{"id":1529,"date":"2024-04-27T13:44:49","date_gmt":"2024-04-27T17:44:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/?page_id=1529"},"modified":"2024-05-06T14:39:04","modified_gmt":"2024-05-06T18:39:04","slug":"german-russian-relations-a-history-and-the-way-ahead","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/pardeeatlas\/research-and-policy\/german-russian-relations-a-history-and-the-way-ahead\/","title":{"rendered":"German-Russian Relations: A History and the Way Ahead"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Photo by\u00a0<\/span>Egor Filin via<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Unsplash<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

By Emma Liu<\/p>\n

Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n

German-Russian relations have been on the center stage of Europe for over a century. The vicissitude of the bilateral relationship has long been an integral feature of modern European politics. From Bismarck to Hitler, from Brandt to Merkel, generations of German leadership have approached its powerful eastside neighbor via various philosophies and practices per the changing political, strategic, and economic environment. Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine in 2022 brought the relationship to a historical low in the post-war era. What is the current situation of German-Russian relations? What is the way ahead for Berlin and Moscow? What can the Scholz administration learn from the historical experience when it seeks to forge a new foreign policy strategy toward Russia in a time of crisis? This paper attempts to address these questions by contemplating the historical and political background of the relationship, analyzing the current challenges, and proposing some viable policy recommendations for the German government as it navigates the shifting dynamics of the bilateral relations.<\/p>\n

Historical\/Political Background <\/strong><\/p>\n

There is hardly any relationship between two states that is more dramatic than that of Germany and Russia, which has been full of ups and downs throughout modern history. Following a cyclical pattern from alliance to war, rapprochement to strain, and cooperation to conflict, German-Russian relations have helped to define European history for the past 150 years.<\/p>\n

From the Balance of Power to Two World Wars<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

The German-Russian relations in the late 19th century were marked by a delicate peace via the balance of power that was maintained through an extremely intricate multilayer alliance system devised by Otto von Bismarck, the mastermind of realpolitik and the first Chancellor of the German Empire. Shortly after the German unification in 1871, Germany successfully formed the League of the Three Emperors with Austria-Hungary and Russia. They aimed to alleviate the rivalry between Germany\u2019s two neighbors while reducing the chance of Russia allying with Germany\u2019s enemy, France.[1]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

However, the intensified competition between Austria and Russia in the Balkans eventually led to the dissolution of the League and a new alliance between Germany and Russia. This alliance was then followed by a Franco-Russian alliance that would provide mutual military aid in the event of a German attack.[2]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span> Amid the air of fear and ambition, the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the summer of 1914 and a series of miscalculations triggered between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, European powers (including Germany and Russia on the opposite sides) were entangled in a complex alliance web in what is now known as the Great War.[3]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The 1920s witnessed a warm rapprochement between the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia through the Treaty of Rapallo, under which both countries established friendly diplomatic relations.. [4]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span> In 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (USSR) signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact claiming non-aggression towards each other while dividing up Eastern Europe between the two..[5]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span> One month later, Germany invaded Poland and partitioned the country with the USSR.[6]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Yet, the non-aggression agreement between Berlin and Moscow was rapidly broken by Hitler\u2019s ambition. Germany\u2019s full-scale invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 propelled the latter to join the Allies, fighting alongside the United States (U.S.), Britain, and other countries against the Axis powers, and brought Germany to a fateful defeat during World War II (WWII).[7]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

From Hallstein Doctrine to Ostpolitik<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Following its fiasco in WWII, Germany and its capital, Berlin, were divided into two entities\u2014the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany), which was under the control of the U.S., Britain, and France, and the German Democratic Republic (DDR or East Germany) controlled by the Soviet Union.[8]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Claiming to be the sole legitimate heir of the German Reich and speaker of the German people, the government of the FRG refused to recognize the German Democratic Republic and implemented the strict \u201cHallstein Doctrine\u201d that the FRG would not establish diplomatic relations with other states (except for the USSR) that recognized the DDR.[9]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Encountering backfire over time, the old doctrine gave way to \u201cNeue Ostpolitik\u201d (\u201cnew eastern policy\u201d) during the 1960s, championed by the new FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt. Brandt believed that collaboration with the communist countries would foster trade and people-to-people exchange and would undermine the communist regime in the DDR in the long run.[10]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The \u201cOstpolitik\u201d and a series of subsequent treaties (such as the Four Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971 and the Basic Treaty in 1972) successfully helped West Germany bring about a rapprochement with East Germany and improve relations with the USSR, Poland, and other eastern bloc communist states.[11]<\/span><\/a><\/span> To a larger extent, it also contributed to the eventual end of the Cold War.<\/p>\n

Eleven months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany finally saw the reunification of its territory and people on October 3, 1990.[12]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Russia\u2019s support for German unification became a symbol of another historical reconciliation between the two countries after the bloodiest war in human history.[13]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Building on this positive momentum, Germany established a strategic partnership with Russia that centered on energy, particularly natural gas.[14]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In a pragmatic sense, Germany needs energy from Russia while Russia needs the German market and investment to develop its energy sector.<\/p>\n

From the 1990s until the early 2010s, the overall German-Russian relations progressed steadily despite some hurdles, such as Russia\u2019s authoritarian rule, the Chechen Wars, and Berlin\u2019s support for NATO\u2019s expansions.[15]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Germany, as Russia\u2019s most important trade and economic partner, acted as the facilitator between Russia and the West. In 2010, the European Union (EU) and Russia launched the Partnership for Modernization, which aimed to advance economic and judicial reform in Russia.[16]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Meanwhile, Moscow responded positively to the Berlin-proposed Meseberg Initiative, which tended to resolve standing conflicts by creating a Russian-EU foreign policy and security committee.[17]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In 2012, Germany helped Russia obtain its World Trade Organization membership, leading the annual bilateral trade to over 80 billion euros in the same year.[18]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s Annexation of Crimea in 2014<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

In 2014, Russia supported the separatist groups in the Donbas war in eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea.[19]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In its wake, German-Russian relations took a sharp, negative turn. Berlin became a leading voice for harsh economic sanctions against Moscow, to which the Kremlin responded with a ban on food imports from the EU.[20]<\/span><\/a><\/span> On the diplomatic front, Germany, along with France, Russia, and Ukraine, set up the Normandy Format to seek a peaceful resolution.[21]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Nevertheless, given the seemingly irreconcilable positions of Moscow and Kyiv, the Minsk agreements produced by the Normandy Format failed to stop the fighting and turned virtually powerless to prevent Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.<\/p>\n

Merkel’s Legacy<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Regarded as one of the greatest German leaders in the postwar era, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who served in the office from 2005 until 2021, was a decisive figure in buttressing the German-Russian partnership during the early 21st century. However, Merkel\u2019s Russian policy has long been criticized as \u201ctoo soft\u201d by the West.[22]<\/span><\/a><\/span> During her tenure, Germany cut its military spending to a minimum while increasing its energy dependence on Russian gas to a record high, from 36 percent imported in 2010 to 65 percent by 2020.[23]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

The crux of Merkel\u2019s appeasement approach toward Russia is the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline which she approved in 2015 after Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea.[24]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The $11.6 billion project aimed to deliver gas directly from Russia to northern Germany by building a pipeline under the Baltic Sea.[25]<\/span><\/a><\/span> This project made Europe more dependent on Russian gas by doubling the amount of gas delivered by Nord Stream 1. Higher energy dependence increased Europe\u2019s vulnerability and the Kremlin\u2019s leverage in the event of Russia\u2019s aggression. The pipeline also allowed Russian gas to bypass Ukraine, which will potentially lose $2 billion in transit fees.[26]<\/span><\/a><\/span> For these reasons, the U.S. and other European countries, such as Poland and Ukraine, have strongly opposed the project. However, as an astonishingly na\u00efve view expressed in a recently released 2021 top-secret security assessment on the pipeline, the Merkel administration argued that the possibility of a scenario where Russia cut its gas flow to Europe would be very low, and German regulators would be able to simply intervene and reason with the Russians if Gazprom violated the delivery contracts or EU law.[27]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Unfortunately, the reality was just the opposite. After serving for sixteen years, Merkel willingly left office in 2021 with her highly controversial mark on German-Russian relations that tainted her reputation and tested her successor, Olaf Scholz.<\/p>\n

Current Play\/Challenges <\/strong><\/p>\n

Since Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, relations between Berlin and Moscow have almost completely reversed from their positive status since the end of the Cold War.<\/p>\n

Security<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Two days after Russia invaded Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that the German government would send 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stinger surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine shortly after it approved the military aid by the Netherlands and Estonia.[28]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Immediately after, on February 27, Scholz delivered his famous \u201cZeitenwende\u201d speech.[29]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In the speech, he declared that Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine was a \u201cturning point\u201d threatening the post-war order and promised that Germany would scale up its support for Ukraine, rethink its relationship with Russia, and spend two percent of its GDP matching the NATO\u2019s pledged standard \u201cfrom now on.\u201d[30]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Yet, in contrast to the grand speech was Berlin\u2019s inability to live up to its promises and wide criticism and pressure from Kyiv and the allies.[31]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The most notable episode was Germany\u2019s postponed delivery of its promised state-of-the-art Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, contingent upon the condition of the U.S. delivery of its Abram tanks.[32]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Besides the concern that sending advanced weapons to Ukraine would risk escalating the war, Germany\u2019s initial reluctance to send weapons was due largely to its historical legacy, public opinion, and domestic politics. The country\u2019s catastrophic WWII past and the post-war pacifist and Ostpolitik policies have nurtured across major political parties a deep sense of self-restraint from wars, a policy of not sending weapons to countries at war, and, among the German people, a conscious devotion to peace.[33]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Sensitive to Germany being a leader in military affairs and worried about a potential confrontation with Russia, half of the German public opposed sending tanks to Ukraine, a country that Germany used to wreak havoc on. Inter- and intra-party divisions over this issue also grew wide.[34]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Hence, it is understandable that the Scholz administration had a hard time realizing Germany\u2019s \u201cZeitenwende\u201d moment overnight.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, after a long halt, Germany did deliver what it promised. As the war marched into its second year, Berlin finally supported Kyiv with eighteen Leopard 2 tanks along with additional support from other EU states (such as Poland), thirty-one Abrams tanks from Washington, and fourteen Challenger 2 tanks from London.[35]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In March 2023, Berlin approved a new arms package worth 2.7 billion euros (approximately $2.95 billion) to Kyiv, making it the largest military aid package from Germany to Ukraine since the beginning of the war.[36]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

The series of decisions by Berlin marked a profound transposition in Germany\u2019s foreign and security policy\u2014particularly, a shift away from its longstanding defense policy after WWII of not exporting lethal weapons into a conflict zone while, in general, a shift in its role in Europe.[37]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Economic Sanctions<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

More than military aid, Germany has responded to Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine with ten sanction packages under the banner of the EU, aiming to impose severe consequences on Russia\u2019s aggression and to undermine its ability to continue the war.<\/p>\n

Financial Sector<\/em><\/p>\n

In an effort to limit Russia\u2019s access to its war funding, the EU, alongside the U.S., UK, and Canada, has excluded major Russian banks, including SberBank (Russia\u2019s largest financial institution) and Alfa Bank (Russia\u2019s largest private bank), from the international financial messaging system SWIFT.[38]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The EU has also prohibited all transactions with the Russian central bank and froze all its assets, disrupting Moscow\u2019s attempt to save its depreciating currency.[39]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Energy Sector<\/em><\/p>\n

The focal point of economic sanctions is the energy sector, the primary pillar of the Russian economy. Several rounds of sanctions on imports of Russian products, especially oil and coal, have been put in place. After initially rejecting the idea, the Scholz administration, in June of 2022, eventually came onto the board with the EU\u2019s partial embargo on imports of Russian oil, including seaborne imports of crude oil and petroleum products.[40]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In addition, Germany, along with Poland, voluntarily pledged to ban oil imports from Russia by pipeline, which was exempt from the EU\u2019s sanctions.[41]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Although no EU sanctions have targeted Russian gas due to Europe\u2019s heavy reliance on the specific product, Chancellor Scholz decided to suspend the certification process for the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline in February 2022, a big turn-around from Merkel\u2019s legacy and the chancellor\u2019s own attitude months before.[42]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Moreover, Germany has strived to reduce its energy dependency on Russia by securing natural gas sources from other places, such as Norway and the Netherlands, building its infrastructure for the import of liquefied natural gas from the U.S. and Qatar, and temporarily reactivating coal and oil-fired power plants.[43]<\/span><\/a><\/span> By the end of June 2022, Germany\u2019s gas import from Russia only counts for about 25 percent of its total need compared to 55 percent prior to the war.[44]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Due to the widely applied sanctions and Berlin\u2019s effort to reduce its energy reliance on Moscow, bilateral trade between the two countries plummeted. By February 2023, the first full year of the war, Germany\u2019s imports from Russia decreased by more than 90 percent. Specifically, Germany\u2019s imports of Russian oil and gas dropped by 99.8 percent, from 2.2 billion euros to 4.2 million euros.[45]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Coal imports decreased by 92.5 percent.[46]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Meanwhile, Germany\u2019s exports to Russia saw a similar decline of 60.5 percent, from 2.1 billion euros to 800 million euros.[47]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

In retaliation to Western sanctions, Moscow gradually reduced the flow of gas through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which is the biggest gas pipeline between Russia and Western Europe, to 20 percent of its capacity for \u201cequipment repairs\u201d in July 2022.[48]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Two months later, Russia halted the gas supply completely, claiming no gas supply resumption until the sanctions are lifted.[49]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The shortage of gas and the resulting soaring price caused a Europe-wide energy crisis that made the winter of 2022-2023 particularly harsh. The widespread energy crisis also exacerbated the food crisis in Europe as farmers would reduce their production due to the skyrocketed gas price.[50]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Other Measures<\/em><\/p>\n

In the transport sector, the EU has banned Russian road transport companies from entering the EU except for agricultural products and food.[51]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In February 2022, the EU closed all its airspace to Russian aircraft of all kinds and prohibited the export of goods or technology in the aviation and space industry to Russia.[52]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In terms of individual visa restriction, key individuals involved in Russia\u2019s aggression, including politicians, diplomats, oligarchs, and military officials, were denied access to the EU.[53]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

As the European Commission is currently preparing for its 11th sanction package, Germany, teamed up with Poland and some other EU states, is pushing for new sanctions on Russian civil nuclear energy activities, diamond imports, and the provision of information and communication technology services to Russian state firms.[54]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Information Operation<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russian Disinformation Campaign<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s disinformation operation attempting to influence German public opinion and policymaking is nothing new. It can be traced back to the Cold War era. From 2015 to 2021, studies have found more than 700 Russian campaigns targeting Germany on issues ranging from immigration to human rights to elections.[55]<\/span><\/a><\/span> The war in Ukraine set up the perfect stage for Russia to wave its notorious massive disinformation campaign to Germany and across Europe.<\/p>\n

Several studies showed that many comments calling out on Zelenskyy\u2019s appeal or criticizing the German government\u2019s policy against Russia on the websites of German major media outlets, such as Der Spiegel, were not posted \u201cby Germans.\u201d Instead, they were created by \u201cpro-Kremlin trolls” using random usernames (such as \u201czw9s,\u201d \u201cnzjdMFpV,\u201d etc.).[56]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Their comments would then be picked up by RIA Novosti, a news agency under the state-owned media company Russia Today (RT), and published in its pro-Russia\/anti-West propaganda articles.[57]<\/span><\/a><\/span> While the German public was facing the energy crisis and soaring gas prices, the Kremlin beefed up its disinformation campaign to exploit public anxiety and deepen the existing gap among the political parties over Germany\u2019s policy toward Russia. Narratives attempting to paint the European energy crisis and people\u2019s suffering from the energy shortage as a consequence of the West\u2019s sanctions against Russia flooded over social media.[58]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Another goal of Russian fake news and social media campaigns was to create a false impression that the German public opposed its government\u2019s support of Ukraine, which is the opposite of the fact. According to a poll conducted by German public broadcaster ARD in 2022, 86 percent of Germans see Russia as a global security threat.[59]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Another poll by Deutschlandtrend showed that 37 percent of respondents considered the sanctions against Moscow were not tough enough, and only 23 percent saw them too strict.[60]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Cybersecurity<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

In the Spring of 2015, Russian hackers attacked the internal computer system of the Bundestag, the German parliament, stealing more than 16 gigabytes of data which included confidential emails from lawmakers.[61]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Chancellor Merkel\u2019s own constituency office was also under attack with emails from 2012 to 2015 being stolen.[62]<\/span><\/a><\/span> Merkel described the attack as \u201coutrageous.\u201d \u201cNevertheless,\u201d she said, \u201cI will continue to strive for a good relationship with Russia, because I believe that there is every reason to always continue these diplomatic efforts.\u201d[63]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Unfortunately, the former chancellor\u2019s goodwill was not received in an equal manner by the Kremlin. After the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia\u2019s cyberattack only intensified and became more politicized. Whenever the German government made an important decision against Russia, the number of Russian cyberattacks on German targets surged. A case in point was the increased attacks on German companies, airports, financial institutions, and government agencies following Chancellor Scholz\u2019s decision to deliver Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.[64]<\/span><\/a><\/span> In February 2023, Germany\u2019s interior minister warned that \u201cThe cybersecurity concerns have been exacerbated by the war. The attacks of pro-Russia hackers have increased [\u2026.] We are in competition with ever new manners of attack and technologies.\u201d[65]<\/span><\/a><\/span> So far, the German government has expanded its Federal Office for Information Security to advance the security authorities\u2019 capacity to tackle the long-lasting issue.[66]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

As Russia\u2019s aggression in Ukraine fundamentally altered the balance of power in Europe, the Scholz administration is tasked with the tough mission of developing a clear, sensible strategy as to how to redefine German-Russian relations and Berlin\u2019s role on the continent. Germany, once again, standing at a historical watershed, ponders the way ahead.<\/p>\n

Lessons Learned <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

From the country\u2019s historical and current experience of dealing with Russia, specifically the Putin regime, some essential lessons can be distilled for the German government.<\/p>\n

First and foremost, Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine has shown that the half-century-long Ostpolitik and Merkel\u2019s legacy in German foreign policy toward Russia are no longer feasible. Political reconciliation through economic cooperation has become impossible with the Putin regime in the context of an aggressive war. Contrary to the original intention of bringing Russia closer to the West through economic interdependence, Germany\u2019s energy dependence on Russia has become the most vulnerable spot for the Kremlin to exploit for its militaristic ambition. The failure of the Minsk agreements to stop the wars and Moscow\u2019s intensified retaliatory cyberattacks have further exposed the weakness of the German-Russian \u201cstrategic partnership.\u201d Tolerance and appeasement in Merkel\u2019s era should be replaced by systematic, robust countermeasures. However, it is equally important to distinguish between those responsible for war crimes and the general Russian people and culture.<\/p>\n

In the meantime, Germany should adapt its post-war pacifist security policy standing to the new strategic imperatives in Europe. While it is crucial to sustain the moral foundation of Germany\u2019s foreign policy, the German government should look beyond its dark past and into the future, where the peace and prosperity of Europe demand Berlin to play a bigger, more decisive role in this historical juncture.<\/p>\n

Policy Proposals<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Based on the analysis above, a series of policy recommendations are proposed for the German government to manage its ongoing relationship with Russia.<\/p>\n