

MOTIVE

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CONTENTS OCTOBER 1964

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
2 the picket line / 4 editorial / 6 STUDENTS AND POLITICS, by Wilson Carey McWilliams / 13 A BEAD ON THE BIRCHERS, by John Allen Broyles / 16 THE MEETING OF THE TWAIN: THE SOUTH AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, by H. C. McClesky / 21 THE SEARCH FOR BLACK POWER, by Nat Hentoff / 24 CONSERVATISM VS. THE MODERN RIGHT, by William Koelsch / 29 THE UNPOPULARITY OF INTELLECT, by Richard Hofstadter / 34 SICK, SICK, SICK?—THEN GIVE, GIVE, GIVE—OR DIE! by Robert Short / 42 BENEATH AFFLUENCE, BEYOND ALIENATION, by Alvin Pitcher / 44 FOUR POEMS: Sheppard Kominars, Judson Crews, Carol Hill, Fran Hassencahl / 48 fiction: KINIEV—AFTER, by Edward Lanning / 53 books / 56 contributors / 57 SPECIAL ELECTION SUPPLEMENT, from the editors of *CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS*

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MOTIVE



a still, small voice?

MYERS



SENATOR

WATER



WATER

GEORGE



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HARP

SEN

STATE

GEORGE



SENATOR



THE THY GOD

REINWA

DULL

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
DRUG

VOTE

DRUG



George 964



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I have recently read

"Dialogue or Dissonance" by Elwood B. Ehrle (*motive*, April, 1964). I was at times amused and at other times amazed at what he said. He does have some trenchant criticisms of the present role of the church and its professional leadership. There is truth to be found here.

He had a rather unique definition of the church. He said, "My 'definition' of the church is quite simple: by it I refer simply to a group of people. Beyond this, one becomes embroiled in irrelevancies." Since Mr. Ehrle is a biologist I am sure he will understand my simple definition of a horse. A horse is a quadruped. Beyond this, one becomes embroiled in irrelevancies. His definition is an inadequate foundation for the article.

What is the message of the church? What is the purpose of the church? These questions needed to be dealt with more clearly.

He said, "At least two major staffing deficiencies face Protestant Christendom: quantity and quality." What other problems are there to be faced?

If he were involved in some phase of the training of the clergy I could take his evaluations of seminary training more seriously. I am involved in seminary training at the present time. I can see weaknesses in the curriculum but on the whole those going out are well trained. There is a real emphasis upon scholarship here. I have seen several scholars from here go out into the world. On the other hand I would agree with Mr. Ehrle that most clergy are not permitted to function as scholars once their formal training is completed.

Just as a theologian has to exercise caution when he gives weighty pronouncements upon some phase of science so a scientist must exercise caution when he dons the role of a theologian.

RODGER ZELLER
 fuller seminary
 pasadena, california

My appreciation

and admiration for *motive* continues unabated, but I wonder if there isn't one area characterized by—to use an observation applied to the artist Paul Nash—"the presence of an absence." I mean the absence of any consistent Biblical reflection? The arts, existentialist theology and philosophy, social and political comment are all ably represented . . . and I agree.

But look, isn't there an area of critically alive dialogue in the church which finds *motive* strangely silent and aloof? The current generation of theologians—Ebeling, Ott, and all their company—are insisting that one of the foremost tasks in theology, preaching and church life is hermeneutics, the art or science of interpreting the Bible.

What I'm suggesting is not an entering into the jargon of the technicalities of Biblical exegesis, but some reflection of the historico-critical work being done, and some of the beauty and excitement of scholarship brought to bear on the handling of Biblical content. The purpose would be to simply lay bare, in a meditative, reflective way, some text, scene, episode of the Bible. Let it be as a poem has being: the craftsmanship is subdued to the statement.

TOM PAYNE
 wesley foundation
 university of minnesota

Cheapskate that I am

I have never had a subscription to *motive*, and so I see it only when I am around people who are as interested in graphics as I am. It has been a year—what a surprise! Always tops on my list as far as art was concerned, I had always found the layout and typography rather uninspired, but no more—it's beautiful, imaginative, exciting, and the increased use of good photography is another pleasant change in the last year.

DAVID R. ANDERSON
board of parish education
lutheran church in america
philadelphia, pa.

I wish to commend

you on the interesting article by Robert Short, "The Penultimate Peanuts" (October, 1963). Mr. Short's assertion: "Any resemblance between our contentions and Schulz's intentions is purely hypothetical" is perhaps more true than he realizes. Intentions may be important in analyzing art, but if so, *only the intention of the work*, not the artist. Were this not the case a critic would not be a critic but would be an historian of personalities, or perhaps, a psychologist. For the true task of the critic is to reveal what artists *do*, not what they may or may not think. Every work "means" on many levels, and this article clarified one of the levels on which something as "ordinary" as a comic strip can mean.

Arnold Isenberg has probably stated the function of art criticism more clearly than anyone else when he said its function is "to bring about communication at the level of the senses; that is, to *induce* a sameness of *vision*, of experienced content. . . . Reading criticism otherwise than in the presence, or with direct recollection, of the objects discussed is a blank and senseless employment." For having reproduced the strips along with the article, I thank both you and Mr. Short.

GEORGE W. LINDEN
southern illinois university
east st. louis, illinois

. . . and so you see

it isn't really any one quickly-articulated thing that makes me feel hostile to your magazine, but rather an aggregate of irritations of a fingernail on a chalky blackboard as the generally *strained* feeling *motive* gives: the feeling that you are trying painfully hard to show that you too know it's hip to be an intellectual—that you too have made the metamorphosis from convention-conscious institute-attending hot-sweet-awkward-necking m.y.f.-er to the reserved-intense, *sensitive* young collegian who knows damn well that he'd better have something cogent to say about the absurdest theatre or he'll never make the grade with the big boys. minor pimples bobbing up and down on your verbal upper lip such as copy-writers who think they are e.e. cummings or archy or *somebody* and art that is to picasso and klee as disneyland is to the taj mahal. and i think that the next time some campus wit comes over and quips, 'well, are you eagerly awaiting the coming of the great pumpkin?' i'll throw something very lethal at his head. . . .

JIM RUHLEN
baker university
baldwin, kansas

. . . As each issue comes

out, I always plan to write and compliment you, but each issue surpasses the previous one. In addition to the "Death" issue, thank you particularly for the issue with the great cover by Jacob Lawrence.


I originally discovered *motive* in a sorority house at the University of Pennsylvania. The high quality of the art work was the original reason for my subscribing. Your choice of art and your intelligent and articulate articles are well worth the 50 cents per issue. As a Roman Catholic, I feel that your *motive* transcends sect and reaches everyone. So again I thank you for a stimulating, thought-provoking, discussion-inspiring magazine.

PATRICIA M. NUGENT
lansdowne, pa.


I am pleased

to see that once again *motive* is coming in for its share of criticism from those who like to criticize anything in the church which is worthwhile and challenging, anything that doesn't fit into their mold of Christian thought and practice. I refer particularly to recent blurbs which have been handed to me by disenchanted Methodist lay-groups in this sometimes sunny, golden-locked Southern California. *motive* once again is stirring up the wrath of the right-wing here—and I for one would like once again to extend the appreciation of the United Presbyterian Church for your publication, and express the hope that our relationship will continue for quite a while.

HERBERT A. STOCKER
calvary presbyterian church
wilmington, california



COMMITTEE REPORT



editorial:

Dirty Christians

DURING an election year the most often heard and often repeated statement by individual citizens is, "My vote doesn't count." Most candidates who have campaigned for office can testify that the aggregate vote from all such doubters could usually elect or defeat any candidate or issue on the ballot.

The most effective weapon in our possession is the right to vote, and the infrequent or casual use of this quiet revolver results in effectual marksmanship. A rusty voter usually makes a loud noise—after the score is already posted!

Election results may sometimes be insignificant and relatively inconsequential—or they may be pivotal, penetrating in impact on the subsequent flow of events. Both the tides of history and the eddies of hamlets allegedly can be altered by individual citizens amassed in corporate concern.

But even harder to accept than civic apathy is the dogmatic rejection of overt political action—and of the political order itself. Again the callow, dry phrase heard repeatedly from "religious" people: "Politics is dirty business. I don't want to get my hands soiled." There is legitimate justification politically, theologically, and socially for the historic separation of church and state. But to withdraw deliberately from the economic and political welfare of men is to misread the demands of the gospel and to pervert the ethical legacy of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

The methods and positions which Christian individuals and institutions pursue will vary, but disagreement and conflict may be the occasion for penetrating the smokescreen of propaganda and political cliches which veneer too many campaigns. Truth is not a monopoly of any party or sect, and honest disagreement can clarify issues and create more honest solutions. Harmony—whether in party or congregation—is too frequently the price paid for superficial unity, the gloss achieved which shatters principle and purpose.



It is shameful that the most frequent political activity of Christian communities has been only that of opposition (e.g. anti-gambling, anti-liquor, anti-pornography). Where has the church been in referendums seeking better employment practices or improved educational facilities, reform campaigns for honesty in office, and precinct caucuses for the selection of informed party officials? What of the "morality" of a nation which can discriminate against a candidate because he is divorced, and never ask the moral implications of other candidates whose nationalism, racism, or military status have far more severe moral ramifications? In the name of "moral goodness," we can become destructively naive and simplistic.

The pietistic discrimination between the so-called "sacred" and "secular" worlds has moved many Christians to a false sense of mission in their stated goal of being God's agents for reconciliation. We cannot continue to shake the dust, grime, greed, and graft of life from our vestments and parade in pious sham and indolent affluence before a world of crime and violence, hate and bigotry, poverty and ignorance. How can we act surprised when legislators, party and public officials, and political observers paternalistically humor our occasional pronouncements and resolutions, and politely receive our petty delegations?

If there is a perennial tension between the best and the possible, might we not become participants in the efforts to achieve the best? Some dirty hands and tarnished halos would be a refreshing symbol to a world grown accustomed to haughty declarations and Christmas baskets.

—BJS

For further editorial opinion, see our special election supplement beginning opposite page 56.

STUDENTS AND POLITICS

"THE WOULD-BE NEW RULERS AGAINST THE OLD"



BY WILSON CAREY McWILLIAMS

EVERY generation has its romance, and every older generation, its nostalgia. The political romance and nostalgia of most analysts of contemporary politics is the decade of the 1930's—the age, so the story goes, of political activism and excitement with ideas. Contrasted with this picture, the contemporary student looks a sorry creature. To the romanticists of the Roosevelt age, he has seemed indifferent, apathetic, part of a "silent" generation.

No one would dispute the facts on which this analysis is based, but it overlooks a critical fact. Students are always part of a surrounding political and social order; whatever unique qualities they may have are set within a context of attitudes and ideas deriving from political relations and social institutions. Students are never even "political men" in any unambiguous sense. They are moving *into* the world of politics, in a state of transition between the world of the child who sees problems as personal and familistic, and the world of the adult who hopefully sees problems in their broader social and political setting. The apathy of the campus, the silence of students, is not a unique quality of the young; student indifference to politics is part of a general indifference to politics in mass society.

Presuming that the men of the 1930's depict that age accurately, it was in any case, an aberrant decade. Far more typical, and far more contemporary with today's student, was the "lost" generation of the 1920's. Like all generations in the modern world, they found the technical and scientific ideas of their parents outdated, but they were also alienated from the moral goals of traditional America. The adult world offered little and threatened much, and the men of the twenties remained children, demanding immediate satisfactions in a world they had not made and could not control.

The students of the 1930's, however, can claim little credit for any increased political concern. They did not give up the demand for immediate satisfactions; the Great Depression simply made such gratifications impossible, and made the present seem as bleak and uncertain as the future had appeared to students in the days after the First World War. The men of the thirties chose to be part of the public and political world: they were *driven* into it. Having no alternative, they could identify with masses and movements, the great forces of history which promised to restore the logic and direction of a civilization which had broken down. The aim of the men of the thirties was not to reexamine the moral and philosophic foundations of industrial civilization, but to reestablish its institutions as rapidly as possible.

The zeal of the 1930's was not entirely admirable. Those with the highest idealism could be inhumane in their relations with concrete men. The New Deal's ebullient pragmatism and its concern for "what works" represented the morality of the time. So, in lesser degree, did the totalitarian parties, fervent for "growth" and the advance of human power at whatever the costs to men as individuals.

Whatever may be thought of the politics of the 1930's, it is evident that today's student lives in a very different world. Private gratification is easy in an age of affluence. The zealot of the 1930's has become the

prosperous professional of the 1960's, and his thoroughly calmed fervor has little to distinguish it from the indifference of his children. "The active religion of our times," wrote a French diplomat in 1848, "is politics." The active religion of the 1960's, by contrast, presuming that the sixties have either activity or religion, is indifference, and especially indifference to political life.

Political life demands three convictions of its votaries: (1) that politics is important to the individual, (2) that it is possible to understand the political world, and (3) that individual actions can be effective in politics or that more is to be gained by political involvement than is to be lost. Few citizens in our time, despite the renewed promise which President Johnson has brought to the political order, hold all three convictions.

Most men will concede that politics is important; the atomic bomb is enough to make each citizen recognize that political decisions vitally affect his life. Far fewer Americans, however, can perceive the political dimension of their everyday problems and tensions. Fewer still believe in their capacity to understand politics, and most of those are in error in that belief. Ours is a world of increasing political complexity, in which one must be a specialist to understand any part, but in which a specialist cannot understand the whole. If we judge whether Edward Teller or Linus Pauling is right about atomic weapons, our judgment is based more on moral predilection than on any knowledge of the scientific facts. Moreover, given the pace of change, an idea which was valid yesterday will be hopelessly obsolete tomorrow (or even today). The political world is full of a buzzing confusion from which the pillars of conviction and certainty have been removed.

It is almost impossible for the individual to believe in his own importance in the political world. Tocqueville said years ago that "As the public sphere expands, the private sphere contracts." In a world of billions of men and of massive material and technical power, the individual man seems infinitely small. The world seems composed of great and dimly comprehended forces subject to no human control, and of great crowds of men moving without apparent purpose toward some unseen destination.

This is not entirely a new phenomenon. James Bryce wrote of the "fatalism of the multitude" which he found in late nineteenth-century America. Men were nearly as confused by the world of 1890 as we tend to be by the world of 1964. They were no less convinced that individuals had little effect on the course of events. They did believe, however, that events were taking care of themselves, that the world was guided by the law of progress toward democracy, peace, and prosperity. Political indifference was not only justifiable, it was

morally preferable to political action. Only the "absurd attempt to make the world over," William Graham Sumner remarked, could upset the beneficent timetable of nature.

The growth of technological power did not frighten a world convinced that peace was the law of historical change. The development of mass media of communication did not disturb those who believed that truth triumphed over error in the test of debate. Our times, however, have been characterized more by disasters than by progress: the World Wars, the Great Depression, the rise of totalitarianism, the atom bomb, the Cold War. The uncomprehended world, which the nineteenth century people with friendly spirits, seems to be filled with demons. It is, after all, only prudence to expect the worst when the worst is possible and events can neither be understood nor controlled in such a way as to avoid it. The nineteenth century saw the promise in technological innovation; we tend to see its peril. Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* and George Orwell's *1984* stand as the symbols of their respective ages.

The world of headlines and happenings has not become "separated from the world of meaning," as some social theorists have asserted. For most Americans the world of events is, at best, so confusing that one cannot find or discern meaning, cannot identify the connection between personal life and political events. Yet many events seem to be only too meaningful; the meaning, however, is almost entirely negative, a suggestion of menace or a portent of evil.

The response of most Americans, faced with such a world, has been understandable enough. The political world, however important and however well understood, seems one in which the individual does not matter and one which threatens him with loss far more than it promises gain. To withdraw from involvement in such a world (or to seek to withdraw from it) seems only common sense. In the family, in private life, in daydream and fantasy, the American seems to find a manageable universe, full of meaning, possible to understand and subject to control.

Yet these small social units, the individual and the family, are never able to withdraw from the world. They are only too small to affect it. The family may seem independent, but its livelihood depends on economic forces like automation and on political decisions regarding economic growth; its residence is fixed by the market, which moves families from place to place, and by government decisions on public housing; its taste is structured by the mass media which play on the need for status among men who know themselves to be insignificant parts of a vast social order.

This is an age, Erik Eriksen comments, of a "locomotorist intoxication" in which men who have lost

the capacity for moving themselves become the spectators of movement. Men are encouraged to adapt themselves to those portions of the spectacle which touch their lives. Passivity and plasticity have become the qualities which guarantee success, or at least the sense of security: a man who cannot control or change his times can control and change himself.

Nonetheless, although he conceals it from the world and from himself, "adaptive man" resents being the plaything of impersonal and unconcerned forces. The forms of resentment are protean, but they all contain the potential threat of violence. Often unexpected, frequently without apparent purpose, violence is the constant companion of American society. A November day in Dallas, Texas; a student riot in Columbus, Ohio to protest the jailing of a co-ed on a jay-walking charge; savagery in Oxford, Mississippi or St. Augustine, Florida; the annual spring descent of northern students on the Florida beach towns; motorcycle gangs and Malcolm X; the contorted features of an anti-fluoridationist: the tragic and the inane, bestial and pathetic, the more pointless such outbreaks of violence become the more they serve their purpose. The object which the violent would destroy is, in reality, the social order itself; proximate enemies are selected only because they symbolize it: the Negro, chemicals in the drinking water, the President of the United States. Revolutionists without doctrine or party, the men of violence are openly what most Americans are only in secret and in dreams. Indeed, it is in the fear of "subversion" that Americans show most clearly that every citizen in mass society is to some degree a subversive.

The two worlds of men, the world of events *in* which men live, and the world of values and visions, which give structure and meaning to events, seem hopelessly separated. There is a perennial tension between the best and the possible, but today the two seem utterly incompatible. Yet it was the effort to find a connection between the world men were in and the world they were *of* that the classics defined as politics: the effort of men in common to discern the best possible life within the limits of time and nature. The crisis of contemporary American politics is that politics itself has seemed to be impossible.

THERE is very little in the actions and attitudes of contemporary students which would tend to suggest a unique contribution to American political life. The stamp of mass society is found in almost every facet of student activity, whether that activity is termed "political" or not. That quality may be observed clearly in four elements of current student life: (1) the "conservative revolt," (2) the personalist fixation of con-

temporary students, (3) their demand for immediate satisfactions or solutions, and (4) the poverty of social vision among even the "political" students.



THE CONSERVATIVE REVOLT

Nearly three years ago, Steven Roberts and I argued that the "conservative movement" among students had been built almost entirely on press clippings. Nothing in the present situation suggests that thesis to be in error. Rightist publications have a natural interest in magnifying any "conservative" tendencies among American students, and do not hesitate to do so. The membership lists of the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists (ISI) and the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) remain, despite generous assistance, small and uninfluential. Senator Goldwater's appeal is directly proportional to age: the younger the voter, the less likely he is to be among the small, vociferous band of the Senator's votaries.

There is, however, something behind the fanfare on the right: the changing composition of American colleges. The traditional American college was dominated by the children of the small town and small city aristocracy of business and professional men. Ruling from "Greek row," they dominated its attitudes and set its style. The rapid and radical expansion of enrollments, however, has begun to undermine the dominance among students of a class which long ago began being pushed to the wall in the nonstudent world. Lower class and lower middle class children are now more likely to attend colleges; the children of the business community are drawn more and more from corporate bureaucracy rather than the traditional "independent businessman"; beginning with the fifties, though the impact was delayed by McCarthyism, entering students have been children of the New Deal.

Attitudes which once went unchallenged in the American college are now subject to debate, if they are not, in fact, characteristic only of a minority of students. When I entered as a freshman it was rare to find a campus where a majority of students were Democrats (except, of course, in the South). Today, though students are still, due to upper class recruitment, less Democratic than the country the "Democratic campus" is becoming the rule (and, notably, Republican strength is growing in the South). The first sign of the times was William F. Buckley's *God and Man at Yale* which found it necessary to complain that even at that citadel of conservatism the ancient wisdom of *laissez-faire* and its associated pieties were becoming the doctrines of an embattled minority.

The conservative "revolution" is the mark of decline: the same forces which have compelled the nonstudent right to become vocal and organized operate on their children. What was once a majority, able to maintain itself by weight of opinion and prominence, must seek to use organization, discipline and fanaticism to accomplish what numbers cannot.

Part of a general process of social change, the conservative "upsurge" is typical of the politics of mass society: the effort to impose on a new age the moral canons of a past era through discipline and force, the suppression or intimidation of "menacing" ideas, and, of course, violence directed at foes abroad if not aimed at its real objects at home.



THE PERSONALIST FIXATION

America has always been a country which emphasized private, individual qualities and virtues. Individualism was part of our inheritance from the Enlightenment and its belief that men were "born free"; that the body might be chained, as Spinoza said, but the mind would remain at liberty. Such a belief finds little support in our age: mass propaganda, brainwashing, or indoctrination have made us only too aware that the mind is painfully easy to chain, that men are often prisoners of neurotic insecurity and anxiety, that masses of men can and will seek to "escape from freedom."

But precisely because there is little confirmation of the Enlightenment thesis in our times, arguments which seek to reaffirm it have an almost irresistible appeal. Thoreau long ago became a secular saint for the organization man. The college student is more attracted by the existentialists or their preposterous coadjutor, Ayn Rand. The existentialist effort to construct an impenetrable fortress of personality in an impregnable private world is a touching one. Even when they speak of "commitment" to men and ideas it is to something outside and perpetually separated from the self. The existentialist appeal is paralleled by the declining but real fascination with Freudian theory. Romantic individualism and analytic psychology serve the same function: they suggest that the problems of man are dominantly individual, a result of his "orientation toward himself," and hence, subject to his control.

The conviction of personal control is appealing at any time, but especially in our own. Problems which are not personal, which are political and social in nature and origin, seem to be insoluble. Every college teacher is annually besieged by hordes of sophomores

who for "psychological" or "personal" reasons feel compelled to work or travel in Europe for a year, normally to "find themselves." Few instructors have failed to trace the sources of the "sophomore's complaint." The end of the sophomore year coincides with the need to choose a major. All majors involve choices which tend to fix the future life of the individual; all are too specialized to be completely appealing. It is natural enough that the student, who finds it difficult to structure the future, or who finds specialization unappealing or problematic, should desire to delay the choice. His problems, however, are less due to psychological maladjustment than to the social and political facts which command specialization, or which make it difficult to make commitments to a painfully uncertain future. The fact is that students do not want to see problems in the latter context, which is uncomfortably resistant to solution. So too, the varying cults of peyote, LSD and mescaline are based on the notion of a private universe of meaning which is somehow the "solution" to all the frustrations.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to blame the contemporary student. In its current phase, American education conceives its task not in terms of developing either the character of the student as a man or his sense of responsibility as a citizen. Rather, it sees itself obligated to provide the necessary number of trained personnel to operate the industrial economy; its concern for the student centers on providing him the tools which will guarantee employment and high income. Passivity has become the logic of the secondary school: discipline becomes tighter, the "fluff" subjects are eliminated, the student is encouraged to assimilate and reproduce at command masses of information. "Adaptive man" becomes the ideal student.

Nor are such attitudes confined to secondary schools. President Clark Kerr of the University of California defines the university as "the handmaiden of industrialism." The duty of the university is to separate the "managers" of the new order from the "managed," to train the first to play the role of organizational leadership, the second, to "receive instructions, follow orders and keep records." Since intellectuals tend to be "irresponsible," the university must take care that students "unlearn" those ideas which are of no use to "good production workers." After all this, Kerr justifies his position by the conviction that the new order is producing a "happy hunting grounds of the independent spirit."

Of course, Kerr fails to consider how his "managers," trained to obey the logic of industrialism, or the "managed," trained to obey the managers, can possibly contain any "independent spirits." He does not consider that the process effects the results, the means distort the end. The basis of Kerr's theory is the creed



MAN

WOOD ENGRAVING

HANS ORLOAISKI

of romantic individualism: men's minds are independent of their actions, the "spirit" of man is independent of and not influenced by the processes by which individuals live and learn.

Kerr provides a convenient rationale for the passive student who accepts without question the attitudes of his instructors. His theory also helps explain why the student with critical intelligence and creative imagination increasingly finds it impossible to find meaning in education, why he *refuses* to fulfill his classroom assignments, and why he retreats to a private world of fantasy. Indeed, it is possible that the cult of peyote represents the road to the only "happy hunting grounds" that a Kerr-educated America could ever know.

Yet even the student who is "committed" to politics shows the signs of the personalist fixation. Student political movements tend to be reminiscent of the nineteenth century. The emphasis of almost all student movements has been on "moral issues." Nothing, of course, is wrong with an emphasis on morality, but student moralism has been characterized by a certain priggishness, an unwillingness to work with others on any terms which might compromise the private moral integrity of the individual. This curiously contradicts another theme of student politics: its concern with "personal relations" and "human values," its interest in community and the bonds between men. Indeed, as Jonathan Eisen has noted, student leaders have been so preoccupied with questions of morals and of personal relations that they have only recently discovered the facts of structure, organization, and power in the political order. Even in its concern for "personal relations," however, student politics shows the style of the politics of mass society. The key word in the lexicon of student politics is "communication." A moment's reflection will suggest that the term refers to a *technical process* connecting *separate* entities; the word "communion," which suggests the opposite, is not adapted to the logic or attitudes of the times.

Moreover, the key prescription of student politics for improved political relations is a simple one: it is freedom. Freedom in personal relations is thought to guarantee sound personal relations. The relations between men, however, imply reciprocity, responsibility, obligation and loyalty. It is possible to argue that only in such relations is a man free, but students normally have no such meaning in mind. Freedom is private freedom, the ability to "do as one wills" without having to pay the consequences, the ability to maintain a pure conscience untainted by compromise. The freedom demanded by students is innocence, the freedom of the child who has not yet learned that human relations demand the willingness to accept responsibility for one's actions and, given the necessary ignorance and

errors of men, the reciprocal willingness of friends to share the burden of blame.

The failure of students to understand the logic of communion contributes directly to the second major feature of contemporary student politics.



THE DEMAND FOR IMMEDIACY

Whenever a man guides himself by goals and lives for purposes he hopes to realize, he must inhibit his immediate desires. Part of what would be pleasant now must be deferred that the time may be employed in the service of some anticipated good.

Traditionally, the myth of progress provided an ideal justification for immediate frustrations. Contemporary American students, however, as we have noted, lack any such belief: whether their aim is sensory gratification or the achievement of a moral goal, students cannot tolerate defeat or delay.

There is much more in today's demand for immediate solutions than the traditional student impatience with the complexity of society, the caution of the old, and the mechanisms of political compromise. Earlier generations might find in frustration only a greater stimulus to more intense pressures, might struggle for a long-term solution to problems insoluble in the short-term. Students in our time show an inability to tolerate defeat. Beaten in the short-term, students tend, as Paul Potter has noted, to retreat into a universe even more private than the one they originally deserted in favor of political action.

The vogue of "direct action" certainly derived from the demand for immediate solutions to problems. Yet faith in direct action has lapsed in almost all movements aside from the struggle for civil rights. The peace groups among students have turned increasingly from action to "peace research"; economic radicals concern themselves with means of penetrating the "power structure." Direct action, however, is a technique almost ideally suited to student political groups. Failing to understand its limitations, politically committed students have failed to understand its virtues. Direct action is *almost the only technique* whereby groups (like students) outside the major centers of community power can *create* issues and debate. Direct action cannot determine solutions, but neither can students who are necessarily outside the life, and hence the "power structure," of American society. By creating issues, however, students can have a major effect on opinion. When Governor Stevenson first advocated a test-ban, he was denounced as a traitor; he would now be only conventional. That shift of opinion is very largely due

to the direct action peace movement. Peace groups, however, seem more impressed with the failure of direct action to achieve the unlikely goal of universal disarmament. The private and respectable world of "research" has, accordingly, risen in its appeal.

The demand for immediate solutions is part of a general and traditional American creed: the cult of success. The myth of progress justified frustration on the basis of a *certain* triumph in the future. Action, however righteous, that seemed unlikely to "pay off" has never appealed to Americans. Direct action remains in vogue in the civil rights movement because success has seemed to attend it. In fact, the popularity of the cause of race equality among students is partly due to the fact that alone of all the great causes of the time, it seems destined to be victorious. In race relations the myth of progress represents the reality ("You might as well fight the tide with a broom," Congressman Celler told his colleagues from the South). With certain success, frustration becomes tolerable. The combined cults of success and immediacy suggest why John Kennedy was so ideal a hero for the student of the 1960's: he was the man of success epitomized, never defeated, and unable to tolerate a setback.

The alternative to a preoccupation with success has always been communion. Friends and brethren who share purposes also find in each other a joy that takes the grim edge of frustration and desperation from the effort to reach the goal. Loyalty excludes loneliness, and with loneliness, the fanaticism or fearfulness of the lonely. In the most meaningful moments of their lives, Americans have known as much: men who have learned the athletic ethos—that to lose well is better than to win badly—have learned it from and with their fellows. That, however, is not a lesson that one expects an individualistic culture to apply to politics, especially in an age of mass society.



THE POVERTY OF VISION

The final characteristic of contemporary student politics is its lack of genuine social and political imagination. Students are often classed as "radicals," but that term is a misleading one. Radicalism, after all, means going to the "root of the matter," an impatience with evasions, a questioning and challenging habit of mind. It is perfectly true that students are frequently extreme in their positions, but their extremism is characterized by *dogmatism* rather than radicalism. There is nothing "radical" about the "new" conservative who tries to make his devotion to Christianity square with

the ethics of avarice: he is merely chanting a liturgy. There is nothing radical, either, in the student of the "left" who adheres to the formulations of Marxism, a creed which bears every mark of 1848 and—like most things over a century in age—shows signs of decay. The ancient doctrines—nineteenth century liberalism, New Deal liberalism, Marxism—may be promulgated with great vigor, but it is doubtful that they add much to the understanding of our times.


To be sure, students will always, for the most part, simply "try out" doctrines taken from their seniors. Yet our times are notable because there are so few students who do anything else.

There have been very few efforts to discuss in concrete terms some of the possibilities inherent in the technological forces with which we are afflicted. There has been even less in the way of serious questioning of the moral premises and the social goals of American democracy. Students today may engage in the discussion of high metaphysics: Tillich and Sartre, Camus and Kierkegaard, are their stock in trade. Or they may engage in politics in terms of the traditional dogmas of the great ideologies. Between the worlds of high metaphysics and low politics, between private meaning and public events few connections are attempted. Even in thought, mass society extracts a toll.


This too should not be surprising. Students are not likely to challenge the foundations of modern American or Western society; they are too much a part of it, even the "radicals." Mass society may be indifferent to the individual, but it is affluent. The leaders of "left-wing" student movements are financed by scholarships; the "right" is rewarded by complacent parents and congenial millionaires. Self-styled "left" journals, like *Studies on the Left* or *New University Thought* appear in glossy paper and high quality printing, financed by foundations and by successful business and professional men nostalgic for the leftism of their youth.

Student elites are not "alienated" from the values and institutions of mass society: they are only excluded from the control of those institutions. Student politics are not the radical quest for a new way; they are only the oedipal struggle of would-be new rulers against the old.

Social and political regeneration may be possible in America; some of the problems of mass society may be overcome. Any such regeneration is, however, more likely to come from political men who have learned in practice the lesson of loyalty that American students have not learned, and perhaps could not have learned in the educational and institutional setting of mass society. That lesson is an ancient one, and the root of political life and passion: that the self is never a sphere of meaning, but is, in fact, meaningless save in a right relation to its fellows, and to the whole of nature.



A BEAD ON THE BIRCHERS



BY JOHN ALLEN BROYLES

EXTREMISM, in the defense of liberty, is no vice." Thus, with the blessing of Barry Goldwater, the John Birch Society was officially given its long-sought respectability. But even with this endorsement, the Birch Society still maintains its traditional political "neutrality."

John Rousselot, the newly appointed director of public relations for the Society, indicated that the John Birch Society would shun direct participation or partisan activity in the national campaign. This stance has the twin virtues of protecting the "non-political, educational" and tax-free status of the Society and of perpetuating the vagueness of the relationship between Senator Goldwater and the Birch Society.

The Birch Society, gaining its reprieve from obscurity, emerges as a potent campaign issue at two points. First of all, is the extremist, anticommunist John Birch Society "good" or "bad"? Second, what precisely is its relationship to the Republican nominee for President? Neither question is apt to be conclusively answered in the months to come.

But it is no secret that Senator Goldwater has long been a favorite of the Birch Society. Robert Welch said admiringly when he founded the John Birch Society in 1958, that "Barry Goldwater has political know-how and the painstaking genius to use that know-how with regard to infinite details. He is a superb political organizer, and inspires deep and lasting loyalty. He is absolutely sound in his Americanism, has the political and moral courage to stand by his Americanist principles, and in my opinion can be trusted to stand by them till hell freezes over. I'd love to see him President of the United States, and maybe someday we shall." (*Blue Book*, pp. 119-20)

Welch has been unstinting in his support of Goldwater. In 1958, he raised \$2,000 in Massachusetts to help the Senator to meet the attack of what Welch called the "Reutherite Left" in his campaign for reelection in Arizona. Senator Goldwater was also given the opportunity to become a member of the advisory Council of the Birch Society in 1960—an honor which he declined.

Goldwater was among the first to see Robert Welch's controversial book, *The Politician*, in which

former President Eisenhower was described as "a conscious agent of the Communist Conspiracy." The Senator advised Welch "that if he could not prove every word in it he had better do one of two things, or preferably both—destroy all the books and then retract the statements that were contained in them. I told him at the time that these statements, if found out—and they were bound to be discovered—would work a hardship on the people connected with him." Commenting further on Robert Welch, Goldwater said that "Bob Welch is a good American" but "I can't agree with his approach and I've told him so time and time again. One shouldn't condemn as a Communist anybody who disagrees with him."

With regard to the Birch Society itself, Goldwater has been equally ambivalent. His standard reply for some time has been a refusal to say whether he's for or against the Society because "I don't know too much about the Society. However, I think their avowed purpose is anti-Communist and I don't see how we can be against that. I might add I know the type of people it has attracted in my own community of Phoenix, and I'm impressed with them. They are the kind we need in politics."

In later interviews he has said of the Birch Society that "they believe in the Constitution, they believe in God, they believe in Freedom." He has also said that he welcomes the support of "any American who is not a Communist," and that "I don't consider the John Birch Society as a group to be extremist." In the Republican Platform Committee, his supporters voted down Gov. Scranton's proposed repudiation of the Birch Society, and on the floor of the convention attempted to shout down the same proposal by Governor Rockefeller.

But why all the furor? What is the character of this controversial organization? Why did some try to raise it as a major issue at the Republican Convention? Why may we expect it to become an issue in the election campaign? Simply because some see the goals of the Birch Society as unassailable and others see them as subversive. Because some see its activities as necessitated by circumstance and others see them as incompatible with the processes of democracy. And none is sure whether the power of the Birch Society is enormous or infinitesimal. Therefore, some dare not risk its displeasure and others dare not fail to rise to its challenge.

"We're here to save our country from *communist plot*," runs a line from the satirical song, "The John Birch Society," done by the Chad Mitchell Trio. The line is correct. Members of the Birch Society do believe that the collapse of our country is imminent. They believe, moreover, that this collapse was blueprinted by Lenin at the time of the Russian revolution

and is about to be precipitated by a vast web of communistic subversives who hold high places in all walks of our national life. We're the most powerful nation on earth, yet the Birchers are sure we're losing to the communists. Subversion must be the answer, they reason.

The character of Birch Society community and political conflict is very distinctive; one cannot help but observe that it's more like warfare against a foreign enemy than like an argument with a fellow American. But it is accurate to say that a member of the Birch Society looks upon an opponent, even though he may live next door, as a representative of the Soviet Union. Thus, when a member of the Birch Society launches himself into the stream of conflict—over education, religion, labor unions, government, or whatever—such conflict, no matter what the issue, is always defined as "Americanism vs. communism."

Look through the eyes of a typical Bircher as he girds himself for such a fight: he is jubilant! He has, at last, found a local "ComSymp." (For the uninitiated, "ComSymp" is the supposedly nonslanderous label proposed by Welch for alleged "Communist sympathizers.") At last he can do his bit to plug the dike. The ComSymp in question has "tipped his hand." He has, perhaps only for an "unguarded" moment, shown his "true" colors. Even if he never does another thing to reveal his "true" communistic sympathies, *anything* he does may be viewed through Welch's "principle of reversal," so that one can still "find the rascal out."

Having once identified his prey, the only considerations a Bircher bothers with are those of strategy. He aims only to devise the most efficient means of exposure and destruction of his allegedly pro-Communist enemy. He feels no need to abide by any rules of civility or of rationality because he sees the enemy as so dangerous that such "formalities" cannot be tolerated. Therefore a Bircher moves to the attack, using methods that he, himself, would not condone under "more favorable" circumstances.

The Bircher's prey, having been hit below the belt in the first round of the conflict, usually responds in kind. Thus the battle becomes acrimonious at the outset, since each side views the other as seeking illegitimate goals by illegitimate means.

MEMBERS of the Birch Society have little hope of converting their "ComSymp" opponent. They see this enemy person or group as so thoroughly "un-American" that it's a waste of time to try to get them to reverse their position. Therefore the Birchers

make no attempt to resolve points of disagreement. Instead they concentrate upon propagandistic efforts to alert the American people to the Communist subversives in their midst. The intent of most conflict is to clarify and resolve points of disagreement. But in Birch-style conflict differences are seen as total. They see no possible meeting of "communism" and "Americanism."

Since there is no attempt by the Birchers to resolve issues, but only to engage in propagandistic charges and countercharges, the issues, charges, and countercharges tend to increase at nearly a geometric rate.

The opponents of the Society find themselves also enmeshed in this burgeoning conflict. There is, of course, no resolution of this kind of conflict through the ordinary settling of differences, which allows conflicting persons or groups to resume a workable relationship. For members of the Birch Society and their opponents, seeing each other's goals and means as wholly illegitimate, seeing each other as "communists" and "fascists," any such accommodation could be interpreted only as "appeasement." Nevertheless resolution of a sort does come to pass. It occurs as both sides are literally overcome by emotional strain as well as sheer weight and complexity of acrimonious and propagandistic charges. As both sides withdraw for a time to recoup their energies, and to prepare for the next fight, the conflict is temporarily "resolved" by being abandoned.

Birch Society members could have much to contribute to public discussion of the great economic and political issues of our time, but their characteristic style of conflict broadens rather than narrows, and is "resolved" only as it falls of its own weight, obscuring whatever these contributions might be, and tending to lower all other conflict to the same level. Thus the political arena becomes more a battleground for shamen and tribesmen than a market place of ideas for free men.

THERE is no reason to believe that members of the Birch Society will approach the up-coming national election in any less "forthright" fashion. Despite the contention of Publicity Director John Roussetot that the Birch Society itself would shun partisan political activity in the coming campaign, we can expect to see its members, "as individuals," working all-out for the election of Senator Goldwater.

It is impossible at this time to gauge their possible influence, but we can anticipate the shape of their activity. Philip Blair Jones, a coordinator in the

Birch Society office headquarters for Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado, shortly after the Republican Convention, gave an outline of what to expect from such "individual" Birch Society members. With apparent reference to what has been described as "project monitor," he said that members would be particularly suited to keep a "vigilant" eye on news media. "They will be writing and calling editors and publishers to insist news media are fair in reporting the campaign." The effect, Mr. Jones said, might be to "neutralize" reporters otherwise antagonistic to Senator Goldwater.

Mr. Jones said he believed that Birch Society members, especially in the Southwest, would be the most diligent workers for Goldwater. "They have experience at letter writing, they have experience working in the precincts in door-to-door campaigns, and their telephone campaigns are very effective."

Birch Society members and others of the rightwing in Texas have already begun active promotion of a one dollar, anti-Johnson paperback by J. Evetts Haley entitled, *A Texan Looks at Lyndon*. Its theme is contained in its subtitle, "A Study in Illegitimate Power." By inference, Mr. Haley alleges that President Johnson has engaged in unethical, unprincipled, and illegal practices. They expect that three million copies will be sold by the end of the Presidential campaign. It is said that the Birch Society will distribute this and other literature linking President Johnson with alleged "Socialists and Communist-fronters."

The effect of such vicious opposition to Johnson, and of such enthusiastic support of Goldwater by members of the Birch Society (operating as "individuals") is difficult to anticipate. But a national poll conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, N.J., and released July 31, indicated that such support would be harmful. It was reported that 47 per cent said they would be "more likely to vote against" a Presidential candidate because he was approved by the Birch Society, whereas only 4 per cent said they would be "more likely to vote for" a man with that backing.

But Goldwater's nomination has apparently been a boon for Birch Society recruitment. Mr. Jones, the Birch Society coordinator quoted above, said that since the nomination of Mr. Goldwater, there had been a sharp increase in applications for membership. Mr. Jones added that Mr. Goldwater, as well as the Birch Society, will profit from an increase in membership.

of the Birch Society in it, one wonders how irrational conflict of the Society can best be met. Most people would agree that our democracy is better served when its decision-making processes are more nearly channeled within the bounds of rationality. How then may opponents of the Birch Society not only co-exist, but perhaps even move toward potentially constructive rational debate and conflict?

First of all, opponents of the Birch Society should have enough trust in rational democratic processes to abide by their norms. Of course all opponents of the Birch Society will not be willing to do this or to grant the right of any and all to be heard within the political arena. But the core of local Birch Society opposition must be willing to attack allies as loudly and clearly as they do the Birch Society for any abandonment of the norms of rational conflict.

Second, opponents should respond to a specific major charge early in a conflict with the Birch Society and stop right there. Ignoring the build-up of further propagandistic charges, opponents should refuse to discuss any of them until local members or leaders of the Society have come to rational debate upon that specific one. If such debate is refused or avoided, opponents should protest this fact persistently and loudly until the public either loses interest because of the lack of "progress" of the conflict or until the public itself "reads the Society out" of the rationally legitimate arena of conflict. Opponents of the Society should *never* abandon contention unless they are, in fact, bested in rational debate. If no other resolution of the conflict over this specific initial charge comes, opponents should always protest the fact that representatives of the Birch Society refused to engage in rational debate over it.

Third, opponents should also insist that local members and leaders of the Birch Society themselves observe norms of rational conflict. They should point out to representatives of the Society and to the uncommitted public when and how these norms are violated by the followers of Welch.

Finally, whenever it may become appropriate and necessary, it is to be remembered by opponents of the Birch Society that the courts provide legal recourse against libel and slander.

Only as members and leaders of the Society are compelled to engage in rational political conflict is there any possibility that they might exert a constructive influence within our nation.

If we do not defend freedom and rationality as the norms of political conflict, we ought not to be surprised to find ourselves caught in a totalitarianism not of the left or of the right, but on dead center.

As we view the coming election and the role



THE MEETING OF THE TWAIN:

IN a year notable for a great many things, the attempted rapprochement between the Republican party and the South in 1964 is likely to be remembered best of all. Indeed, the irony of the party of Charles Sumner, Abraham Lincoln, and Thaddeus Stevens courting Southern segregationists is so exquisite that we may altogether overlook the basic causes of this development as well as its broader implications for American politics. I have been following for several years the fortunes of the GOP in the South, and it is my considered opinion—stated as starkly as possible—that the one-party system so long associated with that region is in its death throes. Such a conclusion may seem premature—the last rites have been administered in vain on a number of previous occasions—but hear me out.

When the Southern political canvas is painted with broad and bold strokes, one can discern three critical turning points spaced, as it happens, about half a century apart. One came in the 1850's, when the ascendancy of Southern politicians in the Democratic party and the collapse of the Whig party combined to put the Democracy in a dominant position in most Southern states. (Prior to that time, the Whigs were strong and often successful competitors below the Mason-Dixon line.) The seeds sown in the 1850's were of course reaped in the Presidential election of 1860, which saw all of the Southern states except Virginia and Tennessee give their electoral votes to the Southern Democratic candidate. Even so, the beginning of the one-party era cannot be dated from the election, for there were three other states where the Southern Democratic candidate either did not receive a majority of the popular vote or did so only by the slenderest of margins.

The second critical stage in Southern politics was the period just before and just after the turn of the century. While the attempt to graft the GOP onto the political system in the South in post-Civil War could hardly be called a successful operation, Republicans there for 30 years did offer competition that was frequently strong and sporadically successful. The withering that set in after the end of Reconstruction was more gradual than we remember it, as is indicated by the 1884 Presidential election. Republican nominee James G. Blaine was credited with 45% or more of the vote in four states (Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee) and around 40% in two others (Arkansas and Louisiana). Similar results obtained in 1888. There was also enough GOP strength to elect a scattering of local officials, legislators, and members of Congress, and even occasionally to threaten in state-wide elections (particularly when in fusion efforts with third-party elements).

In the 1890's, however, the one-party mold began to take unmistakable shape. Northern Republicans said "farewell to the bloody shirt," the courts very considerably looked the other way, and Southern white Democrats proceeded to rewrite election codes and suffrage provisions so as to eliminate many Negroes (all Republicans, of course), and some white persons as well, from the electorate. The widespread adoption of the direct primary in these states a little later provided the finishing touches, shifting as it did the point of protest and dissension from the general election to the Democratic party primary.

As a result, the Republican party in the South—already stigmatized as the party of Negroes, and already cursed with wretched leadership, was pushed even further into the political backwaters. It tended, on the whole, to degenerate into a holding operation designed to enable a set of party officials to control federal patronage in their respective states whenever a Republican occupied the White House, which was usually the case prior to 1932.

To this tendency, however, there were exceptions. There was, first of all, the identification with the GOP found in the scattered enclaves over many of the Southern states, so perceptively reported by the late V. O. Key in his classic *Southern Politics*. In Tennessee and North Carolina these "mountain Republicans" had enough strength to play a role in state politics; in other states (e.g., Texas prior to redistricting in 1931) they had enough votes to control a Congressional district; in still other states they could manage only a local impact.

For present purposes, it is even more important to note the exception that involved Presidential elections. Although it is true that the Republican presidential vote in states like Mississippi, South Carolina, and sometimes Georgia fell in the period between wars to a level little above the accidental, there were other Southern states where enough "presidential Republicans" would join with the "mountain" GOP voters to make a significant, sometimes even competitive showing. I have in mind here the support that manifested itself in elections other than that of 1928, where special issues admittedly clouded the results. For example, in 1916 Charles Evan Hughes polled over 40% of the vote in North Carolina and Tennessee. Similarly, in 1920 the Republican ticket carried Tennessee, and obtained 40% of the vote in Arkansas and North Carolina and 30% in Alabama, Florida, Virginia, Georgia and Louisiana. Even in that most disastrous of all years, 1936, the Republican ticket polled 30% of the vote in Virginia and Tennessee, little below what it received nationally.

Although these exceptions help us to remember

THE SOUTH AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

that even in its heyday the solidity of the South was always exaggerated, it nevertheless remains true that the Democratic party enjoyed a near-monopoly on offices in the region. The general election became a mere formality for the most part, replaced by the Democratic primary. The number of GOP candidates on the ballot dropped precipitately, and the amount of Republican campaigning fell even more.

Some of the reasons for this state of affairs can be seen from what has already been said, particularly the association of the Democratic party with secession and the Confederacy, and of the GOP with the Union forces and Negroes. The eventual exclusion of Negroes from the Democratic primary made it seem all the more the party of white Southerners. Other reinforcing factors can be found, as, for example, the deeply-rooted free trade dogma that pointed unmistakably to the Democracy rather than to the high tariff party of McKinley.



BUT also of importance in explaining the one-party system are the advantages that accrued to the Democrats once they became securely entrenched in the South. They soon monopolized the registration and election machinery; they attracted the talented and ambitious politicians who could see no future as Republicans. Even those persons who were avowedly Republican were often to be found voting in the Democratic primary in order to have any voice at all in the actual decision. As the one-party system became more and more secure, social and economic pressures were added to other considerations dictating a profession of Democratic faith.

All this had the effect of converting the Democratic party in the South into a public utility, as a Texas newspaperman once described it. An institution supposed to exist—according to the precepts of political science—for the purpose of providing voters with meaningful choices concerning governmental personnel and policies became instead “merely a holding company for a congeries of transient squabbling factions.” Key pointed out, in almost the same breath, that the term “one-party system” was at best applicable only to the South in its external relations, i.e., in national elections. So far as state and local politics were concerned, the South really had a “no-party” system.

One cannot at this point do more than make passing reference to the shortcomings that have been traced to that system. Its most prominent characteristic is the lack of continuity—in factional composition as well as name. Voters are thus more apt to be

confused, and less likely to be organized into like-minded groups. The system is one more likely to advance leaders skilled in catching public attention by one demagogic device or another; at the same time, leadership by those who have gained ascendancy is made more difficult. Governmental officials in such a system are more likely to engage in favoritism and to yield to individual pressures. For these and other reasons, governmental operations are marked by considerable instability and uncertainty.

To this point I have been concerned with the origin and development of the Southern one-party system. We have seen that the South in the 1850's began to move away from the two-party system, but that the transition was not completed for several decades. Finally, at the turn of the century the tipping point was reached, and the Southern states began their fateful toboggan into the one-party system. But what is the status of that system today? I referred at the outset to a third critical stage in Southern political development; it is my conviction that we are now well into it. What we have been witnessing for several years is the gradual breakdown of the one-party system and the emergence of a second major party in the South.



THE heavy vote for Eisenhower in 1952 left most political scientists properly doubtful that this signaled any fundamental alteration in the nature of Southern politics, but each succeeding election since then has added fresh evidence that the system is in actuality undergoing extensive change. The bare facts are impressive: in 1956 the Republican presidential ticket polled 52.5% of the total vote in the eleven states of the Confederacy, with the Democracy gathering 45.0% (“other” parties accounted for the remainder). In 1960, the Republican presidential vote in the same eleven states came to 45.9% of the total, with the “other” party vote totalling 3.5%. The Democratic vote rose to 50.5%, although it is questionable how much of the Alabama vote included in that calculation really belongs there. (Only 5 of the 11 Alabama electors were pledged to the nominees of the national Democratic party.) There seems to be general consensus that Goldwater in 1964 will also do well in Dixie. Thus it would appear that in presidential politics at least the South as a region now has a two-party system. Such appearances are somewhat deceiving, inasmuch as there are significant variations among these states in the degree of their Republican support, although I wonder whether these variations are much greater than

those found within single states that are traditionally said to have a two-party system (e.g., New York).

But doesn't this simply represent an expanded version of the "presidential Republicanism" that could be seen as far back as Woodrow Wilson's time? A count of the number of seats held in the national House of Representatives by Republicans seems to dictate an affirmative answer to the question. After all, of the 106 Southern Congressional seats in 1963, only 11 were held by Republicans (2 each from Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, and 3 from Tennessee). But here one must study trends in the aggregate vote in order to see more clearly what is happening. If one examines results of all House of Representative elections in 10 Southern states (Arkansas is excluded, because of peculiarities in the method of counting ballots), it will be found that in 1958 the Democratic party nominees won 82.1% of all votes across the South. In 1960, in the same states and the same races, that percentage slipped to 77.7%. In 1962, the total Democratic vote in the same 10 states amounted to 68.1%. When one keeps in mind that in some districts there were no Republican candidates at all, and in many of those that were officially contested the Republican candidate hardly bestirred himself, the 1962 percentage becomes somewhat more impressive. When the 1964 returns are in, I fully expect the Democratic percentage to show still another sizable drop, although the total number of Republican Congressmen from the South may show little if any gain.

Another set of figures which seem to support my contention that the one-party system is doomed are those pertaining to gubernatorial elections. One cannot use aggregate figures of the kind just cited for presidential and congressional voting, because elections for governor are not all held at the same time, but one can go over the results in the latest elections, state by state. The most recent gubernatorial elections in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina and Arkansas show nothing except the traditional Democratic near-monopoly, but such is not the case elsewhere. In Tennessee, Texas, and North Carolina the latest Republican gubernatorial nominees won over 45% of the vote. The Republican gubernatorial vote in Florida was just over 40%, and in Virginia it was 37%. Perhaps most impressive of all are the 38% votes recorded for the most recent Republican nominees in both Louisiana and Mississippi—two states whose history made such votes entirely unlikely. Again, I grant that such percentages would ordinarily be taken as a sign of weakness rather than strength, but they must be read in the context of the vote given the Republican party in the previous gubernatorial

election (less than 20% in Louisiana; in Mississippi there was not even a Republican gubernatorial candidate).

As might be expected, Republican showings fall off rapidly as one moves from fairly well publicized national and gubernatorial elections to those for lesser posts, such as minor state officials, legislators, and local officials. Even so, one hears with increasing frequency of the election of a few Republicans to state legislatures that have been solidly Democratic for most of the twentieth century, and of Republican victories in city and county elections. Although Democrats still have a virtual monopoly of such lesser offices, the increased Republican effort and the occasional success that it brings indicate once again that the very pillars of the old system are crumbling.

The one-party system in the South is dying, like a beetle-infested pine tree, from the top down. I do not claim that the South has already achieved a two-party system, but I am convinced that we are now—and have been for several years—in a transitional stage carrying us inexorably in that direction.

To explain this phenomenon is not an easy matter. One can without too much difficulty identify a number of forces at work, but the problem is to relate them, to determine their respective weights and to see beyond the surface to the fundamental factors. One must begin by noting the tremendous upheaval that has been taking place in the Southern social and economic systems. For better or for worse, the old agrarian South is rapidly disappearing. Agriculture still has absolute importance in the Southern economy, of course, although it is apt to be a different type from that which once prevailed. But from a relative standpoint, agriculture more and more is being overshadowed by business and industry.

One important consequence of this economic change has been an influx of middle and upper class newcomers from outside the South to fill the need for professional and managerial talent. The significance of this for the thesis I am defending hardly needs to be pointed out: for reasons of personal history, status or class, or company policy, many of these newcomers are Republicans. Although they are not numerous enough to constitute a Republican army, they have proved a vigorous officer cadre for the party. In addition to providing leadership and financial support, such persons by their status have made it easier for Southerners to identify themselves with the Republican cause.

Urbanization, which is of course closely related to the economic transformation taking place, is another vital force at work in the South on behalf of the GOP. This may seem a bit puzzling, in view of

the fact that urban centers outside the South are typically regarded as Democratic strongholds. But Southern cities have not been built on the basis of mass production industries employing large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled immigrant workers. The percentage of their labor force employed in manufacturing employment is apt to be distinguished by the relatively high ratio of white-collar to blue-collar workers, and of skilled to semi-skilled workers. Plants are smaller, professional and managerial personnel more numerous and more influential, labor unions weaker.

Urbanization in the South, then, has been creating a vast new middle class composed of professional and managerial groups as well as of less prestigious white-collar workers. Whatever it is that orients the middle class all over the nation, to the Republican party is at work in the South as well. Thus, it comes as no surprise to find that the three leading Southern states in white-collar employment (Florida, Texas, and Virginia) are leading states in Republican support.

One must add to the foregoing considerations the tendency for rapid urbanization to be highly disruptive of established behavior patterns, including political ones. The majority of newcomers to Southern cities are from rural and small town areas. Having left behind a well-defined social system relentless in its demands for orthodoxy in matters of politics (Democratic) as well as religion (Protestant fundamentalism), they cannot help but be shaken and confused by the urban maelstrom. Rootless and restless, frustrated by inability to realize old values and to apply old principles in this new setting, many of them are easy targets, even if somewhat unstable recruits, for Republican appeals.


What has made it possible for these forces to shake the foundations of the one-party system is the inherent weakness of the Southern Democratic party. The simple truth is that the muscles of the Democracy below the Mason-Dixon line atrophied long ago, and all that has held it together since then has been tradition and the vested interests of various conservative groups, including the Democratic politicians themselves. It follows, then, that if heavy blows are landed on these twin props of the one-party system, it is in mortal danger.

The second of these props—conservative group interests—began to be weakened as far back as the New Deal. As the national Democratic party under Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John F. Kennedy became more and more identified with liberalism, the conservative interests which have dominated most Southern states became increasingly dissatisfied. The impact of this disaffection with the

national Democratic party has been emphasized by Robert J. Steamer in his chapter in *Change in the Contemporary South*, edited by Allan Sindler. Led by such astute politicians as Harry Byrd of Virginia and Allan Shivers of Texas—to mention only two—the Southern conservatives carefully cultivated a distinction between the national Democratic party and the state and local parties, making clear that the former was not deserving of support. Rallying behind the Republican candidates for President in 1952, 1956, and 1960, they argued strenuously—and effectively—that “you aren’t leaving the Democratic party; it has left you.”

By its very nature, the first prop of the one-party system that I mentioned—tradition—has been somewhat harder to shake. The social and economic processes reviewed above have already had some impact and would in time complete the job. However, I am now inclined to believe that the final push will be supplied by the civil rights movement. The commitment of the national Democratic party to civil rights for all, including Negroes, is rapidly severing the emotional and traditional ties of some white Southerners to the Democratic party. If the GOP makes even a temporary pitch for the support of the segregationists—as it appears to be doing at the time of this writing—then the final chapter on the one-party system can be readied.

I should not be misunderstood. The Republican party in the South needs badly to broaden its appeal, to reach farmers and workers and minority groups, and the long-range prospects of the party depend heavily on its doing so. But while such support is being built up in the time-honored but time-consuming fashion of American politics, the GOP can exploit to advantage the rifts in the Democratic party. Whatever temporary surcease in the bitter fight between conservative Southern Democrats and the liberal national party may be provided by President Johnson, in the long run the tensions are too great for containment.


THE consequences of the development I foresee will undoubtedly be many and far-reaching. There are some we can predict with a certain amount of assurance, others that can be perceived but dimly, and still others that will occur to no one beforehand. For one thing, an end to the one-party system in the South will almost certainly result in more systematic politics. That is, politics will no longer be confined to the weeks just before the Democratic primaries. Instead, a certain amount of party activity will be carried on year around. This

continuity and the increased publicity it will bring will help, I feel, to produce a political style more attuned to the real issues. It seems likely also to bring about more interest and participation on the part of the electorate. The notoriously low levels of Southern voter turnout are only in part reflective of the exclusion of Negroes from the political process, for turnout among whites is also low compared to other states. A major factor in this is simply that in the one-party system the Southern voter is not educated and stimulated as much as in those areas where there is better organized political conflict.

More systematic politics is also likely to bring about other changes. I think it likely that the influence of pressure groups in Southern politics will be reduced because of the greater insulation and backing that political parties can provide public officials or perhaps it would be best to say that group pressures will have to be filtered through the parties. There is likely to be as well a more important role for grass roots political organization—block workers, precinct leaders, and so on. The growth of large cities creates the need for such political machinery, but increased partisan conflict will speed the process of development.

Once this organizational machinery comes into existence, I think the temptation to use it for elections at all levels will be difficult to resist. Accordingly, one can expect to see nonpartisan local and municipal elections give way to those in which there is a partisan element. I recognize, of course, that there are sound reasons why such elections may not feature a full-blown party battle, but I think there will be increasingly a tendency for partisan overtones and activities to enter in.

But at the state level, undoubtedly the major impact of the collapse of the one-party system will be on the orientation of the Democratic party. I have already said that the disenchantment of the Southern conservatives with the national Democratic party will lead them to the Republicans. Such a shift cannot help strengthening the position of the Southern liberals who have been struggling—futilely, for the most part—to nominate candidates and to gain control of the Democratic party machinery. There can be no doubt that these liberals will alter significantly the orientation of the Democratic party in the South, although such a development is likely still to leave them considerably more moderate than some Democrats in the Eastern states (assuming they want to win the general election).

And what of the impact on national politics? I do not expect this anticipated move of Southern conservatives into the Republican party, and the subsequent liberalization of the Democratic party

in the South, to have much impact on the presidential wing of the national Democratic party. After all, the Southern conservatives have not had much influence there for some time, which is precisely why they are so dissatisfied. By contrast, I anticipate that the national Republican party will be affected to a rather considerable extent by this infusion of conservatism; indeed, the Southern role in bringing about Goldwater's nomination seems to be the example *par excellence*. Contrary to some analysts, however, I do not see this as necessarily disastrous for the Republicans, inasmuch as it will make it possible for them to be—for the first time in their history—a truly national party. I attach one condition here: provided they do not become too closely linked with the cause of Southern racism. While events surrounding the Republican convention in 1964 suggest there is danger here, it seems likely that the party will in time veer off somewhat from the tack that has been set by Goldwater.

But perhaps the most dramatic changes of all will be seen in Congress when the one-party system is finally buried. It has operated over the years to secure for Southern Congressmen a disproportionate share of committee chairmanships and positions of influence in the Congress. The greater turnover that party competition is sure to bring can be expected to reduce Southern influence on the national legislative body. Thus, paradoxically enough, the effort by Southern conservatives to find a way to safeguard their values by turning to the Republican party may ultimately have the effect of weakening one of their most important bulwarks against change in the South—a possibility that has not escaped the notice of the persons involved.

Although the views I have expressed here cannot be proved or disproved by the outcome of any single election, the results in November, 1964 will help us a great deal to estimate the speed and direction of political movement in the South. If, by the measures I have employed above, Republican strength is found to be significantly lower, I will have been found guilty of over-estimating the pace of change. If, on the other hand, Republicans in the South in the coming election hold or improve their present positions, still more will have been added to the mounting stack of evidence that the Southern one-party system is doomed. Although it is still early to judge Goldwater's effectiveness as a campaigner, I suspect he is probably the best possible choice that the GOP could have made *if* it is determined to become fully competitive in the South. The question of what his nomination will do to the Republican party elsewhere, or of what his election might do to the nation, I leave to others to ponder.



THE SEARCH FOR BLACK POWER

BY NAT HENTOFF

THIS past May, a demonstration for integrated schools was held in New York City. Earlier in the school year there had been two one-day boycotts of the school system—boycotts which had been impressive in numbers and had also helped move the Board of Education into a degree of action for integration. But more community pressure was needed, and as a result, the NAACP and CORE co-sponsored the May project. It failed. Less than 5,000 participated.

Bayard Rustin, the astute strategist who had been primarily responsible for the 1963 March on Washington, was in charge of the May failure. Afterwards, he pointed out: "What that failure revealed was that many had come to the point at which they felt marching in the streets could not get them what they wanted in that area (of school integration). And that is why political action must be the next major step. I don't mean the formation of a new party, but rather the creation of a great consensus on basic economic issues—a consensus on which candidates can be elected."

This recognition that "the movement" must move beyond civil rights to accumulate and sustain political power has become endemic to nearly all segments of what A. Philip Randolph has called "the unfinished revolution" among American Negroes. This year, the NAACP has been much more explicit in opposing candidates it considers hostile to Negro aspirations than it has ever been before. Furthermore, the NAACP has for the first time assigned a full-time staff person to coordinate voter registration work in the North. (In the ten largest Northern cities, from 25 to 50 per cent of eligible Negro voters are not registered.)

CORE is also making plans for political action, and SNCC (the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) is increasingly fusing its voter registration drives in the South with the simultaneous support of Negro candidates for office.

Politics is also a major preoccupation of the newest cadre of putative Negro leaders—those who consider CORE, the NAACP and even SNCC as insuffi-

ciently militant, as insufficiently "nationalistic" in terms of having a mass black base of power. ACT, for example, described by its founders as a "third force action group," is focusing on the need to organize the ghetto for action—political as well as economic. One of the founders of ACT, Lawrence Landry, a Chicago sociologist, has been active in that city in attempts to overthrow the old-style "accommodating" political machine of Negro Congressman William Dawson.

Malcolm X, who considered political action alien to the separatist credo of Elijah Muhammad while he was with the Muslims, is now pressing for a broad-scale coalition among Negro activists to stimulate the black poor to register and vote. Paule Marshall, the Negro author, whose views are characteristic of those of a growing number of young Negro intellectuals, has proclaimed: "Our full force must be utilized to bring together the mass of the blacks."

The acceleration of emphasis on organizing the black ghettos involves two basic problems. How are the masses to be sufficiently motivated to think and act in political terms? And, will not this focusing on black political action lead to a deeper division between the races?

Bayard Rustin is wary of that kind of all-black political activity which does not also take into account the need for an eventual coalition between Negroes and white civil rights actionists, the more aware sections of organized labor and even parts of the white liberal middle-class. Only with such white allies, Rustin insists, can the Negro get *enough* political power to make the necessary economic changes in this society so that full equality of opportunity can be meaningful. Rustin means, in brief, major expansion of social security and unemployment compensation payments, and huge public works projects in such badly needed areas as urban transportation systems, school building programs and conservation. Rustin also means greatly increased expenditures for retraining of workers; for public education; and ultimately for a re-definition of work in a cybernated society in which there will not be enough of the traditional categories of jobs for those who are not highly specialized. In this respect, Rustin and other long-range strategists are sympathetic to the proposal of economist Robert Theobald that every citizen be guaranteed by the government a basic annual income.

MANY of the younger militants—such as those in ACT and the more restive actionists in certain

CORE chapters and in SNCC—consider the Rustin proposal logical enough but they also claim that Negroes cannot wait until this broad Negro-white alliance is formed. They do not see any concerted forward motion as yet among white liberals or in organized labor toward the goals Rustin cites. They feel that labor, for example, is too much the prisoner of the Democratic Party to push hard or insistently enough for basic political and economic reorientation within that party. And how, they add, can they trust white liberals when so often it is these liberals who stiffen when presented with specific Negro demands close to home—the abandonment, for example, of the traditional "neighborhood school" concept in order that school segregation caused by housing segregation be ended without waiting another generation or more.

The new militants would agree with Noel Day, a Negro who ran for Congress this year in Boston, that "the new Civil Rights law does not deal with the problems of the North . . . The Fair Employment section of the Law will not provide enough jobs for Negroes until there are enough jobs for everyone. Nor does the Law deal with the problems of slum housing or inferior *de facto* segregated schools. There will be no justice on these fronts for anyone, Negro or white, until we guarantee either a job or a decent income for every citizen; decent housing for every family regardless of income; and quality education for all children."

They would agree, but they would add that just as only Negroes were able to provide the dynamism which eventually resulted in the passage of the Civil Rights Bill, any fundamental change in political direction will come first from Negro action. While waiting for white allies, the theory goes, at least the Negro ghettos can be mobilized to create as much change as possible in the daily living conditions of the black masses.

At this point, the root dilemma appears—how are those masses to be organized? Until now, the weakness of the NAACP, for instance, has been its relative lack of contact with the "lower classes." Until the past couple of years, moreover, none of the major civil rights organizations had devised plans for working *with* the poor in specific ghettos to attack their primary problems. Now, it is being increasingly realized that if the masses are to be spurred to register and vote, they must be shown palpable victories that have meaning in their own lives. A picture of President Lyndon Johnson signing the Civil Rights Bill is not going to significantly lighten the life of an undereducated Harlem factory worker living in a slum tenement and painfully aware that his child is receiving inferior education.

THE growing trend, therefore, is for both the established and the newer Negro-led groups to set up functional bases in the black slums. In New York, East River CORE is organizing a neighborhood on the upper East Side into a block-by-block structure which will be able to agitate against slum landlords and discriminatory employment situations on a cohesive, mass basis. In Chicago, CORE is engaged in a similar project. Parallel activity is taking place in St. Louis and other cities. In Cambridge, Maryland, Gloria Richardson, a leader of ACT and the woman who has been in charge of civil rights demonstrations in that city, is now focusing on organizing Cambridge Negroes to fight for improved educational and job opportunities.

This emphasis on going into the bedrock problems of the Negro—education and jobs—does not mean a diminution of direct action demonstrations. It does mean, however, that out of these local organizations—whether led by CORE, the NAACP, SNCC or sections of ACT—will come more and more political candidates from the ghettos themselves. Until now, too many of those Negroes who have been elected to office have been co-opted into whatever political parties supported them. William Dawson is a particularly instructive example; but throughout the country, it has been largely true that the old-line Negro politician has not been in the forefront of advocacy of the basic changes in the economy which are vital if Negroes—and all the poor—are to have the opportunity to be equal.

Adam Clayton Powell, for instance, deals more in rhetoric than in carefully planned, thoroughly oriented political-economic strategy. It is the hope of the new actionists that the coming political leaders from the ghetto will replace the Dawsons and the Adam Clayton Powells. As Bayard Rustin points out, "The Powell-type is a product of the ghetto but does not represent the kind of leadership which fully understands the needs of the ghetto. When the people in the ghetto really begin to organize for action, they will reject his leadership because he does not understand the degree of change—in our *values* as well as in our economy—that must come if the revolution is to be finished."

There are those in the drive to organize the black masses who recognize the possibility that in certain areas, it will be the black nationalists rather than CORE or SNCC or the NAACP who will succeed in getting a base of power in the ghetto. "But," a CORE organizer told me, "I would rather have more Negroes beginning to think in terms of political action, even in support of Malcolm X, than remaining in apathy and despair. It will then be our responsibility to prove to them that *our* goals and

our means of achieving those goals are more realistic and more viable than those of the nationalists."

SIGNIFICANTLY, in the meantime, SNCC has already begun assigning some of its white workers to set up organizations among the white poor—in an initial step toward an ultimate biracial coalition such as Rustin envisions. Walter Reuther, moreover, has finally begun to talk about organizing the unemployed. These, however, are still only minor signs of the possible fusion of forces beyond color. For the next few years, it seems certain that the major thrust of young Negro activists will be aimed at awakening the ghettos and in finding black leadership in the ghetto.

It is true, as Negro actor-writer Ossie Davis has stated, that "All this controversy about the race question obscures the real illness at the vitals of the community. We live in a society that is structured so that all of us cannot consume what we produce. The answer is for all of us—of all races—to put person above property." Davis was calling for the kind of redefinition of work which has been urged by such intellectuals as Robert Theobald, Michael Harrington and Gunnar Myrdal.

But, as of now, not enough of the white unemployed and underemployed understand *their* need to join with Negroes to achieve these goals through political activity. And, as of now, the black poor are too constricted by their double burden of poverty and discrimination to conceive of an alliance with others outside the ghetto. They must first be shown what *they* can accomplish by organizing in their own neighborhoods. Then, they may be ready to place some faith as well as energy in joining whatever groups of whites have become aware of their own communality of interest in a new, neo-Populist coalition which, as Rustin says, does not entail a new party but which does require a basic change in the nature of the Democratic Party.

It took enormous outside pressure to bring about the passage of Civil Rights Bill by the present Congress. It will require, however, a new kind of Congress for legislation to be passed which will actually entail a full-scale battle against national poverty, not simply the present skirmish outlined by the Johnson Administration. But before that degree of political change takes root, there is every likelihood that the initial directions will be shown in the black ghetto. Ironically, after more than three centuries of subjugation, the Negro is now the best hope for the country at large of making equality for *everyone* operative.

By WILLIAM A. KOELSCH

CONSERVATISM VS THE MODERN RIGHT

MUCH polemic ink has been spilled over the last ten years on the postwar "conservative" revival, sometimes termed the modern right. People who read the *National Review* on subways and buses glare suspiciously at people across the aisle who are carrying the *New Republic*, and the latter look back with a smug we-know-what-you-are expression on their faces. Everybody is supposed to act like "either a little liberal or else a little conservative," to use the celebrated phrasing of Private Willis of Gilbert and Sullivan's *Iolanthe*, and if you protest that only small men fit into small categories you are looked on as somewhat perverse and indeed a man without "principles."

As an historian, I generally prefer the empirical realities of human perversity to the pernicious abstraction inherent in "principles." For certainly any historical examination of "conservatism" and "liberalism" reveals not a fixed body of meanings but simply conventional categories of thought, highly relative in time, place, and culture, and of limited usefulness in describing complex cultural phenomena. Even the original application of the terms to politics is clothed in ambiguity. The terms "left" and "right" used in this context originated in 1789, when the Paris populace forced King, Queen, and National Assembly back from Versailles to Paris after the "October Days." For its meetings, the Assembly was given a low rectangular building which had served at one time as a riding school for Louis XV. In this hall were eight rows of green benches in ascending tiers, arranged in the form of an ellipse. This ellipse was broken into two parts by the desk of the President on one side and the tribune, or lectern, on the other. Certain blocs of seats came to be occupied by certain deputies, the royalists to the right, the Cote Droit, and the democrats to the left, the Cote Gauche. And it was thus that the terms "left" and "right" entered our political vocabulary as synonymous for ideological positions.

The terms "liberal" and "conservative" are equally ambiguous, though their common usage is post-Napoleonic. The English historian Macaulay referred in 1832 to "conservative" as "the new cant word," a description not without contemporary relevance. And the same confusion about the meanings of the terms

was evident during the French revolution of 1830, when one group of French politicians previously styled as "liberals" announced that they would henceforth call themselves "conservatives," since they intended to work for the conservation of the new "liberal" regime.¹

As a culturally conditioned phenomenon, the liberal-conservative polarity in politics arises out of specifically European conditions and is grounded in a particular view of human history. It takes its definition from the structure of the post-feudal society whose aristocratic remnants preceded it in political dominance. The liberal movement was essentially an upper bourgeois movement, and in no sense a democratic movement, though the reforms which it sponsored eventually made possible a larger measure of democratic self-government. Its view of history was linear, with the line tending upward throughout "the age of improvement," "the age of reform," or whatever the liberal happened to call it. Ideals which once had seemed utopian could be realized within, not outside, the historical process.

The conservative, sharing the linear view, could only play a defensive role by deploring the direction of the line. His ideology too was defined by the old order. That existing institutions, having lasted a long time, are presumed to be good is one of the principles which all conservatives seemed to agree on, yet in the years after 1789 many of these institutions were manifestly falling to pieces. Throughout the nineteenth century the movement of history was against the conservative. The liberal's utopia monopolized the future; his own lay in the past.

World War I closed the liberal-conservative era of European history. The postwar period brought with it widespread disillusionment with efforts to reform society along liberal principles. The left and right in Germany tended to polarize around competing absolutist ideologies, Nazism and Communism, while the intermediate positions were politically squeezed out through a combination of inflation and depression and the disunity of the moderate parties, held apart by competing ideologies and class interests of their own. The same process occurred in Russia in 1917, in the

¹ See Irving Kristol, "Old Truths and the New Conservatism," *Yale Review* XLVII (1957-58), 365-73 for a discussion of origins.

1930's in Spain, and elsewhere in Europe between the wars. The interwar period can be seen as a transition, though a violent and disastrous one, toward a new type of politics.

Simultaneously with the ending of the first World War, Europe had been presented with a different understanding of the historical process. This alteration was symbolized by a book published in Munich in the summer of 1918, a few weeks before the end of the war, bearing the title *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, later translated as *The Decline of the West*. The author, Oswald Spengler, believed history to run in cycles—it is not at all linear. History does not always bend onward and upward toward Utopia; at some point it inevitably begins to go downward and backward into sterility and decay. Spengler's significance as a cultural figure, in spite of his defects as an historian, is that he served as a solvent of the old linear notion of history. He and other cyclical historians such as Brooks and Henry Adams undermined the presuppositions on which the liberalism and conservatism of nineteenth-century Europe rested by confronting the West with a radically different understanding of history.

I contend that "liberalism" and "conservatism" took their definition from a post-feudal European society and a linear notion of history, and are most properly applied to European history roughly between the French Revolution and the fall of the dynasties in 1918. The terms have never held much that is relevant for the United States, which as writers from Crèvecoeur through Tocqueville to Louis Hartz have pointed out, developed a different form of social organization in a different environment.

HARTZ, in one of the more thought-provoking volumes to come down the historical pike in recent years,² has seen the special character of American political life in the fact that there was no *ancien régime*, no feudally derived order to be overthrown. Without this social and political structure to protest, America was able to develop a new society which absorbed both peasant and urban laborer into the value system of a dominant middle class. In Tocqueville's view, we were "born free." This relatively homogeneous social order was founded on and has remained publicly committed to a consensus of classical liberal values in politics—private property, natural rights, majority rule, equality, democratic capitalism—articulated or implicit in the writings of John Locke but given and shaped by the American experience in the New World. This consensus of values is shared by nearly all American political leaders from Hamilton and Jefferson through Calhoun

² Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955).

and Lincoln to Hoover and Roosevelt. America's "conservatives," "liberals," and "progressives" (descendants of Lockean liberalism as modified and contained in the constitutionalism of the Founding Fathers) have argued not about these premises but within them. The result of this broad majoritarian consensus has been to exclude successfully from the American political order, at least up to now, both conservative (in the European sense) and Marxian options. The only group to which Hartz is willing to grant the word "conservative" is a group of antebellum Southern political philosophers, now forgotten except to the specialist, who attempted to justify slavery in openly feudal images and to demonstrate the inevitable failure of a free society.

Any summary of a 300-page book necessarily distorts and ignores the qualifications which the author makes. To say that we all share the same values is not to say that our political life has been distinguished by the absence of conflict. But these conflicts have been fought out within the same value system, and have not hitherto been conflicts of ideology. The really significant lines of division have been those between the broad, pluralistic consensus of the center on the "inside," and small groups of ideological extremists on the ends of the spectrum, highly vocal but normally of little political weight.

A recent confirmation of the general Hartz thesis was the 1960 report of the President's Commission on National Goals, entitled *Goals for Americans*, now being widely used in college reading programs. This project was conceived by President Eisenhower, apparently in the concern that we have a better ideology than the Soviets. But President Eisenhower is no Karl Marx, still less a Lenin, and so he set about the task characteristically, by appointing a committee. (This ought to reassure the John Birch Society about President Eisenhower's Americanism; it is difficult to imagine Karl Marx appointing a committee to draft the *Communist Manifesto*.) The committee (including corporation and university presidents, a scientist, an editor, a judge, a respectable former Southern governor, etc.), in its letter of transmittal, expressed the hope that the proposals would lead to active discussion, since "under the democratic process this is the path to a national consensus." Then the Commission threw their work and that of 100 other experts away on the first page by conceding that the goals of the United States had been laid out by the Founding Fathers in 1776 in what they identified as "the original plan." What was this plan, according to the commission?

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,

and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Clearly these are the goals which are the terms of the consensus itself: equality, natural rights, ordered liberty, the pursuit of individual opportunity, majority rule. This "Lockean consensus," at least on the articulate level, has survived two centuries of internal political conflict and even the "welfare state." The real paradox then which American history offers to the would-be conservative is (as Peter Viereck has pointed out): that in the absence of medieval feudal relics, the tradition which conservatives have the job of conserving is the liberal tradition, which is a paradox having implications neither the radical right nor the Marxian left can swallow.

This state of affairs, disturbing as it may seem, has certain advantages to the inquiring student. For one thing, it prevents him from looking back into the American past and typing individuals as "true liberals" and "100% conservatives," as a substitute for going to the sources. The most commonly made case, that for John Adams and Hamilton as "conservatives" and Jefferson as "liberal," is overdone and several scholars are now making this point clear. Perhaps one could call John Quincy Adams a conservative of a sort, though he was defeated for reelection to the Senate through the efforts of ultras in his own Federalist party who thought he was a deviationist and a Jeffersonian appeaser. Jackson on the other hand would turn over in his grave if he knew he had been treated by a prominent recent historian as the prototype of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Is Calhoun a conservative, Wilson a liberal, Teddy Roosevelt a progressive? The following chapter headings, from Richard Hofstadter's *The American Political Tradition*, show the inadequacies of conventional labeling: "Theodore Roosevelt: The Conservative as Progressive; "Woodrow Wilson: The Conservative as Liberal"; "John C. Calhoun: The Marx of the Master Classes." And what on earth do you do with Madison or de Tocqueville or Lincoln or Melville? All of them have been given the litmus-paper test and claimed by both sides.

WHAT about the phenomenon most of our contemporaries are calling "conservatism," the emergence of the so-called "radical right" after World War II as a political force in our national life? In spite of Governor Scranton's remark about "dime-store feudalism," the only feudal linkage which this movement suggests is its analogy to Voltaire's classic definition of the Holy Roman Empire—that it was neither Holy nor Roman

nor an Empire. So the so-called "new conservatism" in American politics is neither new nor conservative, stemming much more directly from that side of the liberal tradition in America which runs from Cooper's "American Democrat" through Horatio Alger and the Populist movement to Senator Joe McCarthy. Peter Viereck put his finger on the meaning of the movement in the second edition of his *Conservatism Revisited*. In 1949, when the first edition was published, conservatism was as out of fashion as the candles and tie-wigs with which it was popularly associated. In 1962, when something called conservatism was seemingly on the road to success, Viereck felt compelled to re-issue the volume enlarged by a Book II titled "The New Conservatism—What Went Wrong?" In it, he asked the following question:

Which is it, triumph or bankruptcy, when the empty shell of a name gets acclaim while serving as a chrysalis for its opposite? The historic content of conservatism stands, above all, for two things: organic unity and rooted liberty. Today the shell of the "conservative" label has become a chrysalis for the opposite of these two things: at best for atomistic Manchester liberalism, opposite of organic unity; at worst for thought-controlling nationalism, uprooting the traditional liberties . . . planted by America's founders.

Viereck, a leading conservative intellectual himself, pointed out the moral evasions and muddled thinking of what he called "the whole inconsistent spectrum of Goldwater intellectuals and right-radical magazines," and chided them for being the same kinds of rootless doctrinaires that they accused liberals of being.

If we look behind the labels, it is fairly plain that those segments of the movement which are not rootless have a firm rootage in the liberal tradition, even though in a form which has not received much credence for some time. Tocqueville was only one of the first to point out that the reverse side of common agreement on liberal values such as equality and the pursuit of private gain was a community pattern of thought control. The insistence that certain widely articulated values constitute "Americanism" and the use of what Hartz calls "redscare" tactics to enforce them is not the invention of the last fifteen years.

The leaders of the so-called conservative forces in politics, who are now grouping themselves around the symbolic and receptive candidacy of Barry Goldwater are not themselves conservatives in any historic sense. Under the circumstances, the term "radical nationalist reactionaries" is as applicable as many others currently being used to describe them. To call them radicals means that they wish to uproot; to call them reactionaries means that they wish to return to a time be-

^a Peter Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Revolt* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949; 2nd ed., New York: Collier Books, 1962).

fore the plants which they are trying to uproot ever sprouted. What plant that is depends on which group you are talking about. Clearly the Napoleon they all wish to exile is Franklin Roosevelt. Many also wish to uproot such pre-New Deal innovations as the income tax and the anti-trust laws. The Civil War, with its revolutionary change in the status of the Negro, is the moral equivalent of the French Revolution for some. Insofar as I understand the muddled constitutional thought of some of our Southern political leaders, I take it that Supreme Court decisions as early as the time of Chief Justice Marshall, appointed by President Adams in 1801, have never been accepted as applicable to what they are fond of calling "the Southern Way of Life." It bespeaks a strange lack of critical acumen for a movement such as this one to choose the label "conservative."

The point at which this movement demonstrates its radical character most clearly is not in its challenge to liberalism but its challenge to long-established American institutions. One would expect any conservative movement to be interested in conserving those institutions which either were guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or grew out of the early years of the experience of the Republic, but such is not the case. The Bill of Rights, for example, has never been restricted by amendment since its adoption, yet it is the self-styled "conservative" who is trying to do it now. I had thought that freedom of speech was a fairly well established right, yet those who watched Governor Rockefeller's attempts to exercise it may judge to what extent it was preserved by the "conservatives" who packed the 1964 Republican National Convention. The persistent attempts to undermine the independence of the judiciary, to flaunt the practice of judicial review, to

negate the powers of the Federal government in areas where it has traditionally been regarded as supreme, these and other infringements on long-established constitutional practices are being made by "conservatives." The proposed breakup and realignment of political parties into "liberal" and "conservative" ideological groups, hailed by the misguided on both sides, would be to destroy the system of internal checks and balances which make these venerable institutions appropriate to a continent-sized, industrialized, Federal state.

The real paradox of the movement is not that its conservatism can so readily be unmasked as a form of American liberalism, but that despite its virtuous and uninformed appeal to the Founding Fathers and despite its pose of anti-communism, it is in many ways so subversive in character. Again, one returns to the point that the conservative label simply does not apply.

I N the midst of all the political brouhaha about "conservatism," there is danger of overlooking a parallel movement also growing up in the 1950's and 1960's which seems to me to have substantially more merit as a trace element of criticism in our otherwise liberal society, a movement which for want of a more precise term is sometimes called "cultural conservatism." It is an historical truism that nothing fails like success, and to the extent that liberal objectives of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in social, political and academic thought had become orthodoxy by the 1950's, they needed critical reexamination in the light of events. At present, fundamental questions (as well as many substantially less than fundamental) are being asked by both "liberals" and "conservatives" about commonly held liberal assumptions as they apply in international relations, economic policy, both secondary and higher education, social thought and welfare, religion, and the interpretation of the past. In my own field, for example, the term "neo-conservative" is often applied to a vigorous group of researchers into the American experience, and in other fields similar terms, like "neo-orthodoxy," "neo-classicism," "neo-humanism," and so forth testify to the same type of revisionist movements.

The antecedents of this cultural criticism are mixed. Many thinkers look to Burke, and recently also to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, now emerging as a political and religious thinker of some significance after a long period simply as the author of "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner." Representative American sources of this temper before World War II would be the neo-orthodoxy of Reinhold Niebuhr, the critical humanism of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, the educational



philosophy of Robert M. Hutchins, and perhaps the Nietzschean needling of H. L. Mencken. So far, this American cultural conservatism has remained a cultural, ethical, and educational movement, and has influenced public life indirectly when at all. It stands primarily as critic of mass man and mass culture, which it sees in part as the inevitable result of the egalitarian fallacy applied to values, that everybody's choices are as good as anybody else's.

The fundamental contribution of this new temper is its rediscovery of values, and in particular the new emphasis on the value code of Western man inherent in our Judeo-Christian and Hellenic tradition. The locus of these values is the world of literature, intellectual history, religion, philosophy, the life of classical antiquity, and so forth. "For many independent students and younger professors," Peter Viereck observes in his *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals*,⁴ "the new conservatism (in its value-conserving sense) is rapidly becoming the only escape from the stultifying standardization of their cynical, value-denying elders. . . ." He points out that the movement is not one of escapism into the past; rather it is the affirmation of the relevance of the past to the continuing task of building, preserving, and extending the values of Western civilization. Nor does this affirmation mean necessarily immediate direct action. "By asking all those basic questions the activists ignore rather than by too glibly answering them," Viereck observes, "a conservative return to values will transform politics and economics indirectly . . . by raising in both parties the *level of insight* into historical and ethical processes."

The dilemma of American democracy in these days of mass society and mass man is that although democracy requires excellence in order to survive, excellence implies superiority, and superiority is resented by the mediocre. In direct political action, there isn't much future for it. But the cultural conservative still believes that American democracy could profit by an intellectual leadership which had steeped itself in the values and insights of Plato and St. John, Shakespeare and the Greek playwrights, Dante and Goethe, Augustine and Pascal and J. S. Bach. The members of this "elite group," if you will, are not drawn from any social class or economic group, but are recruited from the ranks of all those who everywhere respond to the best, who can profit by the active reexperience of the aspirations of the past and commit themselves to their eventual fulfillment. Their common quality is that of being a self-disciplined aristocracy, aristocratic in the sense only that it holds itself to higher standards than it expects of others. This is an ideal which would have been shared by many men of the past, both John Adams

and Thomas Jefferson, and by many whom we label "liberals" or "conservatives" but who possessed too much insight to apply such labels to themselves.

George Santayana once observed that "The merely modern man never knows what he is about"—and the American more than most is in constant danger of becoming the merely modern man. If in some sense we define ourselves and our political and cultural stances as I have suggested, in the light of a view of history, what options are currently available? A recently published major historical work which is as symbolic of our own day as Spengler's was of his is William H. McNeill's *The Rise of the West*.⁵ This book bears the subtitle "A History of the Human Community" and is probably the first attempt since the eighteenth century to take on the formidable task of writing truly universal history. McNeill rejects both a linear and a cyclical vision of history in favor of what I call an empirical and pluralistic one. His assessment of the possibilities open to us stresses not only the "burden of present uncertainties" but also "the unexampled plasticity of human affairs" which gives wise men armed with the ancient virtues of "foresight, cautious resolution, sustained courage," new opportunities to count for good. Certainly the complement of this enlarged scope for good is increased power for "evil men and crass vices," but this is inescapable in any case. "Great dangers alone produce great victories," writes McNeill, "and without the possibility of failure, all human achievement would be savourless. Our world assuredly lacks neither dangers nor the possibility of failure. It also offers a theater for heroism such as has seldom or never been seen before in all history."

Within the last two centuries, but particularly in our own, we have seen a succession of idolatries, each held out as a political faith. Nazism, Communism, Socialism, and what some have called "the cult of good intentions" in conventional liberalism have gone by the board as viable options for Americans. We now are offered at least two new idolatries: the cult of historical obscurantism in the modern right and the cult of nihilism among extremists in the civil rights movement. These idolatries have led or are leading us down blind paths in an era when we need all the clearness of vision we can muster. The opportunities of the future which McNeill suggests are not to be met with the exhausted rhetoric appropriate to a dead Age of Ideology. The lessons of recent history suggest that if they are to be met in the world of the here and now, it is by concrete and reasoned action, rooted in the value-heritage of Western civilization, seeking to extend those values by realizing them both as enduring and as continuously developing entities in a pluralistic world.

⁴ Peter Viereck, *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals: Babbitt Jr. vs. the Rediscovery of Values* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953).

⁵ William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

THE
UNPOPULARITY
OF
INTELLECT

BY RICHARD HOFSTADTER



BEFORE attempting to estimate the qualities in our society that make intellect unpopular, it seems necessary to say something about what intellect is usually understood to be. When one hopes to understand a common prejudice, common usage provides a good place to begin. Anyone who scans popular American writing with this interest in mind will be struck by the manifest difference between the idea of intellect and the idea of intelligence. The first is frequently used as a kind of epithet, the second never. No one questions the value of intelligence; as an abstract quality it is universally esteemed, and individuals who seem to have it in exceptional degree are highly regarded. The man of intelligence is always praised; the man of intellect is sometimes also praised, especially when it is believed that intellect involves intelligence, but he is also often looked upon with resentment or suspicion. It is he, and not the intelligent man, who may be called unreliable, superfluous, immoral, or subversive; sometimes he is even said to be, for all his intellect, unintelligent.

Although the difference between the qualities of intelligence and intellect is more often assumed than defined, the context of popular usage makes it possible to extract the nub of the distinction, which seems to be almost universally understood: intelligence is an excellence of mind that is employed within a fairly narrow, immediate, and predictable range; it is a manipulative, adjustive, unfailingly practical quality—one of the most eminent and endearing of the animal virtues. Intelligence works within the framework of limited but clearly stated goals, and may be quick to shear away questions of thought that do not seem to help in reaching them. Finally, it is of such universal use that it can daily be seen at work and admired alike by simple or complex minds.

Intellect, on the other hand, is the critical, creative, and contemplative side of mind. Whereas intelligence seeks to grasp, manipulate, re-order, adjust, intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines. Intelligence will seize the immediate meaning in a situation and evaluate it. Intellect evaluates evaluations, and looks for the meanings of situations as a whole. Intelligence can be praised as a quality in animals; intellect, being a unique manifestation of human dignity, is both praised and assailed as a quality in men. When the difference is so defined, it becomes easier to understand why we sometimes say that a mind of admittedly penetrating intelligence is relatively unintellectual; and why, by the same token, we see among minds that are unmistakably intellectual a considerable range of intelligence.

This distinction may seem excessively abstract, but it is frequently illustrated in American culture. In our education, for example, it has never been doubted that the selection and development of intelligence is a goal of central importance; but the extent to which education should foster intellect has been a matter of the most heated controversy, and the opponents of intellect in most spheres of public education have exercised preponderant power. But perhaps the most impressive illustration arises from a comparison of the American regard for inventive skill in pure science. Our greatest inventive genius, Thomas A. Edison, was all but canonized by the American public, and a legend has been built around him. One cannot, I suppose, expect that achievements in pure science would receive the same public applause that came to inventions as spectacular and as directly influential on ordinary life as Edison's. But one might have expected that our greatest genius in pure science, Josiah Willard Gibbs, who laid the theoretical foundations for modern physical chemistry, would have been a figure of some comparable acclaim among the educated public. Yet Gibbs, whose work was celebrated in Europe, lived out his life in public and even professional obscurity at Yale, where he taught for thirty-two years. Yale, which led American universities in its scientific achievements during the nineteenth century, was unable in those thirty-two years to provide him with more than a half dozen or so graduate students who could understand his work, and never took the trouble to award him an honorary degree.

A special difficulty arises when we speak of the fate of intellect in society; this difficulty stems from the fact that we are compelled to speak of intellect in vocational terms, though we may recognize that intellect is not simply a matter of vocation. Intellect is considered in general usage to be an attribute of certain professions and vocations; we speak of the intellectual as being a writer or a critic, a professor or a scientist, an editor, journalist, lawyer, clergyman, or the like. As Jacques Barzun has said, the intellectual is a man who carries a brief case. It is hardly possible to dispense with this convenience; the status and the role of intellectuals are bound up with the aggregate of the brief-case-carrying professions. But few of us believe that a member of a profession, even a learned profession, is necessarily an intellectual in any discriminating or demanding sense of the word. In most professions intellect may help, but intelligence will serve well enough without it. We know, for instance, that all academic men are not intellectuals; we often lament this fact. We know that there is something about intellect, as opposed to professionally trained intelligence, which does

not adhere to whole vocations but only to persons. And when we are troubled about the position of intellect and the intellectual class in our society, it is not only the status of certain vocational groups which we have in mind, but the value attached to a certain mental quality.

A great deal of what might be called the journeyman's work of our culture—the work of lawyers, editors, engineers, doctors, indeed of some writers and most professors—though vitally dependent upon ideas, is not distinctively intellectual. A man in any of the learned or quasi-learned professions must have command of a substantial store of frozen ideas to do his work; he must, if he does it well, use them intelligently; but in his professional capacity he uses them mainly as instruments. The heart of the matter—to borrow a distinction made by Max Weber about politics—is that the professional man lives off ideas, not for them. His professional role, his professional skills, do not make him an intellectual. He is a mental worker, a technician. He may happen to be an intellectual as well, but if he is, it is because he brings to his profession a distinctive feeling about ideas which is not required by his job. As a professional, he has acquired a stock of mental skills that are for sale. The skills are highly developed, but we do not think of him as being an intellectual if certain qualities are missing from his work—disinterested intelligence, generalizing power, free speculation, fresh observation, creative novelty, radical criticism. At home he may happen to be an intellectual, but at his job he is a hired mental technician who uses his mind for the pursuit of externally determined ends. It is this element—the fact that ends are set from some interest or vantage point outside the intellectual process itself—which characterizes both the zealot, who lives obsessively for a single idea, and the mental technician, whose mind is used not for free speculation but for a salable end. The goal here is external and not self-determined, whereas the intellectual life has a certain spontaneous character and inner determination. It has also a peculiar poise of its own, which I believe is established by a balance between two basic qualities in the intellectual's attitude toward ideas—qualities that may be designated as playfulness and piety.

TO define what is distinctively intellectual it is necessary to be able to determine what differentiates, say, a professor or a lawyer who is an intellectual from one who is not; or perhaps more properly, what enables us to say that at one moment

a professor or a lawyer is acting in a purely routine professional fashion and at another moment as an intellectual. The difference is not in the character of the ideas with which he works but in his attitude toward them. I have suggested that in some sense he lives for ideas—which means that he has a sense of dedication to the life of the mind which is very much like a religious commitment. This is not surprising, for in a very important way the role of the intellectual is inherited from the office of the cleric; it implies a special sense of the ultimate value in existence of the act of comprehension. Socrates, when he said that the unexamined life is not worth living, struck the essence of it. We can hear the voices of various intellectuals in history repeating their awareness of this feeling, in accents suitable to time, place, and culture. "The proper function of the human race, taken in the aggregate," wrote Dante in *De Monarchia*, "is to actualize continually the entire capacity possible to the intellect, primarily in speculation, then through its extension and for its sake, secondarily in action." The noblest thing, and the closest possible to divinity, is thus the act of knowing. It is only a somewhat more secular and activist version of the same commitment which we hear in the first sentence of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*: "It is the *understanding* that sets man above the rest of sensible beings; and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them." Hawthorne, in a passage near the end of *The Blithedale Romance*, observes that Nature's highest purpose for man is "that of conscious intellectual life and sensibility." Finally, in our own time Andre Malraux puts the question in one of his novels: "How can one make the best of one's life?" and answers: "By converting as wide a range of experience as possible into conscious thought."

Intellectualism, though by no means confined to doubters, is often the sole piety of the skeptic. Some years ago a colleague asked me to read a brief essay he had written for students going on to do advanced work in his field. Its ostensible purpose was to show how the life of the mind could be cultivated within the framework of his own discipline, but its effect was to give an intensely personal expression to his dedication to intellectual work. Although it was written by a corrosively skeptical mind, I felt that I was reading a piece of devotional literature in some ways comparable to Richard Steele's *The Tradesman's Calling* or Cotton Mather's *Essays to Do Good*, for in it the intellectual task had been conceived as a *calling*, much in the fashion of the old Protestant writers. His work was undertaken as a kind of devotional exercise, a personal disci-

pline, and to think of it in this fashion was possible because it was more than merely workmanlike and professional: it was work at thinking, work done supposedly in the service of truth. The intellectual life has here taken on a kind of primary moral significance. It is this aspect of the intellectual's feeling about ideas that I call his piety. The intellectual is *engage*—he is pledged, committed, enlisted. What everyone else is willing to admit, namely that ideas and abstractions are of signal importance in human life, he imperatively feels.

Of course what is involved is more than a purely personal discipline and more than the life of contemplation and understanding itself. For the life of thought, even though it may be regarded as the highest form of human activity, is also a medium through which other values are refined, reasserted, and realized in the human community. Collectively, intellectuals have often tried to serve as the moral antennae of the race, anticipating and if possible clarifying fundamental moral issues before these have forced themselves upon the public consciousness. The thinker feels that he ought to be the special custodian of values like reason and justice which are related to his own search for truth, and at times he strikes out passionately as a public figure because his very identity seems to be threatened by some gross abuse. One thinks here of Voltaire defending the Calas family, of Zola speaking out for Dreyfus, of the American intellectuals outraged at the trial of Sacco and Vanzetti.

It would be unfortunate if intellectuals were alone in their concern for these values, and it is true that their enthusiasm has at times miscarried. But it is also true that intellectuals are properly more responsive to such values than others; and it is the historic glory of the intellectual class of the West in modern times that, of all the classes which could be called in any sense privileged, it has shown the largest and most consistent concern for the well-being of the classes which lie below it in the social scale. Behind the intellectual's feeling of commitment is the belief that in some measure the world should be made responsive to his capacity for rationality, his passion for justice and order: out of this conviction arises much of his value to mankind and, equally, much of his ability to do mischief.

The very suggestion that the intellectual has a distinctive capacity for mischief, however, leads to the consideration that his piety, by itself, is not enough. He may live for ideas, as I have said, but something must prevent him from living for *one idea*, from becoming obsessive or grotesque. Although there have been zealots whom we may still regard as intellectuals, zealotry is a defect of the breed and not of the

essence. When one's concern for ideas, no matter how dedicated and sincere, reduces them to the service of some central limited preconception or some wholly external end, intellect gets swallowed by fanaticism. If there is anything more dangerous to the life of the mind than having no independent commitment to ideas, it is having an excess of commitment to some special and constricting idea. The effect is as observable in politics as in theology: the intellectual function can be overwhelmed by an excess of piety expended within too contracted a frame of reference.

Piety, then, needs a counterpose, something to prevent it from being exercised in an excessively rigid way; and this it has, in most intellectual temperaments, in the quality I would call playfulness. We speak of the play of the mind; and certainly the intellectual relishes the play of the mind for its own sake, and finds in it one of the major values in life. What one thinks of here is the element of sheer delight in intellectual activity. Seen in this guise, intellect may be taken as the healthy animal spirits of the mind, which come into exercise when the surplus of mental energies is released from the tasks required for utility and mere survival. "Man is perfectly human," said Schiller, "only when he plays." And it is this awareness of an available surplus beyond the requirements of mere existence that his maxim conveys to us. Veblen spoke often of the intellectual faculty as "idle curiosity"—but this is a misnomer in so far as the curiosity of the playful mind is inordinately restless and active. This very restlessness and activity give a distinctive cast to its view of truth and its discontent with dogmas.

Ideally, the pursuit of truth is said to be at the heart of the intellectual's business, but this credits his business too much and not quite enough. As with the pursuit of happiness, the pursuit of truth is itself gratifying whereas the consummation often turns out to be elusive. Truth captured loses its glamor; truths long known and widely believed have a way of turning false with time; easy truths are a bore, and too many of them become half-truths. Whatever the intellectual is too certain of, if he is healthily playful, he begins to find unsatisfactory. The meaning of his intellectual life lies not in the possession of truth but in the quest for new uncertainties. Harold Rosenberg summed up this side of the life of the mind supremely well when he said that the intellectual is one who turns answers into questions.

This element of playfulness infuses products of mind as diverse as Abelard's *Sic et Non* and a dadaist poem. But in using the terms *play* and *playfulness*, I do not intend to suggest any lack of seri-

DRAWING BY JIM CRANE



ousness; quite the contrary. Anyone who has watched children, or adults, at play will recognize that there is no contradiction between play and seriousness, and that some forms of play induce a measure of grave concentration not so readily called forth by work. And playfulness does not imply the absence of practicality. In American public discussion one of the tests to which intellect is constantly submitted when it is, so to speak, on trial is this criterion of practicality. But in principle intellect is neither practical nor impractical; it is extra-practical. To the zealot overcome by his piety and to the journeyman of ideas concerned only with his marketable mental skills, the beginning and end of ideas lie in their efficacy with respect to some goal external to intellectual processes. The intellectual is not in the first instance concerned with such goals. This is not to say that he scorns the practical: the intrinsic intellectual interest of many practical problems is utterly absorbing. Still less is it to say that he is impractical; he is simply concerned with something else, a quality in problems that is not defined by asking whether or not they have practical purpose. The notion that the intellectual is inherently impractical will hardly bear analysis (one can think so readily of intellectuals who, like Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson, Robert Owen, Walter Rathenau,

or John Maynard Keynes, have been eminently practical in the politician's or businessman's sense of the term). However, practicality is not the essence of his interest in ideas. Acton put this view in rather an extreme form when he said: "I think our studies ought to be all but purposeless. They want to be pursued with chastity, like mathematics."

An example of the intellectual's view of the purely practical is the response of James Clerk Maxwell, the mathematician and theoretical physicist, to the invention of the telephone. Asked to give a lecture on the workings of this new instrument, Maxwell began by saying how difficult it had been to believe, when word first came about it from America, that such a thing had actually been devised. But then, he went on, "when at last this little instrument appeared, consisting, as it does, of parts, every one of which is familiar to us, and capable of being put together by an amateur, the disappointment arising from its humble appearance was only partially relieved on finding that it was really able to talk." Perhaps, then this regrettable appearance of simplicity might be redeemed by the presence somewhere of "some recondite physical principle, the study of which might worthily occupy an hour's time of an academic audience." But no; Maxwell had not met a single person who was unable to understand the physical processes involved, and even the science reporters for the daily press had almost got it right! The thing was a disappointing bore; it was not recondite, not difficult, not profound, not complex; it was not *intellectually* new.

Maxwell's reaction does not seem to me to be entirely admirable. In looking at the telephone from the point of view of a pure scientist, and not as a historian or a sociologist or even a householder, he was restricting the range of his fancy. Commercially, historically, humanly, the telephone was exciting; and its possibilities as an instrument of communication and even of torture surely might have opened vistas to the imagination. But within his self-limited sphere of concern, that of physics, Maxwell was speaking with a certain stubborn daring about the intellectual interest in the matter. For him, thinking as a physicist, the new instrument offered no possibilities for play.

One may well ask if there is not a certain fatal contradiction between these two qualities of the intellectual temperament, playfulness and piety. Certainly there is a tension between them, but it is anything but fatal: it is just one of those tensions in the human character that evoke a creative response. It is, in fact, the ability to comprehend and express not only different but opposing points of view, to identify imaginatively with or even to embrace with-

in oneself contrary feelings and ideas that give rise to first-rate work in all areas of humanistic expression and in many fields of inquiry. Human beings are tissues of contradictions, and the life even of the intellectual is not logic, to borrow from Holmes, but experience. Contemplate the intellectuals of the past or those in one's neighborhood: some will come to mind in whom the note of playfulness is dominant; others who are conspicuously pious. But in most intellectuals each of these characteristics is qualified and held in check by the other. The tensile strength of the thinker may be gauged by his ability to keep an equipoise between these two sides of his mind. At one end of the scale, an excess of playfulness may lead to triviality, to the dissipation of intellectual energies on mere technique, to dilettantism, to the failure of creative effort. At the other, an excess of piety leads to rigidity, to fanaticism, to messianism, to ways of life which may be morally mean or morally magnificent but which in either case are not the ways of intellect.

Historically, it may be useful to fancy playfulness and piety as being the respective residues of the aristocratic and the priestly backgrounds of the intellectual function. The element of play seems to be rooted in the ethos of the leisure class, which has always been central in the history of creative imagination and humanistic learning. The element of piety is reminiscent of the priestly inheritance of the intellectuals: the quest for and the possession of truth was a holy office. As their legatee, the modern intellectual inherits the vulnerability of the aristocrat to the animus of puritanism and egalitarianism and the vulnerability of the priest to anticlericalism and popular assaults upon hierarchy. We need not be surprised, then, if the intellectual's position has rarely been comfortable in a country which is, above all others, the home of the democrat and the antinomian.

It is a part of the intellectual's tragedy that the things he most values about himself and his work are quite unlike those society values in him. Society values him because he can in fact be used for a variety of purposes, from popular entertainment to the design of weapons. But it can hardly understand so well those aspects of his temperament which I have designated as essential to his intellectualism. His playfulness, in its various manifestations, is likely to seem to most men a perverse luxury; in the United States the play of the mind is perhaps the only form of play that is not looked upon with the most tender indulgence. His piety is likely to seem nettlesome, if not actually dangerous. And neither quality is considered to contribute very much to the practical business of life.

SICK, SICK, SICK

SOREN Kierkegaard once described himself as "essentially a humorist," with a bent toward the religious. Just as this description gives us a rather clear bird's-eye view of the work of Jules Feiffer, we can also look to SK for an almost detailed contour map of what Feiffer is about. There may be important differences between the two, because, for one thing, Feiffer has let us know far less about what makes him tick than SK did. But even this is an important Kierkegaardian tactic—for the artist to remain in the background, "to be nobody, an absentee." Or, as Feiffer has put it, "I'm sneaky—I hide behind my pictures." But in spite of Feiffer's sneakiness the obvious parallels of their points of view are so many and so striking as to leave Feiffer looking very much like a sort of latter-day, Greenwich Village Kierkegaard, waging his own furious attack (essentially a work of love) upon Christendom. We don't have the slightest idea as to whether Feiffer is actually acquainted with SK's work. But if he isn't he ought to be. Not that he'd have so much to learn, but it is simply that in SK he would find a real friend. For not only is the madness (content) of

Feiffer's communication very much like what SK has said to us, but Feiffer's method is identical to SK's method of "indirect communication."

Kierkegaard tells us that "All my terrific work as an author is one great thought and it is: to wound from behind." And why did SK insist that "a man who cannot seduce men cannot save them either," and thence recommend that the religious author should begin with the "aesthetic" rather than the "religious"? Because:

If one is to lift up the whole age one must truly know it. That is why those ministers of Christianity who begin at once with orthodoxy have so little effect and only on few. For Christianity is very far behind. One must begin with paganism. . . . If one begins immediately with Christianity then they say: that is nothing for us —and they are immediately on their guard.

The first thing any Feiffer reader will tell you is that Feiffer does "wound from behind," that his approach is decidedly indirect. A couple of samples from the popu-

MY DREAM HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO WRITE A NOVEL ON THE CULTURAL BREAKDOWN OF THE MIDDLE CLASS.



BUT I'VE LONG FELT AN INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE. WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE - DO I REALLY KNOW PEOPLE?



SO I TOOK LEAVE OF THE UNIVERSITY AND ASSUMED AN OFFICE POSITION FEELING THAT THE PRESSURE OF DAILY CONTACT WOULD LEAD ME INSIGHTS INTO THE ORIENTATION, HABITS AND GROUP NEEDS OF MY FELLOW WORKERS.



SO I PUT ASIDE THE NOTES FOR MY NOVEL AND BONED UP ON THE SPORTS PAGE FINDING THAT, IN TIME, I WAS READY TO SUBTLY LEAD OFFICE CONVERSATION FROM BASEBALL AS A SPORT TO BASEBALL AS A FACTOR IN THE CULTURAL BREAKDOWN OF THE MIDDLE CLASS.



BUT AT THAT POINT THE FOOTBALL SEASON BEGAN. SO IN ORDER TO RE-ESTABLISH RAPPORT I HAD TO ABANDON THE NOTES FOR MY NOVEL AND BONE UP ON THE SPORTS PAGE TILL I FOUND MYSELF READY TO SUBTLY MANIPULATE OFFICE DISCUSSION INTO THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BASEBALL, FOOTBALL AND THE CULTURAL BREAKDOWN OF THE MIDDLE CLASS.



FOR PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THE CARTOONS ON PAGES 34, 38, AND 40, WE ARE INDEBTED TO JULES FEIFFER.

then GIVE, GIVE, GIVE

lar press: "Feiffer has recorded the American idiom with . . . an accuracy that leaves his readers cringing nervously between laughs" (*Newsweek*). "Feiffer's models are the very sort of people who think it is fashionable to dig Feiffer, and often the audience is left laughing uncomfortably at itself" (*Time*). But as to how Feiffer himself feels about this method of indirection, we turn to an interview from *Harper's Magazine*: "Feiffer . . . admits that he has never seen a cartoon, and seldom any kind of writing, that directly changed anybody's mind about anything. 'Rather, what it can do,' he says, 'is encourage a climate where different kinds of questions will be asked . . . and finally after a long period, changes will begin to be made.'"

"After a long period" concurs completely with SK's emphatic counsel that there be "no impatience" on the part of the religious artist. For, he said, "there is nothing that requires such gentle handling as an illusion" (including perhaps such widespread illusions that basically we are not really sinful after all?). But it is this very subtlety of the arts, coupled with all their charm and fascination,

which can enable them to penetrate man's thick hide—his eyes which can't see, his ears which can't hear, his hardness of heart—when all the bluntness of the most devastating frontal attacks inevitably would fail.

"There must be something more than words to express the emotions that the best of words don't seem able to," says Feiffer in his novel, *Harry, the Rat with Women*. Also, "we don't use language, any more; we misuse it. Language is no longer a means of communication but a means of avoiding communication." Feiffer has been called "one of the best cartoonists now writing, and certainly the best writer now cartooning"; he speaks himself of "writing" a cartoon.

But does the Pied Feiffer actually manage to pull off this kind of underground tactic of subversively leading us into the truth? Well, as an example, how else could one consistently express an "anti-girlie magazine philosophy" in one of the more popular girlie magazines and get away with it? Or, to be a little more specific, how else could one roundly satirize "the under-weaned editors of a girlie magazine" in a girlie magazine and still leave the same editors begging for more? If the editors didn't get it, certainly many of Feiffer's readers did. And sometimes the knife is so sharp that, as in the popular gang fight story, the target of a throat-slashing attack blissfully howls: "Ha! You missed me!" "Just wait 'til you try to turn your head," retorts his opponent. However, as SK was quick to point out, the method of "indirect communication" can be extremely dangerous also for the communicator. And therefore "the religious writer," says SK, "must be sure of himself . . . he must relate himself to God in fear and trembling, lest the event most opposite to his intentions should come to pass, and instead of setting the others in motion, the others acquire power over him." And this is precisely the danger being expressed by the hapless Feifferian office worker of the following monologue:

BUT I COULDN'T COMMUNICATE WITH THEM. WHEN I TRIED TO LEAD DISCUSSIONS ON THE CULTURAL BREAKDOWN OF THE MIDDLE CLASS ALL THEY'D TALK ABOUT WAS BASEBALL.



WHICH IS WHEN THE BASKETBALL SEASON BEGAN.



AND SOON AFTER—ICE HOCKEY.

I'VE FINALLY HAD TO ABANDON MY NOVEL. IN ANY EVENT IT'S ALL BEGUN TO SEEM A BIT SUPERFICIAL. BESIDES I'M MUCH TOO BUSY KEEPING UP



WITH THE SPORTS PAGE.

HOWEVER I AM COMMUNICATING EXTREMELY WELL.



NEVERTHELESS, in spite of this danger, new parables must be created to fit the time, just as the parables told by Christ were especially suited for his time. The new wine of truth must always be contained in new wineskins—of the expression of that truth, or else the fruit of the vine will be lost. This is why the opening paragraph of "Excalibur and Rose," one of the delightfully illustrated stories collected in *Feiffer's Album*, can serve not only as an adequate portrait of Feiffer, but also as a first-rate expression of his method:

There was once a funny, awkward little man named Excalibur, who made his living entertaining the villagers in the township where he lived. He sang. He danced. He recited parables to fit the time. It was said that there was no dispute Excalibur could not settle by gathering before him the disputants and mocking them gently till their self-righteous frowns changed to embarrassed grins and their bitter quarrel seemed only a trifle.

Truth will always need to be spoken in parables. This is because it is the nature of a parable to force us first to ask seriously "different kinds of questions"—to use Feiffer's phrase; for only then can we ever come close to sincerely appreciating, or understanding, the suggested answer of the parable. So much for Feiffer's method. Now for the suggested "answer" contained in that method.

Feiffer is a "protestant" in two important senses of that word. First, he *protests against* the attacks of society upon the individual—whether these attacks are political, economic, social, or what have you. Secondly—and this is merely the other side of the same coin—he *testifies for* (as expressed by the Latin *protestari*) the all-important integrity and place of the individual in society. Kierkegaard dedicated his entire work to "the individual"—"that existing individual" who, above all, has the courage to be true to his own deepest self in all his relationships with life. And all of Feiffer's work pushes relentlessly in the same direction. Those who have caught in Feiffer's work only a diagnosis of certain political and social ills need to cast their nets more deeply. As Julius Novick has said in *Harpers*: "Whatever you think of Feiffer's politics (which he describes as 'nonpartisan radical'), it is clear that for him all contexts, including the political, are moral contexts . . . his political strips are essentially not about statesmen and nations but about the moral problems imposed on us by political events."

So be it. But it should be made clear, at the same time, that as society is not the hero of the Feifferian drama, neither is it the villain. Just as the individual is that victim

which Feiffer intends to lift up, it is also the individual who has already fallen, in Feiffer's view. "We have met the enemy and he is us," as the great Albert of "Pogo" has so aptly put it. And how does Feiffer go about expressing this universal sickness besetting the individual? By pointing out, first of all, that the last thing the individual wishes to be is an individual. Man, for Feiffer, as well as for SK, is a master of escaping the dreadful freedom that comes only with the realization that one is held responsible not only for the choices one makes, but—and with infinitely more importance here—for the way in which these choices are made, or again, for the kinds of questions that are asked. It is only at this point that man must be an "in-dividable," must be alone, and hence can be free. At this point he can no longer base his actions on the suggestions of anyone or anything else, but must live only on the basis of his own innermost subjectivity—and hence must live in fear and trembling with an unprotected heart. But without this constant shield before his heart, it is also possible for the first time in a man's life for him to "make contact," to really love another, or to find full-fulfillment of this originally empty heart. Feiffer puts the matter this way in *Harry, the Rat*:

Life is an abrasive. The more you come in contact with it the more it uglies you. To make contact is to uglify. To give is to leave yourself open, to leave yourself open is to be hurt. Love, true love, is the act of taking all these negative factors and turning them into gold. To make ugliness beauty; to make suffering joyous; to make giving receiving.

This is why SK could say that in death, or even in the "sickness unto death," there is "infinitely much more hope than there is merely humanly speaking when there not only is life but this life exhibits the fullest health and vigor."

FEIFFER would pinpoint the location of hope at precisely the same point of crisis. In "The Oddball," a longish story-cartoon Feiffer did for *Playboy*, it isn't until the hero becomes "all mixed up" that real creativity and newness begin to take place in his life. But as soon as he straightens himself out by "identifying like mad" and becoming "just like everyone else," he dies—"just like everyone else." Thus endeth "The Oddball." There are also several other Feifferian heroes who, because they are always getting their hearts stepped on in the game of love, find devices to protect themselves from this pain:

one begins ditching women before they can ditch him; another finds a machine which can love him and give him confidence. Both are quite triumphant when they finally tell us that they "never felt disappointed, ignored, rejected or betrayed—or any other feeling again."

Feiffer is quite complete in his catalogue of the ways we escape "leaving ourselves open," and hence escape bearing a direct relationship to life. For "only then will man, finding that he cannot lose himself in the trivia of the outer world, return to where he belongs," Feiffer tells us in *Harry, the Rat*. But in his cartoons he shows us how we attempt to hide: by making love, making money, playing the boy, marriage, the social whirl, the rat race, the organization, the clique, the cause, affluence, fancy rationalization, and—of course—those two readily avail-

able standbys: alcohol and TV. ("Most of the time I feel just like me, . . . so I drink!" concludes one of Feiffer's characters. "I'm not sure of anything anymore. So what's the use?" concludes another as she clicks on "Gun-smoke.") But one of his favorite targets is the person who attempts to escape from life behind an intellectual or scientific objectivity of one kind or another. This is the man SK called "the Professor." (Feiffer would call him "the Explainer.") "And even if the 'Professor' should chance to read this," said SK, "this too will be made the subject of a lecture." In fable after fable, Feiffer also helps us see the same tragi-comic aspect of "the Professor" and the man "in whom the Professor is lodged." A good example of the latter is the following cartoon, in which "the Professor" is lodged in—of all places!—

The Student



SICK, SICK, SICK? then GIVE, GIVE, GIVE,

USUALLY there are none of these escape devices that we really care for in themselves, says Feiffer. They are only stopgaps to help us literally lose ourselves in order that we won't have to really care, or love, and hence won't have a chance of ever really getting hurt. Thus Novick can say of Feiffer: "The one evil that arouses this gentle, sensitive man to anger, that has no claim on his wide-ranging sympathies, is *not caring*: indifference the twentieth-century form of the orthodox deadly sin of sloth." Another way of saying the same thing is that we all have the tendency to let our heads come between the objects of our love and our hearts. Thus: "Oh, the sins of passion and of the heart—how much nearer to salvation than the sins of reason!" (SK); "[Harry] sensed that most people's lives were made up of inventing excuses for not getting what they wanted. Perhaps that was what this whole business of contact and communication was: the thinkers of the world were the losers"

(Feiffer). Furthermore, SK and Feiffer are both very quick to point out that usually we actually succeed in losing—literally—our selves in all our attempts to avoid being individuals. "What is called worldliness is made up of just such men, who . . . pawn themselves to the world. They use their talents, accumulate money, carry on worldly affairs, calculate shrewdly, etc., are perhaps mentioned in history, but themselves they are not; spiritually understood, they have no self, no self for whose sake they could venture everything, no self before God—however *selfish* they may be for all that," says SK. Or, as another one of SK's "poets," T. S. Eliot, has put it: ". . . it is better, in a paradoxical way, to do evil than to do nothing: at least we exist. It is true to say that the glory of man is his capacity for salvation; it is also true that his glory is his capacity for damnation. The worst that can be said of most of our malefactors, from statesmen to thieves, is that they are not men enough to be damned!" Now watch Feiffer say the same thing:

ALL MY LIFE I'VE FELT THAT DEEP WITHIN ME I'VE BEEN SUPPRESSING A GREAT EVIL.



THAT'S WHY I WAS AFRAID WHEN MOTHER HAD MY PORTRAIT PAINTED.

BUT MY PORTRAIT MADE ME LOOK YOUNG AND GOOD AND INNOCENT. IT REMINDED ME OF THAT STORY—YOU REMEMBER—"THE PORTRAIT OF DORIAN GRAY."



—WHERE THIS YOUNG MAN WITH GREAT EVIL IN HIM NEVER AGED A DAY—BUT HIS PORTRAIT GREW OLD AND UGLY AND EVIL.



SO I HID MY PORTRAIT, DETERMINED NEVER TO LOOK AT IT AGAIN. AND AS THE YEARS WENT BY I WENT TO WORK, I CAME HOME, I WENT TO WORK, I CAME HOME. BUT I DID NOT AGE A DAY.



I CRINGED AT WHAT MY PORTRAIT MUST LOOK LIKE. I GOT MARRIED, I WENT TO WORK, I CAME HOME. I HAD CHILDREN, I WENT TO WORK, I CAME HOME. BUT I DID NOT AGE A DAY.



FINALLY I COULD STAND IT NO LONGER. I HAD TO KNOW MY REAL SOUL AND IT WAS ON THAT CANVAS! I RIPPED THE PAINTING FROM ITS HIDING PLACE AND REMOVED THE COVER!



..... or DIE!



THUS Feiffer would prod us to "look at life in terms of absolutes." This is why he claims he "writes for children," just as J. D. Salinger (who admits to being a Kierkegaardian) tells us that he, Salinger, always writes about children. Feiffer says: "The questions I seek to raise are always questions a young, not very bright, child might ask. Questions like 'What is good and what is bad? Is good always good? Is bad always bad?' A child would answer 'Yes.' That's why I like to write for children. An adult, on the other hand, would recognize the innocence of the question and answer, 'Only sometimes. Good is good when *our* side does it. Good is bad when *their* side does it because they're just trying to lull us into false security. Bad is always bad when *they* do it. But bad is good when we do it because *they* forced it on us.' A child wouldn't understand that at all. Adults seem to."

BUT Feiffer is not only a knifer as many have contended. ("... people say, 'Why are you so bitter?' and I don't know what in hell they're talking about," as he puts it.) True, he is terrifically skilled at his own type of heart surgery, but it's difficult to see how anyone could have so much insight into the disease we are all heirs to without having at least some inkling of the cure. And "inklings" he indeed has given us. The basic question Feiffer has addressed to us is, "Sick, Sick, Sick?" If we answer in the affirmative, then his answer, as it is expressed in *Harry, the Rat with Women*, is "Give, Give, Give—or die":

People who do not make contact do not live. They only exist. Existing isn't living, Harry. We must open our hearts to others if we are to live. I have tried and failed. If you are ever to be happy you must try and succeed. Give, Harry. Give, Give, Give—or die.

IT
WAS
BLANK.



I BURNED
THE CANVAS
BUT IT
MADE NO
DIFFERENCE.
I DID NOT
AGE A
DAY.

I JUST
GO TO
WORK
AND I
COME
HOME.



Incidentally, Harry (the rat) is "Man," is "everybody," as Feiffer indicates clearly. But as much as Feiffer tells us about Man's need to find love through the act of loving, he seems to be carefully silent in this novel about the source of this love—or about how the process gets started in the first place. For instance, Harry, at first finds joy and insight into people through his initial acts of love, but soon is left only with the insight. "But this knowledge was more than was bearable. He had learned nothing from experience. He had no strength to draw upon." And this is the question we now put to Feiffer—where does one find the "strength to draw upon"? If Feiffer, like Salinger, is following SK's carefully conceived plan for indirect communication, he should not be in a hurry to "introduce the religious," as SK has told him; nor does he need to be—he is still a young man (early thirties) with, we sincerely hope, a good number of working years ahead of him. Nevertheless, if Feiffer ever does step forward with a clearer answer than he has given us up to the present (as Salinger finally stepped forward in *Franny* and *Zooey*) there are already indications that the answer will be somewhere in the same direction—that is, "the religious." These indications are, first of all, Feiffer's use of language and, secondly, the rather healthy understanding and consideration of the Bible he displays in some of his cartoons. Feiffer uses good theological terminology in what initially seems to be a profane or even blasphemous way. But our guess is that he is actually using this language quite self-consciously in the same way as what Salinger calls "a low form of prayer." ("I can't believe God recognizes any form of blasphemy," says Salinger in *Seymour*. "It's a prissy word invented by the clergy.") Words and phrases like "Oh, God!" "The Word," "the Life," "faith," "Lost Forever . . . and then . . . suddenly . . . Found!" etc., constantly provide Feiffer with central themes in many of his cartoons. In the following cartoon, Feiffer shows what can happen when we insist on demythologizing the declaration that can be called the essence of the New Testament's Gospel, "peace on earth and good will to all men," into terms of twentieth-century power politics:

A DANCE
TO THE
NEW YEAR.



IN THIS DANCE
I HAVE
SYMBOLIZED
PEACE ON
EARTH AND
GOOD WILL
TO ALL MEN.



WAIT A MINUTE - BY ALL
MEN I MEAN ONLY THOSE
MEN WHOM WE RECOGNIZE
AS WILLING TO BE
REASONABLE AND SEE
OUR SIDE AS WELL AS
THEIR OWN - AS LONG AS
THEY DON'T HAVE A DOUBLE
STANDARD AND PRETEND
TO BE NEUTRALISTS.



SO REALLY WHAT
THIS DANCE
SYMBOLIZES
IS A
RESPONSIBLE,
CAUTIOUS APPROACH -



UM - I DON'T WANT YOU
TO THINK I MEAN
ANYTHING FUNNY
BY THAT STATEMENT -
I MEAN PEACE, YES -
BUT WITHOUT APPEASE-
MENT ON THE
AFOREMENTIONED
EARTH AND, NATURALLY,
GOOD WILL TO
ALL MEN.



UH - WAIT A MINUTE - BY
GOOD WILL I MEAN
THAT WE SHOULD
HAVE GOOD WILL TO
THOSE WHO ARE - YOU
KNOW - ALL MEN OF
GOOD WILL -



THE cartoon which perhaps gives us our best indications of Feiffer's view of "the Word of God," is a story-cartoon he calls "The Deluge," originally published in *Esquire*. In this cartoon Harvey N. Noah, "government worker," is awakened one night by the voice of an angel, who says: "You don't know me, Harvey N. Noah. But I'm here from heaven where somebody gave me your name and told me to give you this message of special interest." At this point the angel proceeds to explain that the Earth would soon be deluged by atomic rainfall for 40 days and 40 nights, "at the end of which period there would be no living creature on the land or in the sea and that Harvey N. Noah had been chosen to gather from over the world two of every kind of living thing and that he was to build an ark on which these creatures would live and that they would be the sole survivors of the deluge." However, Noah thinks this visitation is a dream and goes back to sleep. But the next morning he receives a telegram saying, "This is to confirm your hallucination of last night. Proceed as directed re conversation pertaining to deluge, etc." Noah then begins his "mission" by going to his supervisor, who immediately shuttles him over to the Navy Department, who immediately passes him on to the Atomic Energy Commission, who quickly sends him to the Secretary of State, who angrily shouts at him, "Does this heaven realize it's dealing with the United States Government?" A fact-finding committee is set-up: "How long, Mr. Noah, have you been carrying on with angels?" Then governmental demythologizing sets in. A report concludes that "two of every living thing" is really symbolic for Man, "since, after all, Man is the highest form of living thing." It is further decided that "two of every kind" would be "wasteful duplication" and that, therefore, "the telegram should be amended to read 'one of each best kind.'" And so the selection begins. Then one night as Noah is again asleep: "Harvey N. Noah, this is the angel again. Boy, what a mess you've made out of things! It's the last time I'll ever tell you anything!" The following morning the atomic rainfall begins and the passengers of the arks (each of the fifty states has built its own ark since the government didn't want to interfere with states' rights) are quickly checked on board: "One doctor! Here! One lawyer! Here! One Philosopher! Here! Fifty atomic scientists! Here! Here! Here! Here! etc. One nonconformist! Present!" But Noah's name isn't on the list. So he then takes "one last look at the telegram he had received so many weeks ago," places it over his head to

protect himself from the gentle rain from heaven, reflects: "That's the way the ball bounces," and sorrowfully begins to walk home.

And how are we to judge what this parable is saying? The answer to this question depends on who's interpreting the parable—or any other work of art, for that matter. As SK has attempted to teach us, we do not judge good art so much as it judges us. Art, then, is like a mirror—"when an ape peers in, no apostle can be looking out." Thus, since there is this tendency to see ourselves in art, whether we like what we see or not, I can only say what this parable—and this is true of everything of Feiffer's I have been considering—says to me. To begin with, the entire story seems to be very close to the second chapter of II Peter. This chapter has a great deal to say about the preservation of Noah, the "flood upon the world of the ungodly," the pronouncements of angels, the day of judgment, "pollutions of the world," and ends by giving us a rather appropriate comment on the final picture we get of Harvey N. Noah: "For it would have been better for them never to have known the way of righteousness than after knowing it to turn back from the holy commandment delivered to them." This chapter also contains a few rather sharp digs at "false teachers," and it is here that Feiffer's whole attitude toward "the Word of God" is suggested most strongly to me. For in the radical reinterpretation of Harvey N. Noah's telegram, Feiffer seems to suggest that he has little use for those lispng theological "explainers" bent on their own "mythinterpretation" of the Bible in which all of the Bible's "hard sayings" and puzzling contradictions of our own twentieth-century scientific world-view are carefully watered down and/or explained away—thus throwing out the biblical baby with the bath by making the Bible's message supremely palatable in the name of modern "apologetics." (Hence "apologetics" moves from being a "defence of" to being "ashamed of.") This suggestion of Feiffer's exhibits, it seems to me, a rather healthy attitude toward the Bible. At any rate, it is certainly Kierkegaardian, to say the least.


In spite of all these inklings, it still would be hard to say whether or not Feiffer looks upon his own work as "angelic," or as having "a message from God." He is certainly a master at "casting out demons," regardless of "in whose name" he happens to be working. Perhaps the advice of Hebrews really is the attitude to adopt toward all such "strangers": "Do not neglect to show hospitality to strangers, for thereby some have entertained angels unawares."

TO ARMS CONTROL
ON EARTH AND
FRUITFUL
NEGOTIATION
TO SOME MEN.



I CALL IT
"THE BENDS."





BENEATH AFFLUENCE, BEYOND ALIENATION: CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

THE contemporary political situation in America reveals some real questions in our social philosophy and in our Christian social ethics. Underneath all the apparent general progress and even of the present effort to secure equality for the Negro runs the hidden crisis. The constant blare of the old tunes—freedom, released either by more order for the sake of equalizing freedom or by less order for the sake of freeing freedom—still drowns out an old yet neglected theme: true freedom is more than self-determination. Social analyses, for the most part, continue to beat the same drums with more elaborate instruments. Christian ethics, having advocated equality as at least coordinate with freedom, and realizing now that the substance of equality is as ephemeral as that of freedom, has begun to ask about the Christian substance; but as yet it has done little more than to insist that to be relevant Christian ethics must deal with the concrete, changing world.

The current fashion—if not fad—in Protestant Christian ethics emphasizes history as a realm of freedom. That is to say that no law or rule or principle (understood as a static form) suffices to determine what is right or

what ought to be done. What is “fitting” rather, is determined by response to a dynamic or fluid reality. Whatever stabilities exist are to be located not in the response but in similarities in situations as occasions for responsible action.

This situational or contextualist approach in Christian ethics is not only dependent upon some analyses of what the situation is, but also, if it intends to be Christian upon some view of what kind of analysis, if kinds there be, is most adequate. Furthermore, whether or not a particular analysis of the historical situation may be inadequate or less adequate is because of criteria located in a subject matter called Christian faith, or to be more exact, because of the particular interpretation of the Christian faith that is employed. In any Christian critique of American society, then, two preliminary decisions are necessary: What interpretation of the Christian faith? What interpretation of the situation?

We are quite unanimous, at least in the more “sophisticated” Protestant circles, that we do not have Christian rules for conduct. We cannot learn a set of formulas for human action that have only to be applied. There is no way to tell in advance what should be done. What is

BY ALVIN PITCHER

fitting or responsible action can be determined only in the light of what is in fact the particular case being considered. Telling the truth to one of a lynch mob about a fugitive hidden in your house would "probably" be irresponsible, unfitting, unchristian. Generally speaking, law and order are to be upheld, but civil disobedience under certain circumstances may be one's duty. Ultimately, then, what God in his freedom wills is not something that can be captured in formulas, rules, laws, or patterns of action. This situational or contextualist emphasis and the implied ultimate subordination of form to dynamics characterizes recent Protestant ethics.¹ This presupposition sets the stage for the real issues in Christian ethics.

Historically, the issue arose in Germany when a good proportion of the Protestant pastors supported that wing of the church that saw Hitler as the "wave of the future," as God's instrument for bringing order out of chaos and for protecting and advancing "Christian" interests. With or without a "situational" emphasis in Christian ethics, Christians identify God's will with their own interest. I am sure that most "Christian" segregationists have not the slightest notion about a situational or contextualist ethic. In reaction to the so-called German Christians who looked with favor on Nazi socialism long after its demonic character had become obvious to others, Christian ethics sought some criterion to avoid such idolatry.

Clearly, if an ethic is to be something more than a reflection of an aspect of the contemporary culture and if it is to take seriously the reality of God as part of the context of human action some way must be found, said Karl Barth, to transcend the situation. This thrust, which according to Paul Tillich really saved the church on the European continent, is what has been called neo-Orthodox or neo-Reformation theology. In it revelatory events and their record in the Bible became the escape hatch from the world of human finitude and sin. We are dependent, according to this point of view, on revelation both for the knowledge of and for the power to become what we are intended to be.

Except for an interlude in which a writer or two following Wilhelm Herrmann insisted that the Christian faith only provided a certain disposition a concern for the neighbor (philosophy provided the content) Christian ethics has sought some directives from the Bible. The question of course is: once having disregarded rules and commandments as universal laws what is there to be found?

The initial emphasis upon transcendence combined three factors, two of which probably belong together. On the one hand, there was the rejection of law and rule in favor of a more dynamic view of reality. God is free. Ultimately there are no eternal absolute forms that dominate reality. Therefore, whatever is can be expected to be transcended. No form of life can claim to be ultimate. On the other hand, because of man's sin and finitude both his knowledge and his power are limited. He deludes himself if he thinks that he knows and embodies the good. Therefore individuals and institutions that claim too much for themselves or refuse to be subject to the corrections

of other finite sinful men and institutions are inadequate. On this note of transcendence or what might be called the protesting "no" to everything finite there was general agreement. Both the view of a dynamic ultimate reality and of man's limitations are presuppositions—albeit biblical in origin.

Furthermore there are certain implications of this position with its emphasis upon the no. For Reinhold Niebuhr, whose analyses unquestionably have provided one of the great intellectual forces in American social thought, the no implied a "yes," namely self-assertion and organization for the sake of equalization of power. Through the eyes of the Bible, Niebuhr saw man in his pride, distorting his knowledge, misusing his power, and claiming to be more virtuous than he was. Ordinarily even the good man, said Niebuhr, will pursue first his own interests in the name of the common good. Therefore, everyone must be given an equal opportunity to pursue his interest, his view of the common good. The theory that freedom is maximized by reducing regulation was attacked. Organization and law must be introduced for the sake of equalizing freedom. Labor unions and the Democratic party became the vehicles for offsetting what industry and finance did in their relative freedom to do as they pleased subject only to the regulation of the market place. What was to be done was determined by Niebuhr's view of man, on the one hand, and what seemed best to equalize freedom of opportunity and to bring about a minimum standard of living for all. Of course, there was nothing inherently good in strengthening labor or the Democratic party; it just so happened that these were useful instruments to balance the power of industry and finance at that particular period of history. Having achieved a relative balance of the small people versus the rich what remains to be done, if we follow the principle of equalizing freedom, is to provide the Negro with a tool for expressing his interests. Supposedly, then, when this task has been accomplished the equilibrium of forces would only have to be maintained with minor adjustments. History, with its surprises, naturally, might upset the balance at any time. A large group of unemployed conceivably might exist outside any of the present instruments for controlling decisions. And for a time after World War II it looked as if Big Labor and Big Steel were working together to advance prices and wages, such that a new third force was necessary to represent the people on fixed income.

The school of thought represented by Niebuhr has been characterized by its starting point in Biblical anthropology. Sometimes it has designated the position by the formula "faith plus facts." In any case, it depends upon common sense or reason to assess the situation and to determine what the Christian in his concern for the harmony of impulse with impulse, of self with self, and of the individual with God, should do. The Bible provided the directive to be concerned and a realistic appraisal of the extent to which men can be expected to actualize this concern. But common sense using all the tools of modern research provided the basis for action.

This position has been challenged by those who feel

that one human criterion has been substituted for another. The Niebuhrian "no" is not enough to provide a more-than-human "yes." In other words the no as provided by revelation does not prevent common sense from finding its yes in the distortions and demonic demands of institutions and interpretations of the human situation. Revelation, says Barth, in his later development must provide more of a yes than Niebuhr finds in it. Barth wants more help from the Bible and less from common or uncommon (e.g., social science) sense. The acts of God in the past and man's responses to them, particularly as recorded in the Bible provide us with directions—not laws or rules—but with more help in determining the shape of Christian human action than Niebuhr will admit. Barth's position is echoed in Paul Lehmann's recent book *Ethics in a Christian Context*. Lehmann promises us a volume that will spell out the meaning of his appropriation of the Biblical revelation for particularity. One of Barth's promised three volumes (III,4) develops in detail what criteria the Bible provides for human action.

Once having granted the situational character of Christian ethics either the Christian faith is limited to its soteriological function, that is to the provision of a certain disposition, or a way must be found to distinguish a Christian interpretation of the situation. Niebuhr's way is questionable on two counts: first, because it does not provide enough content for the yes from the Bible; and secondly because its content is too formal. As James Baldwin states the case (in *The Fire Next Time*):

I cannot accept the proposition that the four hundred year travail of the American Negro should result merely in his attainment of the present level of the American civilization. I am far from being convinced that being released from the African witch doctor was worthwhile if I am now—in order to support the moral contradictions and the spiritual aridity of my life—expected to become dependent on the American psychiatrist.

In other words, if to be more free or to be equal requires the adoption of the substance of the middle class style of life, equality is a questionable value. Freedom and equality are not enough.

Barth claims that the Bible will provide criteria and that Jesus Christ is the key to its content. The late H. Richard Niebuhr (cf. *The Responsible Self*) says that Christ cannot carry the load; Barth drags in images from all over the Bible to give him his content. Reinhold Niebuhr claims that Barth has a lot more baggage from his own experience, baggage which because of his desire to escape the contamination of a particular culture is not recognized. Paul Lehmann insists that something like Barth's effort is necessary.

TWO things have become clear to me. First, Christian ethics must get more out of the Bible than have the brothers Niebuhr (and their clan) and than Paul Lehmann seems destined to get, or accept the challenge to formulate philosophical ethics.² It may be that this is what H. R. Niebuhr does with his emphasis on Christian phi-

A HIGHER FIDELITY

The table of my days has opened
wide and wider still until
at every place a handsome footman
stands to serve my willing guests;
and my disassembling eyes
see the crumbs of the banquet whole,
because pieces, by pieces seen, are one.

But tonight, at my last supper,
by mistake a sonata by Mozart
was left playing on the machine,
and the sound hovered over
the board of the hall and the chaos
there was genesised into order;
and I rested my fork and listened
until the music stopped, and creation
and my life in pieces passed.

—SHEPPARD B. KOMINARS

SEASON, SEASON, TART SO RED

Ribbon no spell longer than laughter
smiling whisp of the eye is none
lone
long linger the nun in her scarlet
this holy fervor has cleansed the red cross

Shut the palm and feel with the belly
the wind is lover unlike any man

The dance of the perfect
O splendor of wonder
no wound is a burden the apple cut thrice
dance over windwood, spiral in brass
the face of the pure

O splendor of splendor
no space is like motion here is the glade

Longer than laughter no ribbon of spell
longer than nun would linger in scarlet
the path of the heart

O traipsing wonder
robed in robeless the belly is white
no wound is a burden the apple thrice sundered

The night is O perfect
the immaculate sender
the wind is a lover O laughter be still

—JUDSON CREWS



JERICOHO ELIZABETH EDDY

SOUTHERN SHORE

All dreams breaking on this lonely beach
are blue, but bolder than before,
leave black lines in the sand

of this land, this land where nothing
will get its way for miles but sun
and silence. And we are blue

at summer's end, barefoot on the broken shells,
with only a stone to speak for us
where the dark waves break and fall.

Only a stone as the sun goes down.
(If you ask for bread He will not give you a stone,
but if you ask for a stone

chances are that's what you'll get.)
The fires we lit are splashed and salty,
a familiar aroma of bones

among the ashes. "I'm gonna go
up to the blue mountains," he said,
"sell grapes and preach to the rabbits."

Me, I'm going to gather all the seaots
I can and drive like crazy
to the nearest altar.

—CAROL HILL

A REVELATION

St. John reads like a 1949
movie
clipped and trimmed by the Director appropriate
for
the 11 to 1:15 spot
on channel three

AWARD MOVIES
STARLIGHT THEATER

With its four horsemen and seven bowls
Is it

THE PARADE OF THE PAGANS

or

THE LAST TIME I SAW JERUSALEM

—FRAN HASSENCAHL

losophy. Either we must get more from the Bible, or admit that we can get less. Either we accept Barth's direction or we become philosophers admittedly. Secondly, Barth's special ethics must become more specialized. If we take a situational ethic seriously we must address concrete situations. This raises the most serious question about Barth's method. For if situations change as much as we claim they do it may well be that anything dealing with similarities of circumstance will be so abstract that it will be almost meaningless to speak of direction from the events recorded in the Bible. If, for example, we do have an economy of abundance in America for the first time in history, does this not raise different questions about productive work and about education as preparation for such work? Does not the existence of atomic weapons also radically change the situation?

Such considerations lead us to the second major task confronting Christian ethics. What interpretation of the situation are we going to adopt? What social analysis is useful in understanding the context of human action? Are there some analyses of society that must be rejected by all Christian ethics? Do some social analyses fit in with some Christian ethics while not with others? Karl Barth, to be sure, has rejected this problem as the plague. And regrettably in the best American analysis of method in Christian ethics, Lehmann ignores this dimension completely. Following his adopted mentor Barth (Barth's formula: the Bible in one hand, the newspaper in the other), he seems to assume that while an elaborate analysis of problems and alternatives is necessary to appropriate the Bible, one somehow understands the situation by reading the morning newspaper!

This judgment, of course, is partially a caricature. But Christian ethics must provide a way of looking at the "facts" that permits it to be at least as responsible here as it has been on the side of "faith." Every social analysis depends upon an informing perspective. In the development of the United States into two societies it may well be that different perspectives are useful in looking at each part. The relevance of any perspective is in part dependent upon historical development. Some preliminary correlations between views of the Christian faith and the perspectives informing social science are possible. In the so-called society of affluence it is particularly difficult for Christian ethics to provide content for the moral imperative.

Sometimes it seems very simple to distinguish among social scientists. There are pessimists and there are optimists. Some think things are going well as a whole and our chief problem is in helping people get into the swim. Others are not so sure that being on the inside is much better than being on the outside. Edward Shils, whose judgment should be sophisticated, describes three types of sociology (or of sociologists) in the concluding essay of the monumental *Theories of Society*. According to Shils there are social scientists who permit themselves to be used by some of society in order to manipulate the rest. There are the alienated in the second place, who refuse to identify with authority. And there are the consensualists who consider themselves equal to authority

and equally a part of the same society.

In an effort to be a little less socio-psychological I will classify social analyses on the basis of their doctrines, especially using their views of freedom because of its centrality in our social philosophy. One model or image that informs analyses emphasizes participation and the form or process of decision-making. Its authors frequently use such terms as equilibrium, balance-of-power, or equality of opportunity. To be free is to participate in a process by which one's life is determined. Daniel Boorstin finds that this is the genius of American Democracy. There is agreement and emphasis on a way of doing things, but not on what is to be done. William Kornhauser sees our hope in so ordering our common life that elites and nonelites are protected from each other by intermediate organizations—those between the citizen and the state—which channel and limit the influence of the top on the bottom and vice versa. In their analyses of class both Lloyd Warner and Robert Havighurst implicitly assume that upward social mobility is desirable. Failure to participate in this process seems an unquestioned evil. Gunnar Myrdal finds the challenge to America in the increasing of its affluence in order that more may share more equally in whatever is to be had.

A second model emphasizes freedom as the absence of *external* restraint. To be free is to be self-determining. Milton Friedman wants us to make all schools private in order to give each parent the opportunity to choose the kind of school he prefers. Barry Goldwater represents this point of view consistently in *The Conscience of a Conservative*. The essential principle of this position is that anything done contrary to one's will is destructive.

A third model again might be described as self-determination, but in this case freedom from hampering *internal* restraints is crucial. Carl Rogers represents this position. Erich Fromm combines this stress with the fourth when he distinguishes freedom *from* and freedom *for*. One is not free, Fromm claims, unless he has no compulsive personality traits.

The fourth perspective that informs social analyses focuses on the content or result of human action. Freedom is self-fulfilment or the achievement of the good. Self-determination is subordinated or united with the principle of determination for something. Walter Lippmann looks at political life from this perspective in *The Public Philosophy*. He concludes that the results of the democratic process are very problematic. The opportunity for leaders to act with some independence from the electorate, called for by Kornhauser, is not enough. The leaders as well as the electorate must be informed by the "public philosophy." That means that some conception of the ends of government and of human life should inform political decisions.

It would lead us far beyond the purpose and possibility of this essay to point out how these differing perspectives inform both descriptive and prescriptive materials in the analyses. But it is very striking to compare two books such as Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* and Myrdal's *Challenge to Affluence*.³ Myrdal focuses on freedom and equality and the necessity to increase production in order

to provide equality of opportunity. He claims that Galbraith would share his perspective were he writing now. He misses Galbraith's different perspective. To be sure Galbraith might find the challenge of Michael Harrington's *The Other America* larger than he had anticipated, but he would still ask a different question. He would ask about life in the affluent part of society.

Some contend that there are two societies in the United States, that of poverty and that of affluence. Perhaps it is more useful to distinguish those who are excluded from those who are included. There are different ways of asking questions. Some men ask only about freedom and equality, freedom always meaning self-determination or participation. Others, in addition, are concerned about the content of life. For the society of the excluded, excluded either because of income or race, freedom and equality are essential—if not sufficient—guiding images. But for the society of affluence something more is required.

It may well be that our historical development in the United States has brought us to the point where freedom and equality as ordinarily conceived are exhausted of most of their creative capacity as concepts. Ideas may well have a seasonal relevance. In a society of poverty when innovation and efficiency have a preferred status because the sheer amount of production is important, freedom as self-determination may be allotted a larger role whatever its costs than is desirable in a society of affluence. In a society of relatively healthy individuals—physically, mentally, and spiritually—freedom as self-determination may be a more relevant model than in a society in which alienation abounds. In a society with a long history of tyranny, freedom as self-determination may seem to be the only important guide post. In a society in which a large segment of the population face inequalities in what are considered basic rights for the majority, freedom and equality have a peculiar relevance. To suggest the exhaustion of self-determination in its creative capacity is not to decry its relevance. It is not to contend that choice is not a part of being human. It is merely to relegate it to a subordinate place and to elevate some other principle or image to the predominant role in the constitution of our common life.

At any rate Christian ethics must find a way to distinguish and to choose among various interpretations of the situation, to assess the influence of these perspectives on description and prescription, and to judge which social analyses may be useful in the work of Christian ethics.

It may be suggestive to point out that Protestant social thought has tended to emphasize self-determination and process whereas Roman Catholic theologians more often raise questions about ends. Paul Tillich's memorable distinction between protestant principle and catholic substance provides a basis for suggesting correlations. Those Christian ethicists who focus on the protestant principle

(on man's finitude) find help in social science concerned about self-determination and process; those who focus on the catholic substance find an affinity with social science stressing freedom as determination for the good. But the distinction is not between Protestant and Catholic thought, for Tillich himself sees the primary problem today as that of substance.

The issue seems clear-cut in the area of race. The emphasis in social thought and in Christian ethics on equality and freedom has a singular relevance. But if we ask about the content of the middle-class style of life, access to which we hope to make available to all people, we find the most perceptive writers wallowing in uncertainty. The guiding image suggested by Talcott Parsons, "instrumental activism"—in my words, the successful performance of a role in our society—has a hollow ring, or at least it leaves us with more of a feeling of ambiguity than even modern sophisticated men wish to live with.

No doubt my own assumptions have been obvious. Social thought and Christian ethics in dealing with the concrete historical situation will seek a way to deal with and to transcend the givenness of the present. Analyses that tend to accept what is, or to use the formal principles of freedom and equality as norms are not adequate for our time. Christian ethics must find in Christian faith more than help in shaping the disposition. But to find this and to relate it to the historical situation requires cooperative action on the part of the church. It truly is a task of the "koinonia," that is, of those who are in a conversation encompassing the church in time and space. But the encompassing may well be a smothering of the gospel if at the same time the dialogue does not result in a transformation of the church. Thus, Christian ethics will be responsible for and dependent upon the renewal of the church.⁴ For here, just as in every other place, the substance or concrete content of faithfulness is much in question. The old guiding images no longer suffice. What we need is new content for the Christian law, which content—without claiming to be absolute—must involve more concrete direction than we have provided. The racial situation illustrates the problem. There are some things that a Christian ought to be doing in our day. The Christian faith has some implications here that can be made clear or Christian ethics truly is a waste of time. We sometimes lament the vehement disagreements of Christians on doctrinal matters. Would that we, without having to justify ourselves by our interpretations, had some of the same controversy regarding the crucial ethical implications of the Christian faith!

1. Cf. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, III 4, pp. 6-13.
Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, Book I. Ch. IX.
Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, Ch. X.
Paul Lehmann, *Ethics in a Christian Context*, Ch. V.
H. R. Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self*, Ch. 1.

2. By philosophical ethics I refer to those who use reason and experience to develop theories about what man is meant to be and how he is able to achieve this. For example, E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, P. Weiss, *Man's Freedom*, Erik Erikson, *Insight and Responsibility*.

3. An equally interesting and dramatic comparison could be made of William Kornhauser's *The Politics of Mass Society* and Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy*.

4. Cf. particularly Gibson Winter, *The Suburban Captivity of the Churches* and *The New Creation as Metropolis*.

fiction:

BY EDWARD LANNING

KINIEV-AFTER

IN EARLY JUNE, 1941, the liner *Scythia* left Liverpool for New York. Everyone hoped for an early end to the War; no one knew which way it would turn. It was not foreseen that in two weeks Germany would invade Russia. Statesmen and news analysts did not claim credit for having predicted the invasion until later.

The world stage was becoming cluttered. Britons marked time and waited for the appearance of the United States. And it was in anticipation of this that my paper, the *Guardian*, sent me off to America. Covering the international politics of the past two years had all but exhausted my resources. Aware of this, I think, the paper requested that I sail rather than fly. And though I protested, the prospect of four days on board looked attractive. Providing the ship did not run afoul of a torpedo.

The first day out was uneventfully spent learning the lumpy spots in my mattress. Early on the afternoon of the second day, I strolled the deck. The weather remained springlike, the air cool. Water the color of dark green glass flung foam against the hull. After standing some moments at the deckrail, I chose to sit down and read for a bit. Instead of the standard diet of newspaper war propaganda (the content of which I knew very well), I had brought with me a book. It contained a number of short pieces by Kiniev. I had read all of them before, yet something had prompted me to take up the volume again.

Having read through several stories, I saw it was late afternoon, marked my place and, setting the book down, slipped off to the dining room for a small pot of tea. On my return I saw an elderly gentleman bent over the book and leafing through the pages. Judging by his wrinkles he must have been all of sixty, though he stood straight and tall and had a muscular frame. He wore a dark, unfashionable suit, leaned on a walking stick, was hatless, and his straight white hair blew in all directions. I

walked up and introduced myself. The man seemed a bit ruffled and embarrassed, but then smiled.

"Sergei Merkovski," he said. "Recently arrived from the USSR. The United States has favorably responded to my request for asylum. I go there now."

Merkovski spoke with the slow, distinct English of the foreigner. But more unusual was his voice—it was barely audible, though obviously he strained to accommodate the listener. I apologized for having come upon him so quietly. He nodded, his mouth grave. "Yes—there has been much of that in my country since the Revolution. Few were my friends who did not start at sudden noises."

We sat down, he beside me, and talked. The present state of Russia interested me a good deal, as it did the rest of the world. I was eager for any first-hand data. Behind his slow and deliberate way of speaking lay an astounding vigor and passion. Evidently he felt deeply about the state the world had got itself in, and would have personally gone to great lengths to help get it out. When I mentioned that I was a journalist, he seemed pleased.

"At one time I also wrote for the newspapers," he said. "Before and during the Revolution. After that I fell out of favor. It was in the course of one of my stays in Siberia that I contracted the throat ailment which, as you have noticed, almost robbed me of my voice."

"Have you been in retirement?"

He flashed an ironic smile, shook his head. "Before the Revolution I had taken my degree in history. I intended to combine this, my first love, with my writing. Unfortunately in those days history no longer was a dead and static field. At any moment your written conclusions were more than likely your ticket either for prison or the graveyard.

"While pretending to capitulate—follow the party line, as you English say—I wrote of Russia as I observed it, published under an assumed name. Some of my articles, I believe, reached your country.



At any rate, not too long ago I was informed upon. Hence my sudden flight, though I must admit I leave my motherland with sorrow."

After a pause he said: "Perhaps you wonder why I found your book so interesting?"

"Certainly Kiniev seems to exemplify the spirit of the people," I said. "In attacking the Czar and orthodoxy, his work suggested a more hopeful future than that which we have witnessed."

"True," Merkovski said. "He was a great and a brilliant artist—I think the greatest the world has yet known. Of course this is a personal opinion. I knew him, you see."

The fact surprised me. Somehow my generation had come to regard Kiniev as an imaginary colossus as deeply buried in the past as Homer or the bones of Caesar. To find oneself in the company of his contemporary seemed fanciful.

"Did you know him well?" I said.

"Quite well. I saw a good deal of him while he was writing his last big book. At the time I still was a boy. I grew up on his estate, my parents were serfs of his family. It was under his influence that I pursued my studies and took up authorship myself."

"He must have been an extraordinary fellow."

"Oh—very. He would tell me stories from time to time. When still a lad, I listened along with the others my age to his improvised fairy stories and moral fables. Later, only slightly changed, some of them appeared in his collected works. Yes, Kiniev was a man of great natural appetites and a strong, nearly inflexible need to live consistently with his beliefs. To live any other way than he advised others to live in his work would have seemed to him criminal."

"His death was in 1910?"

"Nineteen-eleven," Merkovski said. "In the winter . . . surrounded by snow and ice . . ." His mind appeared to wander back to that time. "Of course he was much changed at the end. But contrary to

popular opinion, he still was very much in control of his faculties. He simply espoused a vehemently anti-artistic and rather fanatical view of things. Not unlike your detective writer, Mr. Doyle. Still, his death scene will be written in my memory for as long as I live."

"You saw him die then?"

"Yes—I was there, I came after I had heard what he had done. A man in his eighties does not belong traipsing about the countryside unaccompanied. He was a strange and sometimes unfathomable spectre. The dichotomy of man and artist made him mysterious. Even today he seems almost a ghost."

Merkovski glanced at his watch. As it was time for supper, he wished me good-day. He planned, he said, to study some papers and retire early. I suggested we meet again the following afternoon and he agreed.

That night I copied as best I could remember them the notes of our talk. Once in bed I tossed for a long time before sleep came. The dead titan haunted my thoughts.

II

Next afternoon Merkovski resumed his tale. The night had darkened the rings beneath his eyes, and he confessed to having had difficulty sleeping. "The Russian bear is a land animal—he feels more secure when his cave is not in motion."

"We shall be in port in two days," I said. "How does the prospect strike you?"

"Oh—favorably," he said. "Although I stand in awe of the day. In but a few years to be a United States citizen—that is as the muzhik who in his dreams becomes the Czar! Yes, yes . . . just the

same. . . . But you wanted to hear about Kiniev. I shall tell you. His death was not like the death of any ordinary man. . . .

THE GREAT MAN LAY upon a huge featherbed, his body bundled in heavy blankets and his head half sunken into a pillow of down. His eyes hung like motionless stars in the sockets, his breathing was irregular and hardly audible. He was attended by three of the greatest physicians in the province; one of them, Yacobov, had been with him nearly all his life.

Yet there was little hope.

Since reviving from sleep and sedation, the old giant had said no word, made no gesture other than to motion for a water glass at his bedside. The doctors looked at one another, frowns of irritation at their mouths and eyes. Occasionally one would release a sigh or give a shrug of the shoulders.

Kiniev must have known only too well it was all up with him. Upon his face, nevertheless, was no sign of regret and in his eyes only a rather serene flickering of light as with an altar candle. He must have been in pain but showed nothing of it. The eyes alone lived in that broad bearded face, and they remained fixed upon the large icon of the Savior on the opposite wall. Above him stood a plaque bearing the line: "They also serve who only stand and wait."

In the bedroom adjoining the death chamber, the intimates of the dying man awaited the final moment. Among this number were his publisher Akhranin, the renowned critic Shinski, a peasant with whom he had become very friendly toward the end whose name was Yakov, and his wife Anna Katrina. The rest of the company was made up of two of Kiniev's children, some aged servants who had been all their lives with the family, and several of the author's disciples. Among these last was Merkovski.

No one was able to remain still. Anna Katrina would sit down, then bounce up as though on springs. At intervals she spoke to her elder son or to Akhranin. Her face—striking for its absence of lines considering her age—seemed full of worry. Her son Pavel patted her shoulder and talked to her in low, soothing tones. "Do not worry, Mother," he said. "This divorce business—it will work itself out. Father is the hero of the nation. And as his legitimate widow, you shall receive the love of the people just as if they were your own children."

"His mind was gone, he was out of his head," Anna Katrina murmured. "That divorce suit! I will

fight it! He did not know what he was about. Anyone could see he was sick . . . sick. . . ."

She paced to and fro, small mouth puckered in a frown, and continued to talk to herself. Akhranin, whose most remarkable feature was his treble chin, the color of a variety of purple-red grape, was more composed. He sat on a large padded chair with a straight back, palms resting on the fringes of his bloated belly, and occasionally spoke with Shinski.

"A sad affair," he said, and wagged his jowly head back and forth. "Poor, dear Anna Katrina—all those years, squabbles, children. Then to be shuttled off, deprived of royalties from his work. And here am I charged with the solemn duty to publish the pieces. No doubt the demand will be great. The public will want every word. Still, it is an unfortunate business."

Shinski nodded. He was a lean, whitish fellow with thinning straight hair plastered to his head. His bloodless lips and pale grey eyes had a way of combining in an ironic expression when he prepared to speak. And he had the nervous gesture of covering with his long feminine fingers some pock marks on his face. "Indeed—indeed!" he said. "Well, perhaps it will console the tragic widow to view the tear-stained face of Moscow at the funeral. For surely the entire city will be a veritable river on that day. The greatest spectacle since the assassination of the last Czar—rest his spirit. Everyone will be there. Don't you agree?"

"Of course. The affair will be remembered years after by all those present. The glorious sight of an entire people ministering as one, honoring the name of their late and true friend with their earnest sorrow. That will be a wondrous day indeed—a wondrous day!"

At that moment a newcomer appeared before them. Though fifty and a man of inherited wealth, the man, Druchafski, considered himself one of Kiniev's disciples—one who would carry on the master's work in the same tradition. He had among the men of letters of the time a reputation for dullness and pomposity that was unequalled.

"Well—my dear Vladimir Ivanitch!" Shinski said, and the ironic twinkle in his eye escaped Druchafski. "You too have made your way here to glorify the master."

Druchafski sniffled, wiped his nose with a lace handkerchief. His small eyes were moist. "Ah! Ah! Why does it have to be so," he said, "—the great ones scuttling off to the domains of dust just as all the rest of us. It seems a terrible pity."

"Have you done any work lately?" Akhranin said.

"Certainly not!" Druchafski said, shocked at the impropriety of the suggestion. "On the eve of such

a doleful hour? How can an artist work under such circumstances?"

"I am certain our friend referred to the time prior to the saddening news," Shinski said.

Akhranin nodded. "Of course, of course."

"In that case I have indeed," the writer said. "My new play—grounded upon that same undepleted soil which nourished the flowering treasures of our faded friend—shall unquestionably be my crowning achievement. It is entitled: *Marya, Maid of Virtue*."

"We cannot wait too long to devour it with our eyes," Shinski said. "The hours before its arrival surely will be unbearable."

"Thank you, sir," Druchafski said with a beaming face. "Your expectations, I promise you, shall not be disappointed."

"That hardly is possible in your case, my dear Vladimir Ivanitch. As a matter of fact," Shinski continued, turning back to Akhranin, "I have worked up a small study discussing our good master Kiniev's work. A critical analysis. There should be a market for it, don't you imagine?"

"Of course, of course. Bring it up, I shall have a look at it," Akhranin said. "If it follows in the same vein as your articles in the press, the piece no doubt will find favor with the public."

During these goings-on, the peasant Yakov remained of all those present the most calm and quiet. He merely stood in a corner of the room, his short figure straight and his arms at his sides. From time to time he nipped at a small bottle he concealed beneath his rough jacket, his small eyes shining with amazement at his illustrious company.

Suddenly a commotion exploded in the sick room. All heads turned in that direction.

"Does this mean the time has come?" Anna Katrina said to Pavel; her eyes went wide and flashed, the fingers tightening together.

The sick room door was thrown open. On the

bed Kiniev lay supported by pillows, his head commanding a vantage which allowed him to meet all their faces with his eyes. At the sight of those eyes Anna Katrina slunk back, for once speechless. The expression on his face was of quiet, implacable hatred.

Standing at his right side, Yacobov whispered something to the patient. Kiniev with difficulty tried to clear his throat. Then in a distinct voice he said: "In my work I had prophesied the scene now before me, I had foreseen it. All the mourners! I shall die now, but let me tell all of you—Anna Katrina, Akhranin, Shinski, and the rest—the thought of what you will do with my life after all is over fills me with horror and freezes my blood in my veins. Carrion vultures! Pickers of the bones of the dead! Ghouls and perverters of life! It was to avoid this very scene and the grisly circus which certainly will follow that I left my house. Yes! I set off to escape from these very lies you are speaking on your tongues. But they have managed to catch me up . . . in spite of. . ."

Raising his right arm to say something further, his body convulsed and the head dropped back. With a final look at his icon he was dead.

SO IT ENDED," Merkovski said. "A note of savagery mingled with sure conviction. His wife threw her face into her hands weeping, of course—they all gathered round her to give comfort. Yet that all was anticlimax to his last breath monolog, delivered in true literary fashion."

"And he did not appear touched with madness?"

"As surely as I stand here, I would swear to his sanity at that moment," Merkovski said. "The real tragedy of the affair was that his dying vision proved completely prophetic. The funeral was a ghastly parody of his simple and secluded life. A regular society ball. I did not attend—I could not participate in the man's final degradation."

Like an instant the hours had passed. Again it was time for the evening meal and again I persuaded Merkovski to be present at the same place next afternoon. He had spoken of a final degradation, and something in his voice suggested that the macabre funeral was not all.

III

The next day, the last of our cruise, he was later than had been his custom. With impatience I waited. In a few hours we would have docked in New York.

At last I made out his figure emerging from below decks.

"I regret to have kept you," he said, and sat in



DRAWING BY JEAN PENLAND

the usual place. "I have been assembling my few belongings. In the excitement (I am not too old to feel it) the time escaped me."

I said I had not been there long, though I was anxious to hear the conclusion of his interesting account. He smiled, plucked at a thick eyebrow. "It has been enjoyable for me also," he said. "The passage almost at an end, my seasickness even is cured. Perhaps you guessed that I do not regard the funeral as the lethal blow? No—at times the anticlimax may exceed the actual climax in importance if not in force. Such I feel to be the case. The wound I speak of has been done to his work."

I must have looked puzzled, for he hurried on.

"An artist is known to posterity in two major ways. First, by his work and second, by his life. Now, anyone of course may study his work. It speaks for itself. The sad truth, however, is that often the work is given second place. And it is only through biographies and other studies we know the man.

"In the case of Kiniev this is doubly true, for he was a doubly great artist. And what do we learn from these studies? That he was a magnificent artist—yes. But on the heels of this information comes the news that he decayed into madness and fanaticism. That he was some sort of raving modern Elijah, a muddled hermit and halfway socialist. In short, we heap upon his name a lugubrious ignominy, leading many people to regard the man's work either with distrust or with downright disdain."

"Yet if it was true?" I said.

"Even so—the emphasis must be upon the work. That is what must be permitted to live. And there are other things as well—other sins. These are grievances which go deeper than a mere displaced perspective.

"I refer to the validity of art criticism in general. The right of essentially uncreative people to dissect a creation beyond their own power or dream. How can a Shinski criticize the work of a Kiniev? How can he have the measureless cheek to stand and judge something prejudged by the artist himself in the act of creating it? To create is no easy task—either book or painting or musical composition. It is an ability bred from long hours of isolation and endless practice and repetition.

"In the newspapers we see a composer accused of formalism, a painting referred to as 'ethereal,' 'kinetic,' 'sinful,' or even 'God-inspired.' How can a painting be these things? It is meaningless cant! All a painting can be is a painting. All you can say about it is that you either like or dislike it. And the only defense for your position can be a technical analysis, considering only technical flaws. Can we

attack a work for having meanings we have read into it ourselves? This is not criticism—it is mere opinion."

"Then the only valid critic is the artist himself?" I said.

"Exactly. The sort who Kiniev called 'the perverters of life' are the bane of creativity. We can thank them that Nietzsche shoulders the blame for Hitler, Einstein for our collapse of values, and Marx for the atrocities of Stalin. The men who warp theory—they are the great sinners of the world. It is they who misguide the human race, they who blindly steer it towards annihilation."

It was not the evil that men did that lived after them; it was the evil which others thought they had done. We sat in silence. From a nearby radio came the account of the latest war happenings—how many more dead, the strategy of the day, increases in production. The voice of the commentator rang hollow compared with the throaty anger of the waves. Soon his voice could not be heard at all.

"What then remains of Kiniev—after all of this?" I said, and stared at him. "What is left of the artist?"

"After? After his portrait is drawn for the world by wife and contemporaries and critics? The actual work remains for those who will study it. For the artists who will be, the work is there. But of the man? Of the man—dust."

Shortly the two of us parted. I do not know what Merkovski did in the years which followed, although I heard of his death in the early fifties. He had become a United States citizen.

When the Soviet Union joined the Allies, the *Guardian* offered a blurb in praise of their contemporary artists. I did not read the article. I was no longer interested in their great plans. The propaganda articles I had written during my stay in America were printed after Pearl Harbor. When last I saw Merkovski he was peering intently at the Statue of Liberty. However, I do not believe he got a good view because the mist in the harbor was thick.



DRAWING

BY LU ANN CIPOJ
motive



books

George H. Mayer, *The Republican Party, 1854-1964*.
Oxford University Press (1964), 563 pp., \$9.75.

Carlyle observed that "history is the essence of innumerable biographies." Although some attention in this volume is devoted to issues, electioneering, and election results, the emphasis is upon Republican leadership. *The Republican Party: 1854-1964*, will probably receive a higher rating from admirers of Carlyle than from devotees of modern social science techniques of historical study.

This is a large book about a larger subject, the most comprehensive treatment of the Republican Party yet attempted. The author is doubtlessly correct when he says, "It is unlikely that a definitive history of the Republican Party will ever be written unless the project is undertaken by a team of scholars." Despite its limitations the present volume will be valued as a source of facts and character sketches. Its bibliography, although not exhaustive, is a storehouse of Republican lore. Primary sources include correspondence, the press, campaign leaflets, popular periodicals, government and party publications, manuscript collections and interviews with Alf Landon. Secondary sources are chiefly published monographs and unpublished Ph.D. theses.

The text which emerges is a sometimes perceptive, sometimes obscure, fragment of the Republican story in its first eleven decades. Cervantes wrote, "By a small sample we may judge of the whole piece." A central question relevant to the Mayer history is this: Is the sample representative of the "whole piece"?

In the opinion of this reviewer Mayer interprets twentieth-century Republicans more successfully than those of the nineteenth century. Theodore Roosevelt, the Tafts, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover emerge rather clearly. Eisenhower is described as an outgoing personality of genuine warmth whose fame came too late in life to corrupt his accustomed humility. Yet, as Mayer points out, the General shares the typical military man's disinterest in, and dislike of, politics. As President, he neglected opportunities which might have brightened the future of the GOP. The author persuasively laments that the party, which originally championed Negro freedom in the United States, merely marked time after the 1954 desegregation decision of the Supreme Court. The Democrats were permitted to win the major share of Negro ballots in large states with crucial electoral votes.

Among nineteenth-century characters, Grant, McKinley, Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and James Blaine are depicted succinctly. Mayer strives for clarity and detachment in

characterizing Lincoln, and he secures the second of these qualities more surely than the first. Lincoln is communicated as a rather commonplace executive, dominated by congressional policy except on questions which are directly related to the war crisis. Somewhat the same impression might be achieved if Winston Churchill is viewed simply as the leader of the Cabinet and the servant of the Commons.

Mayer is at his best in explaining the principal members and mores of the United States Senate. Lyman Trumbull, Ben Wade, Sumner, Roscoe Conkling, Matthew Quay, Mark Hanna, Nelson Aldrich, John Sherman, the elder Lodge, Robert Taft, and many others become real people in his pages.

The book contains a few misconceptions. The suggestion that southern elections were "quiet" during the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century finds scant support in detailed studies of the pre-civil war and post-civil war periods. The reader may consult many historians, including Richard Shryock, Horace Montgomery, Hugh Lefler, Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, John F. Kennedy, Allan Nevins, T. Harry Williams, C. Vann Woodward.

The treatment of the 1928 election illustrates the serious omission of sources which utilize sophisticated statistical analysis. Ruth C. Silva, *Rum, Religion and Politics*, employs a complex computer analysis to test the hypothesis that Al Smith's voting strength was closely correlated with a high proportion of Roman Catholic population and with sentiment favorable to repeal of prohibition. Her negative findings appear to refute a popular interpretation of the Hoover-Smith election. It is regrettable that Mayer failed to make use of this and other studies employing politicometrics.

Microhistory emphasizes the intricate, the detailed, and the unique. It treats of a narrow subject intensively and aims to immerse the reader in a historical moment until he becomes a part of that moment and understands it. Herbert Butterfield, Harold T. Parker, and Allan Nevins are representative micro-historians. *Macrohistory* deals in the sweep of vast historical movement, explains cyclical patterns and probes for authentic historical philosophy. Macrohistory may be represented by the works of Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, and Giambattista Vico. In *The Republican Party* George Mayer has assumed a task more extensive than microhistory, the difficult goal of perceiving the intricate and the unique along with the sweep and pattern of a historical period extending over a century. His deficiencies are accounted for, in large measure, by the magnitude of the objectives. He is due congratulations; much has been achieved.

—JOSEPH L. BERND

Milton Mayer, *What Can a Man Do?* University of Chicago Press (1964), 310 pp., \$5.

When the editor of *motive* solicits book reviews he reminds prospective reviewers that *motive* readers "seek lively criticism and provocative analysis, not reportorial outlines for chapter content." Ordinarily I would have no trouble meeting his terms; all of us would rather outline our opinions than give opinions about others' outlines. But in the case of a book by Milton Mayer, I have difficulty coming even to the point of "reportorial outlines for chapter content." The stronger temptation is along these lines: simply to reprint Mayer, shamelessly to plagiarize, to give people a taste and a sample, and to let Mayer thus take care of his own affairs. Few essayists today are so pithy, so witty, so personal in style.

Lively criticism and provocative analysis of Mayer would have to begin with the judgment that he is a semi-recognized semi-official sort of chaplain to people semi-committed to various semi-subversive and semi-anarchic causes. By that I mean to say that he appeals to all of us who know we really ought to be pacifist, socialist, free men but who, in his own terms about himself, are "corrupt" enough to settle for compromise. If we are semi-committed to our roles, so is he to his. The tools of his trade: passion mixed with humor, criticism mingled with self-deprecating irony, a gift for looking at himself in a comic mirror—all these prevent his being taken seriously as a real chaplain to real subversives and anarchists. For one thing,

I blush to say it in these supranational days, but I love my country, and I could not more leave it lightly than I can remain and stand by while it is being pulled to pieces. This is my own, my native land. I am an American.

He continues: "But I am a man before I am an American; not a good man, and getting no better, but a man, and a man has the overriding duty, in jail or out, to be free." He describes himself as an independent journalist who affects, on the side, "to be a religious man with an ecumenical outlook and an affiliation of some amorphous sort with a cheerful institution like Quakerism."

Mayer is not sufficiently compromising to be popular with the complacent defenders of culture and not sufficiently ideological or propagandistic to be *shaman* for the causes he espouses. A Jew, he reminds Jews that they have to save their own souls; a near-Christian, he regrets too much of Christian history and practice to be popular; a loosely-affiliated Quaker, he is not humorless enough to head the ranks; a pacifist, he is too militant to look like the earth-inheriting meek. He is, in short, himself. I am tempted to say that he is an individualist, but that word connotes so much that he is not. For his basic view of life finds men's destinies to be wrapped up so much with each other's that "the Body of Christ" motif for human solidarity constantly comes to mind.

The most important piece in this collection is the well-known "Christ Under Communism," reprinted from *Harper's* (August, 1960). He tells of "Christians who live in a world much more like Christ's than [we do]," behind the Iron Curtain; of Christians disturbed by our crime, cultural vulgarity, and juvenile delinquency; of Christians who are disturbed because they see their children growing up without Christ while at the same time they see the apparent quality of their life and culture improving; and of *our* Christians who are puzzled by the whole process and judgmental against all Christians behind the Iron Curtain.

Mayer does not spend much time with the really evil, with the McCarthys; he concentrates on the 'good' men of a good

society, the Dulleses and others whom he sees as representative of the crowd that knows better but still exploits and kills. If Mayer is to be faulted, it is for his willingness through humor to take off the pressure from our conscience just at the point where we are alerted. On the other hand, since we can bear so little reality, we probably would pay no heed at all were his writing not so attractive. *What Can a Man Do?* is a question not clearly answered in the book of that title. What can we do? We can begin by beginning to sharpen our residual consciences, by reading Mayer and trying then, as he does, to piece our way between misguided authority and mistaken anarchy.

—MARTIN E. MARTY

Harry Golden, *Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes*. World (1964), 314 pp., \$4.95.

In reading *Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes* one gets the feeling that Harry Golden is saying, "This is what I've been trying to tell you all the while." It is a story which had to be told and it had to be told by Harry Golden. Had the tragic death of President Kennedy not occurred he would still have found a vehicle. This is not to minimize the unparalleled contribution which the author makes in pointing up the late President's deep sincerity and positive genius in his participation in the great social revolution.

Social historian, humorist, journalist and great American—all that Harry Golden is comes to the fore in this remarkable book. Here the precedent-breaking role of the late President is presented in its proper context. And here Harry Golden gets across his message with remarkable perception. He reveals a better than average understanding of the Southerner who refuses to become a traitor to the South and of the Negro who says the white man simply cannot "think black."

While the author's argument that "There was no 'natural antipathy' of the races" (p. 40) is well taken, his presentation of the nonsegregated antebellum South could perhaps bear elaboration. During these days, he says ". . . segregation was not only impossible, it was undreamt of. Negro and white frequently lived in the same house, shared the same plates, and attended the same church." This situation was so far from the present dreams of Negroes in America that it would have been well for Mr. Golden to make some such explanation as did Kyle Haselden in *The Racial Problem in Christian Perspective*. Says Haselden ". . . However many and casual were the physical and social relationship which prevailed between Negroes and whites in the South in antebellum days—undoubtedly considerable—they prevailed in a master-slave setting. The associations were paternalistic and largely contemptuous of the personality of the Negro. . . ."

As reporter Harry Golden presents innumerable occurrences which not only dramatize the dehumanization process which has victimized the Negro in America but which also provide much needed insight into these circumstances. True, he seems to take an occasional unnecessary flight, but most of what he says is crucially relevant.

In order to present John F. Kennedy in proper perspective the author makes significant and relevant points regarding preceding U.S. presidents. While Franklin Roosevelt was "never an open champion of the Negroes," he captured the Negro vote and not a few tears were shed by Negroes at the time of his death. For one thing, they knew that they were deeply, even if inadvertently, involved in President Roosevelt's attempt to abolish hunger. Through his relief programs the Negro received

the same wages for the same amount of work done as the white man for the very first time.

President and Mrs. Roosevelt made the way a bit easier for President Truman in his efforts to desegregate the armed forces. In turn, Mr. Golden points out, President Truman made it a bit easier for President Kennedy to proclaim that the Negro's struggle for equality and first class citizenship is a moral issue.

The lack of moral leadership on the part of President Eisenhower was a serious deterrent. Proper moral leadership from him would have helped to get the South to accept the Supreme Court's decision on public school segregation and in other vital ways. The author in no way hesitates to condemn President Eisenhower for his inaction. "Perhaps he was aloof because he thought (this) would aid his chances for re-election in 1956 . . . this . . . did not hurt him in the South" (p. 104).

President Kennedy recognized the moral dimensions of the racial problem to a greater extent than any of his predecessors. Even prior to his election Kennedy had spoken of the moral responsibility of the Chief Executive. Perhaps he could not fathom the consequences of his well-publicized call to Georgia when Martin Luther King had been wrongly imprisoned.

Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes makes it clear that the late President did not hide behind the moral meaning of the struggle as an excuse for inaction as others had done. With full awareness of the fact that those who supported him for the vice presidency with the rebel cries of the Southerner were now vehemently opposed to him, President Kennedy took many significant steps in the interest of human rights.

The inclusion of two of the outstanding speeches of the late President was wise, indeed, for it provides immediate evidence of the deep commitment and uncanny wisdom of Pres. John F. Kennedy with regard to the racial problem and the American problem.

Toward the end of the book Mr. Golden makes an interesting comparison between Kennedy and Lincoln. Both men were assassinated before the fruits of their struggle were realized. Neither assassination can be traced directly to the race problem. Both men spoke eloquent and persuasive words in behalf of the cause to which they were committed.

—KELLY MILLER SMITH

Rene deVisme Williamson, *Independence and Involvement: A Christian Reorientation in Political Science*. Louisiana State University Press (1964), 269 pp., \$7.50.

This is a book for the times—one is tempted to say, for all times. It is addressed to Christians, of course, both of the genuine and nominal variety, but it speaks to every man who is concerned with the proper relation of church and state, or who is sincerely seeking a satisfactory explanation of the meaning of Christian faith for his personal participation in politics. Above all it speaks vigorously, honestly, courageously to any man who has come to the conviction that religion should be a private matter, and that natural reason, science and moral law, *unaided by divine revelation*, must suffice as a guide for conduct in this life and as ground for belief in immortality of the soul. Practically every page flames with the author's passionate conviction that America is a Christian nation, that the authentic tradition, the strength, the universal lesson of American constitutionalism consist in the beliefs he attributes to the framers of the Constitution, both Christians and Deists (p. 223): (1) that God rules the world

and guides peoples and their governments with his providence, (2) that morality is rooted in religion and cannot long survive without it, (3) that political strength and stability depend on morality and nowhere more so than in a constitutional republic."

Williamson is a professional political philosopher and an elder of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. He is deeply dissatisfied with liberalism, conservatism, with all secular ideologies, which he feels offer nothing to counteract the widespread contemporary currents of pessimism, meaninglessness and extremism, let alone the omnipresent threat of universal annihilation. He is equally unsparing in his disappointment with Catholic, Protestant and existentialist thinkers who reject or give up the possibility of Christian influence in politics, who make only general affirmations of the Christian's duty to involve himself in proximate answers and partial solutions to political conflicts, or who admit the possibility of such commitment only in particular cases, for example, to prevent extermination of human selfhood and decency by the forces of nihilism, barbarism and inhumanity. Williamson therefore sets himself the task of providing "a body of concepts as part of a guiding political philosophy which is Christian in spirit, conclusions and techniques" (p. 63). He is under no delusion as to the difficulties confronting such an intellectual effort. The title of the book explicitly poses the dilemma inherent in the requirement that Christianity remain independent of ("cannot be identified with") any form of political organization or system, while simultaneously it imposes the duty not to wait for the Second Coming of Christ in the future but to seek the kingdom of God in the present (*Matthew*, 6:33).

The method of the book, as I understand it, is dialectical. Except for the opening, diagnostic chapter and the concluding, prescriptive summary, each chapter presents a conceptual contradiction which is resolved by reference to a deeper Christian (usually Scriptural) principle of ambiguous meaning capable of constructive reconciliation through faith. In Chapter II the promise and performance of Christianity is reconciled through "knowledge of" Jesus, who in his own life perfectly exemplified the harmonious integration of moral absolutes with practical wisdom. Chapter III is a critique of several secular theories of the state, showing how each is defective, from the Christian viewpoint, as to its conception of the nature of man and of government. Here, surprisingly, instead of consistently offering a dialectical reconstruction of the Augustinian theory of church-state relations (the "two swords" doctrine) Williamson confines himself to a few cryptic remarks such as: "Law and politics are consolidating and manipulative, not creative, forces" . . . "only the grace of God can bring salvation, regeneration, sanctification" . . . "the state is a very general concept. . ." (and) "we need to know what Christian thought can do with particular concepts like constitution, citizenship, and representation" (pp. 96-97). The almost cursory reference to divine grace in this context is a weak defense to the challenge of the secular religions and crises of the twentieth century.

Chapter IV transposes the conception of sin to illuminate the gap between constitutional norms and national practice (belief and behavior). "The Constitution functions as the mirror of the national conscience . . . the charter of our national values." Straightforward recognition of our inescapable guilt will enable us to choose whether to live up to it or live it down (pp. 126-127). Chapter V applies the Scriptural concept of liberty to the role of positive law in defining individual rights and duties, pointing out that divine will and moral law operate as necessary criteria which partly limit, partly authorize governments to impose restraints on individual conduct, restraints which aid individuals to choose to do what they ought and help them

not to do what they ought not. Chapter VI spells out the connections between the concepts of Christian citizenship and representation in the kingdom of God and their transforming (morally uplifting and activating) effects upon citizens in the City of Man. Chapter VII presents the author's views toward the American doctrine of separation of church and state (in theoretical perspective the general Christian view, if there is one, should have been included in Chapter III). Williamson rejects the doctrine of *radical separation* espoused by Madison, Jefferson and some members of the present-day Supreme Court, and he convincingly argues that radical separation was rejected by the great majority of the Founding Fathers. The doctrine Williamson supports is that the First Amendment undertook only to prevent the establishment of any formal, organized church by act of Congress; that the language finally adopted reflected the conviction of the framers and the First Congress that political stability is rooted in the government's guarantee to all men to choose and pursue their personal form of religious worship; and that this is a positive (not a negative) conception of freedom, permitting each church to be, to grow, and to be protected by the state in promoting its version of accepted religious truth (pp. 212, 224).

The foregoing summary, imposed by limitations of space, does small justice to Professor Williamson's felicity of writing, wit and pungency of style, relevancy of analysis, catholicity of perspective and scholarship. The same limitations prevent satisfactory discussion of the debatable points in his position. The flavor of the book is caught in the candid admission in the preface:

In politics I am a lifelong Democrat, who has generally supported liberal candidates for office and the liberal side of most public issues, but I do not share the liberal philosophy. I find myself more in sympathy with the conservative philosophy but am generally opposed to conservative candidates and most of the specific measures they advocate. I think liberalism and conservatism need to be transcended. They have contributed much that is invaluable to civilization, but their day is over . . . I hope that some of my readers will be stimulated to contribute to the great task of re-thinking their professional fields and occupational problems in terms of the Christian faith.

What the author succeeds in doing, and doing brilliantly, is to show the political power of faith combined with reason, and to remind us how much we owe to people who participated in politics believing in the Judaeo-Christian view of the nature and destiny of man. What he does not succeed in refuting, if indeed he wishes to, are such propositions that: (1) the fate of the world depends quite as much upon men who question the divinity of Jesus and the Bible, the doctrines of immortality, original sin, resurrection, transubstantiation, and so on, as it does upon committed Christians; (2) the free-thinking spirit and the values and methods of science are quite as responsible for human development and for human prospects as are the Christian churches, denominationally or collectively; (3) Christian principles, embodied in Scripture and its authoritative interpreters, are controversial and indeterminate guides to the solution of particular political conflicts, including the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

—AVERY LEISERSON

CONTRIBUTORS

WILSON CAREY McWILLIAMS teaches political science at Oberlin. **JOHN ALLEN BROYLES** is author of *The John Birch Society: Anatomy of a Protest* (Beacon Press). **H. C. McCLESKY** teaches political science at the University of Houston. **NAT HENTOFF**, free-lance writer *extraordinaire*, has recently been participating in the *Village Voice's* running argument on the myopia of the white liberal. **WILLIAM KOELSCH** teaches history at Florida Presbyterian College, where he sports an "I-used-to-be-a-Republican" lapel pin. **RICHARD HOFSTADTER**, who teaches at Columbia, has written histories of the Progressive era and of Social Darwinism as well as his classic *The American Political Tradition*. **ROBERT SHORT** is pursuing his doctorate at the University of Chicago—where **ALVIN PITCHER** teaches on the faculty of theology. **EDWARD LANNING**, also a Chicagoan, is a free-lance writer whose unrealized ambition is to write screenplays. We owe a deep debt of thanks and a monstrous telephone bill to **WAYNE COWAN** and his staff at *Christianity and Crisis* for the preparation of our special election supplement, which also appears as a special issue of C&C. Their enthusiasm and critical intelligence have been contagious and rewarding.

October's **BOOK REVIEWERS** are **JOSEPH L. BERND**, Dallas; **MARTIN E. MARTY**, Chicago; **KELLY MILLER SMITH** and **AVERY LEISERSON**, Nashville.

POETS: CAROL HILL, a graduate of Radcliffe and Illinois, has recently appeared in *Epos*, *Outcry*, and *Patterns*. **FRAN HASSENCAHL** is beginning an assistantship at Western Reserve this month. **JUDSON CREWS**, whose work appears widely, once ran a bookshop called **MOTIVE!** **SHEPPARD B. KOMINARS'** work recently appeared in *South & West*.

ARTISTS: ROBERT O. HODGELL served as guest art director for this issue; he normally teaches at Florida Presbyterian College along with **JIM CRANE**. **HANS ORLOWSKI** has most recently sent us his magnificent *Orpheus et Euridice* series from West Berlin. Our two photographers are both Tennesseans: **PHIL TROYER** depicts the South in decay, while **A. R. SIMONS** delights in its ferment. **ELIZABETH EDDY** works and studies in Chicago; **JEAN PENLAND** works and paints in Nashville. **SUSAN PERRY**, **ROGER BARTLETT**, and **LU ANN CIPOV** are all studying in St. Petersburg with Jim Crane—who sent their work, but no information. We are mystified, but pleased to have their work appearing in *motive* for the first time.

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

SPECIAL ELECTION ISSUE

A Christian Journal of Opinion

We Oppose Senator Goldwater!

Christianity and Crisis, throughout its almost 25 years, has lived by the belief that Christian faith calls men to involvement in the social issues of their time. We have held that theological and moral commitments have political consequences, that politics is full of religious and ethical meaning. This journal was founded as a response to the threat of Hitlerism, and ever since we have taken stands on public issues.

But we have never allied ourselves with any political party. We have sought to appeal to the intelligence and conscience of persons with varying political loyalties. We have praised and blamed men and policies in various parties.

We have specifically criticized the idea of a "Christian" political party for three reasons: (1) we think no party has a right to claim the Christian banner; (2) we recognize that Christians can differ in political judgments; (3) we deem it healthy for Christians to work in parties alongside men of other faiths.

Nothing in 1964 has changed our basic convictions. We expect to continue acting on them. But these convictions never ruled out the possibility that occasions might arise when men and issues would become so identified that "A Christian Journal of Opinion" might have to take sides on candidates for public office. This is such an occasion.

The difference this time is the forces crystallized around the candidacy of Senator Barry Goldwater. We have no desire to argue that Mr. Goldwater is an evil man. For people who like to personify the devilish forces in history, he is an inappro-

priate stand-in for Satan. He is a man of personal charm and disarming amiability. It is hard for Americans to get angry at a ham radio operator with a handsome smile, who rides horseback, has a house full of electrical gadgets, and crusades for law and public decency.

We point simply to the objective, unarguable conflict between his record and the judgments of the Christian churches on most of the major issues of social ethics in our time. We have in mind neither some imaginary consensus of church members nor the stands of the agencies specifically organized for social action. We mean the sizable body of ethical convictions that have been endorsed, after long processes of study and debate, by the major American denominations, by the National Council of Churches and by the World Council of Churches. Although Roman Catholicism and Judaism work through somewhat different processes, we can make the same assertion about their most authoritative teachings on social ethics.

As a lover of moralism, Mr. Goldwater may be surprised to know this—as will many church members who are won by his simplifications, his praise of virtue, his denunciation of crime and evil. But the evidence is incontrovertible.

The clash comes at four major points:

(1) Senator Goldwater and many of his supporters repeatedly describe the international situation as a kind of holy war. They see the United States as the defender of true faith, fighting for its life against "godless communism." Such identification of national destiny with a religious cause

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is not a uniquely Goldwater confusion. *Christianity and Crisis* has had reason to decry it on many occasions.

In the Goldwater movement, however, the religion of national destiny goes to an extreme that is new in recent American history. It provides the motivation for the Senator's repeated insistence on "victory" and on "winning" when we are not at war and when, if we were, the war would be of such a kind that neither side could win, though both could be destroyed. The Senator seems deaf to those who plead for restraint in any contemplated recourse to atomic weapons. Why? Because "restraint" does not belong to the vocabulary of religious enthusiasts.

Since the Senator sees himself as the leader of a crusade, he attracts the support of countless persons who, impatient with the slow procedures of diplomacy, seek to relieve their frustrations by her-

alding a messianic figure who will lead them to victory. The danger thus created for the entire human community is great. We have never believed, nor do we now, that a religious zeal that endangers mankind is a proper point of departure for making policy decisions.

(2) Mr. Goldwater has *never* voted in the Senate for a foreign aid authorization or appropriation. He has voted against ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty. He has shown a cavalier delight in brandishing nuclear weapons. His insensitivity to the political meaning of military decisions is evident in his claim that, as President, he would solve the problem of Southeast Asia by telling the military officials: "Fellows, we made the decision to win, now it's your problem." Our objection to all these stands comes not from pacifism, which we have consistently criticized, but from a belief that America must *both* maintain strong military power and exercise that power with moral and judicious restraint. We exalt wisdom over "winning."

(3) Senator Goldwater voted against cloture in the Senate debate on civil rights, then against the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On no legislative act in a quarter of a century have the churches mobilized so decisively as on this one; Mr. Goldwater opposed their efforts entirely. Although it is obvious that he is not a segregationist, he does cultivate their votes. As pollster Samuel Lubell has said, without the white backlash Mr. Goldwater would not stand a chance in this campaign. As we oppose the backlash, we oppose the man who counts on it to win.

(4) The Senator from Arizona is committed to a social and economic individualism that was always fallacious and that has become peculiarly inept in our age. He has opposed most of the legislation that has helped to improve health, education, housing, relief of poverty, opportunity for the oppressed. He has made a long series of incredible and insensitive statements about the poor, the graduated income tax and the efforts of government to improve the general welfare. At a time when 70 per cent of our people lead urban lives he shows no evidence of understanding the problems of the modern metropolis.



Senator Goldwater won the nomination by cultivating a hard core of enthusiasts who liked his radical conservatism. Now he knows that he must win the undecided votes of more moderate people. Since the meeting with President Eisenhower and other Republican leaders at Hershey, Pa., he has shown that he sees the profit in reversing his

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Christian Journal of Opinion

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CONTENTS

THE PROPER ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
— J. G. STEWART

BARRY GOLDWATER'S WORLDVIEW
— JAMES FINN

AMERICA'S "RISING DISCONTENT"
— DONALD L. ROBINSON

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tactic and offering more echo, less choice. He has already begun to project the image of moderation during the campaign. But at this late date he cannot hide his long record or do much to modify it. We are convinced that a vote for Mr. Goldwater is a vote for irresponsibility, recklessness and reaction.

We not only oppose Mr. Goldwater, we favor President Johnson. We shall have more to say about the Johnson candidacy in our next issue.

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

THE PRESS AND POLITICS

IT'S AN old American custom to criticize the press. George Washington did it with passion, and the tradition continues. Readers comment cynically that "you can't believe anything you read in the papers."

Despite its antiquity, however, the custom has taken a turn for the worse in recent weeks, and this mounting tide of press criticism deserves examination. Newspapers say that poison-pen mail has never been heavier, more threatening, more abusive. The tide reached a near-hysterical crest at the Republican Convention, and many persons who watched that spectacle were alarmed at its intensity. Charges of prejudice, unfairness, error, conspiracy are serious claims to make against organs of information, which in a democracy need to maintain a certain credibility if public information and debate are to be served.

The Republicans seem convinced that an Eastern liberal conspiracy within the press is out to get their candidate. The explosion at the convention came, ironically, during the remarks of President Eisenhower, a man who has consistently—at least until shortly before the convention—had a favorable press. Obviously something was there to explode. The Goldwater delegates were angry at the news media, and the fist-shaking and harassment reflected their fury.

Senator Goldwater, it is safe to say, is not particularly a darling of the press. He has his supporters, but he has more detractors. He has chafed at the opposition and has named Walter Lippmann, the Alsops, Roscoe Drummond, Marquis Childs, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* as "radicals" who are "like *Izvestia*" in opposing him. He has a singular hostility to CBS News. His partisans are even more intense in their anger.

Some of their complaints are legitimate, some are not. He has been misquoted in ways that damage him. The Associated Press felt compelled to

retract and correct the famous comment about using nuclear explosives to defoliate areas of Vietnam. CBS surely went too far in linking him and his partisans with German neo-Nazis. But, on the other hand, there is an impulsiveness to his comments—on poverty, on missile strength, on the Berlin wall, on Vietnam strategy, on the "extremists," on civil rights—that no amount of after-polishing can make sound any better.

He poses a difficult problem for reporters. As Senator Pastore commented, it is hard to know the mind of a man when you have to wait until Saturday to find out what he meant when he spoke on Monday. In the famous defoliation quote, if he didn't believe what he was saying, why did he bring up the matter at all? And how is a reporter to make clear such ambiguity? Political figures must get used to seeing their words in print and having the public take them as they sound without an obligato of irritated complaining about being misquoted and misinterpreted.

Democrats have long complained about the one-party press. Only 15 per cent of the country's editorial pages backed Kennedy in 1960, nearly four times as many supported Nixon. Columnists, commentators, editorial writers and cartoonists can and should express opinions they believe to be sound; this is their contribution to the public debate. And it is what they are paid for. Nor is it unfair, in principle, for a columnist or editor to support Goldwater and oppose Johnson, or vice versa.

Many Goldwater supporters have been confused at this point. In their devotion to their man they have charged unfairness and evil motives against anyone who does not share that devotion. Men still have the right to differ. And the editorial page is one of the places to do it.

Why are so many of the most respected voices in American journalism so critical of Senator Goldwater? It is a vexing question not only to his spirited followers. Related to this is the question, why is he so often on the losing end of votes in the

In Coming Issues

Our November 2 issue will be completely devoted to US participation in the war in Vietnam and will feature articles by Senator Wayne Morse, Alan Geyer and Frank Trager, who just returned from a visit to Vietnam.

Other issues this fall will include articles by William Hamilton on the uses and misuses of Dietrich Bonhöffer; Charles West on the Prague Peace Conference; Kenneth Carstens on South Africa; and M. M. Thomas on Southeast Asia.

Senate? There is a sense in which Mr. Goldwater and the press are intellectually out of tune with each other. Journalists live in the turbulence of current history; they know the complexity of it and the burden of it.

Simplistic solutions are, to them, the height of irresponsible and reckless wishful-thinking and escapism. We are reminded of fundamentalism, of the Populist movement, of utopianism—of all the thrusts to oversimplify history and human experience. The problem lies not in a discrepancy between Eastern liberalism and Western conservatism. It is more an intellectual difference.

A Critique of Senator Goldwater's Views

The Proper Role of Government

J. G. STEWART

BARRY GOLDWATER stands today as the most principled man in American politics. And it is precisely this almost total reliance upon a litany of principles—useful in all situations and conditions—that makes Senator Goldwater's candidacy for President so disturbing.

He and his more committed supporters revel in the fact that his popularity is rooted in the public's growing appreciation of a man of principle. Such a man apparently scorns political expediency in his passion to uphold certain fundamental tenets of natural law and government in the conduct of our domestic affairs. Yet even a cursory examination of Mr. Goldwater's writings and political record demonstrates that this steadfast reliance upon principle has served perhaps to disqualify him for the American Presidency, rather than prepare him for it.

Any political decision reflects certain presuppositions about the nature of man and the proper role of government in human affairs. Although in American politics it is rarely necessary to express these presuppositions explicitly, there are legitimate differences of opinion that can be profitably examined and debated. The Republican nominee may offer this country such an opportunity.

But all self-proclaimed spokesmen of political morality face one special requirement: that their

J. G. STEWART is a specialist in Congressional affairs. He watches the Washington scene closely and reports on it regularly in the pages of *Christianity and Crisis*. Readers will recall his perceptive articles covering the debate and passage of the Civil Rights Act.

In view of these real differences, the press must take scrupulous care to be impartial and accurate in its reporting of the campaign, honest and persuasive in its comment and opinion. This does not mean that it should be intimidated by criticism, as some signs indicate it may be, or yield its right to report and comment. Journalism has more to do in this campaign than run and hide behind stenographic transcripts. The candidates and their partisans, meanwhile, ought to be able to live with the information media without insinuations and criticism that tend to undermine the whole role of communication in society. R.T.B.

preaching provide a recognizable basis for making workable decisions in terms of the daily tasks of government. To a large degree the major contributors to American political thought have been persons charged with making the practical operating decisions.

Unlike the Founding Fathers, whose notions of political right were matched by their political accomplishment, Mr. Goldwater has never had any direct or personal responsibility for translating his vibrant generalities into less scintillating specifics. In fact, his preoccupation with principles has provided him instead with a means of avoiding the agonizing task of reaching policy decisions that the real world must accept.

All Vision, No Program

We find Mr. Goldwater's writings and speeches sprinkled liberally with declamations about freedom, balancing order with liberty, stimulating the development of the whole man, and the need to resist concentrations of public authority. He sees politics as "the art of achieving the maximum amount of freedom for individuals that is consistent with the maintenance of the social order."

These notions of natural law serve to project an image of a man sorely dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs, prepared to remove the burden of government involvement from many areas of life, and calling upon his fellow citizens to join him in this crusade for individualism and self-re-

sponsibility. A return to conservative principles is the key to national salvation.

This preoccupation with principles manifested itself in the Senator's attempt to abolish the traditional party platform in favor of a statement of principles. If the Republican Party had adopted the suggestion, the American electorate would probably have received something similar to his recent testimony before the Republican Platform Committee, e.g., "Let us dedicate ourselves to strengthening government in its proper spheres and at its proper levels while withdrawing government from needless and damaging intervention." Or: "In the conduct of its monetary and fiscal affairs, our government must above all replace capricious and predatory schemes with consistent and predictable policies." A collection of these exhortations—and nothing more—would have made the promise of a "choice not an echo" quite difficult to fulfill.

It would be unfair to say that Mr. Goldwater completely fails to appreciate the need for some specificity in these matters of principle. Both *The Conscience of a Conservative* and his more recent book, *Where I Stand*, are billed as attempts "to show the connection between conservative principles so widely espoused and conservative action so generally neglected." Yet a careful reading of the sections devoted to particular policy areas discloses no comprehensive program of action capable of bringing his conservative vision to life.

For example, on fiscal responsibility the Senator observes:

The first fiscal responsibility of government is to preserve the value of the dollar. It can do this by prudent budgeting, by living within the means of the people who pay the bills, and by encouraging individual initiative.

On labor-management relations:

To achieve industrial peace, we must maintain a balance among the rights of employees, employers and the public. The balance is best assured when laws are clear and fairly administered, and when government does not inject itself in a partisan way into dealings between employers and employees.

Other examples could be cited from the sections on federalism, states' rights, civil rights, social security and the TVA. In only one area—support for education—does he make some truly specific suggestions for policy alternatives, i.e., tax credits to local taxpayers, to persons supporting students at accredited college or university, and for persons making gifts to colleges or universities. Although one can dispute the merits of such a pro-

posal, at least it contains certain recognizable policy alternatives to ponder and evaluate.

The Avoidance of Policy-making

One fundamental fact seems clear in Mr. Goldwater's writings: he is most hesitant to move beyond the realm of generalization into the more unpleasant world of specifics—where decisions tend to be a mixture of the desirable and the undesirable. But it is in this latter world that the President must reside.

In his numerous speeches, the problem of specificity is less acute. We discover a variety of suggestions, e.g., making social security voluntary, withdrawing the Federal Government from welfare programs, decreasing government spending, and advocating right-to-work laws. Yet these suggestions appear to be largely rhetorical devices; seldom, if ever, does he provide a comprehensive and logical program to accomplish these objectives of lessening the role of government in human affairs.

During his 12 years in the Senate Mr. Goldwater has avoided being placed in the position where the burden of political decision rested on his shoulders. Who can recall any major piece of legislation—or even an amendment—that he seriously advanced during this period? Despite the Democratic majority for 10 of these 12 years, other Republicans managed to participate actively in the process of hammering out viable legislation.

Or who can recall the Senator debating the substance of a pending measure, thereby demonstrating in even a single specific area the depth of understanding we expect the President to possess in many areas? How then did Mr. Goldwater spend his 12-year tenure as a Senator? Quite simply: he delivered thousands of speeches to discontented audiences on the need to return the tested and true principles of conservatism to our councils of government.

The issue of extremism in politics clearly has its

This Special Election Issue

—we are pleased to report—is also appearing in the pages of *motive* magazine, the splendid monthly publication of the Methodist Student Movement. It delights us greatly to have 50,000 readers . . . even for one issue.

Which reminds us, our circulation is up almost 30 per cent over a year ago. Some of our new readers are students, who subscribe at the special rate of \$3 per year (to school address only).

roots in the Arizonan's preoccupation with principles and his avoidance of policy-making responsibilities. When he deliberately underlined the two famous sentences of his acceptance speech, i.e., "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue," he was acting as a man used to the luxury of speaking in extreme terms. But a President seldom enjoys this luxury.

If a President is to retain the confidence of the nation, his actions must win the consent of widely differing interests in this country and abroad. For the President extremism is suicide; moderation is salvation.

Likewise Mr. Goldwater's reputation for speaking first and thinking later is the predictable result of a political diet that for 12 years has avoided the indigestible lumps of political decisions for the Pabulum of generalities.

It is, therefore, most difficult to reach any final conclusions about the probable impact of the Senator's principles on the conduct of our government. His proclamations about the need to "maximize freedom," "balance order with liberty," etc. offer few hints about how a Goldwater administration would actually come to grips with the difficult and complex issues no President can avoid.

"Ever-Eager Fingers of Bureaucracy"

One could also express a certain disquiet over his apparent lack of comprehension of the existing mechanisms of the American governmental system. No single administration—however determined—can remake this system; it would appear to be desirable for the potential President to demonstrate a working knowledge of it.

Mr. Goldwater's writings deal particularly with the question of states' rights and federalism. In *Where I Stand* he notes that states' rights is "a check on the steady accumulation of massive power in the hands of national bureaucrats." He continues:

... The states can fit their powers and programs to the varied needs of their people. It is in the cities and towns, and in person-to-person relationships, that their immediate needs arise. And it is there—certainly not in Washington, D. C.—that public servants can best adapt governmental power to the individual human situation.

Speaking before the National Association of Counties, Senator Goldwater trotted out certain variations of this theme. He talked of "Washing-

ton's ever-eager fingers of bureaucracy," and he castigated the Federal Government as "obsessed by the enlargement of its role and its personnel."

This conception of battered and defenseless state and local governments cowering before a predatory Federal Government is a difficult one to accept in light of the facts. In recent years expansion of American government has taken place primarily at the state and local levels. (For example, since 1946 the number of Federal civilian employees has declined about ten per cent—while the number of state and local employees has risen by over 100 per cent. The Federal debt has risen by slightly more than ten per cent in the past 18 years; state and local debt has climbed by over 400 per cent.)

Mr. Goldwater also failed to acknowledge another basic fact about the operation of our federal system: Federal agencies have devolved an immense amount of decision-making to their state and regional offices, which are generally staffed by local people. Federal programs are run on terms highly favorable to states and localities: the Federal Government provides a major portion of the money, requires certain *minimum* standards, and leaves the implementation of the program to the wisdom and abilities of local officials. This arrangement would appear to balance states' rights with states' responsibilities in a reasonably equitable manner.

In his address to the county officials Mr. Goldwater recommended a comprehensive review of Federal grant-in-aid practices. Again the Senator apparently was unaware that this question does receive intensive analysis by the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a body established by Congress in 1959. Moreover, a Senate subcommittee has been investigating this same question during the 88th Congress.

Mr. Goldwater also speaks frequently of the need to "return" certain governmental functions to the states, thereby saving the "freight charges" incurred by collecting the tax revenues in Washington and then redistributing them among the states in the form of Federally sponsored programs. In fact, few states—if any—have the slightest desire to assume complete responsibility for programs in which they participate with the Federal Government.

The Federal-State Action Committee, established during the Eisenhower administration, labored for two years to discover programs that could be "returned" to the states. A minor vocational education program was readied for shipment back to the states, but the effort collapsed. Why? The states

refused to accept the program, even when alternative revenue sources had been provided. Governors—if not Senator Goldwater—realized that continued Federal participation was an essential ingredient in the success of the program.

It is hardly original to describe Mr. Goldwater as the only candidate running backwards into the 20th century. Yet it is disturbing to discover his apparent lack of understanding and information about certain basic operating realities of our system of government. In any intelligent discussion of this matter, one fact stands out above all others: the respective levels of government are partners in a common enterprise. These governments are collaborators—not antagonists—and he who fails to

understand this is indeed out of touch with the contemporary situation.

My concern with Senator Goldwater is not with his addiction to certain abstract principles—with which many persons would probably agree—but rather with the quality of decisions he would render as President when specifics could no longer be avoided. His meager record as an elected public official gives little basis for assurance. This concern is compounded by his apparent lack of a working understanding of the dynamics of American government in the 20th century. The combination of these two factors can only raise the gravest doubts about his qualifications for the most demanding job in the world.

Simple and Contradictory

Barry Goldwater's Worldview

JAMES FINN

*Who is Goldwater? What is he?
That diverse men do follow him?*

IT IS extraordinary that, at this late date, these are still the large and most important questions to ask about the man the Republicans have nominated for the highest office in the United States. Yet this is the case. To these questions no single set of answers inspires general assent. Is Goldwaterism a mood, a movement, an ideology; does it represent a radical and permanent shift, or only a temporary political aberration? The responses cover the spectrum.

The problem is not only that Senator Goldwater's opponents differ from his supporters in the way that they would distribute his virtues, vices, attitudes and opinions, or that the Senator on occasion differs even with his warmest supporters. It is that his opponents differ with each other about what he means, that his supporters conduct their own intramural arguments, and Mr. Goldwater continues to contradict himself.

Emmett John Hughes revealed the difficulties analysts must cope with when he juxtaposed opinions issued by two of Goldwater's most lucid and voluble supporters—Clare Boothe Luce and William Buckley. Writing on the same day, they contradicted each other directly and repeatedly concerning the relation of Mr. Goldwater's policies to

those of President Eisenhower. For example:

Mrs. Luce: "... no one in the entire [GOP] convention knew so well as General Eisenhower that he himself was the chief architect of Senator Goldwater's Vietnam, Panama, Cuba, Far East and NATO policies."

Mr. Buckley: "His [Goldwater's] chance to win . . . depends precisely on establishing the very great differences between his approach to foreign policy and that of his genial, and benumbed, predecessor."

Which of these two bright lights of conservatism illuminates the real Goldwater? It might be thought that in a direct confrontation Buckley would have the better of the argument, for on more than one occasion Senator Goldwater has lashed out at our foreign policy of the last two decades—and has not troubled to exempt the Eisenhower years. Yet on the opening day of the Republican Convention he was to say that "my foreign policy is really peacemongering, patterned exactly after the Eisenhower-Dulles policy. The world is closer to peace than it's ever been."

Limited Vision, Total Solutions

Is this untypical of the Senator and unfair to his developing views? Unfortunately not. Every politician has a right to declare a moratorium on statements and opinions that he has long outgrown, and it would be pointless to evaluate Mr. Gold-

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water on the basis of statements made when he was a fledgling Senator. But if we look at the positions he has taken on questions of foreign policy just in the last four years, we will find a record stunning in its inconsistencies, frightening in its possibilities. It reveals with harsh clarity that, in the matter of foreign policy at least, the more limited one's vision the more nearly total can be one's solution. And it is the most convincing justification for Mr. Eisenhower's explanation for his own fractured syntax—that it was better to leave people confused and uncertain about what he meant than to make mistakes that needed continually to be cleared up.

It is not given to any man to be always and everywhere inconsistent and self-contradictory. Like most Americans, Barry Goldwater has always been opposed to communism. Beyond that he has attributed almost all of the world's turmoil to the virus of communism. In his acceptance speech, which we have a right to think represents his ripest views, he said that "the Republican cause demands that we brand communism as the principal disturber of peace in the world today. Indeed we should brand it as the only significant disturber of the peace."

Banished from discussion as too insignificant for serious attention are the racial upheavals here and abroad; banished are the problems of automation, unemployment and spreading urban blight; banished is the population explosion; banished are the related perplexities of stagnant economies, hunger and maldistribution of the world's material resources; banished are the tensions of intense nationalism and anti-colonialism; banished are the explosive situations in Cyprus, South Africa, South America—all banished unless we can somehow relate them to communism.

With this simple view of the world and its problems it should be easy to arrive at relatively simple solutions—and the Arizonan offers them. The difficulty is, however, that they are inconsistent. In our struggle against the only significant disturber of the peace in the world, how should we defend ourselves and others, how should we limit and overcome communism? Should we have summit meetings to declare our stern intentions? Should we negotiate? Should we work through the UN? Should we use foreign aid as a tool and a weapon? Should we rely on repeated threats of great military force and possibly employ that force? Should we depend upon conventional weapons or utilize some of our nuclear capability?

To all of these questions the Republican nominee has answers. Normally it is not necessary to give

diplomatic recognition to a country in order to negotiate with it, but it is helpful, especially for a summit meeting. In *Conscience of a Conservative* we read that "we should withdraw diplomatic recognition from all Communist countries, including that of the Soviet Union." Last year he stated, "I have always favored withdrawing recognition from Russia." More recently he has backed up and argued only that "the possibility of withdrawing recognition should be held as a sword over the head of the Kremlin. . . ."

Goldwater has frequently dismissed with contempt the concept of summit meetings: "The only summit meeting that can succeed is one that does not take place." But more recently he has said that "there may be times when the West should take its case to the Communist leadership." Thus from a position that resisted negotiation with Communists, because "for them negotiations are simply an instrument of political warfare," he has moved to a position that would allow negotiations with Red China for a settlement of the war in Vietnam.

A Sword of Simplicity and a Shield of Inconsistency

It may seem foolish to ask if Senator Goldwater would conduct any negotiations through the UN, since the general opinion is that he is willing to dismiss it entirely. This opinion undoubtedly stems from the rash of criticism he has directed at the UN over the years, statements describing it as "in part a Communist organization" in which there is no reason for any Western nation to participate. Nevertheless, he repudiates this general opinion, and in his famous interview with *Der Spiegel* he said that "I've given more support to the UN than some of my critics." Assuming that the last statement is not disingenuous, we may charitably leave open the question of how he regards the UN. (For most of his followers, admittedly, the question is definitely closed.)

Should we have a strong foreign aid program not only because—as Pope John said in both *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in Terris*—the developed countries have a moral obligation to aid the developing countries, but also because it will help individuals and countries to withstand the pressures and temptations of communism? Mr. Goldwater says no. Congress should stop foreign aid, for the US receives nothing in return. So much for the Marshall Plan, the Point IV program, the Peace Corps; so much for the degree of independence attained by Eastern European countries because they could,

economically, afford to resist the Soviet Union; so much for the possibility of increased stability and freedom in countries that look to us for succor and support.

Should we then resort to arms? Brinkmanship, Senator Goldwater said last year, is all the Communists seem to understand, and we should resort to it. To the widespread uncertainty about what he would do in Vietnam, he has recently contributed additional confusion, which his faithful interpreters are even now attempting to clear up.

And, while wanting to keep power in the hands of the US, he now advocates turning over to the NATO commander responsibility for initiating the use of nuclear weapons. He would, further, blur the distinction between conventional weapons (however large) and nuclear weapons (however small) by speaking of "conventional nuclear weapons." The idea that there is a grave danger of rapid escalation once nuclear weapons, however limited, are introduced into war seems to have escaped him.

Clearly it is a brain-rending, nerve-wracking, futile exercise to attempt to reconcile the Goldwater views. It is best simply to acknowledge that he has ridden forth to battle with a sword of simplicity to attack every problem and with a shield of inconsistency to fend off logical analysis of his views. And his success has surprised both foe and friend.

Goldwaterism, however fluid and yet unhardened, represents a shift in political alignment just as radical as he claims it to be, from the nuanced foreign policies that have been followed over the last two decades. It repudiates entirely the efforts made during the Kennedy-Johnson Administration.

In the Senator's own views there is change without development, contradiction without acknowledgment or embarrassment. It is this uncertainty of stance—or flexibility of outlook, as his supporters might term it—that allows some people to look upon his possible election with a degree of equanimity. For they point out, and quite correctly, that every President can act only within definite, if not always discernible, limits imposed by the mood of the people and the restricting influence of the other branches of government. Further, they note, the office and burden of the Presidency imposes a degree of sobriety upon the man who holds that high position. He must function to the hilt of his ability.

Even if one grants this argument totally, it is not, when applied to this candidacy, reassuring. The Republican candidate is an amiable, attrac-

tive, personally modest and sincere man. He has expressed and skillfully exploited the diverse and fractured resentments, fears and criticisms that exist in our country today. He has gathered to his support not only extremists, racists and dissidents, not only people who are nostalgic for a past that never was, but some thoughtful, dedicated and intelligent people who do not like the path our country and our world are taking.

Into the Vacuum . . . Ideologues

But in that area which should be pervaded by the President's firm convictions and developed ideas, at that core which should attract, galvanize and focus the great energies and talents of this country, there is nothing—a vast emptiness, a vacuum. It will not be the erratic dissidents, the factionalists or the honest conservatives, but the ideologues who will rush to fill that vacuum. Indeed this is what was implied in an extraordinary article written by an editor of the *National Review* before the convention. Mr. Goldwater, it was suggested, should not be expected to formulate the philosophy of the conservatism he was supposed to live by; that task could best be left to those better qualified. There was no question about where these better qualified people were to be found or who they included.

Ample evidence thus exists to argue that Goldwaterism is a mood, a movement *and* an ideology, for it partakes of all three. It is his strength to have provided a single shelter for all. Some of the resentment and dissatisfaction that powers the drive must inevitably fade and give way. The danger is that the ideologues will have had time to disturb and distort much that is valuable in our non-ideological, moderating two-party system. That realignment of political forces which appealed to so many of us in the abstract looks, as it shows signs of coming into being, much less desirable.

By his nomination Senator Goldwater has already strengthened the forces of dissension at home and spread dismay among friends and allies abroad. Our reputation for being able to employ great strength with due restraint—so recently won and so tenuously secured—has been severely damaged. If we are to regain the confidence, without which we have strength but not leadership, we must assure ourselves and our allies that we cannot suddenly be shifted into new and dangerous paths. In a complex world with intractable problems we cannot afford a leader who offers simple and conflicting solutions. It is essential not only that Goldwater lose but that he lose by a great margin.

America's "Rising Discontent"

DONALD L. ROBINSON

The measure of success of a democratic system is found in the degree to which its elections really reflect rising discontent before it becomes unmanageable, by which government responds to it with timely redress, and by which losing groups are self-disciplined to accept election results.

JUSTICE ROBERT JACKSON

WILL ANALYSTS in the future come to look upon 1964 as a "critical election"?

The term "critical election" was coined by V. O. Key Jr., Harvard's late great student of American politics. In Professor Key's usage, a "critical election" is one that exposes profound fissures in the coalition that has ruled until that time. It is an election waged primarily on new issues. The campaign of the challenger brings many new voters to the polls. Close analysis of the returns reveals that important elements were joined during the campaign, elements that eventually demonstrated a capacity to cooperate for the purpose of governing the nation.

A critical election is not always won by the challenging party. Often it takes an additional blow—a depression or an international crisis—to rip the defending coalition apart. In that case, the critical election is the one that shows the emerging coalition of groups in its first cooperative effort and demonstrates the combination of issues that brings them together.

Professor Key chose 1928 as an illustration. Governor Al Smith lost decisively to Herbert Hoover in that campaign. But by speaking for those who had been left out of the postwar boom, and by being a Roman Catholic, the "Happy Warrior" gained the backing of ethnic minorities and workers in the big cities and of poor farmers in the Midwest. And he retained the support of the most solidly Democratic parts of the Old South.

This coalition became the core of the electoral alliance that brought control of the House of Representatives to the Democrats in 1930 and of the Senate and White House in 1932. The Great Depression of 1929 was the blow that finished the work begun in 1928, breaking what was left of the Republicans' hold on the Northern cities and the Farm Belt, while the presence of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a Protestant, at the head of the ticket in 1932 enabled the Democrats to expand and solidify their hold on the South.

This theory is especially suggestive this year. Barry Goldwater could lose decisively and still

fashion an alliance and enunciate a platform that would bear the seeds of the future undoing of the New Deal-New Frontier coalition. In other words, if Mr. Goldwater loses but his coalition maintains control of the Republican Party, and if the nation undergoes a serious crisis during the next four years, then future analysts may come to see 1964 as the election that foretold the future.

What other factors give rise to the suspicion that 1964 could be a critical election? First, it is not being contested along the lines that have divided the parties since 1932. In 1936, the GOP conducted a frank and thoroughly conservative assault on the whole New Deal, and the lessons of that disastrous campaign were deeply learned. In the ensuing six bids for the Presidency (1940-1960), the Republican challenge to the Democrats was conducted on the latter's ground. Twice the Republicans were successful, but the basic consensus fashioned by Smith and Roosevelt continued to set the ground rules and define the terms for gaining victory.

It is a mistake, which some have made, to see Goldwater's bid as another in the series that began in 1940. It is more plausible, but still a mistake, to see 1964 as a replay of 1936.

Senator Goldwater's speeches show him resisting what must be a terrible temptation—the impulse to repudiate the whole New Deal and its successors. Alfred Landon would never have said, as Goldwater did at Hershey, "And let me repeat—for perhaps the one millionth time, lest there be any doubt in anyone's mind—that I support the Social Security System and I want to see it strengthened." This statement will convince only those who want desperately to be deceived. It indicates that Goldwater has other things on his mind besides the New Deal, and he is convinced that a lot of other people do, too.

Goldwater and Bryan

Many observers have suggested that Goldwater's challenge bears striking resemblance to the Populist campaigns waged by William Jennings Bryan around the turn of the century. These observers point out that Goldwater like Bryan pits himself against an Establishment pictured as running the nation from its base along the Atlantic Seaboard. Like Bryan he promises to disentangle America from the contaminating influence of alien cultures. Likewise he calls upon the good people in America's Heartland to wrest the governance of this nation from the hands of far-off villains and to put it back on the tracks supposedly laid by the Founding Fathers.

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The portrait of the Senator from Arizona as a Republican Populist is frightening to anyone familiar with the earlier period. Bryan's campaigns were deeply divisive. Marxism notwithstanding, sectional conflicts have always divided the nation more deeply and painfully than class conflicts. Many question whether America, under present circumstances, can bear a series of campaigns as bitter as those waged between Bryan and the Republicans, particularly in view of the delicate and dangerous racial situation and our role in the Western alliance.

The suggestion that Mr. Goldwater may be a new Populist leader, however, is not easily dismissed. Clearly his candidacy has far stronger appeal, as did Bryan's, in the South and west of the Mississippi than it has in the Northeast. But Mr. Goldwater knows that he will never win with a purely sectional appeal, any more than Bryan did. If the latter couldn't win in 1896, then surely Goldwater in 1964 cannot win with an appeal addressed solely to the farming states in a nation where two-thirds of the populace lives in cities.

If the Senator is really piecing together a new majority coalition, he will have to fashion his brand of Populism on a model different from that used by Bryan. There must be elements in it directed to groups not normally attracted to the Republican Party, *i.e.*, to the South and to dwellers in Northern cities. It is these *new* elements that concern us in what follows.

The New Coalition

We have said that one of the identifying marks of the critical election is that it marks the entrance of a new batch of voters into the active electorate, a group that will continue to vote as long as the new-forming coalition is able to keep its issues alive. Goldwater has long contended that a genuinely conservative Presidential candidate would activate a lot of potential voters who will come to the polls only if they perceive a "real choice."

In this regard it is significant that the eleven states with the poorest percentages of voter participation in 1960 were the eleven states of the Old Confederacy, ranging from Mississippi's 25 per cent to North Carolina's 54 per cent. With the poll tax requirement now inapplicable in Federal elections, Goldwater's hope to capture some of these states has to be taken seriously.

For many years white Southerners have depended on the Democratic Party to protect them from the Negro. Specifically, they have expected their monolithic support for Democrats to guarantee them sufficient control of Congress to frustrate meaningful civil rights legislation. Until this summer that strategy has proved nearly foolproof. Now, though, Southerners are forced to realize that their Democratic Congressmen can no longer stem the legislative tide.

In casting about for another weapon, Southern Democrats at first supported the campaign of Alabama's Governor Wallace, to "wipe the smiles off

the faces of the liberals." It was a long shot, but they hoped to move the election to the House of Representatives, there to work another "redemption."

Meanwhile, the Republican nominee's campaign managers were quietly recruiting a lot of political neophytes to serve as delegates from the South to the Republican Convention. These delegates went to San Francisco not to participate in the choice of the Republican candidate but to do or die for Goldwater. This strategy yielded 271 Goldwater delegates out of 278 from the Old Confederacy. It was this group, together with the delegates won in primaries and others given by Mountain states to their "favorite son," that gave Goldwater his victory at the Cow Palace.

Suddenly many hearts in the white South began to sing again. Even if it was no longer possible to prevent the flow of legislation, perhaps Southern states could put a man in the White House who would use his discretionary latitude in a way sensitive to the desires of white Southerners. The new civil rights legislation, like all laws of its kind, gives the President and the Attorney General abundant leeway concerning the pace and vigor of enforcement. Perhaps, thought many Southerners, the Lord was tempering the wind before the new-shorn lamb.

No one will know until November how the South as a whole will respond to the appeal of Barry Goldwater and his Southern agents. But a statement issued recently by retiring Congressman Carl Vinson of Georgia indicates that the Democrats have not given up the fight for their old bailiwick. "Will the South," asks the 80-year-old Vinson, "blinded by its anger and frustration of the moment regarding its civil rights problems, reward a political enemy and punish an old friend? This will be the case if the South supports Barry Goldwater and opposes Lyndon Johnson."

The Southern white man is, of course, not the only one to whom Mr. Goldwater's vote against the Civil Rights Act will appeal. The surprising support for Governor Wallace in the Wisconsin, Indiana and Maryland primaries suggests that plenty of people in the North, particularly in the cities, welcome a chance to register their disapproval of the civil rights movement.

Mr. Goldwater need not and will not overplay his hand here. If he were to suggest during the campaign that, as President, he would thwart the will of Congress as expressed by bipartisan majorities of over two-thirds, he would be subject to all kinds of unnecessary abuse. When asked about the civil rights issue, he merely says that he will "faithfully execute" the law of the land. He depends upon his lieutenants at the ward level to remind voters where he stood when the roll was called in Washington, and what his powers would be as Chief Executive with respect, for example, to the Justice and Labor Departments, and over appointments to the Supreme Court and the Civil Rights Commission.

It should be remembered, however, that Congress passed the Civil Rights Act *after* Wallace's pri-

mary contests. Apparently those members facing reelection campaigns this fall, including all Representatives and more than one-third of the Senators, decided that they could convince their white constituents that the act would not hurt them.

Warren Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee, recently indicated the line that would be taken: the act, he argued, is less stringent than similar legislation already on the books in 32 states, which white people in these states have found no threat to their way of life. This amounts, of course, to a veiled admission that the recent civil rights legislation was largely irrelevant to the problems in race relations that bedevil the cities in the North and West. It, nevertheless, appears that the main effort of Democratic campaigners in the area of civil rights will be to convince white Northern trade unionists, homeowners and parents of school-age children that they have little to fear from existing or contemplated Federal legislation.

But to return to the Senator's strategy, the other new element—new as part of the Republican assault on the Smith-Roosevelt coalition—is his foreign policy (discussed in detail elsewhere in this issue). Again, the age-old appeal of the conservatives has been to the isolationist spirit in America's Midwest. He can count on the support of these people no matter what he says; what he says, therefore, will be directed to a broader spectrum of citizens.

"Why not victory?" he asks. Thus he seems to accept America's world-wide engagement in the defense of Western civilization—indeed, he welcomes it. But in doing so, he speaks for everyone who has felt frustrated at the compromises engineered by American Secretaries of State since World War II. In his speech at the Hershey unity meeting, he sought to identify himself with the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy, but again, only those most anxious to be converted can be convinced. At heart, Mr. Goldwater belongs to those who want to press on to "victory," and they know it.

Wisdom and Restraint: Our Watchwords

How will the Democrats defend themselves against this challenge? Basically their strategy must be to try to keep attention focused on the issues that have kept their coalition intact for 32 years. They must try to persuade voters in the South and in the Northern cities that a Democratic administration is still their best friend. Carl Vinson showed the way in his statement urging Southerners to continue faithful to the Democrats. "Actually," he said, "[the] domestic economic problem is the most vital thing facing the South. To risk the consequences of a Goldwater administration is the height of folly for the South, as it is for the entire nation. Only Election Day will answer the question: Will the South cut off its nose to spite its face?"

Senators Humphrey and McCarthy and Ambassador Stevenson have shown the same determination to emphasize the positive program of their

party. The emphasis has been on prosperity at home and strength abroad, upon the capacity of an experienced, "responsible" Administration to cope with present crises. As Mr. Stevenson said in his recent speech to the American Bar Association, "The greatest issues of our day—civic order, civil rights, peace-keeping, conciliation and law—these above all command the response and the responsibility of wise and temperate—I almost said 'moderate'—men. Our freedom depends upon our wisdom and our restraint. Let these be the watchwords in this election year."

From the point of view of those who regard the Smith-Roosevelt coalition and its political accomplishments as an acceptable foundation for further political action, the sad thing about the current campaign is that it provides so little opportunity for criticism of the Johnson administration. If the opposition were running someone like Scranton, Nixon or Rockefeller, the Johnson program would be subject to the closest possible scrutiny.

Those who expected to vote for Lyndon Johnson anyhow would welcome a demand that the President respond to the charge that his poverty program is only a shabby political symbol, wholly unworthy of the problem to which it is addressed. A thorough discussion of the American involvement in South Vietnam would have earned our gratitude, as would a probe into the Administration's plans for sharing the benefits of this nation's wealth and power with the developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Presumably, with a different GOP candidate pressing the attack, Senator Magnuson's defense of the Civil Rights Act as having virtually no impact on the North would have been rejected as unacceptable, and the Administration would have been pressed to outline the next steps in the campaign against racial discrimination all over the land.

Instead of this, we are watching a contest in which interest and excitement centers on the Arizona's attempt to make this a critical election. It will behoove the defenders of the old coalition to watch Mr. Goldwater's campaign very closely, not so much in fear as out of a determination to identify those whose interests and needs have been forgotten or ignored in recent years. Justice Robert Jackson's words stated above have a special ring of urgency about them today.

America's political system will be sorely tested by the election of 1964. Senator Goldwater is waging a campaign that will provide many people who are unhappy with the present dispensation in America to express their "rising discontent." The dangers inherent in this discontent cannot be eliminated by Mr. Goldwater's defeat.

If the groups that rally to the Republican standard-bearer are taken seriously and their needs met, as far as is consistent with the commitments of the Democratic Party, then Mr. Goldwater will have served the useful purpose of calling trouble-spots to our attention. If his following is ignored, however, or if it cannot be served without disrupting other elements in the pattern, then America will be in for some very rough years.