Outsourcing Security and Defense in the US and Europe <\/em>(manuscript in progress)<\/p>\n The Political Economy of European Security<\/em> Cambridge University Press (2017)<\/p>\n \u201cWeaponising Europe? Rule-makers and rule-takers in the EU regulatory security state\u201d (online Feb 2023) Journal of European Public Policy<\/em><\/p>\n \u201cMuddying the Waters: Migration Management in the Global Commons\u201d with Noora Lori, (2021) International Relations<\/em><\/p>\n \u201cThe Political Economy of Global Migration and Border Security\u201d with Noora Lori, (2021) Journal of Global Security Studies<\/em>.<\/p>\n Forum introduction on \u201cPolitical Economy of Global Security\u201d with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski and Norrin Ripsman, (2021) Journal of Global Security Studies<\/em>.<\/p>\n “A more martial Europe? Public opinion, permissive consensus, and EU defence policy<\/a>” with with Stephanie Anderson and Andrew Garner, European Security<\/em> (2019)<\/p>\n Questions the European public\u2019s alleged resistance to defense integration and the use of force. Findings include evidence of robust and well-formed preferences over EU defense integration, including an equal preference for hard power over soft power options, as well as normal public opinion preferences over defense spending and the use of force.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n \u201cHatchet or Scalpel? Domestic Politics, International Threats, and US Military Spending Cuts, 1950-2014<\/a>\u201d with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski,Security Studies<\/em> (2019)<\/p>\n Theorizes US defense decision making as subject to constraints and tradeoffs, due to relative domestic interest group configurations. Proposes a framework for understanding defense spending cuts, taking an organizational lens to the strategic and parochial interests and organizations with a stake in the distributional politics of defense spending. Evaluates the relative capacity constraints on the foreign policy executive to cut, not cut, or redistribute existing spending relative to other strategic or domestic concerns.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n \u201cWhat Goes Up, Must Come Down? The Asymmetric Effects of International Threat and Economic Growth on Military Spending\u201d<\/a> with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski <\/a>and Benjamin Fordham<\/a>, Journal of Peace Research<\/em> (2017)<\/p>\n Questions key assumptions about defense spending, including the idea that variables explaining national differences also explain overtime spending changes, and variables explaining spending increases also explain decreases. We hypothesize that\u2014both across and within cases\u2014growth might not vary inversely with spending (contrary to expectations of defense budgets as Keynesian tools), and that variable (GDP and threat) increases might impact spending increases differently than GDP or threat decline impact spending decreases. We found a differential impact of economic growth\/decline on defense spending increases\/decreases. We also found no systematic relationship\u2014either increases or decreases\u2014in threat change and spending change, a surprising result, but one that lends support to my overall research agenda that security outcomes are driven by nonstrategic, domestic interests and parochialisms as much, if not more than, strategic or international factors.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n \u00a0\u201cEuropean Security Strategy and Capability: Enablers and Constraints on EU Power?\u201d<\/a> JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies <\/em> (2017)<\/p>\n Uses a historical institutionalist framework to theorize military capabilities, proposing that 1) European states are threat-sensitive to international change, 2) this is not always evident in spending changes, but in procurement pattern shifts (from conventional to expeditionary back to conventional), and 3) over time, investments in a particular kind of capability can produce capability constraints at a later stage, when international threat environments shift.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n “Cosmic top secret Europe? The legacy of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and cold war US policy on European Union information policy.”\u00a0<\/a>European Security<\/em> (2015)<\/p>\n Evaluates EU classified information and security clearance policy,\u00a0addressing how the 21 Century EU adopted US McCarthy-era rules for secrecy and classified information, due to bureaucratic inefficiencies in attempting to mimic NATO standard operating procedures. The consequences resulted in extreme opacity in EU affairs, as well as the accidental adoption of d\u00e9mod\u00e9 discriminatory personnel policies over sexuality and mental health.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n “Who are the Europeans? European Identity Outside of European Integration.<\/a>” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies<\/em> (2014)<\/p>\n Questions the assumptions around EU identification, including that identifying as European was associated with support for the EU or expectation of benefits from EU membership. Found evidence that cultural attachment to Europe exists separately from EU support. The implications are that there are multiple possible mechanisms in identifying as European, and at least one is not liberal or cosmopolitan. ‘Feeling’ European is not necessarily a progressive or cosmopolitan frame, but can be associated with more cultural, historical, or regressive politics.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n \u201cWeaponized Weapons: The US F-35 and European Eurofighter networks\u201d with Florian Bodamer, in Daniel Drezner, Henry Farrell, and Abraham Newman (eds) The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence, <\/em>Brookings Institute Press, February 2021.<\/p>\n \u201cEuropean Military Power: External Threat and Institutional Legacies in EU Defense Cooperation,\u201d with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski, in Europe, Russia, and the Transatlantic Divide: Security Relations in Turbulent Times, Mai’a Davis Cross and Pawel Karolewski (eds), University of Michigan Press, 2021.<\/p>\n Evaluates how and via what means have European states engaged in formal and informal coordination over arms development and joint purchasing for defense? What explains the patterns over time in this coordination? The paper introduces two theoretical propositions: 1)\u00a0a neoclassical realist premise that changing threat environments have driven key junctures in EU defense cooperation strategy, institutions, financing, and policy., and 2) \u00a0an organizational framework of institutional layering for understanding these strategic patterns over time, which helps explain the domestic and institutional constraints and opportunities of the EU as a strategic actor. Evaluates the development of EU defense cooperation via this combined framework, linking historical and contemporary changes in threat environments and stability in institutional legacies of coordination, including legacies of wartime economic cooperation and informal institutions (WW1, interwar, and WW2) prior to the creation of the common market.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n “The EU\u2019s Response to the Migration Crisis,” chapter in Handbook on EU Crisis, Marianne Riddervold, Jarle Trondal and Akasemi Newsome (eds), Palgrave MacMillan, 2021<\/p>\n \u201cThe Foundation of National Security: The Political Economy of Security,<\/a>\u201d with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski and Norrin Ripsman<\/a>, chapter in the Oxford Handbook on National Security<\/em>, Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, 2018<\/p>\n \u201c<\/a>Strategy First: What Price Is Military Superiority Worth<\/a>?\u201d with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski, article in Policy Roundtable: The Pursuit of Military Superiority<\/a>, Texas National Security Review, June 2018<\/p>\n \u201cThe State of EU Foreign Policy Scholarship,\u201d EU ANTERO Research Network, June 28, 2017.<\/p>\n \u00a0\u201cWar Powers, Private Actors, and National Security State Capacity,\u201d Boston University Law Review, Volume 95, Number 4, July 2015.<\/p>\n \u201cEuropean Armaments, Dependence, and Austerity: the Case of Greece and European Arms\u00a0 \u00a0Contracts,\u201d European Union Studies Association: EU Political Economy Bulletin\u2013Issue 18, Summer 2014.<\/p>\n \n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Books Outsourcing Security and Defense in the US and Europe (manuscript in progress) The Political Economy of European Security Cambridge University Press (2017) Refereed Journal Articles \u201cWeaponising Europe? Rule-makers and rule-takers in the EU regulatory security state\u201d (online Feb 2023) Journal of European Public Policy \u201cMuddying the Waters: Migration Management in the Global Commons\u201d with […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8908,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":8,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/kschilde\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/17"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/kschilde\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/kschilde\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/kschilde\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8908"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/kschilde\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/kschilde\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/17\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":231,"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/kschilde\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/17\/revisions\/231"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.bu.edu\/kschilde\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Refereed Journal Articles<\/h3>\n
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Book Chapters and Non-refereed Articles<\/h3>\n
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