**The Problem of Citizens: Social Media and Policy-making for Actually Existing Democracy**

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**Abstract**

This paper argues that many contemporary efforts around social media and policy-making have at their heart a model of atomistic, independent, rational, and general-interest citizens. As such, these projects, ranging from online deliberation to what is broadly known as ‘civic technology,’ assume a broad shared consensus about collective definitions of ‘public problems’ that both does not exist and sidesteps debates over what these problems are and what potential solutions can and should be. Drawing on recent theories of political parties, social identity, and cultural cognition, this paper argues that social media and policy-making efforts need to account for the fact that the citizens practitioners appeal to see themselves by default as members of social groups, and that this has implications for politics and what Jasanoff calls “civic epistemology.” Presenting the case of attempting to change Republican opinions about climate change, I argue that social media and policy-making initiatives should seek to foster collaboration and deliberation *within*, not between, parties and among partisans. To do so, social reformers need to explicitly structurethe deliberative and collaborative environment so there is a range of intra-party opinions and beliefs as part of the deliberative and policy-making process.

 Nearly a decade ago, Andrew Chadwick (2006, 102) made the well-known and oft-cited declaration that “with the notable exceptions of some community networks…the road to e-democracy is littered with the burnt out hulks of failed projects.” While Chadwick was writing at a time before the explosion of ‘social media’ platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, contemporary academic writings on the subject generally take a similarly dim view. Margolis and Moreno-Riaño (2013, 17), for instance, concluded both that the Internet has failed to spur revolutionary changes in political participation and that even if it had the ends towards which this participation was directed would not necessarily be democratically desirable. Katz, Barris, and Jain (2013, 5) argue that:

Rather than relying on: ‘the wisdom of the crowd’ to set policy, opposition and confrontation at the leadership level are far more important dimensions of the political process. Conflicts over broad national policy cannot, and should not, be avoided or short-circuited through reliance on ever-more-powerful social media tools. In the final analysis, social media-based town halls and aggregations of “likes” and Tweets do not add up to representative democracy.

 The course of the literature over the last decade reflects a movement away from the early utopian hopes that the Internet would create a more participatory and deliberative polity and attenuate the power of elites. Refreshingly, scholars have embraced more political realist views of the value of representative democracy and the limits of public attention and engagement, and, as such, have seen the meager capacity of digital and social media to create better democracy.

 And yet, despite the skeletal frames of burned out e-governance projects and general failure to incorporate social media into policy-making processes, the ghost of digital democracy still animates much of the trade literature and, more importantly, the starry-eyed dreams of funders at powerful organizations such as the Knight Foundation. In November, the U.S. General Services Administration launched the “U.S. Public Participation Handbook” (2015), a collaborative document of the Public Participation Working Group (itself a collaboration between federal agencies, foundations, and nonprofit organizations), designed to further ‘open government’, a diffuse concept spanning transparency and public participation. The GovLab (2015), hosted at New York University in partnership with MIT’s Media Lab and funded by the MacArthur and Knight Foundations, “brings together thinkers and doers who design, implement, and study technology enabled solutions that advance a collaborative, networked approach to reinvent institutions of governance.” As I am writing this, the organization just announced the launch of the GovLab academy designed to mentor and teach ‘civic entrepreneurs’ (GovLab Academy, 2015). The idea of harnessing the power of social and digital media to create new and more robust forms of democracy is alive and well.

 How might we reconcile academic skepticism and practitioner enthusiasm about the power of digital and social media to restore the health of contemporary democracy? This paper seeks to make a modest contribution to the literature on, and practice of, e-governance and civic technology by simultaneously embracing a realist view of the limits of technologically-enabled participatory or collaborative democracy *and* a belief in the potential of social media to play a positive role in facilitating citizen engagement in civic deliberation and policy-making. To make this argument, I embrace something that is almost entirely absent from the e-governance literature in all its guises (except in explicitly and implicitly pejorative terms): the importance of parties, partisanship, and social identity in representative democracy and for what Jasanoff (2011) calls “civic epistemology,” or “public ways of knowing.” I argue for this on both empirical and normative grounds. Empirically, political scientists Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2004) demonstrate that partisanship is rooted in citizens’ social identity, and scholars working under the emerging paradigm of ‘cultural cognition theory’ have shown how identity shapes epistemology, at the broadest level perceptions as to what constitutes a fact versus an opinion. Normatively, I draw on political theorist Nancy Rosenblum’s (2008) arguments that parties form the organizational and symbolic basis of democracy to argue for the value, both on practical and democratic terms, for using social media to foster *intra-party* collaboration and deliberation.

 I do so to argue that scholarship and e-governance initiatives alike need to account for parties as the broader symbolic carriers of social affiliation and identification, and the primary organizational, ideological, social, and psychological locus of representative democracy. Unfortunately, the one thing that has not changed since Chadwick’s review of the literature and two decades of technologically-enabled government reform efforts more broadly is the stubborn persistence of models of atomistic, independent, rational, and general-interest citizens. Michael Schudson (1998) referred to this as the idealized ‘good’ citizen first formulated during the progressive era, yet stubbornly persistent in our own time. Jeffrey Alexander (2006) usefully (but a-historically) argued that this idea of the citizen is a durable part of the cultural structure of civil life. Regardless of the origins of thinking about citizens as unattached agents free of prior commitments, political values, and social identity, it is a fiction that guides how reformers and scholars alike think about e-governance and civic technology projects, and it has stymied our ability to think creatively and realistically about the potentials for harnessing social media in pursuit of more justifiable policy ends.

 How would e-governance and civic technology theory and practice look if they more fully accounted for the role of parties, partisanship, and social identification in democracy, and ultimately embraced them as an empirical starting point? First, instead of celebrating and, indeed, presuming that those participating in projects of e-governance through social media are unattached, unaffiliated, rational, and general interest citizens, the model citizen should be seen as partisan-affiliated and having existing social attachments, identities, and values. Indeed, one irony is that ‘model citizens’ in terms of engagement, participation, attentiveness, and knowledge are precisely those who are most partisan (or act in ways indistinguishable from partisans) and ideological (Bartels, 2009). Second, e-governance initiatives would seek to foster collaboration and deliberation *within*, not between, parties and among partisans (and, by extension, the social groups they are containers and proxies of). Third, e-governance projects would be explicitly *designed* to support intra-partisan and intra-social group deliberation and collaboration. In contrast to the literature on deliberation (Wright and Street, 2007), this would entail presenting citizens with contrasting information *from people within their own social group*. Fourth, the outcomes of e-governance would be measured in terms of change within parties and partisan groups in terms of the platforms and issues they support or prioritize, as well as the facts they accept. Finally, doing so presumes, as a matter of course, a *defined goal or end* (in stark contrast with procedural theories of democracy). As Walker, McQuarrie, and Lee (2014, 8) conclude in their sweeping indictment of what they call “the new public participation,” the challenge to “activists, citizens, and scholars” is to “think through what kinds of participation yield the positive outcomes we seek and what prevents their realization.”

 Why do we need an approach to e-governance and social media and policy-making that accounts for actually existing democracy? This approach would change the way practitioners and scholars design technical platforms and participatory processes, moving these efforts away from a presumption of general interest citizens and towards the explicit goal of fostering intra-party deliberation. If successful, intra-party deliberation would have the effect of broadening partisans’ understanding of the range of existing and possible debate, values, and ideologies within their own party and social groups. At its best this approach would foster more opportunities for “party-network” (Skinner et al., 2012) wide discussion of the values, beliefs, goals, and aims of parties and their affiliated groups, strategies for governance, paths to achieve power, and ways to achieve public policy aims. To illustrate this potential, this paper provides a brief discussion of how e-governance platforms for intra-party deliberation and collaboration might work, taking up the well documented U.S. Republican intransigence on accepting human caused climate change as a matter of scientific consensus.

 This paper proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly review the current literature on e-governance and civic technology and show how it generally presumes deliberative, atomistic, and non-partisan citizens as both a normative good and empirical fact. I then take up both political philosophy and empirical political science on parties and social identification processes to suggest that parties, partisanship, and social attachments are not only indelible features of democracy, they serve important social and psychological ends. Third, I suggest how accounting for partisanship and social attachments would change approaches to e-governance through a case study of how we can create intra-party deliberation around climate change.

*E-governance and Civic Technology*

Since the widespread adoption of the Internet, and even much earlier in works stretching from Eric Fromm to Ithiel de Sola Pool, scholars and public intellectuals alike have held up the hope that computers and networked digital technologies more generally would create new forms of civic participation and citizen engagement in the policy-making process. Over the past decade, with the advent of and growth in social media, there has been an explosion of work looking at how the affordances of these platforms may facilitate everything from crowdsourcing municipal services to soliciting public input onto the workings of the legislative and executive branches. Within much of this scholarship there is continual disappointment. Scholars have presented growing evidence that shifts in digital technologies do not overcome the lack of resources and interest among citizens to participate in democratic life, the lack of will among bureaucrats, agency staffers, and elected officials to use technologies for participatory, as opposed to broadcast, purposes, and finally the legal and institutional strictures that limit certain forms of civic input (often for very good reasons) (for a review see Chadwick, 2006; Katz, Barris, and Jain, 2013).

 In the face of such limits, contemporary mediated democratic reform efforts by both practitioners and scholars have creatively embraced two separate ideas that actually require very little conscious citizen participation at all. The first falls under the rubric of ‘civic technology’ or ‘civic tech.’ A group of foundations, public intellectuals, and practitioners promote civic tech as a way to create good governance through technology. While seldom made explicit, the efforts around civic tech are primarily oriented towards those individuals, programmers or otherwise, that are already the most likely to be engaged, or intrinsically interested, in civic reform efforts. In other words, civic tech projects do not require a broad-based, or especially diverse, group of individuals to participate (although that is certainly a desirable goal in that literature). Civic tech orients itself around civic entrepreneurs using technology to improve government and create public goods.

 For example, a useful survey of the field comes from the Knight Foundation’s report on civic tech. The Knight Foundation (2013) report defines civic tech in terms of a diffuse array of private and nonprofit organizations that are pursuing, often with foundation and private support, projects around data access and transparency, improved public services, participation in deliberative democratic and community planning projects, interaction with government officials, voter participation, peer-to-peer civic crowd funding, social campaigns, and local information and goods sharing. Prominent examples include projects such as Code for America (2015), which is dedicated to leveraging technology to make “governmental services simple, effective, and easy to use,” and GovLab, which leverages technology to enable institutions and people to better collaborate to solve public problems. In these efforts, there is little explicit reference to who is participating outside of a broad call to participate. At the same time, many of these civic tech projects can be achieved by highly motivated individuals, often with specialized skills, that leverage technologies to create public goods, such as improvements in public infrastructure.

 The second trend in the literature is the embrace of a form of what David Karpf (2012) has termed “passive democratic feedback.” Passive democratic feedback encompasses the ways governmental institutions and civic organizations leverage data on generally anonymous users to improve upon services or respond to public preferences. The examples of this form of social media e-governance are numerous, from the ways that Google search data can be harnessed to predict the emergence or spread of contagious diseases and the use of ‘smart meters’ in homes to create greater efficiencies in electrical power, to the monitoring of traffic patterns in order to design transit systems (Mayer-Schönberger, Cukier, 2013; Morabito, 2010). The general approach of these efforts lies in the leveraging of ‘big data’ as a proxy for active civic participation, in essence engendering forms of passive participation through ambient data. Digital devices produce the data that reveal aggregate patterns in social life.

 While an extensive review of all this literature is well beyond the scope of this essay, what unites these two contemporary trends in work and efforts around social media and public policy-making are the very small demands placed on, and expectations for, citizens themselves. While these efforts may or may not be conscious of the earlier failings of citizen-centric e-governance, these projects all work around the problem of the general lack of interest among citizens by developing alternative mechanisms, from focusing on those most engaged to collecting valuable citizen input with little to no conscious effort required at all.

 While these reform efforts have no doubt led to many important, and positive, innovations in governance, this literature and projects of democratic reform around social media and policy-making more generally lack a theory of the citizen that goes beyond a default notion of general interest, independent, and ideologically pragmatic participants in these projects. In other words, these technologically-oriented projects of democratic reform espouse the idea of *pure* citizens counter-posed to the workings of ideology, partisanship, and social attachments, echoing more broadly a comparatively older deliberative democracy literature. When ideas of partisanship, ideology, and social attachment are addressed at all, practitioners generally hold these things to be corrupting general interest citizens both as an empirical fact and a normative ideal. Schudson (1998) has traced the history of this ideal citizen from the progressive era onward showing how this rational, engaged, apolitical citizen is still held up by reformers as a normative democratic ideal. Furthermore, this ideal still has animating force even after six decades of empirical work on the American public that suggests the limited interest in and knowledge citizens have of public policy matters, as well as the stubborn persistence of partisan and group interests in politics (see Bartels, 2009 for a review).

 The problem with this view is that citizens are rarely the unattached and general interest individuals these reform efforts assume and hold up as an ideal. While scholars have often presumed that civil society is the realm of social solidarity through democratic participation (for a review and critique see Lee, McQuarrie, and Walker, 2014), this naïve view posits that cultural and partisan identity falls away at the doorstep of formal, agonistic politics. This neglects not only all the ways that contemporary political parties are made up of networks of civil society and movement organizations (Kreiss, 2014), but also that, and more controversially, there are no universal values such as ‘good government service’ that stand outside of politics and partisanship itself. What do we do, for instance, with a political party and philosophy that values government not working at all in many domains so as to shrink its role in civic life (an entirely legitimate political position)? At their best, efforts at reform ignore such complications and assume a broad shared consensus about collective definitions of ‘public problems’ that sidestep debates over what these problems are and what potential solutions can and should be.[[1]](#endnote-1) E-governance initiatives and civic technology efforts evacuate the political from democracy in assuming that innovations in civic engagement can be neutrally directed towards broad, shared ends.[[2]](#endnote-2) At a deeper level, all of these projects tend to assume that technology will bring us to an apolitical, communitarian state of nature, and away from agonistic democratic processes that are conceived of being a bug, not a feature of social life. At worst, these projects smuggle liberal progressive values into the public sphere under the guise of reform, without the hard work of addressing the broader fight over political values.

 There is much to commend among these efforts at reform. Who, after all, but the most extreme among us would take issue with such things as more efficient government and expanded voter participation in democratic processes? The problem is that a significant proportion of the membership of an American political party, in a two-party system, rejects precisely the starting point of many efforts at e-governance reform (as they do efforts to provide health care to citizens and create a more sustainable society in the face of overwhelming scientific consensus about environmental devastation.) Indeed, it would be curious to see conservative projects of lessening government, perhaps through truncating the ability to government to research itself (*see* Baumgartner and Jones, 2014), be a stated aim of civic innovators utilizing the online tools of the GovLab Academy.

*Rethinking Parties and Social Identity*

As detailed above, the common thread linking diverse approaches to social media and policy-making is the presumption that citizens are, prior to participating in e-governance projects, independent, free of cultural and social identity that makes them particularistic, and non-partisan.[[3]](#endnote-3) In the process, these models of citizens presume that they are oriented to a general interest, or seek to achieve it through their civic participation, and that participatory projects can somehow be free from political values in finding common ground*.* The problem is that citizens are not only always socially embedded and have pre-existing cultural identities and social attachments, where they are socially located shapes the political values they have, the ends they seek, and the motivations they have to do so. There is no discrete realm of ‘civic’ participation that can be separated from politics and partisan interests. Consider, for instance, the striking finding that only ideological progressives value more walkable communities and sustainable houses (Pew, 2014). In this world, where is good government to start?

 Political philosopher Nancy Rosenblum’s (2008) *On the Side of Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship* and Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler’s (2004) *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters* make this point in various ways and using different language.Both of these works make, to varying extents, three key points that undermine much of the approach of social media and governance efforts (and a broader literature on normative democratic and civil society theory) cited above. First, parties and social group identification come *prior* to the individual’s political interests, values, and drives (seealso*,* Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* on this very point). Second, parties, and the cultural groups that citizens’ perceive them to be made up of, structure politics and, in turn, shape political identity, values, and attitudes. Third, deliberation should take place within parties and social groups. In essence, this shifts the emphasis from deliberation *between* parties to *within* parties. And, as a fourth point, worth considering here, Rosenblum argues that parties are normatively desirable from a democratic perspective, and to that end seeks to develop an explicit ethics of partisanship.

 As Rosenblum (2008) argues, ‘antipartyism’ and ‘antipartisanship’ have long and distinguished histories in both political philosophy and culture. When contemporary political philosophers discuss parties at all, an extraordinarily rare occurrence, they are often the target of a reactive antipartism that animates much political discourse. And, while political scientists have parties at the center of (most) theories of electoral outcomes, normatively they are viewed with the same skepticism. In the field of communication, for instance, the political philosophers and empiricists that have laid the groundwork for much normative theorizing exhibit the same general tendency. Habermas is, of course, famously skeptical of political groups and organized interests as the perversion of rational, general-interest oriented individuals in the bourgeois public sphere (*see* Fraser, 1990, for her critique of the philosopher’s neglect of “actually existing democracy.”) Meanwhile, two decades of work on e-deliberation, e-governance, and political participation and civic engagement online often implicitly or explicitly embrace the same normative models (Chadwick, 2006).

 Contra this quite powerful “democratic wish” (Morone, 1998), Rosenblum (2008, 7) advances a theory of the “moral distinctiveness of partisanship.” While her arguments in a 588-page book are too extensive to recapitulate here, it is worth drawing out a few of her broad claims that are relevant to the mediated policy-making reform efforts detailed above. Rosenblum argues that partisanship both actively acknowledges and embraces (not just bemoans) pluralism, as partisans adopt a worldview that explicitly acknowledges they are one among many social groups in a multicultural society and representative democracy. Parties produce partisans (not the other way around) and more broadly create the issues, positions, and divisions upon which democracy is based. In other words, parties do not so much reflect or represent issue positions in the electorate, they produce them. Partisans are responsible for hashing out a running intra-party consensus amid heterogeneity, and the issue positions adopted by the two parties (in the United States) come to define not only lines of division, but also the political center. Deliberation occurs within parties in the course of their attempts to pursue power, and parties also play a distinctive role in democratic life in having the burden, and responsibility, of mobilizing citizens to participate in democratic life. Parties also have the broad responsibility to balance the interests that make up their coalition (which civil society groups and movement organizations do not have to do, although as recent scholarship has pointed out, these groups are a part of party networks; for a review, see Kreiss, 2014). And, finally, from a normative perspective but also as a general matter of course, partisans should strive for democratic inclusion, comprehensiveness of issues, and a commitment to compromise to get the business of the party, and the polity, done. When partisans and parties fail to do these things, they are extremist. Indeed, Rosenblum notes the irony that the much celebrated ‘civil society organization’is the foremost example of political extremism, given that it often pursues single issues at the expense of multi-issue coalitions and tend to be the most uncompromising.

 Meanwhile, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2004, 4) argue that partisanship is a social identity. In these authors’ formulation, partisanship is analogous to religious identification in that it comes *prior* to adopting a set of policy beliefs and political values: “When people feel a sense of belonging to a given social group, they absorb the doctrinal positions that the group advocates.” This means that partisan identification formed during early adulthood is not rooted in the rational consideration of the issue positions of the two parties, but in social identification that then creates partisans and political attitudes. As these authors argue, ‘Democrats’ and ‘Republicans’ (and ‘Independents’) are relatively enduring social groups perceived by voters to have certain symbolic and stereotypical qualities forged in history.[[4]](#endnote-4) Stereotypes concerning the Democratic Party include it being the party of the working class, unions, poor, minorities, and common people, while Republicans are associated with business, capitalists, and those in a high socio-economic class (9). As the authors summarize: “the terms *Democrats* and *Republicans* clearly call to mind different constituent groups, and how people feel about these social categories has a great deal to do with whether they identify with a partisan group, and if so, which one” (emphasis in the original, 10). Furthermore, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler’s argument implies that partisanship is a meta-identity that encompasses a number of different social groups. Given the nature of the American two-party system, many groups band together under the banner of a common political party, which in turn means that citizens with different forms of social identification and attachment (and who may not agree on all matters of political and cultural value) will share a common partisan orientation. This is a key point for creating intra-party deliberation, returned to below.

 Young adults not only come to associate the two parties with these groups, they see themselves in relation to them, and ultimately categorize themselves in partisan terms on the basis of their social identity. From a policy perspective, as suggested above, parties *produce* what partisans believe. In the context of political debates, parties “instruct partisan supporters on how right thinking Democrats or Republicans view” issues (27), although those identifying with parties can, and do, disagree with party leaders (and on some issues, these elites may be divided themselves). The authors conclude by arguing that partisan attachments structure politics in terms of ‘team’ membership driving political participation, care about the outcomes of elections, and the impetus to choose leaders that help the team, as well as creates broad stability in electoral politics and governance. Partisan identification also shows no signs of waning: “people continue to identify as partisans, continue to vote on the basis of these identifications, and seem to cheer for one of the parties” (20). At the same time, the core of Green, Palmquist, and Schickler’s theory is that social identification theory suggests probabilistic tendencies, not deterministic relationships. In other words, the relationship between parties, social groups, and political preferences are not ironclad, but probabilistic.

 An extensive body of recent work has shown how social identity, and by extension partisanship, conditions the acceptance of scientific facts. The most developed line of work falls under the theory of “cultural cognition.” In work on the “science of science communication,” scholars have generally attempted to understand the paradox that “never have human societies *known so much* about mitigating the dangers they face but *agreed so little* about what they collectively know” (Kahan, 2015, 1, emphasis in the original). While early works on science communication focused on a lack of information among the public and the need to create science literacy as well as psychological biases, cultural cognition theory posits that when facts are associated with different social groups, “individuals selectively assess evidence in patterns that reflect their group identities,” whether they are grounded in morality, sociality, value, or partisanship (ibid.). In other words, individuals in different cultural groups will take opposing sides on factual issues depending on how those facts are viewed by the peer group they see themselves belonging too (Nyhan et al. 2014, Nyhan and Reifler, 2014).

 Partisanship plays into this (for differences among Republican, Democratic, and Independent-identifying citizens’ attitudes in relation to science, see Blank and Shaw, 2015; see Nisbet, Cooper, and Garrett, 2015 for how conservatives and liberals alike respond similarly to dissonant information). As detailed above, people imagine themselves affiliated with particular parties that consist of groups aligned with their broader social identities. What people accept as ‘facts’ is often associated, in turn, with what those party groups are willing to accept. In other words, to retread the discussion above, parties “instruct partisan supporters on how right thinking Democrats or Republicans view” (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2004, 27) scientific facts and controversies. For example, Kahan et. al (2015) argue that partisan media can undermine acceptance of expertise and contribute to polarization given the ways these outlets associate facts with social groupings.

 What is clear from this literature, on balance, is that e-governance and civic tech initiatives need a more sophisticated account of citizens in order to design better reform interventions and create more robust policy-making processes. For example, the insights of the literature on partisanship and cultural cognition challenge the underlying models of citizenship prevalent in the e-governance literature and many recent efforts at civic reform, especially those that hold out the hope for technologies of participation. What would be different about this literature if we took seriously the insight that, as a matter of course, the citizens practitioners appeal to see themselves by default as members of social groups, and that this has implications for politics and civic epistemology? For one, scholars and practitioners would create opportunities for deliberation within, not exclusively between, parties and those individuals that identify with them. At the same time, in efforts aimed explicitly at political change, scholars and practitioners should seek out a balance of intra-group opinion. I turn now to the case of climate change to suggest how this might work in practice.

**The Problem of Climate Change**

 Climate change is a partisan issue. It was not always this way. In their history of the evolution of the issue, Dunlap and McCright (2008) characterize the debate over climate change as a “widening gap” between the scientific establishment and Democratic Party on one side, and the conservative movement and Republican Party on the other, that began taking shape in the 1980s. The partisan division over environmental issues and the Republican turn from science began during the Reagan administration, with the party increasingly embracing a framing of policy issues about the environment that emphasized differences and trade-offs between environmentalism and economic costs. This led Republicans to downplay increasing scientific concerns about climate change and its potential consequences, and emphasize economic growth (itself a false trade-off with respect to the environment). The divergence of the party from scientific consensus and the Democratic Party was accelerated in the 1990s after the 1994 Republican revolution, as conservatives in think tanks, anti-climate change research organizations, and government actively worked to undermine the state of scientific consensus on climate change and any effort towards crafting public policy that would seek to address the issue, in part through mounting a large-scale media misinformation effort. This ‘Republicanization’ of the denial of climate change science has, in turn, produced significant differences in public opinion towards the issue depending on partisan affiliation, social identification, and ideology (Hoffman, 2015).

 The Republicanization of the denial of climate science did not happen in a vacuum. It was the product of a deliberate set of actions by conservative business and movement groups. As McCright and Dunlap (2003) argue, the failure of the Kyoto accords was a decade in the making with the framing of the “non-problematicity” of climate change among the conservative, anti-environmental counter-movement. As these authors argue, despite scientific consensus, growing public concern about the issue, and agenda setting in the professional press, from the 1990s on the conservative movement was successful in challenging the legitimacy of global warming and, even more, was able to construct it as a ‘non-problem’ (see Freudenburg, 2000). Indeed, what is important, and subtle, about McCright and Dunlap’s study is that they show how a countermovement removed an issue *already on the public agenda.* Meanwhile, Bill Clinton’s embrace of the state of climate science and efforts at public education in advance of the Kyoto accords served to increase the issue public around climate change among Democrats, and further made the issue a matter of partisan identity (ibid.).

 While the dynamics of partisanship, science, and public policy around climate change is considerably more complicated than I have the space to address here (for a book length work, see Hoffman, 205), for my purposes what is salient are the ways the conservative countermovement engaged in the successful circulation of counter-claims to scientific consensus regarding the facts, causes, and impacts of climate change. I leave, for the time being, the discussion of structural political opportunities off the table, except to suggest that a greater range of debate over climate change may create its own “discursive opportunity structure” (Ferree, 2009) in terms of moving the Republican Party network in a direction that accepts the scientific consensus, or at the very least prove generative of alternative framings of the issue that might be able to reconcile Republican partisan beliefs with the scientific consensus (see Kahan et al., 2015).

 What would it take to expand the discursive space within which Republicans discuss climate change in the attempt to move them in line with the overwhelming scientific consensus, which Naomi Oreskes (2004) prominently declared in 2004 on the pages of *Science* after tracing twenty years of climate science? Much scholarly work under the rubric of the ‘public understanding of science’ has sought to critique, and ultimately improve, journalistic coverage of the issue as strategic conservative actors seek to sow doubt, undermine scientific claims, and ultimately produce ignorance among the public (Stocking and Holstein, 2009). Civic tech efforts offer an alternative approach that goes beyond information, however. A Google search for “civic tech” and “climate change” returns over 200,000 results chronicling everything from how social media, network organizing, and “connective action” (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013) lead to climate marches (McKenzie, 2014) and efforts to create “resilient cities” that are environmentally sustainable (Mauvais, 2015), to using digital tools to “scale up” participation to confront macro-structures of power (Tufekci, 2014) and hundreds of projects to “Hack Climate Change.”

 While better communication about the state of climate science is certainly welcome, as is more (and global) participation around the issue, the discussion above and research in cultural cognition theory suggests that these efforts will be for naught if claims that embrace science, and human responsibility for climate change, do not come from the parties and social groups that skeptical citizens and their representatives belong to. This is not to say that public demonstrations and pressure including that organized through digital and social media do not have effects on policy making (see Branton et al., 2015). It is to say that we have generally relied too much on the seeming virtues of better information and an embrace of participation among the converted, none of which are likely to win over those who do not identify with the sources of this information or the people in the streets. And, at least in America, where one party can wield enormous power at frustrating change, the social groups that these deniers belong to are associated with conservatism and the Republican Party (Dunlap and McCright, 2008; Nisbet, 2009; Villar and Krosnick, 2011, McCright and Dunlap, 2011.)

*Designing Intra-Party Deliberation into Social Media Forums*

 How should we utilize social media in the context of policy-making given the insights of theorists of political parties and social identity who suggest not only that people sort themselves into relatively enduring partisan groups, but that this also conditions what people accept as scientific facts? The answer to this question has implications not only for efforts to create deliberative projects using digital media technologies, but also civic tech ones as well. It would be odd, after all, if in pursuing individualized projects of social reform (seemingly the default mode of much civic tech, which is grounded in the discourse of individual empowerment), we remain agnostic about the *ends* of change, never seek to open them up to scrutiny, or treat them all as equally valuable and without partisan or social implications.

 In the American context of addressing the climate change issue, social reformers should explicitly convene *Republican-identifying* citizens for the purposes of deliberation, participation, and collaboration around the issue. In other words, following Rosenblum, the proper locus of deliberation is *within* the party because these individuals will be drawn from a perceived common social group, even though there are multiple groups within the Republican Party. Second, with this social group established, reformers should expressly recruit participants that are representative of the *range* (not the sum total) of views that exist within the Republican Party. The design of deliberative and participatory social media projects around policy-making should take its cues from the intellectual framework provided by a body of positive first amendment theory that has underpinned reform efforts such as the public journalism movement (for how this can be applied in digital spaces, see Ananny and Kreiss, 2011).

 Namely, the important thing is not that everyone speak, lest the voices of Republicans who embrace the fact, causes, and consequences of climate change in line with science get drowned out. The emphasis is on every argument having a chance to be heard. This would necessarily promote those voices in the Republican Party who have been comparatively marginalized, particularly with respect to conservative media outlets such as FOX News and the Koch brothers’ network of advocacy organizations. Indeed, there is a bevy of work that suggests that while Republicans on the whole reject the idea that climate change is a fact and that it is man-made, there is a marked range of diversity within the party, exemplified not only in former presidential candidate Jon Huntsman’s position on the issue, but also a range of Christian stewardship movements (see Berry, 2006; Wardekker et al., 2009). And, not only should the designers of social media and public policy-making efforts seek to promote these voices, responsible journalism should provide these voices with a platform as well.

 In other words, while there has historically been a reluctance in the literature on deliberation, e-governance, and civic tech to posit any particular normatively desirable ends of change, those seeking to leverage social media for public policy-making need to posit clear *ends* for change, specify the *extant and relevant* social groups given the *social* *context* for the rejection of scientific facts, and explicitly *structure* the deliberative and collaborative environment so there is a range of opinions represented (i.e.: the importance here is that a range of debate is represented, not that everyone in the Republican Party can have their say, lest those who accept scientific evidence will get drowned out.)[[5]](#endnote-5)

 In practice, this means putting Republican scientists who believe in human-caused climate change (scientists who self-identify as Republicans and can communicate their in-group status while embracing climate science) together with climate change deniers. It would involve putting religious conservatives who embrace, and deny, climate change together on social media to present their arguments. It would also entail putting Republicans who are unsure what to think together with other Republicans on both sides of the intra-party debate. At the same time, following much of James Fishkin’s (1991) work on deliberative polling, it would also entail deliberately structuring these forums by providing information on the current state of scientific consensus, and as importantly information on the range of debate within the Republican Party.

**Conclusion**

 Of course, the prospect for widespread change with any initiative around social media and public policy-making is small. That said, our conventional options seem exhausted. As new work suggests, providing more and better information alone is no panacea with respect to changing people’s minds about scientific facts (Stobbe, 2015, Quiggen, 2015). Current work suggests that the best we can hope for is for issues to not become politicized in the first place (Nyhan, 2014), which does not help much when it comes to issues that are already politicized. Politicization is, unfortunately, out of our hands in a democracy. Strategic actors, such as those who deny climate change, know they can manipulate public debate to achieve their own financial or social ends. Meanwhile, participation is roundly embraced as a democratic value, and for good reason. But participation that is agnostic about the ends worth fighting for, blind to the ways that participation among some social groups may cause retrenchment in others, and fails to confront “manufactured ignorance” (Solomon, 2014) head on is unlikely to help much either.

 As detailed above, one potential path to address issues such as climate change is to embrace, and manufacture, the range of debate within political parties and social groups. We can design deliberative and civic participatory spaces that account not only for the fact that citizens are socially embedded, but that they are differently situated with respect to their political values and what Jasanoff (2011*,* 249) has called “civic epistemology,” or “cultural expectations about how knowledge should be made authoritative.” While Jasanoff concerned herself with national and civilizational ways of knowing (i.e.: western), we need to think of differences in public ways of knowing that exist within national, partisan, and social group cultures. Indeed, the Republican Party’s current relationship to science more closely resembles what the technology theorist Ezrahi (2004) called “outformation” than information. Outformation rests on “cognitive, emotional, aesthetic and other dimensions of experience” serving as legitimate forms of public knowing. Outformation is a turn from an “independent reality against which claims of accurate or valid accounts can be checked and criticized” (ibid., 268). Outformations engage people through emotional and aesthetic appeals, but in the process they turn from public reason and undermine collective ways of acting on a shared basis according to independent ways of knowing the world (which science ideally serves). Despite forty-years of debates in the philosophy and sociology of science, the institution of science still appears to hold fact-making as a collective, difficult, durable, and agonistic process that offers the best path towards establishing the empirical grounds upon which we can act (see Latour, 1987, 2004).

 If Ezrahi is correct, we have a crisis between information and outformation. To recover our collective ways of acting on the basis of a shared and verifiable reality (however imperfectly realized), we need to acknowledge different civic epistemologies, and work towards ends that we can justify and defend. To do so, reformers need to be more explicit about the design of deliberative and collaborative forums and give up the fiction that they can appeal to general-interest and undifferentiated citizens that do not exist, or else they will ride the middle of the road to nowhere.

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1. See, for instance, the framing of GovLab’s coaching programs at: <http://govlabacademy.org/coaching-programs.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. See, for instance, the ways in which ‘local lawmaking’ is entirely vacated of the conflict that underlies democracy: <http://govlabacademy.org/civic-tech-for-local-legislatures-and-legislators-detail.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Legacy journalism has a similar model of its audience. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. More research is needed on the cultural processes by which the symbolic images of parties come to be created. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. The long-standing tradition in the deliberation literature, perhaps stemming from Habermas’s formative emphasis of a procedural, not ends, based theory, has been to bracket any discussion at all of the ends of change. Online deliberative and civic tech projects have embraced this ends agnostic approach as well, in all likelihood based on both a theoretical commitment to process oriented theories and a desire to appear non-partisan. While this may be a noble sentiment, we are well past the time of embracing a false equivalence between the two parties’ respective positions on scientific issues. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)