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 24, 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

[4]<\/span><\/a> Roy, Diana. \u201cChina\u2019s Growing Influence in Latin America. Council on Foreign Relations\u201d, June 15, 2023,\u00a0 <\/span>www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[6]<\/span><\/a> Stuenkel, Oliver. \u201cTrump Drove Latin America into China\u2019s Arms.\u201d Foreign Affairs, November 13, 2020. <\/span>https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/south-america\/2020-11-13\/trump-drove-latin-america-chinas-arms<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

[7]<\/span><\/a> \u201cRemarks by President Biden on America\u2019s Place in the World.\u201d The White House Briefing Room, February 4, 2021. <\/span>https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/speeches-remarks\/2021\/02\/04\/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/span><\/a> Camilleri, Michael. \u201cJoe Biden, Friend of Latin America.\u201d The Dialogue: Leadership of the Americas, December 9, 2020. <\/span>https:\/\/www.thedialogue.org\/analysis\/joe-biden-amigo-de-america-latina<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[10]<\/span><\/a> Mahmoud, Sodfa Mohamed. \u201cBiden and the US-China rivalry in Latin America.\u201d Trends Research, February 17, 2021. <\/span>https:\/\/trendsresearch.org\/research.php?id=630&amp;title=Biden_and_the_US-China_rivalry_in_Latin_America<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[11]<\/span><\/a> Ibid. Alvarez, Priscilla. \u201cBiden Administration Banks on New Venezuela Strategy as US Grapples with Mass Migration.\u201d CNN Politics, November 3, 2023. https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2023\/11\/03\/politics\/biden-administration-venezuela-mass-migration\/index.html#:~:text=For%20years%2C%20the%20US%20was,Venezuela%2C%20marking%20a%20significant%20breakthrough<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

[12]<\/span><\/a> Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.\u201d Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, U.S. Department of State. <\/span>https:\/\/www.state.gov\/americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[13]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[14]<\/span><\/a> Bade, Gavin. \u201cBiden\u2019s Missing Latin America Agenda.\u201d Politico, August 4, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/www.politico.com\/newsletters\/politico-nightly\/2023\/08\/04\/bidens-missing-latin-america-agenda-00109934\/a>.<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[15]<\/span><\/a> Kendrick, Matthew. \u201cBiden\u2019s Pivot to Asia Risks Neglecting Latin America.\u201d Global Politics, Morning Consult Pro, May 31, 2022. <\/span>https:\/\/pro.morningconsult.com\/trend-setters\/bidens-china-pivot-and-latin-america<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/span><\/a> Wilner, Michael, and Jacqueline Charles. \u201cAcross the Americas, crises roil without U.S. ambassadors on the ground.\u201d The Miami Herald, November 5, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/www.miamiherald.com\/news\/nation-world\/world\/americas\/article281400948.html <\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[17]<\/span><\/a> Bade, \u201cBiden\u2019s Missing Latin America Agenda.<\/span><\/p>\n

[18]<\/span><\/a> Smith, Tori. \u201cAmericas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Is Unlikely to Expand Trade.\u201d American Action Forum, March 2, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/www.americanactionforum.org\/insight\/americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity-is-unlikely-to-expand-trades.de\/EN\/Press\/2022\/02\/PE22_N010_51.html”>https:\/\/www.destatis.de\/EN\/Press\/2022\/02\/PE22_N010_51.html<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/span><\/a> Feinberg, Richard E. \u201cA Path Forward for the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.\u201d Global Americans, January 31, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/theglobalamericans.org\/2023\/01\/a-path-forward-for-the-americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/span><\/a> Urdinez , Francisco. \u201cEconomic Displacement: China\u2019s Growing Influence in Latin America.\u201d Wilson Center, June 16, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/blog-post\/economic-displacement-chinas-growing-influence-latin-america<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[21]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[22]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[23]<\/span><\/a> End, Aurelia, and Shaun Tandon. \u201cBiden Calls for Democracy, Not \u2018debt-Trap,\u2019 in Americas Summit.\u201d Barron\u2019s, November 3, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/www.barrons.com\/news\/biden-calls-for-democracy-not-debt-trap-in-americas-summit-0bc52f59<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[24]<\/span><\/a> Lazarus, Leland. \u201cChina\u2019s Ties to Cuba and Growing Presence in Latin America Raise Security Concerns in Washington, Even as Leaders Try to Ease Tensions.\u201d The Conversation, July 7, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/theconversation.com\/chinas-ties-to-cuba-and-growing-presence-in-latin-america-raise-security-concerns-in-washington-even-as-leaders-try-to-ease-tensions-208645<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[25]<\/span><\/a> MacDonald, Scott B. \u201cChina and Nicaragua\u2019s Deepening Embrace.\u201d China Brief Volume: 23 Issue: 21, November 20, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/jamestown.org\/program\/china-and-nicaraguas-deepening-embrace<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[26]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[27]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[28]<\/span><\/a> \u201cChina upgrades relationship with Venezuela to \u201call weather\u201d partnership.\u201d Associated Press, September 13, 2023. https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/china-venezuela-relationship-all-weather-0c9122e6e69c29ebe1a99356d1a4560a<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

[29]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[30]<\/span><\/a> Roy, \u201cChina\u2019s Growing Influence in Latin America.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

[31]<\/span><\/a> Berg, Ryan C., and Carlos Baena. \u201cThe Great Balancing Act: Lula in China and the Future of U.S.-Brazil Relations.\u201d Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 19, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/great-balancing-act-lula-china-and-future-us-brazil-relations<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/span><\/a> Holmes, Steven. \u201cCompeting Visions for Economic &amp; Security Partnership in the Pacific\u2014What Role for LAC?\u201d The Dialogue: Leadership of the Americas, September 22, 2022. <\/span>https:\/\/www.thedialogue.org\/analysis\/competing-visions-for-economic-security-partnership-in-the-pacific-what-role-for-lac\/<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[33]<\/span><\/a> Fern\u00e1ndez, Pamela Ar\u00f3stica. \u201cChile\u2019s Once-Pioneering Relationship with China Is Turning into Dependency.\u201d The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), August 18, 2022. <\/span>https:\/\/merics.org\/en\/chiles-once-pioneering-relationship-china-turning-dependency<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[34]<\/span><\/a> Ibid<\/span><\/p>\n

[35]<\/span><\/a> Heine, Jorge. \u201cNon-Alignment Is Back in the Global South, Albeit in a Different Incarnation.\u201d Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, February 27, 2023. <\/span>https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/2023\/02\/27\/non-alignment-is-back-in-the-global-south-albeit-in-a-different-incarnation\/<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

[36]<\/span><\/a> Stuenkel, \u201cTrump Drove Latin America Into China\u2019s Arms.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Photo by Random Instiute via Unsplash By Frank Jiaqi Wang   Abstract Latin America has historically been an arena of both involvement and rivalry among the world\u2019s major powers. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine offered the U.S. geopolitical claim over the region as part of its own sphere of interests, leading to the expansion of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":21824,"featured_media":0,"parent":550,"menu_order":5,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1549"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/21824"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1549"}],"version-history":[{"count":20,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1549\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1573,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1549\/revisions\/1573"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/550"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1549"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}