Mayors, Partisanship, and Redistribution: Evidence Directly From U.S. Mayors

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Abstract

Policymakers and scholars are increasingly looking to cities to address challenges including income inequality. No existing research, however, directly and systematically measures local political elites' preferences for redistribution. We interview and survey 72 American mayors—including many from the nation's largest cities—and collect public statements and policy programs to measure when and why mayors prioritize redistribution. While many of the mayors' responses are consistent with being constrained by economic imperatives, a sizable minority prioritize redistribution, we find that partisanship explains much of the variation in a mayor's propensity for redistribution. Moreover, the impact of partisanship very rarely varies with institutional and economic contexts. These findings suggest that national political debates may be shaping local priorities in ways contrary to conventional views, and that they may matter even more than other recent findings conclude.

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Many politicians, policymakers, and academics, dissatisfied with federal and state government, have increasingly pointed to cities as venues for addressing socioeconomic challenges. As former Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter succinctly summarizes: "Cities are incubators of change and innovation, and mayors are at the forefront of it all—we get things done" (Mathis 2014). This optimism in cities includes redistributive policy, an arena that influential scholarship (e.g. Peterson 1981) claims cities are constrained from pursuing. For example, New York Mayor Bill de Blasio made redistributive initiatives a centerpiece of his 2013 campaign. Moreover, at the 2014 U.S. Conference of Mayors meetings, he joined with several other mayors to form the "Cities of Opportunity Task Force" to investigate cities' options for implementing equity-oriented policies (Taub 2014).

Urban politics scholarship has long considered cities' pursuit, or lack thereof, of these types of redistributive initiatives. While some influential research argues that economic forces induce city leaders to eschew redistributive policy in order to pursue growth and focus on their tax bases (Peterson 1981), a body of more contemporary work has moved beyond asking whether city-level redistribution occurs to investigate the conditions that affect its likelihood. These studies suggest that urban elites may, in fact, focus on redistribution when institutions (Carr 2015), competitive pressures (Minkoff 2009; Jimenez 2014), and/or public opinion (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2016) favor such policies.

We contribute to this contested literature by providing insight into whether city leaders prioritize redistributive policy, and which factors affect their propensity for doing so. We do so using new data from survey-interviews of U.S. mayors alongside public statements and policy programs. These data permit us to test these varying competing explanations simultaneously. While our approach has its own downsides, collecting information direct from city leaders allows us to complement and supplement prior work and avoid some of its limitations (Fenno 1978; Perry 1994; Gerber, Henry and Lubell 2013; Gerber 2013). It does so in part because: (1) none of the available observational data cleanly and directly speak to the issues, and (2) the pertinent theory is as much about elite policy agendas and priorities as it as about policy outcomes. Specifically, we asked a representative group of approximately 70 U.S. mayors a battery of policy and leadership questions. Our questions require mayors to make explicit and pertinent tradeoffs and/or incur opportunity costs to take pro-redistribution positions. This approach contributes to a growing body of scholarship that uses elite interviews and surveys to explore local policymaking agendas (Gerber, Henry and Lubell 2013; Gerber 2013). To bolster the survey findings and assuage concerns that they are "cheap talk," we also collected and coded public statements and policies related to redistribution for all mayors in the sample.

Our findings reveal that redistributive policy is relatively prominent on mayors' agenda. Interestingly, its prominence varies with mayors' partisan affiliations and it does so almost *irrespective* of cities' institutional configurations and competitive pressures. As in many other realms of American politics, party affiliation matters and indeed dominates other potentially important factors. Thus, our results build upon a nascent body of scholarship which argues that national partisan identification matters in local politics (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2016) and indicate that mayors may not be quite as sensitive to economic and institutional constraints as prior scholarship suggests.

1 Theoretical Expectations

Before we provide a more detailed description of our measures, we begin with a conceptual discussion of redistribution in cities. Following Peterson (1981), we take redistributive policies to be initiatives that "help the needy and unfortunate...[and] provide reasonably equal citizen access to public services" (pp. 43). This definition encompasses both policies that explicitly redistribute income (e.g. progressive taxation) as well as initiatives targeting poverty (e.g. subsidized housing), whose effects on income inequality are more implicit.

Peterson's (1981) influential research argues that competition from neighboring cities, along with state and federal regulatory power, makes city leaders unlikely to pursue redistributive policies. In a modified version of this economic primacy argument, Stone's (1989) regime theory allows for responsiveness to constituent interests, while still emphasizing the predominance of businesses and wealthy residents. All of this research leads us to **H1 Tax-base Constraints**: *Re-gardless of their partisan orientation, mayors will prefer economic development over redistributive policies*. Despite the prominence and influence of this perspective, other work has challenged it and offered reasons to expect at least conditional local redistribution. Thus, while we begin by exploring *if* city leaders prioritize redistribution, we mostly focus on *when* they support such policies.

One potential source of variation in redistributive inclinations is political attitudes and/or local preferences. At the national level, the influence of partisanship on voting behavior (Campbell et al. 1980; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2004, e.g.) and elite preferences and policy choices (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005; Abramowitz 2010) is well known. Its impact on local politics, however, is hotly contested. Studies of mayoral partisanship have argued that all else equal, electing a Democrat or a Republican mayor will have little effect on policy outcomes (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009; Gerber and Hopkins 2011).¹ These studies attribute the disconnect between mayoral partisanship and city spending to the constraints facing mayors. Despite their use of a sophisticated regression discontinuity design, there is reason to doubt that these studies actually demonstrate that mayoral partisanship has no effect. For example, large standard errors due to coarse spending data may explain an ostensible null finding.²

We therefore believe that the question of partisanship's effect on mayoral preferences is very much an open one. This view is furthered by recent findings suggesting that mass partisanship and ideology have an impact on local spending patterns—a relationship that exists, at least in part, because of public opinion's impact on elite behavior (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2016). Thus, we derive our second prediction, **H2 Partisanship**: *Democratic mayors will be more inclined to prioritize redistributive policies than their Republican counterparts*.

The extant research on mass preferences and urban policy outcomes uses either presidential vote returns (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Einstein and Kogan 2016) or ideological preferences

scaled on the national liberal-conservative dimension (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014) to assess the connection between public opinion and urban policy outcomes. One implication we might draw from the independent variables used in these studies is that we should anticipate a sharper partisan divide in mayors' attitudes on policies that are more clearly connected to national policy debates. For example, opinions on progressive taxes might be split by partisanship, while mayors' views on gentrification—a more localized issue—might be less linked with partisan views. This suggests **H3 National Politics**: *Partisanship will better explain variations in mayors' views when local policies overlap with national issues than on issues without an obvious link to national policy*.

Importantly, the ability of mayors to pursue their and/or their constituents' partisan preferences may be contingent on structural and institutional factors. Building from Peterson's insights about horizontal constraints, one line of research contends that cities' propensity to redistribute is shaped by competition from surrounding municipalities. Leaders of cities facing less competition might be more inclined to promulgate redistributive initiatives, or at least have the freedom to pursue those policies if they meet elite and/or constituent preferences (Minkoff 2009; Karuppusamy and Carr 2012; Jimenez 2014). Cities can be insulated from (or vulnerable to) competition in a variety of ways. Mayors of cities with many neighbors, for example, might perceive greater interjurisdictional competition and pursue more developmental initiatives irrespective of their ideological inclinations (Craw 2003; Jimenez 2014). Smaller populations (Minkoff 2009) and tax bases (Minkoff 2009; Jimenez 2014) might generate similar results. Indeed, mayors of larger and more economically developed cities might believe they are sufficiently insulated to enact preferred redistributive policies. This possibility leads us to H4 Economic Competition: Mayors whose cities face greater economic competition-whether due to a large number of neighbors, small population, and/or small tax base-will be less inclined towards redistribution, even if their partisan identification predisposes them to support such policies.

Similarly, mayors' capacity to act according to their partisan views might also be shaped by cities' institutional configurations (see Carr 2015 for a detailed review of the importance of municipal institutional form). Lineberry and Fowler's (1967) seminal work reveals that council-manager cities spend and tax less than non-reform cities, with more recent research confirming that institutional form at a minimum shapes city spending and financing (Wong 1988; Feiock, Jeong and Kim 2003; Carr 2015). Several studies have also found that the effect of interjurisdictional competition on local public spending and finance is contingent upon municipal structure, with strong mayor cities more susceptible to shifts in interjurisdictional competition than their council manager and weak mayor counterparts (Karuppusamy and Carr 2012). We take these lines of scholarship together to arrive at **H5 City Structure**: Mayors in "strong mayor" systems are more likely to pursue redistributive initiatives in line with their partisan identification than their counterparts in council manager and weak mayor cities.

There are, of course, a myriad of other considerations that might shape mayors' propensity for redistribution. When possible, we attempt to consider and/or control for them. For example, if local policy is a function of local needs (e.g. Lineberry 1977; Feiock and West 1993), we might expect the mayors of less wealthy cities to prioritize redistribution. Racial dynamics may similarly impact demand for redistribution. In particular, a more diverse population seemingly dampens public support for welfare spending as individuals are reluctant to endorse spending they expect to benefit other racial groups (Gilens 1999; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Hopkins 2009, though see Hopkins (2011); Rugh and Trounstine (2011)). Finally, a growing body of research suggests that the size of a community shapes its politics in a variety of ways, including electoral behavior, elite powers, and constituent preferences (Judd and Swanstrom 1994; Oliver and Ha 2007; Oliver, Ha and Callen 2012). Specific to the question of redistribution, large cities' more disadvantaged populations might point their mayors toward more redistribution. Similarly, arguments about interjurisdictional competition militate in favor of the mayors of larger cities redistributing relatively more.

2 Data and Methods: Original Survey-Interviews of Mayors

In contrast to previous studies of local redistribution—which have focused on spending outcomes we gathered most of our data directly from mayors. We did so by conducting a set of original hybrid survey-interviews. We argue that mayoral preferences are, at a minimum, important as a consequence of their agenda-setting power. While mayors certainly face an array of constraints when trying to implement redistributive policies (Peterson 1981; Elkin 1987; Stone 1989; Logan and Molotch 2007), as chief executives they are nevertheless uniquely positioned to put these issues on the agenda and shepherd programs through. Indeed, influence over a city's budget represents one among many forms of mayoral influence over the urban policymaking process; studies of budgets may not capture, for example, the impact of mayoral agenda-setting on levers of power such as permitting, zoning variances, and negotiations with community groups. Moreover, because our questions tap into constrained preferences (we elaborate more on this below), we believe that we capture true policy priorities rather than unrealistic dreams or socially desirable position taking. For these reasons, we suggest that mayoral agenda-setting comprises an important quantity of interest separate from other (equally important) outcome measures, such as city budgetary allocations.

About half of our observations were collected via in-person or phone interviews in which we walked though the survey questionnaire directly with a mayor, collecting closed-ended data, openended responses, and additional elaborations. Each of these conversations lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. The other observations were collected via an online version of the questionnaire, which captured answers to the same open- and closed-ended questions posed in in-person interviews. As we discuss below, the varied methods though which we collected data are indicative of our extensive efforts to connect with a hard to reach elite population. The in-person and phone interviews, and even some of the online responses, often required multiple correspondences with mayoral staff. We offered the mayors maximum flexibility by doing everything from offering an online version to attending one of their major conferences.

The data we use in this paper comprise two different groups that were recruited in slightly dif-

ferent ways: (1) mayors of big cities (population greater than 400,000); and (2) mayors of smaller and mid-sized cities. We aggressively (and personally) targeted the *entire population* of large city mayors (we describe these procedures in greater depth below). Conversely, our recruitment of the smaller and mid-sized cities centered on a generic email. While this mixed sampling strategy would be irregular in the context of a mass opinion survey, collecting preferences from elites such as mayors necessitates a mix of systematic and convenience sampling. While we combine these two samples in this paper, we also control for population (and indeed have interaction models with population) to ensure that our results are not driven by population skews. Most importantly, as we elaborate below, our sample closely matches the national population of cities *and* mayors on key indicators.

We devoted more energy toward recruiting and accommodating big city mayors for both substantive and practical reasons. First, large cities, with hundreds of thousands of residents are often the subject of prominent urban politics case studies (Sonenshein 1993; Mollenkopf 1994; Kaufmann 2004) and generally have unique policy priorities and powers (Judd and Swanstrom 1994). The behavior and preferences of their mayors may therefore be of particular interest to urban politics scholars, especially because they are more likely to be able to engage in independent policymaking. Second, more informally, these are the types of places many people tend to think about when discussing city government and policy. Third, and perhaps most importantly, these cities are also quite scarce in the broader universe of American cities. For example, large cities are a very small percentage of the membership in the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM), a large professional association: a mere three percent of USCM members have over 400,000 residents (indeed, only 20 % have populations over 100,000). Because these cities are scarce and have the busiest and hardest to access mayors, we made special efforts to recruit them to ensure enough observations from this special group. We went to the summer meeting of the USCM to offer an in-person interview option to the mayors (especially the big city mayors) that attended.³ Mayors of the 50 largest cities by population and 15 other large city mayors who were registered for the conference received an email invitation that included a scanned personally addressed letter from Thomas M.

Menino, the former Mayor of Boston, inviting them to schedule an in-person interview with us at the conference or to schedule a phone interview. Moreover, our research team obtained the contact information for all of these mayors' schedulers and/or assistants to ensure that invitations and follow ups were seen by pertinent people in mayors' offices and that they did not get lost at a mayor's generic public access email account.

Importantly, however, we acknowledge that the elections and politics of large and small cities differ in a myriad of important ways that may shape our results. In particular, because the politics of large cities tend to be more ideological (Oliver, Ha and Callen 2012), we may be more likely to find support for H2 than we would have had our sample focused on the kinds of small cities featured in other recent surveys of local elected officials (Butler et al. 2015). In other words, we do not necessarily expect the findings of our survey to fully generalize to *every* type of city and town; better understanding the behavior of the large- and medium-sized cities that comprise a disproportionate share of our sample, however, will yield valuable insights.

Our data include 16 of the 46 mayors of cities over 400,000 in the U.S. Overall, more than 1/3 of the large cities that received the full fledged recruitment participated, yielding a sizable and representative (see below) sample of hard to reach big city leaders.

Of course, America's largest cities contribute only a fraction of the country's important urban policy making. Therefore, as part of the broader project, we reached out to a much wider array of cities using a less intensive approach. We sent an e-mail invitation to *all* mayors in the 2014 USCM database. This list includes all of the large cities, hundreds of small cities and everything in between. We opted to recruit broadly and used membership in the association as our survey frame. In essence we included *all cities* that see themselves a policymaking cities (regardless of governing structure) as indicated by their membership in the association.⁴ All of the mayors/cities that belong to the association received a more generic email invitation (to their official but not necessarily direct or personal accounts) and a similarly generic follow up. We offered them the same wide range of options for participating, and most of the smaller city mayors participated online or over the phone.⁵

In sum, the data we analyze below come from two closely related samples: (1) an intensively recruited group of all of the large cities in which we had approximately a 33% response rate and (2) a much more passively recruited group of "all cities" in which the response rate was significantly lower (5%). Because we are studying elites in their professional capacity and asking them questions about their in-office preferences, we believe the most important place to check for representativeness is in the traits of the *cities* the mayors lead, just as one would check the demographics of congressional districts to evaluate the representativeness of a sample of legislators that focused on their priorities and voting. The participating mayors hail from 30 different states and all regions of the country.⁶ Table 1 uses 2012 demographic data from the U.S. Census' American Community Survey⁷ to illustrate how our sample demographics align with those of all of the nation's cities. We split the demographic comparison, and some of our analysis below, into "big cities" and "small cities" using 400,000 as our cut-point. These demographic comparisons demonstrate that despite some minor population count skews, the cities that responded generally look like American cities as a whole. While the participating cities are slightly whiter and less Hispanic, these differences are minor. Most importantly given our focus on redistributive policy, our sample's economic characteristics almost perfectly match those in the full set of cities. Thus, we can discount some of the most obvious and problematic potential skews. Notably, the in-sample mayors do not represent constituencies with abnormal needs for redistributive policies.

A second obvious area of concern would be partisanship. We used a couple of different metrics to ensure that our sample did not have a partisan skew—a particularly important check given our focus on partisanship and the fact that a former Democratic mayor participated in recruitment. First, we compared the proportion of our sample that was Democratic to the overall national share using data from Gerber and Hopkins (2011). The two-party partisan split in our data is 65% Democrat. This is virtually identical to the figure included in the appendix in Gerber and Hopkins (2011) (67%). Second, we measured the mass partisanship in our sample relative to cities across the country using 2008 Democratic presidential vote share from Einstein and Kogan (2016). The average partisan composition of our sample is virtually identical to that of cities as a whole (the

comparison is displayed in Table 1). To ensure that these average comparisons did not mask a bias towards political extremism, we also compared the distribution of the Democratic vote share in our sample relative to cities nationally. Again, we found remarkable similarity: the percentage Democrat at the 25^{th} and 75^{th} percentiles of our data never differed by more than three percentage points from their counterparts in the national data. Our mayors thus lead cities that are politically representative of country as whole. They are *not*, for example, from a mix of ideologically extreme places that cancel each other out in aggregate statistics.

Third, we also check for institutional representativeness. Using data from the International City/County Management Association (ICMA 2011) and Strong Mayor Council Institute (Strong Mayor Council Institute 2011), we find that our sample cities are remarkably representative in their institutional configurations. While our sample features a slightly larger proportion of mayor council cities—unsurprisingly given our targeting of large cities—the proportion of our cities that are council manager is identical to that in the country as a whole.

Fourth, we investigate whether our cities are representative in the state legal contexts they face. Using data from the National League of Cities (Hoene and Pagano 2015), we explore the proportion of cities that are located in states with: (1) no Tax and Expenditure Limits (TELs); (2) less binding property tax limits; (3) potentially binding property tax limits; and (4) binding property tax limits and general limits. The National League of Cities categorized states as having "less binding" limits if solitary limits are easily bypassed; for example, "a rate limit alone might be circumvented by raising assessments, or an assessment limit alone might be circumvented by raising assessments, or an assessment limit is one in which limits are less easily bypassed: "there is either a levy limit...or some combination of rate and assessment limits together, thereby negating the ability of localities to circumvent limits" (pp. 13). The NLC also classifies general revenue and spending limits in isolation as "potentially binding." States that have *both* binding property tax limits and general revenue and spending limits are considered "binding." The NLC's approach is rooted in public administration scholarship (Mullins and Wallin 2004).

Once again, our sample cities are generally quite representative of those in the country as a

whole. While our sample exhibits some small deviations—with a slightly higher percentage falling into the no TELs and binding TELs categories—in general, it largely mirrors cities nationwide.

As we noted above, the most important areas to test for representativeness are those that comprise city, constituent, and/or partisan traits that could directly speak to needs or preferences for redistribution. Nevertheless, it is also possible that we obtained a skewed sample of mayors that is masked by a representative sample of cities. Therefore, we also used biographies on city websites supplemented with Google searches to collect data about the mayors themselves. We collected these data for all cities in the U.S. with over 400,000 people and for a random sample of 50 smaller cities. We focused on factors (in addition to partisanship) that relate to a) the propensity to participate given our recruitment tactics and b) the propensity to endorse redistributive policies. Recruiting participants at the U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting using a letter from former Boston Mayor Thomas Menino could induce two types of bias. One possibility is that we ended up with an unusual sample of mayors who were close with Mayor Menino. For example, our sample might comprise older mayors with whom Mayor Menino worked for years. This was not the case. The ages of participants closely mirror the broader populations. In fact, if anything, the large city mayors were slightly younger as a group. We also did not obtain a sample dominated by mayors from the northeast; instead our participating mayors were geographically representative of the country as a whole. Finally, as we elaborated above, we also did not get an unusual partisan skew which one might expect if we obtained a sample dominated by Mayor Menino's former Democratic allies. A second possibility is that using the conference would result in a sample of extraordinarily well-networked and/or ambitious mayors. This concern would most apply to the smaller cities since smaller city mayors who attend the national conference may be especially different from those who do not. Because attendance at the 2014 conference was endogenous by default, we use attendance at the 2015 summer conference as an indicator of networkedness. We find no differences within the critical smaller cities group (37% vs. 34%, $\chi^2 p = .76$). A higher fraction of the big city mayors we spoke with attended the 2015 conference, but this difference is also not statistically significant (p=.23). Indeed, because of the small number of observations, if

	Under 400,000 People		Over 400,000 People	
Variable	In Sample	All Cities	In Sample	All Cities
Population				
Population	94,200	74,300	777,200	1,015,300
Population Density	3,200	3,800	4,800	5,300
Race				
% White	63%	58%	49%	43%
% Black	13%	12%	21%	22%
% Hispanic	14%	20%	18%	25%
Socioeconomic				
Median Household Income	\$57,600	\$58,400	\$49,200	\$48,800
% Poverty	16%	15%	19%	20%
% Unemployed	6%	6%	7%	7%
% Owner Occupied	53%	56%	46%	45%
Political				
% 2008 Obama Vote	60%	59%	65%	65%
Institutional				
% Mayor Council	41%	33%	50%	58%
% Council Manager	59%	59%	50%	40%
State Context				
% No TELs	14%	9%	13%	9%
% Less binding property tax limit	12%	17%	13%	21%
% Potentially binding property tax limit	52%	61%	44%	37%
% Binding property lax limit and general limit	22%	13%	31%	33%
Number of Responses	57		16	

Table 1: Comparison of average traits of cities in our sample to all cities.

Notes: 1)Some numbers are rounded. 2)Not all mayors answered all questions. We included all mayors that completed the open-ended priorities and challenges section of the survey in these demographics. All data are from the 2012 American Community Survey and the Office of Management and Budget (we use the OMB's 2013 list of principal cities for classification). Cities under 30,000 people are excluded. (Our smallest is approximately 28,000 people).

only two large city participants switched behaviors the ostensible difference would disappear. One final possibility, given our focus on redistribution vs. development tradeoffs, is that mayors with business backgrounds could have different views. Thus, we coded whether a mayor included a job like "businessman" in his/her biography. Both larger and smaller city mayors in our sample were slightly more likely (but not significantly so p=.29 and p=.22) to have business backgrounds than the corresponding comparison groups. While not a statistically significant result, we are attentive to the possibility that this slight skew towards business backgrounds might bias our results in favor of H1, with mayors from the business community more inclined towards development in lieu of redistributive policy. Last, but perhaps most importantly, we reemphasize the fact that the survey was pitched as a general survey about city leadership. It was *not* publicized as a survey about inequality or redistribution or even economic policy. Thus, it is very unlikely mayors' participation choices were driven by their views on the issues we report on in this paper.

2.1 Measuring Constrained Redistributive Preferences

Eliciting meaningful responses is critical to addressing the questions we seek to answer. We thus paid close attention to question wording and design. Rather than attempt to devise one perfect way to capture redistribution preferences, we adopt a triangulation strategy in which we rely on different styles of questions and analysis. Most critically, we tried to design questions to capture mayors' *professional constrained preferences*. As we noted earlier, simply asking if mayors believe inequality is a problem, or asking them about federal programs would not be very informative. Instead, we aim for the constrained preferences at the heart of the arguments that cities do not redistribute and that mayoral partisanship is inconsequential.

Perhaps the most direct way we measure mayors' preferences is by asking them two openended questions about their agendas. In one we simply ask: "What are your current top two policy priorities?" The second related question taps into willingness to expend political capital on contentious policy initiatives: "In the next year, on what two issues do you plan to expend the most political capital?" We coded the answers, however expansive, into a manageable set of categories, e.g. "education," "economic development." In this article, we are primarily interested in responses that fell into our "Socioeconomic Issues" category, which includes priorities related to poverty, inequality, and affordable housing. We include a full list of answers (anonymized) that fell into this category in the appendix.

One important strength of these questions is that they do not force respondents to name or discuss redistribution. They assess whether inequality and redistribution are top-of-the-head considerations for mayors in comparison to other priorities. Second, these lists of top two priorities/capital expenditures already have various institutional constraints baked into them. While some mayors may place controversial items on their lists, it is less likely that they will include items that they are not serious about or that they have no chance of advancing. In our experience, most of the programs and ideas they discussed were already works in progress. Finally, an additional strength of these questions relates to one of the limitations in prior studies that use spending data. Spending data (primarily collected using the Census of Governments) are necessarily provided in coarse categories. They therefore require scholars to make tough choices about what exactly constitutes redistributive spending; these broad categories necessarily miss swaths of redistributive spending happening in other policy arenas, like transit and development, and they do not capture the variation that occurs within categories.

To supplement these open-ended questions, we also analyze responses to two questions about policy tradeoffs that are likely relevant to many mayors. These questions explicitly capture constrained attitudes towards inequality. In each (full wording below where we report the results), we pose a tradeoff and ask mayors how strongly they agree or disagree. One pits fighting inequality against the possibility that doing so will adversely affect the tax base. The other juxtaposes rising property values against the displacement of some lower-income current residents. The first of these tradeoffs focuses on income inequality, a prominent and partisan national issue. The second, concerns gentrification and taps a more local set of redistributive concerns. Combined, they help us evaluate H3 (National Politics).⁸

While we believe these questions elicit constrained preferences and not simply cheap talk, we

also collected data to provide two more "objective" or verifiable measures based on the ideas and programs mayors are touting. First, using mayors' and cities' official websites, we collected all public statements from mayors in our sample endorsing redistributive policies in the year after our survey was conducted (June 2014-June 2015). These statements include press releases and public proclamations/addresses (such as State of City speeches) included on mayoral and city official websites. Second, again using mayors' and cities' websites, we investigated whether our each mayor in the sample helped to implement any concrete programs targeting inequality (or, at least, advertised the implementation of these programs on their websites). All press releases include the mayor explicitly endorsing a policy proposal and/or discussing a program s/he is implementing (public proclamations/addresses are authored by the mayor and thus already contain these clear links between mayor and policy.) Below, we begin our reporting of results with these data before turning to the survey.

2.2 Measuring Independent Variables

To measure our key independent variable—mayoral partisanship—we asked mayors on the survey for their partisan identification, regardless of whether they run with party labels. For those who did not provide this information, we searched online for any records of party labels or connections to party politics. Specifically, we conducted two separate searches per mayor; one with the mayor's name and "Democrat", the other with the mayor's name and "Republican." For each search, we looked for evidence of: (1) party endorsements of the mayor; (2) mayoral attendance at party events; (3) mayoral endorsements of party figures. If mayors evinced party associations for *one* party, we classified them as a member of that party (none of the mayors in our sample had connections with both parties). Those mayors who did not appear to have party links based on these searches remained unclassified by party. To assess economic pressures, we use three different measures: (1) the number of per capita general purpose local governments in a city's surrounding metropolitan area;⁹ (2) city population; (3) city median property values.¹⁰ To capture city institutional form, we include a dichotomous measure coded 1 if a city is governed under a

strong mayor system and 0 if not. This simple distinction is widely used in urban politics and public administration research (Carr 2015).

In our statistical models, we also include a number of controls. First, to address the potentially confounding impact of mass partisanship, we include 2008 city presidential vote share from Einstein and Kogan (2016), the largest available data set on vote share at the municipal level. Unfortunately, such models cannot neatly parse mass partisan effects from a mayor's personal affiliation. As we noted earlier, mass partisanship likely contributes significantly to mayoral partisanship and is thus subject to post-treatment bias. These issues would be more problematic if our central goal was to *separately* identify the effects of mass and mayoral partisanship on mayoral preferences. Instead, we are simply making an argument that mayors' professional views about redistributive initiatives are filtered through a national partisan lens. Whether that partisanship stems from mass or elite divisions is beyond the scope of our analysis. It is fruitful ground for future research.

3 Results

While the survey results comprise the bulk of the analysis, we begin with the data we collected on public statements and actual policies. We coded (see above) press releases and other articles from mayors' and cities' websites to investigate (1) whether a mayor publicly endorsed policies redressing income inequality/poverty in the year after we conducted our survey; (2) whether a mayor helped to implement concrete policies targeting these issues in the year after our survey (or, at least, advertised the implementation of such a policy). These data serve two related purposes. For one, they provide strong support for the partisan split in municipal redistributive priorities on which much of the survey analysis focuses. In fact, they portray the strongest partisan divide of any metric we use in our triangulation strategy. Secondly, in doing so, they provide a preemptive robustness check on the survey results that follow. Despite our best efforts to elicit real and constrained priorities, we acknowledge that stated preferences in a survey may not fully reflect a mayor's true commitments or her ability to actually promulgate policies. The overlap between



(a) Public Statements

(b) Programs

Figure 1: Proportion making public statements and pursuing programs by mayoral partisanship

these observational data and the survey data strongly suggests that the survey responses are not just "cheap talk" and indeed capture real and constrained preferences.

Both the statements and programs dependent variables (summarized in Figure 1) provide strong support for H2. Fifty percent of Democratic mayors made statements endorsing programs targeting income inequality on their websites, compared with only five percent of Republicans. Similarly, 35% of Democratic mayors helped implement programs targeting these issues (and included these programs on their websites), while only five percent of Republicans did the same. Both differences are highly statistically significant (p < .001 and p < .05, respectively). These large partisan effects hold when controlling for potentially confounding factors such as mass partisanship, city institutional traits and economic distress (regression results displayed in Figure 2 and Table 4). Interestingly, the gap between the proportion of mayors who endorsed redistributive programs and those who actually implemented such initiatives suggests that, while mayors are often able to implement preferred policies, they do face important limitations. Moreover, mayors in bigger cities appear more likely to endorse and promulgate these programs, while mayors in communities with large numbers of local governments are less likely—consistent with arguments that more competitively insulated locales are more apt to prefer redistribution.

To test H4 and H5 while dealing with the empty cells that such a strong partisan effect creates,



(a) Public Statements



Figure 2: Marginal effects (from logit models) with 95% confidence intervals for the "public statements" (left) and "programs" (right) dependent variables. The estimates represent the effect of mayoral partisanship in differing institutional and geographic contexts. The continuous variables are normalized (0,1) so the estimates represent the effect of a 1 SD change at the mean, while dichotomous variables' effects are simply a shift from 0 to 1. This and other similar graphs created using the Coefplot program in STATA (Jann 2013)

we estimate a series of bivariate logit regressions (Democrat vs. Republican for each context subgroup) exploring whether the effect of partisanship varies by institutional and economic contexts (Figure 3). It is possible that an ostensible strong partisan effect is the result of a very strong effect in one subgroup and none in another (or, alternatively, in some of the models we explore below, it is possible that a middling overall partisan effect is the result of a robust partisan effect among strong mayors (or large cities etc.) and no partisan effect among weak mayors (small cities)). Basically the question is whether subgroup variation is obscuring main effects, creating false positive main effects, or neither.

With substantially more data we could estimate models with the requisite interactions in them to address these issues. Because we have relatively few data points, and, as important, very few (or no) mayors making statements supporting redistributive policies and/or implementing such programs in some subgroups (attesting to the strength of the party differences), we cannot put much faith in such an approach. Instead, we evaluate the partisan effect in each subgroup of interest separately. Figure 3 displays our subgroup analyses with confidence intervals. Most of the



(a) Marginal Party Effects: Public Statements

(b) Marginal Party Effects: Programs

Figure 3: Marginal effects (from logit models) with 95% confidence intervals for the "inequality statement" (left) and "inequality program" (right) dependent variables. The estimates represent the effect of mayoral partisanship in differing institutional and geographic contexts. The continuous variables are normalized (0,1) so the estimates represent the effect of a 1 SD change at the mean, while dichotomous variables' effects are simply a shift from 0 to 1.

estimates are from simple bivariate logit estimates which allow us to estimate the marginal partisan effect (Democrat relative to Republican) for each subgroup (e.g. strong mayors). In some cases namely when there were no strong mayor Republican mayors making public statements endorsing redistribution or implementing inequality-oriented programs—the figure reports the difference (i.e. the percent of weak mayor versus strong mayor Democrats) with 95% confidence intervals (of the difference estimate) from the Stata Proportion Test function. On these plots, the horizontal lines are 95% confidence intervals around the estimates of the marginal Democratic effect. The light vertical line indicates the "main effect" (all Ds vs. all Rs) to make it easy to see when subgroup effects are significantly different than the baseline effect.

In contrast with H4 and H5, we generally find little evidence that the effect of partisanship varies by institutional and economic contexts. The sole exception is in city population size. Consistent with H4, Democratic mayors in larger cities were more likely to make public statements endorsing redistribution and (especially) implement redistributive policy programs than their counterparts in smaller cities.

3.1 Survey Results

We turn now towards exploring our survey results. We begin with perhaps our toughest test by exploring whether mayors cite inequality and/or redistributive concerns as one of their top two (open-ended) policy priorities or political capital expenditures. We use the label "socioeconomic equality" to refer to redistributive policies. This category encompasses all policies related to inequality, race and housing. A full list of anonymized policies is available in Tables 2 and 3 in the appendix.

The policies that fell into this category are varied. For example, one mayor described his top priority as an overall focus on "equity." He worried about not just economic inequality but also incarceration, racial inequality, and "inequality in access to government [and] trust in government." He contended that "inequality is...about the people being estranged from government." He linked these concerns with concrete policy priorities such as affordable housing, childcare, job training, and access to transit for lower income residents. Another mayor said that one of his top two priorities was "addressing chronic homelessness by moving people to permanent housing." A third's comments both highlight the efforts that mayors are making towards redistributive policy and even their willingness to work against economic constraints. He said one of his top priorities was a "collective impact model to address health, education, and financial security" and that one of his two biggest political capital expenditures would go toward generating "business community support for his poverty initiatives." Other examples of redistributive efforts include one mayor's initiative to study and address black male achievement and others' focus on "living wage jobs."

Eighteen percent of all mayors offer socioeconomic inequality as one of their top two policy priorities, and 19% did the same for political capital. Comparisons to other policy areas we may expect mayors to mention help provide context. 33% cite economic development as a priority and 21% mention infrastructure. Similarly, 26% list economic development as a political capital expenditure and 24% cite infrastructure. Equity-oriented policies are thus somewhat—but not dramatically—less likely to appear as a top-of-the-head consideration than issues we would expect to find at the top of urban agendas. In contrast with the economic imperatives perspective (H1),

almost one-fifth of mayors listed an inequality issue—amid the many policies they could have selected—as one of their top two policy priorities and political capital expenditures. These results provide preliminary support against H1—some mayors do indeed appear to prioritize inequality and redistribution at least as strongly as economic development.

Moreover, consistent with H2, these data provide some preliminary evidence that Democratic mayors are more inclined to prioritize equality-oriented initiatives. Twenty five percent of Democratic mayors selected a redistributive policy as a top priority, compared with only nine percent of Republicans (p-value of difference .13). More starkly, 28% of Democratic mayors chose a redistributive initiative as a top political capital expenditure, while only 5 perent of Republicans did the same (p-value of difference .03). Regression analyses largely bolster these cross-tabulations. Figure 4 plots the estimated marginal effects (from a logit model) for the partisan variables alongside other control variables which one might expect to affect the likelihood of redistributive policy.¹¹ In neither of these models is the main effect of a mayor's party ID significant. It is however positively signed in both and substantially stronger in the political capital variable. In sum, the responses offer suggestive evidence of a partisan effect that manifests strongly in the bivariate relationships but becomes more muted when controlling for other variables, which may both affect redistributive propensities and be correlated with the likelihood of having a Democratic mayor.

Figure 5 turns to exploring whether the impact of mayoral partisanship is conditional on economic pressures (H4) or city institutional form (H5). As with Figure 3, it does so using marginal effects from bivariate logit models estimating the impact of mayoral partisanship in differing institutional and economic contexts. The left hand panel shows no strong relationships in the policy priority variable. As described above, overall, Democrats were about 16 percentage points (.16 marginal effect) more likely than Republicans to name a socioeconomic policy priority when looking at the bivariate relationship. This relationship does not quite achieve conventional significance. More importantly, this plot shows that there are no significant subgroup effects. When looking at the policy priority variable, none of the subgroup effects is significantly different from zero. Moreover, none are significantly or substantively different from the main effect or from the companion



(a) Redistributive Priority



Figure 4: Marginal effects (from logit models) with 95% confidence intervals for the "redistributive policy priority" (left) and "redistributive political capital expenditure" (right) dependent variables. The estimates represent the effect of mayoral partisanship in differing institutional and geographic contexts. The continuous variables are normalized (0,1) so the estimates represent the effect of a 1 SD change at the mean, while dichotomous variables' effects are simply a shift from 0 to 1.

subgroup.

The right hand panel digs into the interactions in the political capital variable. Here, the bivariate main effect (22 percentage points) is substantial and significant. As the figure makes clear, this main effect is not driven by any large subgroup effects. None is significantly different than the overall effect and none is significantly or substantively different than its companion subgroup. Directionally, we do see stronger partisan effects in large cities (H4) and strong mayor cities (H5). While these differences are not significant, they are still noteworthy given theoretical expectations and existing work. Regardless, the overall story here is the extent to which there is a partisan effect in the political capital expenditure models.

3.2 Inequality and Gentrification Tradeoffs

We turn now to our second set of measures of mayoral redistributive preferences, closed-ended questions that forced mayors to make difficult tradeoffs concerning inequality and gentrification. The first of these presents mayors with a tradeoff between reducing inequality and harming the interests of businesses and wealthier residents. Specifically, we asked mayors how much they agreed



(a) Marginal Party Effects: Policy Priorities

(b) Marginal Party Effects: Political Capital

Figure 5: Marginal effects (from logit models) with 95% confidence intervals for the "policy priority" (left) and "political capital expenditure" (right) dependent variables. The estimates represent the effect of mayoral partisanship in differing institutional and geographic contexts. The continuous variables are normalized (0,1) so the estimates represent the effect of a 1 SD change at the mean, while dichotomous variables' effects are simply a shift from 0 to 1.

or disagreed with the following statement:

"Cities should try to reduce income inequality, even if doing so comes at the expense of businesses and/or wealthy residents."

As with the responses to the open-ended questions, responses to this first tradeoff question largely contradict H1. A significant number of mayors do, in fact, prioritize redistribution even when weighed against economic development and tax base considerations. Just under one-third of mayors agreed—a sizable number in light of the economic imperatives arguments. While we certainly do not want to understate the predictive power of the economic imperatives literature— 55% of mayors opposed the tradeoff—the fact that *any* mayors, let alone one third, are willing to sacrifice important components of their cities' tax bases to ameliorate income inequality is striking. Moreover, the variation in responses helps to validate our claim that the question taps into real tradeoffs in a meaningful way. Mayors did not all cluster on what some might consider the



Figure 6: Coefficient estimates for full OLS models (with 95% confidence intervals) with inequality tradeoff (left) and redistributive gentrification tradeoff (right) as dependent variables. Continuous independent variables have been scaled to (0,1) such that the plot shows the effect of a one standard deviation change.

politically correct answer. One mayor of a mid-sized city said of addressing income inequality locally: "It is hard. Our city is not that big. It is really important but the city has limited capacity." Another who took a position against making the tradeoff nevertheless observed: "I do not think cities should try to get inside peoples pocketbook....but we need a more progressive tax structure for city services such as water rates."

The inequality tradeoff does, however, provide evidence for H2: 53% of Democratic mayors agreed with the tradeoff, compared with only 6% of Republicans. Figure 6 uses regressions to explore whether these partisan differences hold when we control for other plausible drivers of mayoral attitudes towards redistribution. All models are Ordinary Least Squares (treating the underlying five point scale as continuous),¹² with coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals illustrated in Figure 6 and available in table form in the appendix (Table 4).

The inequality tradeoff results in the left panel provide powerful evidence for H2: the coefficient on mayoral partisanship is positive and highly statistically significant, revealing that Democratic mayors were much more likely to support redressing income inequality, even if it came at the expense of wealthy taxpayers and businesses. The effect is substantively large. It is approximately one point on a five point scale. Moreover, mayoral partisanship is the only noteworthy effect in



(a) Marginal Party Effects: InequalityTradeoff

(b) Marginal Party Effects: Rising Prices Tradeoff

Figure 7: Marginal effects (from OLS models) with 95% confidence intervals for the "inequality tradeoff" (left) and "gentrification tradeoff" (right) dependent variables. The estimates represent the effect of mayoral partisanship in differing institutional and geographic contexts. The continuous variables are normalized (0,1) so the estimates represent the effect of a 1 SD change at the mean, while dichotomous variables' effects are simply a shift from 0 to 1.

this model.

As above, we now check whether the powerful partisan effect is simply a strong main effect, or whether it is driven by subgroups with very large partisan effects. Analogously to Table 5, we assess the marginal partisan effect (Democrat relative to Republican) in each subgroup by looking at the bivariate relationship (once again, cell size issues prevent us from confidently estimating full interactive models). The left panel of Figure 7 shows these effects for the inequality tradeoff. As before, we show the overall Democratic effect alongside subgroup effects. This plot depicts a strong overall partisan effect (over one point on a five point scale)—consistent with H2—but no evidence of party effects that are conditional on institutional structures or economic power, in contrast with H4 and H5. None of the subgroup effects are substantially or significantly different from the main effect. Indeed, as with the main effect, they are all positive and statistically significant from zero. Regardless of city institutional form, wealth, size, and competitive context, Democratic mayors are more likely to endorse the inequality tradeoff to similar degrees.

We now turn to the second policy tradeoff which, as we indicated above, concerns gentrification. This issue also speaks to economic inequality and a city's tax base, but in different ways than the other tradeoff. It does not map onto national partian divides as neatly as more general questions of redistribution and inequality. Rather, it is more of a local issue. The exact wording of this second tradeoff statement is:

"It is good for a neighborhood when it experiences rising property values, even if it means that some current residents might have to move out."¹³

Here, unlike with the inequality tradeoff, the more redistribution-oriented position is *disagreeing* rather than agreeing with the statement.

The cross tabulations from this question reveal that—consistent with H3—national partisan alignments are not associated with preferences on this more local redistributive issue. In general, mayors are more evenly divided. Approximately 40% agree with the gentrification tradeoff, 30% disagree, and 30% neither agree nor disagree. Indeed, marginal effects displayed in the right-hand panel of Figure 6 confirm the non-relationship between mayoral partisanship and preferences for gentrification.

Since the main effect on this tradeoff was essentially nil, we turn to exploring whether the lack of main effect is a consequence of off-setting subgroup effects. As the right panel of Figure 7 shows, there are almost no noteworthy partisan effects in any subgroup. Democrats and Republicans are essentially evenly split on this issue whether they are in big or small cities, strong or weak mayor systems, and irrespective of at least some economic conditions and threats. The only variable that appears to shape the relationship between partisanship and views on this tradeoff is median housing prices. Here, in contrast with our predictions in H4, Democratic mayors in wealthier cities are more likely to agree with the tradeoff, thus taking the less redistributive position. Combined with the other tradeoff question, these results generally suggest that there are significant differences in how mayors think about the tradeoffs inherent in addressing income inequality and gentrification.

3.3 Summary

We began by announcing a "triangulation" strategy. Having reported results from six different measures we can now put it all back together. Overall, we find strong evidence of general partisan differences in redistributive preferences and little evidence of conditional party differences. Both objective measures and two of the four survey measures point substantially toward partisan differences. A fifth measure, the policy priorities one, is directionally consistent. The only measure that does not evince even suggestive evidence of party differences is the gentrification tradeoff. This is exactly the place we would least expect a partisan gap because it is a purely local issue. Moreover, when we do find support for party effects, these effects are always independent of institutional or economic factors. When party matters is matters in consistent ways across attributes such as mayoral authority, city size, and tax base.

4 Conclusion

Our analyses represent the first attempt to systematically assess mayors' constrained preferences and priorities on pressing local issues. The ability to observe city leaders' views offers unique leverage for exploring the mechanisms undergirding local redistribution. While our data have drawbacks—like any social scientific method—they provide a complementary lens through which to view mayoral responses to structural constraints. Indeed, our survey-interviews blend breadth and depth to provide a generalizable, but nuanced portrait of mayoral policy preferences. They also offer a starting point for a number of future research studies; specifically, going forward, we hope to expand upon our analysis to further link mayors' preferences with public statements and campaign rhetoric, exploring when these important quantities of interest converge and diverge.

Moreover, our findings offer evidence of a broader story about the nationalization of local politics. A significant segment of mayors are actively promoting initiatives in a salient policy arena previously thought to be outside their purview. What's more, their preferences for initiatives in this sphere are shaped by a partisanship consistent with the national parties' positions. Local

politics therefore may encompass a wider array of policies than scholars have explored and may prove to be fertile ground for evaluating many hotly contested political science theories concerning national politics.

Notes

¹Though, using a regression-discontinuity design, Per (2003) finds that partisanship does matter for city councils in the Swedish context.

²Indeed, some of the key null findings in Gerber and Hopkins (2011)—including housing, roads, and taxes actually have coefficient estimates that are fairly large in magnitude. In fact, these estimates are as large as the police spending estimate, which is the area Gerber and Hopkins (2011) find mayoral partisanship to have a significant effect.

³By using the U.S. Conference of Mayors as our sampling frame, we eliminate pure council-manager cities that have no mayors. Because our primary unit of observation in this study is mayors (and the related impact they have on their cities), such a limitation makes sense for our research.

⁴There are 46 cities with populations over 400,000 in the USCM database (and in the U.S.), 482 with populations between 50,000-400,000, and 1427 total.

⁵We also spoke with a few of these mayors (particularly some of the larger smaller cities) at the conference. As we indicated above, the group that received the more intensive recruiting included the mayors of some larger (but sub 400,000 person) cities that attended the conference.

⁶Only 56 of 72 mayors completed the entire survey. While this level of retention is actually good, it does mean that for some of our measures of redistribution, we have fewer observations to work with. All of the analyses presented below include the numbers of observation.

⁷All demographic data below are 2012 ACS 5-year estimates.

⁸In addition to these survey questions, we also ran all statistical analyses on two additional survey items: one exploring mayors' use of business groups as a source of policy information relative to advocacy groups and another measuring the cooperativeness of their relationship with business. All of the key results presented below remain the same when we use these two survey items. Results are available upon request from the authors.

⁹We calculated the number of general purpose local governments per 100,000 residents using data from the 2012 Census of Governments.

¹⁰We gathered city population and city median property values from the American Community Survey's 2012 5-year estimates.

¹¹Coefficients for full models can be found in Table 4 in the appendix.

¹²All results remain substantively the same when we use an ordered probit specification.

¹³This tradeoff roughly tries to capture key facets of Smith's (1998) seminal definition of gentrification, which centers on neighborhood renewal—in particular the in-migration of an affluent population and reinvestment in the local infrastructure. While the issue of whether displacement is in fact a necessary component of gentrification is debated (Atkinson 2004; Pattillo 2008), we include it here, again, to force mayors to make a tradeoff that displays a true prioritization of redistributive initiatives.

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Appendix

Survey Question Wording

Open Ended Questions

- What are your current top two policy priorities?
- In the next year, on what two issues do you plan to expend the most political capital?

Tradeoff Questions

- Cities should try to reduce income inequality, even if doing so comes at the expense of businesses and/or wealthy residents.
- It is good for a neighborhood when it experiences rising property values, even if it means that some current residents might have to move out.

Cooperation and Information Source Questions

- In general, how often do you rely on the following sources of policy information?
- Please rate the quality of your city's relationship with the following entities with 10 being 'cooperative and able to work together on important policies' and 0 being 'uncooperative and unable to work together on important policies.

List of Redistributive Policies in Open-Ended Questions

Affordable housing Income inequality Chronic homelessness Reducing income inequality ane expanding access to pre-k for low income children Local minimum wage increase "My Brother's Keeper" type initiative Creating living wage jobs to combat poverty Affordable housing Low and moderate income housing (including Hope VI grant housing) Economic fairness Study racial achievement gap City equity, affordability, and diversity Revitalizing our struggling neighborhoods Equity including transit, childcare, healthcare, education, job training

Table 2: Anonymized List of Redistributive Policy Priorities

Affordable housing Homelessness Addressing poverty (especially with living wage jobs) Expand public, low, and moderate income housing Black male achievement Reducing poverty Address racial disparities

Table 3: Anonymized List of Redistributive Political Capital Expenditures

Other Results

	(1)	(2)
	Inequality Statement	Inequality Program
Democrat Mayor	6.46***	3.04*
	(2.36)	(1.79)
National Dem Share	-0.67	-0.21
	(0.75)	(0.75)
Log Population	2.81***	2.06**
	(1.02)	(0.81)
Log Median Housing Price	0.01	0.14
	(0.50)	(0.51)
Percent Minority	-0.13	-0.44
-	(0.55)	(0.55)
Per Capita Local Governments	-1.43	-1.15
	(1.16)	(1.19)
Strong Mayor	-0.74	1.39
	(1.17)	(1.12)
Constant	-6.44***	-5.51**
	(2.22)	(2.20)
Observations	53	53
11	-15.45	-16.87
chi2	37.03	25.32
df_m	7	7

Table 4: Logit coefficients for statements and programs. Results displayed graphically as marginal effects in text

> Standard errors in parentheses **

Notes: continuous variables are rescaled such that the estimates are for a one standard deviation change

	(1)	(2)			
	Socioeconomic Priority	Socioeconomic Political Capital			
Democrat Mayor	0.25	2.22			
	(1.20)	(1.48)			
National Dem Share	0.56	-0.36			
	(0.62)	(0.60)			
Log Population	0.80*	-0.14			
	(0.48)	(0.51)			
Log Median Housing Price	0.38	0.62			
	(0.43)	(0.46)			
Percent Minority	-0.37	0.56			
	(0.48)	(0.46)			
Per Capital Local Governments	0.88	1.04			
	(0.73)	(0.71)			
Strong Mayor	0.37	0.71			
	(0.80)	(0.87)			
Constant	-1.95**	-3.56***			
	(0.96)	(1.31)			
Observations	53	53			
11	-22.88	-21.13			
chi2	8.380	9.084			
df_m	7	7			

Table 5: Logit coefficients for policy priority and political capital models. Results displayed graphically as marginal effects in text

(1)	(2)
Fight Income Inequality	Rising Property Values
1.22***	-0.03
(0.39)	(0.39)
0.24	-0.09
(0.20)	(0.21)
-0.16	0.20
(0.17)	(0.17)
0.10	-0.29*
(0.15)	(0.16)
0.15	0.10
(0.17)	(0.17)
0.23	-0.11
(0.24)	(0.24)
-0.18	-0.04
(0.30)	(0.31)
2.05***	3.27***
(0.31)	(0.31)
50	51
0.41	0.17
-63.78	-66.64
7	7
	(1) Fight Income Inequality 1.22^{***} (0.39) 0.24 (0.20) -0.16 (0.17) 0.10 (0.15) 0.15 (0.17) 0.23 (0.24) -0.18 (0.30) 2.05^{***} (0.31) 50 0.41 -63.78 7

Table 6: OLS coefficients for inequality and gentrification tradeoffs. Results displayed graphically in text

Standard errors in parentheses

Notes: continuous variables are rescaled such that the estimates are for a one standard deviation change

Policy Priorities				Political Capital Expenditures				
Party				Party				
		Democrats	Republicans				Democrats	Republicans
Institutional	Strong Mayor	26%	20%		Institutional	Strong Mayor	30%	0%
Form	Weak Mayor	24%	6%		Form	Weak Mayor	24%	6%
-					- 1			
Party				Party			rty	
		Democrats	Republicans				Democrats	Republicans
Housing Prices	Top Half	32%	8%	Housing Prices	ousing Prices	Top Half	28%	8%
	Bottom Half	17%	10%			Bottom Half	28%	0%
Party Party						rtv		
		Democrats	Republicans				Democrats	Republicans
	Top Half	31%	13%		Top Half	31%	0%	
City Population	Botom Half	14%	7%	Ci	ty Population	Botom Half	21%	7%
Party					Party			
		Democrats	Republicans				Democrats	Republicans
Density of Local	Top Half	20%	17%	De	ensity of Local	Top Half	30%	8%
Governments	Botom Half	30%	0%	e	Governments	Botom Half	25%	0%
Agree	With Inequa	ality Trade	off		Disagree with Neighborhoods Tradeoff			
Party			Party		rty			
		Democrats	Republicans		[Democrats	Republicans
Institutional	Strong Mayor	52%	. 0%	1	Institutional	Strong Mayor	35%	25%
Form	Weak Mayor	53%	7%		Form	Weak Mayor	24%	27%
		Pa	irty				Pa	rty
		Democrats	Republicans				Democrats	Republicans
Housing Prices	Top Half	59%	8%	н	ousing Prices	Top Half	32%	42%
1. Cusing Thees	Bottom Half	44%	0%			Bottom Half	28%	0%
		Pa	Denubliane		I		Pa	Republicant
	Ten Half	Democrats	Republicans			Teellalf	Democrats	Republicans
City Population	Determ Light	58%	0%	Ci	ty Population	TOP Hall	27%	14%
	BOLOM Hall	43%	8%		l	BOLOM Hall	30%	33%
Party							Ра	rty
		Democrats	Republicans				Democrats	Republicans
Density of Local	Top Half	55%	0%	De	ensity of Local	Top Half	40%	18%
Governments	Botom Half	50%	13%	e	Governments	Botom Half	20%	38%

Figure 8: Summary tabulations of interactions between partisanship and key institutional variables.