

## Barton L. Lipman

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### Education

Ph.D. economics, University of Michigan, 1985.  
B.P.S. radio journalism, Memphis State University, 1980.

### Positions

Professor, Boston University, 2002–present.  
Professor, University of Wisconsin, 2002–2004 (on leave).  
Professor, University of Wisconsin, 1998–2002.  
Professor, University of Western Ontario, 1997–1998.  
Associate Professor, tenured, University of Western Ontario, 1995–1997.  
Associate Professor, tenured, Queen’s University, 1991–1995.  
Associate Professor (on leave), Carnegie Mellon University, 1991–1993.  
Assistant Professor, Carnegie Mellon University, 1985–1991.

### Visiting Appointments (Month or Longer)

Visiting Professor, Cowles Foundation and Department of Economics, Yale University, September 2022–May 2023.  
Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, September 2018–December 2018.  
Visiting Researcher, Microsoft Research New England, August 2011–December 2011.  
Visiting Professor, Harvard University, September 2008–August 2009.  
Visiting Lecturer, London School of Economics, April–May 1996.  
Visiting Professor, University of Pennsylvania, 1994–1995.

### Editorial Boards

*Econometrica*, Co-Editor, 2018–2023.  
*American Economic Review*, Editorial Board (Associate Editor), 2014–2018.  
*Theoretical Economics*, Co-Editor, 2005–2011; Associate Editor, 2011–2018.  
*Econometrica*, Associate Editor, 2000–2018.  
*Mathematical Social Sciences*, Editorial Board (Associate Editor), 1999–2005.  
*Games and Economic Behavior*, Associate Editor, 1996–2012.  
*International Journal of Game Theory*, edited special issue, August 1999.

## Honors and Awards

Presented 2023 Hotelling Lectures in Economic Theory at the Econometric Society Latin American Meeting.

Excellence in Refereeing Award, *American Economic Review*, 2018.

Fellow of the Game Theory Society, 2017.

Economic Theory Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, 2011.

Graduate Advisor of the Year, Boston University, 2007, 2010.

Fellow, Econometric Society 2005.

Gitner Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching, Boston University, 2004.

Graduate Teacher of the Year, University of Wisconsin, 2001.

Department of Economics Teaching Award, Carnegie Mellon University, 1988.

## Grants

National Science Foundation grant for “Collaborative Research: Evidence in Economic Models,” joint with Eddie Dekel, 2019–2022.

United States–Israel Binational Science Foundation grant for “Stochastic Evidence in Economic Environments,” joint with Elchanan Ben–Porath and Eddie Dekel, 2019–2023.

United States–Israel Binational Science Foundation grant for “Mechanism Design with Evidence,” joint with Elchanan Ben–Porath and Eddie Dekel, 2013–2017.

National Science Foundation grant for “Topics in Economic Theory,” 2009–2012.

United States–Israel Binational Science Foundation grant for “Implementation and Mechanism Design with Evidence Disclosure,” joint with Elchanan Ben–Porath, 2007–2010.

National Science Foundation grant for “Temptation and Related Concepts,” 2005–2008.

National Science Foundation grant for “Topics in Economic Theory,” 2002–2005.

United States–Israel Binational Science Foundation grant with Eddie Dekel and Jeffrey Ely for “Two Topics: Evolution of Preferences and Modeling Unawareness,” 1999–2001.

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grant for “Developing and Applying Models of Limited Awareness,” 1995–1998.

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grant for “An Axiomatic Framework for Limited Rationality,” 1992–1995.

Summer support for 1990 through Sloan Foundation Grant to the Center for the Study of Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University.

National Science Foundation Research Grant for “Takeover Bids, Multiple Raiders, and Information Acquisition: A Game–Theoretic Analysis,” with Mark Bagnoli, 1985–86.

## Administrative Roles

Executive Vice President, Econometric Society, January 2023– .

Chair, *Theoretical Economics* Best Paper Prize Award Committee, 2022.

Department Chair, Boston University, 2012–July 2018; January 2019–June 30, 2020.

On Council of Game Theory Society, 2008–2013.

Director of Graduate Studies, Boston University, 2006–2008, 2009–2012.

Treasurer, Society for Economic Theory, 2005–2015.

Director of Graduate Studies, University of Wisconsin, 2001–02.

## Publications — Refereed

“Mechanisms with Evidence: Commitment and Robustness,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, *Econometrica*, **87**, March 2019, 529–566.

“Disclosure and Choice,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, *Review of Economic Studies*, **85**, July 2018, 1425–1470.

“Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, *American Economic Review*, **104**, December 2014, 3779–3813. (lead article)

“Implementation and Partial Provability,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath, *Journal of Economic Theory*, **147**, September 2012, 1689–1724.

“Costly Self Control and Random Self Indulgence,” with Eddie Dekel, *Econometrica*, **80**, May 2012, 1271–1302.

“Finite Order Implications of Common Priors in Infinite Models,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, **46**, January 2010, 56–70.

“Temptation–Driven Preferences,” with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, *Review of Economic Studies*, **76**, July 2009, 937–971.

“Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games,” with Ruqu Wang, *Games and Economic Behavior*, **66**, May 2009, 292–314.

“Finite Order Implications of Common Priors,” *Econometrica*, **71**, July 2003, 1255–1267.

“Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space,” with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, *Econometrica*, **69**, July 2001, 894–934. (See also “Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: Corrigendum,” with Eddie Dekel, Aldo Rustichini, and Todd Sarver, *Econometrica*, **75**, March 2007, 591–600.)

“Regulatory Rule–making with Legal Challenges,” with Devon Garvie, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, **40**, September 2000, 87–110.

“Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games,” with Ruqu Wang, *Journal of Economic Theory*, **93**, August 2000, 149–190.

“Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality,” *Review of Economic Studies*, **66**, April 1999, 339–361.

“Standard State–Space Models Preclude Unawareness,” with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, *Econometrica*, **66**, January 1998, 159–173.

“Evolution with State–Dependent Mutations,” with James Bergin, *Econometrica*, **64**, July 1996, 943–956.

“Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids,” with Mark Bagnoli, *Rand Journal of Economics*, **27**, Spring 1996, 124–147.

“Ex Ante versus Interim Rationality and the Existence of Bubbles,” with Sugato Bhattacharyya, *Economic Theory*, **6**, Number 4, 1995, 469–494.

“Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability,” with Duane J. Seppi, *Journal*

*of Economic Theory*, 66, August 1995, 370–405.

“Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey,” *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 28, February 1995, 42–67. Reprinted in P. Earl, ed., *The Legacy of Herbert Simon in Economic Analysis*, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001.

“A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 6, January 1994, 114–129.

“Private Provision of Public Goods Can Be Efficient,” with Mark Bagnoli, *Public Choice*, 74, July 1992, 59–78.

“How to Decide How to Decide How to . . . : Modeling Limited Rationality,” *Econometrica*, 59, July 1991, 1105–1125.

“Informational Requirements and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games,” with Sanjay Srivastava, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 2, September 1990, 273–290.

“Delaying and Deterring Entry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 14, July/October 1990, 685–708.

“Computation as a Correlation Device,” with Sanjay Srivastava, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 2, June 1990, 154–172.

“Stock Repurchase as a Takeover Defense,” with Mark Bagnoli and Roger Gordon, *Review of Financial Studies*, 2, Number 3, 1989, 423–443.

“Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions,” with Mark Bagnoli, *Review of Economic Studies*, 56, October 1989, 583–601.

“Successful Takeovers without Exclusion,” with Mark Bagnoli, *Review of Financial Studies*, 1, Spring 1988, 89–110.

“Cooperation among Egoists in Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken Games,” *Public Choice*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1986, 315–331.

## **Publications — Other**

“Temptation,” with Wolfgang Pesendorfer, in Acemoglu, Arellano, and Dekel, eds., *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Tenth World Congress, Volume 1*, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

“How (Not) to Do Decision Theory,” with Eddie Dekel, *Annual Review of Economics*, Volume 2, 2010, 257–282.

“Robert W. Rosenthal (1944–2002),” in S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, eds., *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

“Unforeseen Contingencies,” in S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, eds., *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, , Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

“Language and Economics,” in N. Dimitri, M. Basili, and I. Gilboa, eds., *Cognitive Processes and Economic Behaviour*, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 75–93.

“Recent Developments in Modeling Unforeseen Contingencies,” with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, *European Economic Review*, 42, 1998, 523–542.

“Logics for Non-Omniscient Agents: An Axiomatic Approach,” in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, H. Shin, eds., *Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions*, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1997, pp. 193–216.

“An Axiomatic Approach to the Logical Omniscience Problem,” *Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Fifth Conference*, ed. by R. Fagin, San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1994.

“On the Strategic Advantages of a Lack of Common Knowledge,” *Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Third Conference*, ed. by R. Parikh, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1990.

## Reviews and Comments

Review of Gilboa’s *Theory of Decision under Uncertainty*, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48, March 2010.

Review of Gigerenzer and Selten’s *Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox*, *Journal of Economic Literature*, September 2002.

“Comments on Economics and Language,” in A. Rubinstein’s *Economics and Language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

“Dedication: In Honor of Robert J. Aumann,” *International Journal of Game Theory*, August 1999.

“More Absentmindedness,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 20, July 1997.

“Comments on Bicchieri: ‘The Epistemic Foundations of Nash Equilibrium,’” in D. Little, ed., *On the Reliability of Economic Models*, Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1995.

Review of *Rationality and Coordination*, by Cristina Bicchieri, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 9, May 1995.

Review of *Frontiers of Game Theory*, edited by Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, *Southern Economic Journal*, 61, April 1995.

Review of *The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods*, by Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, *Journal of Economic Literature*, December 1987.

“Dynamic Behavior of a Firm Subject to Stochastic Regulatory Review: A Comment,” *International Economic Review*, June 1985, 511–516.

## Working Papers

“Sequential Mechanisms for Evidence Acquisition,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, June 2023.

“Mechanism Design for Acquisition of/Stochastic Evidence,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, first preliminary draft September 2019, current draft December 2023.

“An Elementary Proof of the Optimality of Threshold Mechanisms,” first draft June 2015, current draft July 2015.

“Why is Language Vague?,” current draft November 2009.

## **Conference Organization**

Program Committee for the 10th World Congress of the Econometric Society, 2010.

Chair, Program Committee for the 2009 Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings.

Program Committee for the 2008 Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings.

Program Committee for the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, 2005.

Program Committee for Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, 1994, 2001, 2005.

## **Seminars and Conference Presentations — Last Five Years**

MIT, September 2018.

Queen's University, September 2018.

Duke University, October 2018.

Texas Economic Theory Camp, Keynote Lecture, Southern Methodist University, October 2018.

National University of Singapore, November 2018.

Columbia University, April 2019.

University of Bonn, June 2019.

Humboldt University of Berlin, June 2019.

Arizona State University, September 2019.

University College London, October 2019.

Cambridge University, October 2019.

London School of Economics, October 2019.

CIREQ Montreal Microeconomic Theory Conference, November 2019.

Caltech, November 2019.

UCLA, November 2019.

Brown University, February 2020.

Virginia Tech, November 2020.

University of Maryland, November 2020.

University of Texas, November 2020.

Brandeis University, December 2020.

Baylor University, March 2021.

Princeton University, April 2021.

Yale University, May 2021, March 2023.

Cornell University, May 2021.

Warwick University's Seminars in Economic Theory, March 2022.

Florida State University, April 2022.

Korean Economic Association International Conference, Invited Speaker, June 2022.

Becker Friedman Institute Economic Theory Conference, University of Chicago, August 2022.

University College, London, March 2023.

Queen Mary University, March 2023.

Nuffield College, Oxford, March 2023.

Workshop on the Economics of Dynamic Incentives, University of Essex, May 2023.

Hotelling Lectures, Latin American Meetings of Econometric Society, Bogota, Colombia, November 2023.

### Refereeing

*American Economic Review*, *American Political Science Review*, *B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics*, *Canadian Journal of Economics*, *Discrete Event Dynamic Systems: Theory and Applications*, *Econometrica*, *Economica*, *Economics and Philosophy*, *Economics Letters*, *European Journal of Operational Research*, European Research Council, Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l'Aide a la Recherche, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control*, *International Economic Review*, *International Journal of Game Theory*, Israel Science Foundation, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, *Journal of Economic Literature*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Journal of Economics*, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *Journal of Industrial Economics*, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *Journal of Public Economics*, *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, *Management Science*, *Mathematical Finance*, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, National Science Foundation, *Operations Research*, *Public Choice*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Rand Journal of Economics*, *Research in Economics (Ricerche Economiche)*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Review of Financial Studies*, Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, *Southern Economic Journal*, *Theory and Decision*, United States–Israel Binational Science Foundation.

### Last Updated:

December 8, 2023.