Appendix: For Online Publication Only

| | Rejection Rate | No. of Filings | Mean Response Time (Days) |
|---|----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| Panel A: Federal Agencies (Top 10) | | | |
| Federal Bureau of Investigation | 0.380 | 2598 | 304 |
| Central Intelligence Agency | 0.669 | 725 | 342 |
| Department of Justice | 0.256 | 712 | 319 |
| Department of Homeland Security | 0.330 | 409 | 282 |
| Department of Defense | 0.253 | 367 | 484 |
| National Security Agency | 0.633 | 343 | 410 |
| United States Amy | 0.213 | 291 | 309 |
| Federal Communications Commission | 0.062 | 274 | 51 |
| Federal Trade Commission | 0.121 | 239 | 45 |
| Immigration and Customs Enforcement | 0.212 | 222 | 338 |
| Environmental Protection Agency | 0.162 | 191 | 386 |
| Panel B: States (Aggregation of Agencies) | | | |
| New York | 0.236 | 817 | 104 |
| Massachusetts | 0.157 | 796 | 104 |
| California | 0.172 | 458 | 95 |
| Texas | 0.092 | 294 | 43 |
| Washington | 0.060 | 282 | 110 |
| Florida | 0.108 | 268 | 112 |
| Virginia | 0.321 | 265 | 46 |
| Pennsylvania | 0.316 | 225 | 61 |
| New Jersey | 0.472 | 212 | 102 |
| Illinois | 0.180 | 206 | 65 |
| Michigan | 0.259 | 185 | 55 |
| Arizona | 0.061 | 179 | 110 |
| Tennessee | 0.438 | 178 | 96 |
| North Carolina | 0.045 | 155 | 124 |
| Ohio | 0.162 | 154 | 62 |
| Georgia | 0.160 | 150 | 56 |
| Rhode Island | 0.043 | 140 | 31 |
| Connecticut | 0.097 | 134 | 115 |
| Wisconsin | 0.141 | 128 | 134 |
| Delaware | 0.452 | 126 | 116 |
| Vermont | 0.056 | 125 | 63 |
| Colorado | 0.080 | 125 | 62 |
| Maryland | 0.177 | 124 | 69 |
| Missouri | 0.187 | 123 | 95 |
| Arkansas | 0.570 | 114 | 75 |
| Utah | 0.286 | 105 | 83 |
| Indiana | 0.162 | 105 | 158 |
| North Dakota | 0.125 | 104 | 29 |
| New Mexico | 0.060 | 100 | 73 |

Table A1: Rejection Rates by Agencies, States, and Cities

continues on the next page

| | Rejection Rate | No. of Filings | Mean Response Time (Days) |
|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| South Carolina | 0.242 | 99 | 84 |
| Nevada | 0.141 | 99 | 121 |
| Louisiana | 0.250 | 96 | 128 |
| Oklahoma | 0.226 | 93 | 317 |
| Iowa | 0.120 | 92 | 61 |
| Kentucky | 0.270 | 89 | 68 |
| New Hampshire | 0.191 | 89 | 71 |
| Kansas | 0.352 | 88 | 78 |
| Minnesota | 0.070 | 86 | 95 |
| South Dakota | 0.429 | 84 | 67 |
| Alabama | 0.602 | 83 | 124 |
| Oregon | 0.171 | 82 | 60 |
| Idaho | 0.114 | 79 | 52 |
| West Virginia | 0.320 | 75 | 37 |
| Maine | 0.187 | 75 | 102 |
| Wyoming | 0.111 | 72 | 57 |
| Alaska | 0.188 | 69 | 147 |
| Nebraska | 0.232 | 69 | 79 |
| Montana | 0.059 | 68 | 67 |
| Mississippi | 0.263 | 57 | 215 |
| Hawaii | 0.135 | 52 | 127 |
| District of Columbia | 0.091 | 11 | 20 |
| Panel C: Cities (Top 15) | | | |
| New York City, NY | 0.461 | 818 | 144 |
| Chicago, IL | 0.137 | 591 | 66 |
| Boston, MA | 0.101 | 427 | 103 |
| San Francisco, CA | 0.071 | 350 | 99 |
| Seattle, WA | 0.087 | 231 | 119 |
| Los Angeles, CA | 0.301 | 216 | 126 |
| Washington, DC | 0.343 | 140 | 183 |
| Los Angeles County, CA | 0.269 | 134 | 138 |
| San Diego, CA | 0.073 | 123 | 52 |
| Somerville. MA | 0.082 | 122 | 60 |
| Denver, CO | 0.105 | 114 | 32 |
| Cambridge, MA | 0.136 | 103 | 70 |
| Philadelphia, PA | 0.500 | 96 | 109 |
| Austin. TX | 0.118 | 85 | 101 |
| Portland, OR | 0.635 | 85 | 179 |

Table A1: Rejection Rates by Agencies (cont.)

Table A2: State Level Corruption and Alternative FOIA Response Measure

This table reports the relationship between state level corruption and the average FOIA rejection rate by the given state where we use an alternative measure of rejection rate, in which we include partial completions as completed requests, and "no document" responses as effectively the same as rejection. Columns 1 to 4 report the results using state-year level data, whereas columns 5 and 6 report the results using data at the state level. We require that the given FOIA filing is either rejected or accepted (i.e., removing, for instance, ongoing or appealed cases). We use the corruption measure of Campante and Do (2014), whereas the outcome variable, *Alternative Rejection Rate*, is an alternative measure of rejection rate in which we include partial completions as completed requests, and "no document" responses as effectively the same as rejection. The mean of the dependent variable, *Alternative Rejection Rate*, is 0.47, whereas the standard deviation of *Corruption Rate* is 0.12. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parantheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

| | Dependent Variable: Alternative Rejection Rate | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--|--|
| | | State-Y | ear Level | | State Level | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | | |
| Corruption Rate | 0.376*** (0.128) | 0.384*** (0.134) | 0.352*** (0.115) | 0.341*** (0.114) | 0.389*** (0.124) | 0.358*** (0.110) | | |
| Log(Income) | | | -0.200* (0.108) | -0.200* (0.110) | | -0.201* (0.106) | | |
| Log(Population) | | | -0.0165 (0.0129) | -0.0141 (0.0135) | | -0.00971 (0.0128) | | |
| Average FOIA Score | | | | -0.0054 (0.0064) | | | | |
| Fixed Effects | | | | | | | | |
| Year | | Х | | Х | | | | |
| N | 477 | 477 | 477 | 477 | 50 | 50 | | |
| R^2 | 0.041 | 0.257 | 0.278 | 0.281 | 0.214 | 0.292 | | |

Table A3: State Level Corruption and Time to Complete FOIA Request

This table reports the relationship between state level corruption and the average FOIA rejection rate by the given state. Columns 1 to 4 report the results using state-year level data, whereas columns 5 and 6 report the results using data at the state level. We require that the given FOIA filing is either rejected or accepted (i.e., removing, for instance, ongoing or appealed cases). We use the corruption measure of Campante and Do (2014), whereas the outcome variable, *Rejection Rate*, is the average FOIA rejection rate by the given state. The mean of the dependent variable, *Rejection Rate*, is 0.19, whereas the standard deviation of *Corruption Rate* is 0.12. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parantheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

| | D | Dependent Variable: Log(Time to Response) | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|--|--|--|
| | | State- | Year Level | | State Level | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | | | |
| Corruption Rate | 0.300 (0.547) | 0.294 (0.552) | 0.224 (0.509) | 0.559 (0.526) | 0.229 (0.556) | 0.223 (0.519) | | | |
| Log(Income) | | | -0.0670 (0.490) | -0.419 (0.574) | | 0.0150 (0.504) | | | |
| Log(Population) | | | 0.113* (0.0651) | 0.184*** (0.0669) | | 0.116 (0.0699) | | | |
| Fixed Effects | | | | | | | | | |
| Year | | Х | | Х | | | | | |
| N | 459 | 458 | 459 | 458 | 50 | 50 | | | |
| R^2 | 0.002 | 0.060 | 0.018 | 0.123 | 0.004 | 0.065 | | | |

Table A4: Matched Sample Analysis of Corruption and FOIA Response – Only Police Departments

This table presents the association between the average corruption rate and the average FOIA responses by a given city during a given date when we match identical FOIA requests that were filed to a given city's department by the same person during the same period. The data is, therefore, at the date t and agency i of city c(k) – agency i of city d(l) pair level. In columns 4, 5, and 6, we require that the standard deviation of corruption within a pair should be greater than 0, whereas we do not put such a condition in columns 1, 2, and 3. Standard errors are double clustered at the state and pair level.

| | Dependent Variable: Rejection Rate | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|---------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Corruption Rate | 0 437* | 0 434** | 0 480** | 0 524** | 0 419** | 0 420** | |
| Corruption Take | (0.219) | (0.210) | (0.216) | (0.198) | (0.170) | (0.173) | |
| Log(Income) | (0.21)) | (0.210) | -0.0999 | -0.0691 | -0.119 | -0.118 | |
| | | | (0.129) | (0.146) | (0.137) | (0.132) | |
| Log(Population) | | | -0.0255* | -0.0389** | -0.0340** | -0.0340** | |
| | | | (0.0146) | (0.0172) | (0.0152) | (0.0151) | |
| Average FOIA Score | | | | | | -0.000355 | |
| | | | | | | (0.00814) | |
| Fixed Effects | | | | | | | |
| Year | | Х | Х | Х | Х | Х | |
| Pair-ID | | | | | Х | Х | |
| Condition | | | | | | | |
| Pair-level $\sigma(Corruption Rate) > 0$ | | | | Х | Х | Х | |
| N | 5,640 | 5,640 | 5,640 | 3,582 | 3,550 | 3,550 | |
| R^2 | 0.016 | 0.063 | 0.070 | 0.051 | 0.292 | 0.292 | |

Table A5: Matched Sample Analysis of Corruption and Failure to Response Around City Mayoral Elections - Latest Year

This table presents the test of whether cities with a mayoral election failure to response, defined as either a rejection or failure to response prior to an election, during the year prior to the city's mayoral election when we match the given FOIA request to other identical FOIA requests that were filed to a different city's department by the same journalist during the same period. The variable $\mathbb{1}(\text{Election})$ takes the value of one if the FOIA request was filed with a department in a city that had a mayoral election one year prior to the election date. Standard errors are double clustered at the pair and state level.

| | Dependent Variable | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------|------------|----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|----------------|----------|----------|
| | | 1(Failure) | | 1(Rejected) | | | 1(No Decision) | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| 1(Election) | -0.0659** | -0.178** | -0.148** | -0.0258* | -0.120*** | -0.0826** | -0.0501** | -0.119 | -0.0952 |
| | (0.0258) | (0.0692) | (0.0625) | (0.0144) | (0.0388) | (0.0337) | (0.0240) | (0.0716) | (0.0686) |
| Corruption Rate | 0.113 | 0.0433 | | 0.308* | 0.250 | | -0.0928 | -0.136 | |
| | (0.226) | (0.203) | | (0.180) | (0.172) | | (0.186) | (0.165) | |
| $\mathbb{1}(\text{Election}) \times Corruption Rate}$ | | 0.422 | 0.287 | | 0.353** | 0.217* | | 0.259 | 0.148 |
| | | (0.252) | (0.235) | | (0.143) | (0.119) | | (0.271) | (0.269) |
| Fixed Effects | | | | | | | | | |
| Pair-ID | Х | Х | Х | Х | Х | Х | Х | Х | Х |
| State | | | Х | | | Х | | | Х |
| N | 3,086 | 3,086 | 3,086 | 3,086 | 3,086 | 3,086 | 3,086 | 3,086 | 3,086 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.341 | 0.342 | 0.387 | 0.257 | 0.258 | 0.326 | 0.365 | 0.365 | 0.404 |

Table A6: Matched Sample Analysis of Corruption and Failure to ResponseAround City Mayoral Elections - 360 Days Cutoff

| | Dependent Variable: 1(Failure) | | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | | |
| 1(Election) | -0.0530** (0.0249) | -0.151** (0.0596) | -0.150*** (0.0543) | | |
| Corruption Rate | 0.102 (0.231) | -0.000301 (0.203) | | | |
| $\mathbb{1}(\text{Election}) \times Corruption Rate$ | | 0.370 (0.231) | 0.389* (0.201) | | |
| Fixed Effects | | | | | |
| Pair-ID | Х | Х | Х | | |
| State | | | Х | | |
| N | 3,512 | 3,512 | 3,512 | | |
| R^2 | 0.260 | 0.261 | 0.306 | | |

Table A7: Matched Sample Analysis of Corruption and Failure to ResponseAround City Mayoral Elections - 270 Days Cutoff

| | Dependent Variable: 1(Failure) | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| 1(Election) | -0.0398 (0.0248) | -0.141** (0.0663) | -0.135** (0.0543) | |
| Corruption Rate | 0.0833 (0.235) | 0.00254 (0.204) | | |
| $\mathbb{1}(\text{Election}) \times Corruption Rate$ | | 0.379 (0.248) | 0.348* (0.203) | |
| Fixed Effects | | | | |
| Pair-ID | Х | Х | Х | |
| State | | | Х | |
| N | 3,386 | 3,386 | 3,386 | |
| R^2 | 0.245 | 0.246 | 0.295 | |

Table A8: Matched Sample Analysis of Corruption and Failure to ResponseAround City Mayoral Elections - 150 Days Cutoff

| | Dependent Variable: 1(Failure) | | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | | |
| 1(Election) | -0.0620* (0.0309) | -0.233*** (0.0640) | -0.186*** (0.0527) | | |
| Corruption Rate | 0.0566 (0.281) | -0.0383 (0.257) | | | |
| $\mathbb{1}(\text{Election}) \times Corruption Rate$ | | 0.641** (0.270) | 0.443* (0.249) | | |
| Fixed Effects | | | | | |
| Pair-ID | Х | Х | Х | | |
| State | | | Х | | |
| N | 2,930 | 2,930 | 2,930 | | |
| R^2 | 0.232 | 0.234 | 0.283 | | |

Table A9: Matched Sample Analysis of Corruption and Failure to ResponseAround City Mayoral Elections - 120 Days Cutoff

| | Dependent Variable: 1(Failure) | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-----------|-----------|--|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | | |
| | | | | | |
| 1(Election) | -0.033 | -0.247*** | -0.216*** | | |
| | (0.0364) | (0.0825) | (0.0757) | | |
| Corruption Rate | -0.00741 | -0.107 | | | |
| | (0.296) | (0.267) | | | |
| $\mathbb{1}(\text{Election}) \times Corruption Rate}$ | | 0.802** | 0.662* | | |
| | | (0.335) | (0.345) | | |
| Fixed Effects | | | | | |
| Pair-ID | Х | Х | Х | | |
| State | | | Х | | |
| N | 2,607 | 2,607 | 2,607 | | |
| R^2 | 0.220 | 0.223 | 0.271 | | |