

(ADVERSE) GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF CASH TRANSFERS[†]

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If general equilibrium effects are taken into account, cash transfers to eligible households indirectly decrease utility of ineligible households living in the same neighborhood. A hike in local prices outweighs the income effect from higher local wages. Households with low labor endowments are particularly affected. Our results contrast sharply with the common notion that this class of programs generates positive multiplier effects on the local economy.

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1 Introduction

The general notion in the existing literature is that welfare programs generate positive spillover effects on the local neighborhood. Miguel and Kremer (2004) show that anti-worm treatment to some individuals - because of reducing disease transmission - generates large benefits for other individuals not receiving the treatment. Kaboski and Townsend (2011) find Microfinance to increase local wages. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), Bobonis and Finan (2009) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) report positive effects of *Oportunidades*, Mexico's flagship conditional cash transfer program, on food consumption and human capital investments of program-ineligible households residing in the neighborhood.

The results presented in this paper contrast with this notion. When general equilibrium effects are taken into account, cash transfers indirectly decrease utility of ineligible households living in the same neighborhood.

We study the effects of *Oportunidades* within a general equilibrium model. The model is simple in the sense that, unlike Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Attanasio et al. (2012), it is static and ignores fertility and educational choices. Instead, the model puts emphasis on equilibrium effects in factor and commodity markets. The basic set-up consists of a village populated by poor and non-poor households. Each household is endowed with staple (food) as well as labor, and chooses a consumption bundle (food, non-food, leisure) which maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint. Poor households receive a social security cash payment by the federal government. The staple (food) is produced *inside* the village, while the non-food commodity is produced *outside*. The village exports a fraction of its staple and imports non-food commodities. These assumptions reflect that rural areas specialize in staple production, while importing industrialized products from urban areas.¹ Importing implies transactions costs, in particular labor. The village price of non-food consists of an exogenous component ('world market' price) *plus* an endogenous component (labor costs linked to importing non-food to the village). Labor costs are endogenous because the procurement of non-food requires village residents' labor.² In equilib-

¹Household data for rural Mexico, for example, shows that half of rural households' monthly consumption consists of imported hygiene products (e.g. soap, combs, tooth and hair brushes, detergents, whiteners), household utensils (plates, towels, combs etc.), clothing, tennis shoes and boots, school supplies (pens and paper), and energy (batteries, gas, petrol).

²Major national grocery chains, or other forms of non-food procurement which do not require village

rium the village's labor market must clear, which determines the village's wage rate hence the village price of non-food. Food prices are determined in a similar vein but, because food is exported, its village price consists of an exogenous component *minus* labor costs linked to export food. If, as is common in practice, food is sold at the farmgate (hence no village residents' labor is required for export), food prices become exogenous. In this case, if wages go up, non-food prices increase while food prices remain unaffected.

The model predicts the cash payment to increase recipients' demand for non-food items. The additional labor requirements for procurement cause growth of village wages. Higher wages have an ambiguous effect on non-food consumption of non-poor households. On the one hand, income hence demand for non-food items increases. On the other hand, the costs of importing non-food items go up. Non-food consumption decreases if the price effect outweighs the income effect. Conditions are derived under which this is the case. Food prices do not increase. The income effect from higher local wages, therefore, increases non-poor households' consumption of food yet not necessarily of non-food.

We then bring empirical evidence for the predictions of the model, using data collected for the evaluation of the rural component of *Oportunidades*. 506 villages were randomized into treatment and control villages, and households in these villages were classified as either poor or non-poor. Poor households in treatment villages would receive regular cash payments by the government.³ The existing literature finds indeed no effect of *Oportunidades* on food prices, and higher food consumption of non-poor households in treatment villages (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009).

Little, on the other hand, is known about *Oportunidades*'s impact on non-food prices and non-food consumption. Lack of data is a major challenge: Only non-food expenditures are observed from the data, yet neither prices nor quantities. This paper approaches the data problem in two different ways, the first using reduced-form and the second using structural estimations. The reduced-form approach compares changes in non-food expenditure at the extensive margin, and finds that non-poor households in

residents' labor, do not usually exist in villages.

³Payments were of substantial size, about 20% of the poors' pre-program household income. See Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) for a detailed description of the program.

treatment villages have a lower probability of purchasing non-food items, suggesting a decrease in non-food consumption.

The structural approach uses an empirical version of the model - calibrated to the *Oportunidades* data - to simulate changes in consumed non-food quantities. In a first step, the parameters of the model are calibrated to data available on households residing in control villages. In a second step, out-of-sample forecasts are conducted: The cash transfer is added to the income of poor households in the control village sample. To test the performance of the model, the resulting simulated moments are compared to the actual moments observed in the treatment village sample. Thus, in the vein of Todd and Wolpin (2006), the experimental design of *Oportunidades* is used as a source of model validation. The model is able to replicate reasonably well the moments of the treatment group sample. This increases confidence in by the model simulated impacts of *Oportunidades* on non-food consumption. The exercise suggests a decrease in non-poor households' non-food consumption of about seven percent. Overall, utility of the average non-poor household falls by roughly two percent.

Lastly, we study heterogenous effects on non-poor households' *per capita* non-food consumption. Analytical expressions are derived which show how the sign and magnitude of the effect depend on household level parameters (endowments, preferences), as well as parameters that describe the program (size of cash payments) and local context (number of payment recipients, land distribution, aggregate agricultural productivity). Model and the data, for example, suggest that non-food consumption and utility are more likely to decrease in non-poor households with few labor endowments, i.e. in households with below average number of adult household members.

2 Theory

A. The model

Consider a village populated by $g = 2$ groups of households: poorer households (**P**s) and somewhat richer households (**R**s)

$$g \in \{\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{R}\}$$

Table 1: Notation of the model's variables and parameters

Notation	Description
Variables:	
p_L	village wage rate
x_i	non-food consumption of household i
q_i	staple (food) consumption of household i
l_i	leisure consumption of household i
L_i	labor supply of household i
Village level parameters:	
\bar{p}_q	market price of food
\bar{p}_x	market price of non-food
\bar{Q}	village's staple endowment (agricultural productivity)
Household level parameters:	
$\bar{\lambda}_i$	household i 's share on the village's staple endowment
\bar{L}_i	labor endowment of household i
$\bar{\alpha}_q$	preference food item
$\bar{\alpha}_x$	preference non-food item
$\bar{\alpha}_l$	preference leisure
\bar{T}_i	cash transfer

Household i in group g has two sources of initial endowment. First, a share $\bar{\lambda}_{\{i,g\}}$ of the village's staple endowment \bar{Q} (the implications of endogenizing staple production are discussed at the end of this section). Second, its stock of labor $\bar{L}_{\{i,g\}}$, net of labor needed to produce the household's staple endowment.

The household consumes staple, $q_{\{i,g\}}$, and a non-food commodity $x_{\{i,g\}}$.

Assumption A.1 *The staple is produced inside the village, while the non-food commodity is produced outside the village.*

Thus, the non-food commodity needs to be imported into village. Assumption A.1 reflects the fact that rural areas usually specialize in agricultural production, while importing manufactured and services from urban areas items (e.g. batteries). Household data from rural Mexico (see online appendix), for example, shows that at least 80 percent of the adult village population report agriculture as their main occupation. At the same time, about half of the monthly value of consumption are non-food items such as hygiene products (e.g. soap, combs, tooth and hair brushes, detergents, whiteners), household utensils (plates, sheets, towels, blankets etc.), industrialized clothing, tennis shoes and boots, school supplies (pens and

paper), and energy (batteries, gas, petrol). Given the latters' industrialized nature and the aforementioned high share of labor force employed in agriculture, these non-food items are unlikely to be produced by the village. Importing these items implies transactions costs:

Assumption A.2 For each unit of consumption of x it is required one unit of labor.

The village price of x is consequently $p_x = \bar{p}_x + p_L$, where \bar{p}_x is the factory price of x and p_L being the price of labor. The interpretation of x is not necessarily limited to consumption of imported non-food commodities. It can also be thought of as a consumed *service*. Think of, for example, a carpenter service: In this case \bar{p}_x may be the remuneration of the wood and tools that the carpenter is using, and p_L the remuneration of the carpenter's labor.

Assumption A.3 Utilities are comparable between households, and each household maximizes a utility function that represents its reflexive, transitive, complete, continuous, and convex preferences.

The utility function of i writes $u_{\{i,g\}}(q_{\{i,g\}}, x_{\{i,g\}}, l_{\{i,g\}})$ where $l_{\{i,g\}}$ is consumption of leisure.

Assumption A.4 All agents treat prices as parametric, and no trade is permitted to take place except at equilibrium prices.

Household i chooses a consumption bundle $\{q_{\{i,g\}}, x_{\{i,g\}}, l_{\{i,g\}}\}$ which maximizes its utility function subject to the household's budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{q_{\{i,g\}}, x_{\{i,g\}}, l_{\{i,g\}}} & u_{\{i,g\}}(q_{\{i,g\}}, x_{\{i,g\}}, l_{\{i,g\}}) \quad s.t. \\ p_x \times x_{\{i,g\}} + \bar{p}_q \times q_{\{i,g\}} & \equiv [\bar{L}_{\{i,g\}} - l_{\{i,g\}}]p_L + [\bar{\lambda}_{\{i,g\}} \times \bar{Q}] \bar{p}_q + \bar{T}_{\{i,g\}} \end{aligned}$$

where $\bar{T}_{\{i,g\}}$ is a cash transfer granted by the government *exclusively* to $g \in \mathbf{P}$, i.e. $\bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} > 0$ and $\bar{T}_{\{i,R\}} = 0$. Under the maintained assumption of strict quasi concavity of the utility function, the solution of the household's maximization problem will result in a demand function for the food item

$$q_{\{i,g\}} : (p_L, \bar{T}_{\{i,g\}}, \mathbf{\Omega}) \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$$

the non-food item

$$x_{\{i,g\}} : (p_L, \bar{T}_{\{i,g\}}, \mathbf{\Omega}) \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$$

and a labor supply function ($L_{\{i,g\}} = \bar{L} - l_{\{i,g\}}$)

$$L_{\{i,g\}} : (p_L, \bar{T}_{\{i,g\}}, \mathbf{\Omega}) \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$$

as functions of the village's wage rate (p_L), the parameter vector $\mathbf{\Omega} = \{\bar{p}_\chi, \bar{p}_q, \bar{L}_{\{i,g\}}, \bar{\lambda}_{\{i,g\}}, \bar{Q}\}$, and the cash transfer $\bar{T}_{\{i,g\}}$.

B. Predictions

Lets first consider the benchmark case in which there are no local general equilibrium effects (p_L is exogenous).

PROPOSITION 2.1 *Under assumptions A.1-A.4, we have that $\partial x_{\{i,P\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} > 0$ and $\partial q_{\{i,P\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} > 0$. For $g \in \mathbf{R}$, however, $\partial q_{\{i,R\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} = x_{\{i,R\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} = 0$.*

Proof. A utility function which fulfills the preference requirements of assumption A.2 is the Cobb-Douglas utility function⁴

$$u_{\{i,g\}}(q_{\{i,g\}}, x_{\{i,g\}}, l_{\{i,g\}}) = q_i^{\{\bar{\alpha}_q\}} x_i^{\{\bar{\alpha}_x\}} l_i^{\{1-\bar{\alpha}_q-\bar{\alpha}_x\}} \quad \text{with } 0 < \bar{\alpha}_q + \bar{\alpha}_x < 1.$$

Utility maximization then yields demand and labor supply functions of the form

$$q_{\{i,g\}} = \bar{\alpha}_q [\bar{L} \times p_L + \bar{\lambda}_{\{i,g\}} \times \bar{Q} \times \bar{p}_q + \bar{T}_{\{i,g\}}] / \bar{p}_q \quad (1)$$

$$x_{\{i,g\}} = \bar{\alpha}_x [\bar{L} \times p_L + \bar{\lambda}_{\{i,g\}} \times \bar{Q} \times \bar{p}_q + \bar{T}_{\{i,g\}}] / [\bar{p}_\chi + p_L] \quad (2)$$

$$L_{\{i,g\}} = \bar{L}_{\{i,g\}} - [1 - \bar{\alpha}_q - \bar{\alpha}_x] [\bar{L} \times p_L + \bar{\lambda}_{\{i,g\}} \times \bar{Q} \times \bar{p}_q + \bar{T}_{\{i,g\}}] / p_L \quad (3)$$

Deriving with respect to $\bar{T}_{\{i,P\}}$ yields $\partial q_{\{i,P\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} = \bar{\alpha}_q/\bar{p}_q > 0$, and $\partial x_{\{i,P\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} = \bar{\alpha}_x/[p_\chi + p_L] > 0$, and $\partial L_{\{i,P\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} = -[1 - \bar{\alpha}_q - \bar{\alpha}_x]/p_L < 0$. For $g \in \mathbf{R}$ we have $\partial x_{\{i,R\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} = \partial q_{\{i,R\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} = 0$ and $\partial L_{\{i,R\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} = 0$. ■

The cash transfer generates a positive income effect for $g \in \mathbf{P}$. Demand for $q_{\{i,P\}}$, $x_{\{i,P\}}$ and $l_{\{i,P\}}$ increases.

The income effect for $g \in \mathbf{R}$ is zero and, consequently, demand remains unchanged. Existing empirical evidence, however, rejects these predictions. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), for example, show that food consumption

⁴Proposition 2.1, however, holds for every other utility function which fulfills the preference requirements of A.2.

of non-poor households increases.

Now, let's allow for local general equilibrium effects. The village's labor market equilibrium writes

$$\sum_g \sum_i L_{\{i,g\}} \equiv \sum_g \sum_i x_{\{i,g\}} \quad (4)$$

where the left hand side is the village's aggregate labor supply. By assumption A.2, the right hand side is the village's aggregate labor demand. Equation (4) assumes that the village labor market is local (i.e. limited to the village's population). This assumption is corroborated by, first, data from the 2002 *Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Rurales* (a representative household survey of rural Mexico), where only six percent of adult village residents report to do non-agricultural work in a different village. We are not aware of any studies looking at *cross-village* migration in Mexico. Existing studies exploit the Mexican census, where respondents are asked the state in which they were born. It is however difficult to conclude from cross-state migration about cross-village migration, because it is unclear to which extent cross-state migration simply reflects rural-to-urban migration. But several factors suggest the magnitude of cross-village migration to be rather low. First, land markets are often imperfect, which may constrain the acquisition of land of emigrants (Finan et al., 2005). Second, formal credit and insurance markets are imperfect and informal insurance networks within the village a dominant source of insurance (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). Thus, emigration is costly, because it may disconnect emigrants from these networks.

Second, there are usually no large supermarket/retail chains (which receive products from its urban area headquarters) in rural villages. This implies that village residents' labor is needed to import non-food (industrialized) products from urban areas.

PROPOSITION 2.2 (*Endogenous wages*) *Under assumptions A.1-A.4, $\partial q_{\{i,R\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} > 0$. However, $\partial x_{\{i,R\}}/\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} > 0$ only if (1) labor endowment of $i \in R$ is sufficiently large, or (2) staple endowment of $i \in R$ is sufficiently low.*

Proof. Substituting (2) and (3) into (4) and solving for p_L yields

$$p_L^* = \frac{\bar{p}_\chi [(\bar{\alpha}_x - 1)(\bar{Q} \times \bar{p}_q + \sum_i \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}})]}{\sum_i \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} + \bar{Q} \times \bar{p}_q - \bar{\alpha}_x \bar{p}_\chi \sum_g \sum_i \bar{L}_{\{i,g\}}}. \quad (5)$$

Note that the equilibrium wage is positive only if

$$\text{Assumption A.5: } \bar{\alpha}_x \sum_g \sum_i \bar{L}_{\{i,g\}} > [\sum_i \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} + \bar{Q} \times \bar{p}_q] / \bar{p}_\chi,$$

i.e. if the village's aggregate labor endowment is large enough to allow the village's aggregate consumption demand for x to be satisfied. Substituting (5) into (1) and deriving with respect to $\bar{T}_{\{i,P\}}$ yields $\partial q_{\{i,R\}} / \partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} > 0$. Substituting (5) into (2) and deriving with respect to \bar{T}_P yields

$$\frac{\partial x_{\{i,R\}}}{\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}}} = \frac{[\bar{L}_{\{i,R\}} \bar{p}_\chi - \bar{\lambda}_{\{i,R\}} \bar{Q} \bar{p}_q][\bar{\alpha}_x - 1] \sum_g \sum_i \bar{L}_{\{i,g\}}}{-(\sum_g \sum_i \bar{L}_{\{i,g\}} \bar{p}_\chi - \bar{Q} \bar{p}_q - \sum_i \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}})^2} \quad (6)$$

By assumption A.5 the denominator in equation (6) is always negative. Since $\bar{\alpha}_x < 1$, the term $[\bar{\alpha}_x - 1]$ in the numerator is always negative. Consequently, the sign of $\partial x_{\{i,R\}} / \partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}}$ will depend on the sign of the first term in brackets in the numerator. We have that

$$\frac{\partial x_{\{i,R\}}}{\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}}} > 0 \text{ if } \bar{L}_{\{i,R\}} / \bar{\lambda}_{\{i,R\}} \bar{Q} > \bar{p}_q / \bar{p}_\chi. \quad \blacksquare \quad (7)$$

The intuition behind proposition 2.2 is the following: The cash grant increases cash recipients' demand for non-food items. Importation of these items requires labor. The village's labor demand increases, raising the village's equilibrium wage.⁵ A higher wage, however, has an a priori ambiguous effect on non-food consumption of the remainder of the village population not receiving cash transfers. On the one hand, higher wages imply a positive income effect which ceteris paribus increases consumption of non-food items. On the other hand, because $p_x = p_\chi + p_L$, higher wages raise the village price of these non-food items, making their consumption more expensive. Non-food consumption of non-poor households decreases if the price effect outweighs the income effect. Whether this is the case, according to condition (7), depends on a non-poor household's endowments. In section 5 we will discuss in detail the crucial role of endowments.

5

$$\frac{\partial p_L^*}{\partial \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}}} = \frac{\bar{\alpha}_x [\bar{\alpha}_x - 1] \bar{p}_\chi^2 \sum_g \sum_i \bar{L}_{\{i,g\}}}{-[\bar{\alpha}_x \sum_g \sum_i \bar{L}_{\{i,g\}} \bar{p}_\chi - \sum_i \bar{T}_{\{i,P\}} - \bar{Q} \times \bar{p}_q]^2} > 0$$

C. Discussion

The model is simple in that there is no credit and insurance market, and schooling conditionalities that come with *Oportunidades* are disregarded. Furthermore, the model does not allow for changes in agricultural production, and assumes away transaction costs for staple exports. In the following we discuss the implication of these omissions.

(i.) School enrollment, classroom attendance, and social interactions

Higher payments are made to households that send their children to school. Paul Schultz (2004) finds a significant impact of *Oportunidades* on school enrollment and school attendance. In our model, school enrollment can be interpreted, at least in the short term, as a reduction in a household's net labor endowment. Consider the stylized case where the loss of child income corresponds exactly to the value of the *Oportunidades* payment. In this case, a poor household's budget constraint does not change. Demand for food, non-food, and leisure remains unaffected, but labor supply decreases. Lower labor supply drives up equilibrium wages. As in proposition 2.2, for non-poor households, higher wages imply an increase in food consumption but not necessarily in non-food consumption.

Bobonis and Finan (2009) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) find that, due to peer effects and social interactions inside the village, *Oportunidades* also increase school enrollment of non-poor households residing in the same neighborhood. If non-poor households enroll their children in school, the income effect from higher local wages will be lower.

(ii.) Risk sharing

Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) find poor households to partially share the *Oportunidades* payment with their extended family. This would increase non-poor households' income, on top of the increase in wages. The effect on food consumption would be higher, and a decrease in non-food consumption less likely.

(iii.) Exogenous vs. endogenous agricultural production, and farmgate selling

Exogenous staple production may be a reasonable assumption in the short but not the long-run. The implications of endogenizing staple production will depend on assumptions about the agricultural market. First, con-

sider the standard separable agricultural household model setting (Singh et al., 1986), with a perfect village labor market, no transaction costs for selling staple, and a surplus-producing village, i.e. exogenous agricultural prices. The increase in local wages resulting from the presence of *Oportunidades* would cause agricultural production to fall. Second, consider the case where the village is not producing a surplus. The price of the staple becomes endogenous. Higher demand exhibits upward pressure on prices which, ceteris paribus, increases production. Agricultural production falls if higher wages outweigh the price effect. Third, in the case of transaction costs for exporting the staple, higher wages imply a decrease in a farmer's selling price hence production.

Should agricultural production fall, this would dampen the income effect from higher wages. Consequently, the increase in non-poor households' food consumption would be smaller, and a decrease in non-food consumption even more likely.

On the other hand, some non-poor household may be credit constrained and invest additional wage income into agricultural production (Gertler et al., 2012; Bianchi and Bobba, 2013). In this case, the increase in food consumption would be higher, and a decrease in non-food consumption less likely.

The model assumes that there are no transaction costs for exporting staple. Fafchamps and Hill (2005) show that farmgate selling is the most common selling method of farmers in Uganda. For Mexico, we are not aware of any quantitative study that documents the most common selling method of farmers. In field work the author conducted in about twenty *Oportunidades* villages, farmers reported to sell their harvest directly to a crop merchant who visits the village with a truck after harvest. This suggests small transaction costs for farmers to sell their produce. There may, however, be villages or regions were, for some reason, farmgate selling is not common. In this case, farmers need to transport their produce to the next regional market. If labor is the only source of transaction costs - and assuming, for ease of exposition, that the export of one unit of staple requires one unit of the village's labor - then the village price of staple is $p_q = \bar{p}_Q - p_L$, where \bar{p}_Q is the exogenous market price of staple. If a non-poor household is a buyer of staple then transaction costs for food exports do further reinforce the increase in food consumption, because higher wages reduce the price

of staple. The opposite reasoning holds if a non-poor household is a seller of staple.

3 Empirical Evidence: Income vs. Price Effect

A. Commodity Price Effects

As a net exporter of staple, a single village is a staple price taker. *Oportunidades* can thus not be expected to differently affect staple prices in the 320 and 186 control villages. This has been confirmed empirically by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), who compare staple prices in treatment and control villages, and do not find statistically significant differences.

Less is known regarding *Oportunidades*'s impact on non-food prices, because the latter are not observed from the data. We attempt to infer changes in non-food prices by looking at the extensive margin of non-food expenditure. The following linear probability model is estimated:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{expense}(\text{yes/no})_{i,t}^{\text{non-food}} &= \text{const.} + \theta \text{treat village}_i + \gamma X'_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (8) \\ &\text{if } i \in \text{ineligible} \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{expense}(\text{yes/no})_{i,t}^{\text{non-food}}$ is a dummy which takes the value 1 if household i had positive expenditures for non-food items during the past month, zero otherwise. The subscript t denotes the post-baseline data waves March 1999 (12 months after baseline) and November 1999 (18 months after baseline), respectively. The variable treat village_i is a dummy that indicates whether household i lives in a treatment village, i.e. a village where *Oportunidades*-eligible households do receive cash transfers (as opposed to control villages, where eligible households do not). Only *Oportunidades*-ineligible households are included in the regression. X'_i is set of controls, including state and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the village level in order to take into account the intra-village correlation of the individual error term $\epsilon_{i,t}$.

In the presence of price effects on non-food items one would expect, *ceteris paribus*, that $\theta < 0$. Higher non-food prices imply, everything else equal, a reduction in demand for non-food items - which will eventually lead to a corner solution (zero expenditure) for some households.

Table 2 displays the OLS estimates of the linear probability model in equation (8). The first column shows that *Oportunidades*-ineligible households in treatment villages are significantly more likely to have zero non-food expenditure. From column (2) to (5), which break down the result by non-food category, we conclude that the effect reported in column (1) is mainly driven by a reduction in expenditure of hygiene and households supply products. This may be seen as additional evidence for the model of section 2, which predicts price hikes for items which a village imports. Hygiene products (e.g. soap, shampoo, etc.) and households supplies (e.g. detergents) are typical examples of items that are not produced by the village, but which have to be imported from outside the village.

A note on identification: Behrman and Todd (1999) show treatment and control group samples to be balanced at baseline, and Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) report no differential attrition rates. In terms of measurement error, ineligible households in treatment villages may underreport their expenditure in order to appear eligible for *Oportunidades*. If this would be true then one should expect ineligibles' reported non-food expenditure to be lower in treatment villages. This, however, is not the case.

B. Income Effect

Previous studies have estimated the impact of *Oportunidades* on wages. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) report no changes in wages. Their wage measure, however, include all sources sources of labor supply, including agricultural wage labor. Because agricultural wage labor constitutes a large share of total hours worked, yet largely being seasonal work on some commercial farm away from the village, these wage measures are not likely to capture the village's wage rate.

We construct a wage proxy which is based on economic activities that occur inside the village. Our wage proxy, ω , is calculated as the sum of reported daily profits from within-village activities (e.g. petty sales, tailoring, washing and ironing, etc.). It is then checked whether this wage proxy, ω_i , is different between treatment and control villages. The following model is estimated:

Table 2: Extensive margin treatment effects: Monthly non-food expenditure of *Oportunidades*-ineligible households (linear probability model estimates)

	by expenditure category				
	(1) non-food expenditure all categories	(2) hygiene and home supplies	(3) toys	(4) clothing	(5) shoes
treat village	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.018)
controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
number of obs	9646	9646	9646	9646	9646
R-squared	0.011	0.014	0.013	0.029	0.056

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table shows OLS estimates for the model $\text{expense}(\text{yes/no})_{i,t}^{\text{non-food}} = \text{const.} + \theta \text{treat village}_i + \gamma X'_{i,t_0} + \epsilon_{i,t}$ if $i \in \text{ineligible}$. $\text{expense}(\text{yes/no})_{i,t}^{\text{non-food}}$ is a dummy which takes the value 1 if household i had positive expenditures for non-food items during the past month, zero otherwise. Subscript t denotes the post-baseline data waves March 1999 (12 months after baseline) or November 1999 (18 months after baseline). treat village_i indicates whether household i lives in a treatment village. X'_i is set controls, including state and time dummies. Standard errors clustered at village level.

$$\omega_{i,t} = \text{const.} + \theta \text{treat village}_i + \gamma X'_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (9)$$

if $i \in \text{ineligible}$

Column (1) and (2) in table 3 report the resulting treatment effects. The Tobit estimate is our preferred estimate given the relatively large frequency of left-censoring in the data. The latter suggests that daily service profits of ineligible households increase by, on average, 2.3 Mexican *Peso*. The OLS estimate is lower than that, yet still statistically significant.

Columns (3) to (6), which report estimates of equation (9) using different measures of labor supply as dependent variable, provide further evidence for higher village wages. The results suggest that ineligible households in treatment villages work more hours per day and more days per months in the above mentioned within-village commercial activities.

A raise in village wages also seems in line with the results of Attanasio et al. (2012), who find an increase in child wages. Since children are more likely to work inside the village, these studies' findings may be interpreted as additional evidence that *Oportunidades* raised local wages.

Table 3: Treatment effect on Oportunidades-ineligible households' daily service profits

	<i>dependent variable:</i>					
	daily income		hours per day		days per months	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
treat village	0.098*	2.298**	0.034	1.080**	0.260	4.264**
	(0.053)	(0.920)	(0.053)	(0.519)	(0.170)	(1.906)
controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
number of obs	9511	9511	9529	9529	9553	9553

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table shows estimates of the model $x_{i,t} = \text{const.} + \theta \text{treat village}_i + \gamma X'_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$ if $i \in \text{ineligible}$. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is daily profits (past week average) made from non-agricultural within-village commercial activities (e.g. petty trade, tailoring, washing and ironing, etc.) of household i , measured in Mexican *Peso*. The exchange rate in 1999 was roughly 1 US Dollar=10 Mexican *Peso*. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is a household's daily hours worked (past week average) in these activities. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is a household's monthly days worked in these activities. Subscript t denotes the post-baseline data waves March 1999 (12 months after baseline) or November 1999 (18 months after baseline). treat village_i indicates whether household i lives in a treatment village. Only *Oportunidades*-ineligible households are included in the regression. X'_i is set of controls, including state and time dummies. Standard errors at the village level. The top percentile of the dependent variable is excluded.

4 Effects on Consumption and Utility

A positive income effect - in the absence of a price effect on food - implies a positive effect of *Oportunidades* on food consumption of *Oportunidades*-ineligible households. That *Oportunidades* has indeed had a positive effect on food consumption of ineligible households is documented in Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), who find positive treatment effects on food consumption of program-ineligible households.

Estimating *Oportunidades*'s effect on non-food consumption of program-ineligible households is complicated by the fact that only non-food expenditure is observed from the data, yet neither non-food prices nor quantities. In section 3, we have already provided some suggestive evidence that *Oportunidades* may have led to a decrease in non-food consumption: *Oportunidades*-ineligible households in treatment villages are significantly less likely to have positive expenditure for non-food items (Table 2).

Another way of inferring changes in non-food quantities is by using an empirical version of the structural model introduced in section 2. In a first step, we calibrate the parameters of the model to the data available on households residing in control villages. In a second step, we conduct out-of-sample forecasts: The cash transfer is added to the income of eligible households in the control village sample. In order to test the performance of the model, we compare the resulting simulated moments to the actual moments observed in the treatment village sample. Thus, as in Todd and Wolpin (2006), we use the experimental design of *Oportunidades* as a source of model validation. The model is able to replicate quite well the moments of the treatment village sample. This increases our confidence in the model simulated impacts of *Oportunidades* on non-food consumption. Next, we are going to describe these steps in greater detail.

A. Model equations

The model described in section 2 can be written as a set of nine equations:

Household full income is given by

$$\begin{aligned} I_P &= \bar{L}_P \times p_L + \bar{Q}_P \times \bar{p}_q + \bar{T}_P \\ I_R &= \bar{L}_R \times p_L + \bar{Q}_R \times \bar{p}_q \end{aligned}$$

Where I_P and I_R denote the full income of the average *Oportunidades*-eligible (Poor) and *Oportunidades*-ineligible (Rich) household, respectively. \bar{L}_P and \bar{L}_R are labor endowments, \bar{Q}_P and \bar{Q}_R are staple endowments, \bar{T}_P is the *Oportunidades* cash transfer, p_L and \bar{p}_q denote the village wage rate and staple price, respectively.

Labor supply is given by

$$\begin{aligned} L_P &= \bar{L}_P - \bar{\alpha}_l \times I_P / p_L \\ L_R &= \bar{L}_R - \bar{\alpha}_l \times I_R / p_L, \end{aligned}$$

where $\bar{\alpha}_l$ is the Cobb-Douglas preference for leisure.

Demand for non-food items is given by

$$\begin{aligned} x_P &= \bar{\alpha}_x \times I_P / p_x \\ x_R &= \bar{\alpha}_x \times I_R / p_x, \end{aligned}$$

with $p_x = \bar{p}_\chi + \bar{m} \times p_L$. \bar{p}_χ is the factory price of non-food items. \bar{m} describes how many units of labor are needed to import one unit of the non-food item. $\bar{\alpha}_x$ is the Cobb-Douglas preference for non-food items.

Demand for food-items is given by

$$\begin{aligned} q_P &= \bar{\alpha}_q \times I_P / \bar{p}_q \\ q_R &= \bar{\alpha}_q \times I_R / \bar{p}_q, \end{aligned}$$

where $\bar{\alpha}_q$ is the Cobb-Douglas preference for food.

A village's labor market equilibrium is given by

$$(\bar{n}_P \times x_P + \bar{n}_R \times x_R) \bar{m} = \bar{n}_P \times L_P + \bar{n}_R \times L_R,$$

where \bar{n}_P and \bar{n}_R denote the number of *Oportunidades*-eligible and *Oportunidades*-ineligible village residents, respectively.

B. Calibration

We calibrate the model exploiting data available on the *control group* of the *Oportunidades* randomized control trial (March 1999 data wave). The vector of model parameters is:

$$\Omega = \{\bar{p}_\chi, \bar{p}_q, \bar{L}_i, \bar{Q}_i, \bar{\alpha}_{\{q\}}, \bar{\alpha}_{\{x\}}, \bar{m}, \bar{n}_i\} \quad i \in \{\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{R}\}$$

In Mexico, the staple is corn. 78 percent of households in the control group cite corn as their main cultivated crop. Corn is also the dominant ingredient in the food consumption basket of Mexicans. A value for

Table 4: Parameter values

	average eligible HH	average ineligible HH
Village level parameters		
price of food commodity (\bar{p}_q)		1.8
price of non-food commodity (\bar{p}_χ)		0.1
number of eligible households (\bar{n}_P)		35.3
number of ineligible households (\bar{n}_R)		8.8
labor requirement per unit of x (\bar{m})		2.7
Household level parameters		
food item endowment (\bar{Q}_i)	301.1	481.2
HH efficient units of labor (\bar{L}_i)	93.0	63.1
preference food item ($\bar{\alpha}_q$)	0.512	0.512
preference non-food item ($\bar{\alpha}_x$)	0.415	0.415
preference leisure ($\bar{\alpha}_l$)	0.074	0.074

the market price of corn (\bar{p}_q) can be observed directly from administrative records (Ministry of Agriculture). Monthly corn production (in kilogram) of the average *Oportunidades*-eligible household in the control group (which amounts to roughly 300kg) is taken for \bar{Q}_P . In an analog manner, monthly corn production (in kilogram) of the average *Oportunidades*-ineligible household in the control group (which amounts to roughly 450kg) is taken for \bar{Q}_R . The number of eligible households in the average control village, \bar{n}_P , is 35.3. The number of ineligible households in the average control village, \bar{n}_R , is 8.8.

Values for the following parameters can neither be obtained from administrative records nor from the *Oportunidades* RCT data:

$$\mathbf{\Lambda} = \{\bar{p}_\chi, \bar{L}_i, \bar{\alpha}_q, \bar{\alpha}_x, \bar{m}\} \quad i \in \{\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{R}\}$$

In order to obtain values for these parameters, we exploit that some of the model's endogenous variables, such as food consumption, non-food expenditure, and labor supply, are observed from the control group data. Denote this vector

$$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbb{C}}^{RCT} = \{q_i^{RCT}, (p_x \times x_i)^{RCT}, L_i^{RCT}\}$$

where the *RCT* superscript (randomized control trial) and \mathbb{C} subscript is used to indicate sample averages of the *Oportunidades* control group. Denote $\mathbf{Y}^{sim}(\mathbf{\Lambda})$ the vector of from the model simulated values of these

variables. We then calibrate Λ by minimizing the standardized squared distance between $\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbb{C}}^{RCT}$ and $\mathbf{Y}^{sim}(\Lambda)$

$$\min_{\Lambda} E = \left(\frac{\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbb{C}}^{RCT} - \mathbf{Y}^{sim}(\Lambda)}{\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbb{C}}^{RCT}} \right)^2$$

The full calibration writes

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\Lambda} E &= \sum_{i=P,R} \left(\frac{q_i^{RCT} - \bar{\alpha}_q \times I_i / \bar{p}_q}{q_i^{RCT}} \right)^2 \\ &+ \sum_{i=P,R} \left(\frac{(p_x \times x_i)^{RCT} - p_x \times x_i}{(p_x \times x_i)^{RCT}} \right)^2 \\ &+ \sum_{i=P,R} \left(\frac{L_i^{RCT} - [\bar{L}_i - \bar{\alpha}_l \times I_i / \bar{p}_L]}{L_i^{RCT}} \right)^2 \end{aligned}$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} p_x &= \bar{p}_x + \bar{m} \times p_L \\ I_i &= \bar{L} \times p_L + \bar{Q}_i \times \bar{p}_q + \bar{T}_i \\ x_i &= \bar{\alpha}_x \times I_i / p_x \\ (n_P^{RCT} \times x_P^{RCT} + n_R^{RCT} \times x_R^{RCT}) \bar{m} &= n_P^{RCT} \times L_P^{RCT} + n_R^{RCT} \times L_R^{RCT} \\ 1 &= \bar{\alpha}_x + \bar{\alpha}_q + \bar{\alpha}_l \end{aligned}$$

where $i \in \{P, R\}$. Table 4 shows all the parameter values of the model.

C. Model predictions (out-of-sample forecasts)

Having obtained values for the parameters of the model, we then add the cash transfer to the income of the Oportunidades-eligible household in control villages, and solve the model. This yields a vector of (on control villages) *simulated* outcomes.

Formally, we compute the simulated treatment effect for some outcome Y_j of household i , $\theta_{\{i,j\}}^{sim}$, as the difference between *simulated* control group, $Y_{\{i,j\}}^{sim} |_{\{\Omega, \bar{T}_P=0\}}$, and *simulated* treatment group, $Y_{\{i,j\}}^{sim} |_{\{\Omega, \bar{T}_P>0\}}$.

$$\theta_{\{i,j\}}^{sim} = Y_{\{i,j\}}^{sim} |_{\{\Omega, \bar{T}_P>0\}} - Y_{\{i,j\}}^{sim} |_{\{\Omega, \bar{T}_P=0\}}$$

The predictions of the model are shown in table 5. The model predicts an increase in ineligibles' monthly food consumption of roughly four percent.

Table 5: Structural estimation *Oportunidades*'s consumption effects

	<i>Oportunidades</i> -ineligible Households	
	(1)	(2)
	observed	predicted
Panel I: <i>Food consumption</i>		
control group mean (C)	756.85	731.08
treatment group mean (T)	757.34	759.44
$T - C$	14.01	28.35
(s.e)	(11.16)	
$(T - C)/C$	0.019	0.039
Panel II: <i>Non-food expenditure</i> [quantity]		
control group mean (C)	679.00[n/a]	592.51[29.17]
treatment group mean (T)	700.44[n/a]	615.49[27.09]
$T - C$	31.94[n/a]	22.98[-2.08]
(s.e)	(24.68)	
$(T - C)/C$	0.047[n/a]	0.039[-0.071]

The first row of column (1) in panel I and II show March 1999 sample means of household monthly food consumption (Mexican *Peso* value) and non-food expenditure (Mexican *Peso* value) of program ineligible households living in treatment villages. In 1999, the exchange rate was roughly 1 US Dollar=10 Mexican *Peso*. The second row of column (1) in panel I and II show March 1999 sample means of household monthly food consumption (Mexican *Peso* value) and non-food expenditure (Peso value) of program ineligible households living in control villages. The third row of column (1) in panel I and II shows the treatment effect (θ) obtained from the treatment effect regression $x_i = \text{const.} + \theta \text{treat village}_i + \epsilon_i \forall i \in \text{ineligible}$, where x_i is household monthly food consumption (panel I), and household monthly non-food expenditure (panel II), respectively. The fourth row of column (1) in panel I and II show the ratio of treatment effect (third row) over the control group mean (first row). Column (2) in panel I and II show the by the general equilibrium model simulated values. Values in [] are consumed quantities (non-food quantities are not observed from the *Oportunidades* data).

This compares to about two percent observed from the experimental data. The model predicts an increase in ineligibles' monthly non-food consumption *expenditure* of 3.9 percent. This compares to 4.7 percent observed from the experimental data.

The model replicates reasonably well the actual treatment effects. This increases our confidence in the model's simulated changes in non-food quantities. The model, however, predicts a decrease in non-food consumption of about seven percent. Overall, non-poor neighbors' utility falls by two percent.

5 Heterogenous Effects

So far, the analysis has focused on average effects. In this section we turn to heterogenous effects. Proposition 2.2 states that the neighborhood effect is

1. decreasing in a household's labor endowment, in the case of non-food consumption
2. not related to a household's labor endowment, in the case of food consumption

In the model, this is because large-labor-endowment households have lower per capita consumption, *ceteris paribus*, than low-labor-endowment households. Therefore, if local wages and non-food prices increase, per capita non-food consumption of the low-labor-endowment households will be more adversely affected. To see this, consider a simple household demand function for non-food, $x_i/\bar{L}_i = \bar{\alpha}_x I_i/p_x$, with $I_i = p_L \bar{L}_i + \bar{p}_q \bar{\lambda}_i \bar{Q}$ and $p_x = \bar{p}_\chi + p_L$. The notation is the same as in section 2. In per capita terms, this demand function writes $\tilde{x}_i = x_i/\bar{L}_i = \bar{\alpha}_x [p_L \bar{L}_i + \bar{p}_q \bar{\lambda}_i \bar{Q}]/[\bar{p}_\chi + p_L] \bar{L}_i$. Deriving with respect to p_L yields

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{x}_i}{\partial p_L} = \frac{\bar{\alpha}_x}{\bar{p}_\chi + p_L} - \frac{\bar{\alpha}_x [p_L \bar{L}_i + \bar{p}_q \bar{\lambda}_i \bar{Q}]}{[\bar{p}_\chi + p_L]^2 \bar{L}_i}.$$

It is easy to see that $\partial \tilde{x}_i/\partial p_L > 0$ if $\bar{L}_i \rightarrow \infty$, and $\partial \tilde{x}_i/\partial p_L < 0$ if $\bar{L}_i \rightarrow 0$.

For per capita food consumption, we have $\partial \tilde{q}_i/\partial p_L = \bar{\alpha}_q/\bar{p}_q$. Thus, if local wages increase, per capita food consumption of low-labor-endowment and high-labor-endowment households should be equally affected.

In order to test these predictions, the following regression model is estimated:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{expense_pcapita}_{i,t}^{\text{non-food}} &= \text{constant} + \theta_1 \text{treat village}_i \\ &+ \theta_2 \text{treat village}_i \times \text{hhs_small} \\ &+ \alpha \text{hhs_small} + \gamma X'_{i,t_0} + \epsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

if $i \in \text{ineligible}$,

where $\text{expense_pcapita}_{i,t}^{\text{non-food}}$ is per capita monthly household non-food expenditure. We are primarily interested in the regression coefficient on the interaction effect $\text{treat village}_i \times \text{hhs_small}$, where variable hhs_small

Table 6: Heterogenous consumption effects of *Oportunidades* on ineligible households

	<i>dependent variable:</i>			
	non-food consumption		food consumption	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
treat village	9.273 (7.862)	23.157** (10.048)	12.419** (5.193)	0.857 (4.863)
treat × hhsiz_small		-17.453* (10.105)		11.324* (5.855)
number of obs	9337	9337	9272	9272
R-squared	0.004	0.013	0.008	0.055

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is per capita monthly household non-food expenditure, and in columns (3) and (4) per capita monthly food consumption, all measured in Mexican *Peso*. In 1999, the exchange rate was roughly 1 US Dollar=10 Mexican *Peso*. Subscript t denotes the post-baseline data waves March 1999 (12 months after baseline) or November 1999 (18 months after baseline). *treat village* indicates whether household lives in a treatment village. Only *Oportunidades*-ineligible households are included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *hhsiz_small* is a dummy indicating if the number of adult household members is below the sample average. Controls include time and state dummies, household size and land size. The top percentile of the dependent variable is excluded.

is a dummy indicating if the number of adult household members is below the sample average.

Columns (1) and (2) in table 6 report the OLS estimates of equation (10). Column (1) shows that the coefficient on the treatment village dummy is positive (though imprecisely measured) when the interaction effects $\text{treat village}_i \times \text{hhsiz}$ is excluded. Including the interaction effects, as column (2) shows, changes the picture. The coefficient on $\text{treat village}_i \times \text{hhsiz_small}$ is positive. This suggests that the impact of *Oportunidades* on ineligibles' non-food consumption, $\theta_1 + \theta_2$, is higher for households with above average number of (adult) members.

Columns (3)-(4) show the results of (10) but with per capita food consumption as dependent variable. As expected, the impact of *Oportunidades* on ineligibles' food consumption, $\theta_1 + \theta_2$, is not strongly related to the average number of (adult) household members.

6 Concluding Remarks

This paper studied how redistributive transfers to the poorest households of a village affect consumption of the remainder of the village population. This is an important question when measuring the distributional (or overall welfare) impact of cash transfers. Yet, most impact evaluations focus on beneficiaries while ‘spill-over’ effects remain understudied. From the set of possible channels through which spill-over effects may operate, this paper explored the role of local general equilibrium effects. A structural model of a village populated by poor and non-poor households - calibrated to data from the *Oportunidades* randomized control trial - suggests that transfers to the poor households generate competing local price effects which increase food consumption, yet potentially decrease non-food consumption of non-poor households. Overall, we find non-poor households’ utility to decrease by about two percent.

The lack of data on non-food consumption and prices is the main challenge of the empirical analysis. In the absence of such data, we propose a structural approach to estimate non-food quantities. The results rely on the strong assumption that the model is correctly specified. Further research, with observed data on non-food consumption and prices, would be useful to support the model’s predictions. Impact evaluations of cash transfer programs usually collect data on non-food expenditure, but not on consumed quantities. We hope the results presented in this paper will encourage researchers to collect such data in the future.

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7 Tables for Online Appendix

Table 7: Descriptive statistics: monthly household consumption

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	October 1998	March 1999	November 1999
hygiene products (soap, combs, tooth and hair brushes detergents, whiteners)	40.1	50.3	59.2
household utensils (ollas, platos, cazuelas sartenes, sabanas, toallas y cobijas)	4.6	6.2	9.8
fuels (gas, carbon, petrol)	14.3	10.4	16.7
electricity (batteries, light, etc.)	21.6	24.0	25.3
industrialized clothes	55.4	116.5	105.2
shoes (tennis shoes, boots, etc.)	59.3	114.7	104.6
school supplies (pens, paper, etc.)	15.6	10.0	28.3
total non-food expenditure	344.9	468.9	495.1
total value of consumed food items	513.1	471.5	520.0

Displayed values are sample means of the control group sample. All values are in Mexican *Peso*. In 1999, the exchange rate was roughly 1 US Dollar=10 Mexican *Peso*.

Table 8: Descriptive statistics: Main occupational choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	October 1998	March 1999	November 1999
	(in %)	(in %)	(in %)
agricultural day laborer (<i>jornalero</i>)	60.35	60.13	64.42
other employment in agricultural sector	14.93	12.72	14.87
self-employed	10.86	13.4	8.89
family business	5.06	4.72	3.77
<i>ejidatario</i>	6.87	5.87	6.42

Displayed values are sample means of the control group sample.

Table 9: Descriptive statistics: Non-agricultural labor supply

	(1) yes/no (in %)	(2) hours per day	(3) days per week	(4) revenue per month
<i>October 1998</i>				
tailoring	1.14	4.3	4.3	220.2
preparing food for sale	0.72	5.6	3.7	284.9
construction/carpenter	0.79	8.7	5.5	560.1
buying and reselling	2.17	7.0	5.7	478.6
transport	0.15	5.6	2.9	1127.5
fixing items	0.01	8.0	6.0	400.0
wash, iron, cooking for pay	1.19	5.3	3.0	102.0
other	3.84	7.0	5.3	1052.5
<i>March 1999</i>				
tailoring	0.77	4.2	4.1	140.8
preparing food for sale	0.35	5.3	4.2	281.1
construction/carpenter	0.87	8.5	5.2	478.1
buying and reselling	2.42	7.3	6.4	394.4
transport	0.09	5.1	3.5	1162.5
fixing items	0.02	8.0	3.5	1030.0
wash, iron, cooking for pay	1.04	5.5	3.2	164.1
other	2.00	6.5	5.1	442.1
<i>November 1999</i>				
tailoring	0.48	4.0	4.2	242.7
preparing food for sale	0.24	4.7	3.4	275.9
construction/carpenter	0.24	8.1	5.1	900.0
buying and reselling	0.51	7.1	5.0	338.7
transport	0.05	8.2	3.4	466.0
fixing items	0.00	.	.	.
wash, iron, cooking for pay	0.69	5.4	3.0	112.6
other	0.59	6.2	5.0	582.4

Values shows are sample means of the control group. Values in columns (2) to (4) are conditional on 'yes' in column (1).

Table 10: Descriptive Statistics: Counterfactual characteristics

	Eligible Households	Ineligible Households
	(1) Mean [Std.Dev.]	(2) Mean [Std.Dev.]
<i>Household and Community Characteristics</i>		
Gini Index for agricultural land ownership		0.71
	[120.7]	[124.9]
Pre-program household poverty score	701.6 [120.7]	882.5 [124.9]
Monthly food consumption (per capita, peso value)	182.5 [163.6]	198.4 [153.2]
Monthly food expenditure (per capita, peso value)	137.3 [130.1]	169.6 [145.4]
Monthly non-purchased food consumption (per capita, peso value)	38.85 [591.9]	27.86 [48.1]
Monthly household disposable income (in peso)	662.1 [362.6]	795.3 [2129.8]
Cultivated area (in hectare)	0.46 [2.77]	0.75 [2.31]
Hourly wage rate	5.27 [36.14]	6.97 [25.12]
Livestock holding (principal component index)	-0.21 [2.41]	0.06 [3.63]
Household size	5.44 [2.60]	4.82 [2.53]
Indigenous household head	0.36 [0.48]	0.17 [0.37]
Education of head		
no	32.55	26.35
primary	62.03	64.52
secondary	4.92	6.95
tertiary	0.51	2.19
<i>N</i>	6857	1949

Calculations are based on the March 1999 Encel survey. Column (1) displays the sample mean of *Oportunidades*-eligible households residing in control villages. Column (2) displays the sample mean of *Oportunidades*-ineligible households residing in control villages. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. Differences between column (1) and (2) are all statistically significant.