

# motive

December 1966

Fifty Cents





# motive

DECEMBER 1966  
VOLUME XXVII, NUMBER 3

EDITOR: B. J. STILES

MANAGING EDITOR: RON HENDERSON

ASSOCIATE EDITOR: ALAN D. AUSTIN

BOOK REVIEW EDITORS:  
WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW  
ANTHONY TOWNE

ART DIRECTION: JOHN SELLERS/  
McDONALD & SAUSSY

CIRCULATION: ELIZABETH JONES

READER SERVICES: INEZ BURKE

PROMOTION: H. ELLIOTT WRIGHT

SECRETARY: JANE JAMES

## EDITORIAL BOARD

RONALD E. BARNES  
ARTHUR BRANDENBURG  
WILLIAM R. COZART  
JAMES CRANE  
TOM F. DRIVER  
RUTH HARRIS  
JAMES K. MATHEWS  
J. WILLIAM MORGAN  
MICHAEL NOVAK  
RICHARD SMITH  
WRIGHT SPEARS  
JAMES S. THOMAS  
CHARLES TURNER  
GAYLE GRAHAM YATES  
ANDREW J. YOUNG

Address all communications to *motive*, P.O. Box 871, Nashville, Tennessee 37202. Unsolicited manuscripts and art work are welcome, but cannot be returned unless return postage is supplied.

Subscription rates: individual subscription, 8 issues, \$3. Single copies, fifty cents. Optional group subscription plans are available; information on request. Transactions with the circulation department require four weeks' advance notice for processing.

Published monthly, October through May, for the University Christian Movement by the Division of Higher Education of the Board of Education of The Methodist Church. Founded 1941 by the Methodist Student Movement. Copyright © 1966 by the Board of Education of The Methodist Church.

Second-class postage paid at Nashville, Tennessee. National newsstand distribution by Eastern News Distributors, 255 Seventh Avenue, New York City 10001.

Microfilm copies of *motive* are available from University Microfilms, 313 N. First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan; photo-copies from Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003.

# contents

- 1 **BUT, THE AFRICANS WALKED AT NIGHT**  
*poem*, STAN STEINER
- 2 **THE PICKET LINE**
- 4 **THE WAR ON THE POOR?**  
JOHN H. GAGNON and WILLIAM SIMON
- 12 **"MEANTIME, THE WORLD"**  
*poem*, KAREN WAYNE
- 14 **BUDDHISM: FAR FROM FATALISTIC FAITH**  
RICHARD BUTWELL
- 17 **CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL OR PERSONAL?**  
ROBERT T. OSBORN
- 21 **A NEW APOCALYPSE**  
*Lithographs* by Karen Laub-Novak  
*art feature*, LUCIO P. RUOTOLO
- 37 **CHRISTIANS AND THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION**  
JOSÉ MÍGUEZ BONINO
- 41 **THE BLACK HORIZON**  
*poems*, MICHELE NAJLIS and DAVID McFIELD  
*translated* by MARGARET WILDE
- 43 **NATIONALISM: POLITICS IN A BIBLICAL PERSPECTIVE**  
COLIN M. MORRIS
- 51 **JOURNEY** *poem*, GLENN F. JACKSON  
**EARLY OCTOBER SNOW**  
*poem*, JAMES H. BOWDEN
- 52 **FILMS** AL CARMINES
- 53 **BOOKS**
- 56 **CONTRIBUTORS**
- COVER 3: **INTRA MUROS XIII** *etching*, PRANAS
- COVER 4: **IF YOU CAN LOSE YOUR HEAD** *picture-poem*  
KENNETH PATCHEN
- FRONT COVER: "Angel with Trumpet" stands atop the octagonal dome of the Collegiate Church in Muri, Switzerland. This former Benedictine monastery church—dating from the 11th century—was originally Romanesque but was remodeled in the 1690's under the Baroque influence. The photograph of this swingin' angel was taken by Josef Stenz, a second-generation professional photographer from Zurich. Stenz was born in Muri, which is the Aargau canton.



# BUT, THE AFRICANS WALKED AT NIGHT

But, the Africans walked at night  
to Lukachukai  
to Tohatchi  
to Chinle  
in the sacred groves of graves of the peachtrees  
of Kit Carson,  
the father,  
of death.

But, the Africans walked at night  
succoring the Earth Mother.

But, the Africans walked at night  
the lawyers of Ibo and Kikuyu  
wondering where are the warrior  
sons.

Come to feast!  
on unleavened bread  
and governmental  
beasts  
to eat  
tribal fables  
mouthed by TV  
tubes full of  
Last Suppers  
of Cheeseburgers—

But, the Africans walked at night  
black as Christs  
shrouded  
in whiteskinned  
business suits of cellophane and aluminum foil  
under the moon  
of the coyote.

But, the Africans walked at night  
in Italian shoes.

But, the Africans walked at night  
through dark light  
to uranium women  
in unlit hogans  
who welcomed them blindly  
to the way of beauty.

But, the Africans walked at night  
medicine bags and stone balls  
in their attaché cases.

Where the warriors  
lie in motels  
of the Navajos  
eyeing redhanded  
knives of yellow  
butter eaters  
the blunted spears  
of the eunuched  
Indians—

But, the Africans walked at night  
wondering where  
John Wayne was hiding  
his red cosmetics—  
why Gary Cooper shot  
Pocahontas—

why  
the warriors of Jeff Chandler  
washed their wounds white  
with detergents.

But, the Africans walked at night  
to wikiups with beautyrest beds.

But, the Africans walked at night  
to exercise  
tours of diplomacy  
with the State  
departmentalized guides who dreamt of reddest sex  
frozen in ice cream cones of blackest secrets.

But, the Africans walked at night  
four hundred miles  
of years where death  
marched to wars  
across the deserts  
of history to be buried  
with unborn Indians  
in concentration camps  
of the Army of Christ.

But, the Africans walked at night  
disguised as one million dead Indians, yelling,  
Uruhu!



DRAWING: SYLVIA ROTH

—Stan Steiner





R. O. HODGELL

Here's my check to extend my subscription. This is undoubtedly the best publication of its type in the U.S. The Christian experience to you is one of active concern and involvement in the problems, beauty and mysteries of life. This witness to the Word of Christ helps your readers to make the "leap" from indifference to faith. *Time* (Oct. 21, 1966) missed the boat when they classified you as radical and controversial; these are mere words and all they do is label. But you evade any label, save the label of "searching" in the name of Christ for the salvation of this earth. May our Lord continue to give you courage.

FRED OJILE  
maronite seminary  
washington, d.c

Even though some people who write letters to you are concerned about, ashamed of,—etc., The Methodist Church, or at least *motive's* association with it, I find hope in what you stand for. To me, yours is one way of following Christ. And if those indignant writers have their own way of "following," it isn't in that particular (negative) action. It would be interesting to know what *their* "works" are.

LOUISE SINNOTT  
dundee, illinois

It would appear from reading Robert Hovda's review of DuBay's *The Human Church* in your October issue that saying important and necessary things in a respectful way is more important than being truthful. William H. DuBay is one of those who has decided to "hang tough" rather than leave the scene of action, in this case the Roman Catholic Church.

Of course, what he predicted in his book is exactly what now is happening! The Vatican has ordered that the book be withdrawn from circulation and that Father DuBay submit himself to the judgment of the very Cardinal with whom he is in disagreement. Father Hovda is so distraught that DuBay would dare raise ethical and moral questions about the Church that he has neglected to give attention to the direct, compassionate and truthful manner in which DuBay calls all of us—Protestant and Catholic—to task. DuBay speaks for himself: "The Church is not 100% human. But it should be. Whatever is in it that is not human is not of God. People should be able to see in the Church what their own lives are to become." (p. 47)

DuBay sees "human life as God's greatest work, human living as man's." He is convinced that it is the Church's task to help man realize his potential. Therefore he talks about how the structures of the Church can serve this goal. He speaks of sex, prayer, work, marriage, worship and other events as places where the Church needs radical redirection. He wonders why it is not permitted to say that "sex, like all other pleasures, has been given man for the development of the human value of love and dedication." (p. 138) He calls for a Church that can have unity through a "variety of forms" in worship and which significantly involves layman and pastor in planning for worship. He wants a Church that helps us "to trust others enough to entrust them with one's thoughts, to accept the response and to listen to others honestly. This art demands great practice, training, support, convictions. This most human of all skills is not provided by nature but needs to be acquired through imagination and labor. People constantly need to be encouraged to speak honestly if they are not to destroy themselves and others. The only dangerous ideas are the unspoken ones."

It would seem that DuBay is trying to practice what he preaches.

It is surprising that in this day of the "open windows" there is no joyous welcome for this loyal son of the Church. It seems as though DuBay has struck home. The response so far sounds like he is a winner.

JOHN L. DOBSON  
campus christian association  
reno, nevada

The articles by Ross Terrill and Carl Oglesby (Oct., 1966) are brilliant and passionate writing which go directly to the heart of our American problem—self-righteousness. We cloak the most brutal destruction of people in moral arguments designed to demonstrate that we are history's white knight in armor defending civilization against communism. But our wars abroad are, as Oglesby demonstrates, designed to build American business and military hegemony wherever remotely possible. And we often call our opponents communist (as we did once of the present government of Laos which we now support) when there is little if any evidence, simply because some allegation of communism is what it takes to get the support of the people to engage in costly foreign wars.

Some Christians who support the mass murder of ordinary people in Viet Nam see the problem as involving so many complexities that there is no simple solution. Yet they then proceed to back war against revolution which is *their* oversimplification of the way to deal with the many problems that have produced the Southeast Asian situation.

One might quarrel with Terrill's statement that "the record of her actions demonstrates that China has been cautious in foreign relations." I would agree with this provided we exclude her invasion of India and her present conflict with the Soviet Union. But the main thrust of both articles is sound and accurate



analysis wholly in keeping with the Christian ethic of concern for the neighbors in need.

JOHN M. SWOMLEY, JR.  
saint paul school of theology, methodist  
kansas city, missouri

Enclosed are the subscriptions for five of us here at Silliman University. The magazine is familiar to us, and is an important resource for our Christian Youth Fellowship. Incidentally, at the general meeting of the CYF last Sunday, I read excerpts from "God's 'No' to False Community" (Feb., 1966) and had numerous comments on it, so we are mimeographing copies (with due acknowledgment to *motive* and Thomas Oden) to be given to all CYF'ers.

You did so many excellent articles last year which are still discussed here: the art feature on Sister Mary Corita, the Hugh Hefner-Harvey Cox dialogue, the Fulbright speech, and a host of others.

And the Jim Crane cartoons are unforgettable.

JURGETTE A. HONCULADA  
dumaguete city, philippines

I'm adding my check for a subscription to be sent to our radio station. I have been a *motive* follower for a number of years, and especially appreciated your foreign policy issue (Jan., 1966).

J. WILLIAM MATTHEWS  
DZCH-AM & FM  
manila, philippines

For years I have read the letters to the editor section of *motive* and frequently been disturbed by the harsh criticisms of the magazine expressed by some readers. There are three letters in the October issue which disturb me in the same way. Although I have read *motive* for many years, I have never before written you of my reaction to the magazine. Now, however, I feel responsibility to express myself—a responsibility akin to that of voting.

First let me say that *motive* magazine is one of the (few) things which make me proud to be a member of The Methodist Church. In contrast to the sluggishness which I have come to expect from most church-related institutions, *motive* strikes me (generally) as being fresh and exciting. You certainly have my personal support.

But apart from my opinion on *motive's* quality, there is another point which deserves some comment. It is one thing to disagree with the contents of the magazine. It is one thing, that is, to believe that the "good news" of which the Church speaks is quite simple and can be adequately expressed in traditional ways (and only in those ways). It is quite another thing, however, to suggest, as many of your letters do, that the editors of *motive* themselves believe that what they are doing is wrong. A letter in the October issue expresses this: "Are you proud of yourself? Do you think young people really appreciate sacrilegious writings? I doubt it and so do you." This sort of criticism is especially insidious because it calls into question not merely the judgment but the very integrity of the editors. It suggests that they are deliberately doing something which they believe to be wrong. This, it seems to me, is what made the Goldwater campaign slogan in 1964 so offensive: "In your heart you know he's right." Personally, I know no such thing! Yet the slogan implies that persons who did not vote for Goldwater were violating their own convictions. The same implication appears in these criticisms of *motive*. I believe that the editors of *motive* are proud of their magazine. And I also believe that they are *rightfully* proud.

JOHN T. GRANROSE  
assistant professor of philosophy  
university of georgia  
athens, ga.

Your October issue encourages some of us abroad that the Church in America hasn't lost entirely its voice on the war in Viet Nam. The more I realize what is going on there and the more I take time to think about it, the more it becomes unbearable. To me, the war looks this way:

1. You will "win" in Viet Nam, but it will be a defeat, because it will happen at the cost of *complete* loss of prestige; even more, at the cost of the pure hatred of almost the whole non-white world.

2. You will "win" in Viet Nam, but it will be a defeat because it will happen without reaching the goal, namely, to bring into function an indigenous and democratic government. A good citizen should be against this "victory," because freedom is prostituted in the name of freedom.

3. You will "win" in Viet Nam, but it will be a defeat, for, because of American national interest, millions of men like you and me (or are they less after all?) will have to be killed or damaged or made refugees. A Christian should be against this kind of "victory," because for him there is no justification whatsoever for this kind of war.

You ask me what I think should be done? I think you should pull out your military personnel from Viet Nam, and support the sending in of an international peace force in order to maintain some civil order. That country and all of Southeast Asia will be communist-controlled before long. With the money that you have poured in there (and still pour in) you could have made friends, and still can, to balance out a communist Southeast Asia.

But you say, "we will lose face." Among most of the intelligent people here, not to speak of the majority of those in the non-white world, you have lost face already, because you don't pursue in Viet Nam what you claim to pursue! What do you mean, "our national honor is at stake"? Your government may now show you enough pictures of the terror which shakes the Vietnamese people. If you would repeat this sentence about "national honor" in front of the pictures we have the opportunity to see here, I wouldn't care to be your friend any longer.

What do you mean, "we want to support the development of a people free of the regime of communist China"? Until you develop some freedom in your own country—Cleveland, Chicago, Alabama—that's not very convincing.

What do you mean, "our Administration will know what it is doing"? This sentence was heard over and over again in Hitler Germany, and what did it lead to?

What do you mean, "our government has top experts who can be trusted"? There are many important and influential consultants to your government who don't care to voice a personal opinion because the Army is their job; and there are others who do voice their opinion because production of war materials is their job. They want to stay in business and are concerned about the American economy.

What do you mean, "our church organizations shouldn't go into opposition of our country's foreign policy"? In Hitler Germany about a hundred of the most outstanding and prominent church leaders did not fear to lose either influence or life itself in their opposition to our country's foreign policy at the time.

What is the church doing there? Several American theologians speak and write about "revolution"—but at a Geneva conference! According to my information, your National Council of Churches' International Affairs Commission is still far too mild in its statements and recommendations on this matter. Shouldn't the NCC set up a special committee on Viet Nam? Shouldn't the decision-making people be put under more pressure? Shouldn't the personal initiative of leading Christians not be much more far-reaching, much more courageous, much more contagious?

Perhaps you should read Ezekiel 22:30. This is the Word of the Lord: "I sought for a man among them, who should build up the wall, and stand in the breach before me for the land, that I should not destroy it. But I found none!" Let that not be said about America!

CHRISTOPH BORNHAUSER  
heidelberg, germany  
(fulbright fellow, 1964-65  
princeton university)



ETCHING: HAMMOND



# The War on the Poor?

By JOHN H. GAGNON and WILLIAM SIMON



The problem of dealing with poverty in the richest country in the world can only be called monstrous. It is monstrous because of the very dimensions of the populations involved; it is monstrous because it involves a basic confrontation between a majority who live in remarkable affluence and a minority who live on the edge of degrading poverty; and it is monstrous because it reflects the basic difficulty of mobilizing the resources of this society to deal with its most tragic waste of humanity.

It is fitting that the major program designed to confront the problem of the poor in the United States should have been conceived in the language of war,



for rarely has the American people ever been united except by the threat of battle. It is impossible to escape the language of Pentagonese in the discussion of the poor: one hears of task forces, Job Corps, weapons in the fight against poverty, and military acronyms fall easily from the lips of the participants in this battle. The dilemma is that the poor, rather than being the victors in this war, may well turn out to be its first, but not its only, victims.

There is, of course, a constraint against attacking the War on Poverty. The very act of defining and dealing with the poor and their condition as the responsibility of the rest of the society is an event of immense significance. Only a short time ago there was considerably more money for the social scientist to study the suburban malaise or the crisis of leisure than there was to study the fundamental problems of the alienated poor. Thus, in this criticism, just as in the one that Hannah Arendt makes in her critique of Marx, there is no desire to join the enemies of programs that are designed to create a society in which poverty does not exist.

Our complaint is with the programs themselves, the simplistic conceptions that have been made of the condition of the poor and problems of what can best be called war profiteering. Our concern is not that the

programs might fail and do no harm, but that they will fail and do positive harm. Society for the most part has still to learn that the shame of the mental hospital and the prison is not that they fail to do good, but that they do a great deal of harm; the asylum reinforces pathology, the prison abets criminality. At the moment there are distressing indications that the War on Poverty is moving in the same direction, for, if these programs fail, they will confirm in the minds of the poor what they have been taught for a very long time; that is, that the larger society despises them and deals with them hypocritically. And it will confirm in the minds of the affluent their prevailing image of the poor as those persons who will not work nor avail themselves of the opportunities to succeed. Further, even if these programs succeed at the level that they have been planned, they will do no more than provide transitory entrance for the poor into the already crowded realm of the low-income consumer.

The War on Poverty exploded like a vogue; the program did not follow a period of accumulating awareness of the problem. Lacking a period of extensive experimentation, only one thing was clear: all existing programs for dealing with the problems of the poor (public housing, school programs, recreational programs, vocational training) had failed and failed badly. The single substantial change that had occurred was the increasing use of a liberal human relations rhetoric in discussing the poor. And this in turn served only to make a realistic appraisal of the problem more difficult. To say that the poor were different from anyone else in any major respect except standard of living, to say that the poor might resist change was, at the very least, in bad taste or possibly, at the worst, being reactionary. Paradoxically, the very value climate that made a concern for poverty possible tended to inhibit a real discussion.

Moreover, it was conceived as a political program which meant, in the then current Washington atmosphere, that it would be informed with a spirit of political cynicism, bureaucratic opportunism, and that core of American reformism that is both innocent and zealous. This latter characteristic, which has always been part of American social welfare, is strongly reminiscent of the benign cruelty of American missionaries of earlier decades. The political cynicism found expression in a number of elements of the program. Salient among these was impossible scheduling under the rhetoric of reformist zeal. The programs were to begin at maximum speed and to begin to produce a week after appropriations were granted by the Congress. It apparently did not matter that no one had as yet come up with a viable approach to the problem; the magical combination of money, necessity, money, concern, and money would do the trick. The solution for a lack of knowledge was to begin immediately with whatever programs were currently available. The designer of one such program, which had become the model for a number of others before it could be evaluated, reported with considerable honesty that his program simply had not worked. There was nobody listening, for in their haste there was no time for program development and the hard work of thinking through the problems and costs of new approaches to extremely intractable issues.

In addition, the programs had to be politically clean. More than that, in many instances, by requiring ap-



proval of programs by political units below the federal level, the program was in no way to reward the wicked (at least the wicked poor). Crucial programs that dealt with people, instead of the vague and frequently unreal entities that are "grass-rooted" community organizations, had built into them qualifications that excluded people with police records and psychological or physical handicaps. These were to be programs for the deserving and politically safe poor.

Bureaucratic opportunism took many forms. A stroll through the Washington offices of the Office of Economic Opportunity revealed long corridors half full of stacked, brand new desks in search of bureaucrats. And there was some consistency in the types of bureaucrats who arrived. The most sympathetic of these was the dedicated amateur whose failing was that he succumbed to the imagery of war too quickly and mistook chaotic uncertainty for dramatic necessity, feeling that his own good intentions were some kind of guarantee of success. Then there were the government professionals who have learned the fine art of agency-jumping and government service-rating climbing. These also showed signs of uncertainty, but uncertainty without anxiety. The third type however—like circling vultures—were both an omen and an odor; these were the professionals at doing well by doing good. They were the refugees from moribund delinquency control programs, near defunct community organizations, and the concrete embarrassments of public housing schemes. Smilers all, they have the reassuring poise of neurosurgeons and the same immense capacity to survive their own failures. Failing all else, this aspect of the poverty program might solve some part of the poverty problem—poverty in the middle class.

### The Image of Poverty and the Poor

Much of the beginning of the War was fought under the flag of public relations. More indicatively, as the War proceeded and each crisis emerged, power seemed to move from the professional to the public relations staff. Indeed, from recent press quotations it becomes difficult to tell one from another. An imagery was created of the poor knocking on the doors of the great society, a large mass of Americans seeking somehow to get into the middle classes and who were amenable to discipline and illusions of that style of life. The model figure that appeared in the literature was someone in late adolescence or in prime adulthood, in robust health, free from the taint of police record, and with an IQ of from 90 to 110; in essence a person who is poor because somewhere along the way—either because of a momentary caprice (the drop-out) or because of a nonfundamental failure of the system—he was shunted aside. Finally, there was the illusion that simply increasing incomes, regardless of the kinds of work engaged in, was a device for moving people over the poverty line. The culture of poverty was conceived in terms of money rather than in terms of culture. The mysterious income figure of three thousand dollars a year was constantly invoked, and manipulation of the numbers of the poor based on various indices looked a great deal like the numbers of communists in the State Department in the McCarthy era. Once we had the families of the poor over this magical economic line, the War on Poverty would be a success.

Even persons in the program were not deceived by this rhetoric, but the rhetoric was what ultimately took charge of the programs, since it allowed the society to ignore some of the most ugly and demoralizing facts about the consequences of a life of poverty.

This is not to say that there are not those in American society who are poor and who are trying desperately to escape poverty. These persons, however, almost by definition, fall outside the culture of poverty. There are persons who are attached to the Great Society and through their striving will probably gain entrance into it either for themselves or for their children. Exclusive of the aged, these persons are often the victims of personal misfortune and economic dislocation, but they have maintained their motivation in the face of their personal handicaps. One suspects for these that the War on Poverty is nearly as meaningless as it is for those who are truly members of the culture of poverty.


For many of those in the culture of poverty the personal misfortune and the economic dislocation was *birth*. Hard times did not suddenly fall on Appalachia, on the southern twenty-six counties of Illinois, or on the section of New York City called Harlem. Times were hard, with few and highly relative remissions, as long as man can remember. It is not the decimation of jobs through automation that haunts these regions, but rather a history of economic exploitation and grinding poverty. The Negro and the hillbilly who sit on the doorsteps of the urban slum have been familiar figures for nearly four decades for those who cared to look. These are not those who knock on the doors of the great society; they have been taught in hard school not to do so.

The reasons for not doing so are complex. One reason has been the general response of the society to the noise that they have created by knocking. Every time the door opens—almost in imitation of the cartoon violence that is the staple of the American television diet for children—someone hits them on the head, or lies to them, or cheats them. The vulnerability of the poor to exploitation as they seek the goods and services of the great society is well documented in Caplovitz's *The Poor Pay More*.

Another reason they do not knock, which is more dreadful and which we are most reluctant to admit, is that for many of the poor it may be too late. Poverty cripples early and cripples profoundly. The real victims of poverty are among the Negro sharecroppers over fifty, the illiterate Southern migrants, and the children living in homes dominated by strife, silence, and erratic childrearing.

The token of existence in modern society is the word; without the word and the capacity to use language it is impossible to make an intelligible demand on the society. For those without these tokens and the capacity to symbolize in complex ways there will be little chance to use the resources of the society or to mobilize them in their own behalf. There is an increasing body of evidence that suggests that the crippling of the capacity to manage symbols and hence language may occur early in life and that this deficit may be difficult to overcome, given the tools that we currently have at hand. The evidence for the divergence of intelligence scores of children in various classes is disturbing evidence for the kind of damage







that is done early and which is not easily retrievable.

Paul Goodman has commented that there is little evidence that the poor learn to decode. He points out that any person who is literate and has the capacity of complex language use could, after some period of time, learn to decode the information available if he were dropped on Mars and there were as much language around as there is in our cities. The poor are bombarded by language in all forms everyday: television, radio, street signs, billboards, and forms to be signed at the welfare office. Goodman asks the fundamental question: why don't they decode? Part of it is motivational, surely, but another part is possibly the passing of a time in human development when such skills as decoding are easily learned. Learning after this time takes an effort that may be nearly insurmountable.

The processes of crippling that begin early in life are reinforced by the very methods that we currently use to handle the children of the poor and their parents. The schools themselves refuse in any major way to become vehicles of social reform. The school dropout is often a push-out because the schools haven't the staff, budgets, or skills to do more than keep children in slum ghettos off the streets during the day. The organization of social welfare has been relegated to individual casework practice and is conducted in the context of the most degrading kinds of means tests until the relationship between the professional social worker and the client is one of constant combat and mutual manipulation. Unfortunately it is these institutions that have tended to supply most of the personnel for the command posts of the new war.

There are others who do not knock, but not because they are tied to the culture of poverty through mere indifference, stupidity, or laziness. For the culture of poverty is not just poverty, it is culture. Culture is the operative word, for there are substantial numbers of families where the husband and wife are working and whose income is at twice or three times the dollar figure for poverty where the conditions within the home are sure to provide us with another generation of culturally deprived and alienated youth whose demands of the society will not be heeded because they cannot be articulated. These persons are tied to culture as all men are tied to culture. Culture is other people whom we love. Culture is a repertoire of real gratifications that, however inadequate, compel immediate adherence and action. Culture is that sense of self that only those who run great risks with their own sense of reality ever question.

The tragedy is that anyone should have had to have written the previous paragraph, for its content is commonplace in the literature of the modern social sciences. In the preface to *Street Corner Society*, William F. Whyte comments on the notion that the slum is disorganized by pointing out that the fundamental problem in Cornerville (his name for the Italian slum district of North Boston) was that it was highly organized, but its organization did not articulate with the larger society. Further, the central figure in that work, the leader of a corner gang, was not a failure, but a success; it was his very competence in life in the slum that kept him there in contrast to the college boys in the same neighborhood who were on their way up and out. To the outsider viewing an alien commu-

nity, what often appears to be incompetence is really a form of competence within the local culture.

An intervention in these series of vital human commitments takes a sure and careful hand, one that has not been present in the past. The entering wedge is commonly an attempt to make the slum dweller over in the values of the middle classes, to commit them to a series of goals and desires that not even the members of middle classes are sure they desire. This has been the consequence of the housing schemes in which old patterns of community living and meeting have been sacrificed to the economies of high-rise construction where there are endless corridors of mental hospital-like cubicles. Persons whose lives have circulated around the streets have been perched ten stories above those streets in the kinds of buildings that only those who have been trained in the patterns of middle-class socialization can possibly seek or even tolerate. The noisy, loosely structured, lower-class family was moved from the slum into buildings; such moves can only disorganize and destroy whatever culture existed on the streets of the community. We want the poor to be clean, but not comfortable. There is the taint of disapproval in our public works as if by making the lives of the poor more painful we might drive them into the middle classes.

The poor are not simply persons who have been thrown out of the normal order of economic success through some accident of frictional unemployment or personal mischoice, but rather persons who have suffered major damage in their capacities to make demands on the society—damage that for some of them may not be repairable. The poor are bound to systems of gratifications and values that are only tangentially related to the values of the larger society. Inextricably mixed with this is a history of exploitation that makes the poor suspicious of all approaches to them and makes them protective of whatever shreds of dignity that an affluent society has left for them.

### Vocation and Communication

The programs that were created arose through the public relations image; their focus was on the deserving and accidental poor. While the programs spread into a number of areas, it was the experimentation with the Job Corps camps and the community organization programs (including the Neighborhood Job Corps) that were pre-eminent at the beginning of O.E.O.'s efforts. Since that time programs organized to give culturally deprived children advance nursery school training through the Headstart Program and other smaller experimental programs in specialized training have been initiated. One of these was Project Cause which sought to teach persons who were unemployed members of the middle class how to be job counselors for the poor. It may be best described and forgotten as a cause without an effect.

In their inception the Job Corps programs intended to teach both vocational skills and skills in communication. The latter were expected to provide sources of motivation for remaining in the workforce. However, all aspects of the program were plagued in all possible ways. Staff was impossible to find so that the teachers who were recruited were those who had already failed with these same youth in the regular schools. Urban youth were transplanted from urban



environments to obsolete military installations miles from the cities where networks of personal relationships, entertainment, and girls could be found. The screening procedures for the young people who were recruited were inept and promises were made that could not be kept. All of these might have been surmounted if there had not been an intense pressure for the camps to provide results.

Results meant that something countable and displayable, like a commodity, had to be produced to insure continuing political support for the programs. The vocational aspects of the programs were countable. It was easy to say that in the last six months we produced so many television repairmen, so many dishwashers, so many landscape workers (yard boys), and so many body and fender repairmen. In this pressure, that which was not easily measurable or teachable, namely the programs designed to create communication skills (which hence increased the capacity for the young people to make demands on the society), were lost. They were, as a matter of fact, the first to go. The program of creating workers, no matter if their work was going to be the most vulnerable to the knife of automation, became the order of the day.

The teaching of communication skills, whatever they might be, was essentially revolutionary and concerned with fundamental social change. But it is nearly impossible to count the consequences of such a program. The results are not immediate or spectacular, and they do not look neat in statistical reports of success. The camps themselves came to look more and more like quasi-penal institutions run by school teachers. Confirming this image is the most recent suggestion by an O.E.O. spokesman in response to the problem of the camp dropout: the camps should be compulsory after signing up. One wonders what this can possibly mean: fences, walls, armed guards? Perhaps these will be kinds of cages that will be our substitute for ghettos.

As there was no attempt to engage the young people in programs of self-government and communication, the inmates resorted to that tactic that they had used so successfully in getting as far as they did in the public schools. They become invisible in the camps, they go along with the program without it ever really touching them, and they become increasingly cynical about the meaning of the program itself. For the youth selected were not the conventional delinquents who are highly visible in the school systems, but rather they are the invisible men who have learned to play it cool in the presence of the middle-class authority structure.

Two of the camps have already changed administrative hands. One formerly run by a university and the other by an independent foundation have lost their contracts with the government. They were never really able to get into gear and start to process as many youth through the camps as was expected. The change of hands means that the goals of vocational education have become overwhelming and that the camps will probably be given over to the major corporations that are now entering the education business. As currently conceived there appears to be no way to suggest that these kinds of programs have any hope of success.

The other major, early commitment of the program was the creation of community poverty programs in which there would be cooperation by the poor. That is, the poor should occupy major positions on the

policy-making boards of the poverty programs and they should decide their own fate. It was hoped by some that the poor would define their own goals and programs and that the function of professionals would be to increase the effectiveness of the programs and give technical aid. In these cases the poor would have the right to be wrong. These programs fell into the same trap that all such schemes do when they are controlled at the local level in American politics. Like the public housing projects that were prevented from being built or were relocated because they would disturb historically normal voting patterns by being placed in certain political domains, the idea of giving the poor power that would free them from a commitment to political organizations came as a shock to municipal, county, and state politicians. At the same time, however, there was the vision of federal largesse and the temptation to feed this money into the ongoing structure of political organizations. The poverty program could provide jobs and these jobs were to be part and parcel of the booty of the political patronage system.

The political patronage system wasn't alone in being guilty of intervening against the allocation of power to the poor. The already existing social welfare institutions were equally as guilty and their actions were more immoral in that they purportedly had a professional interest in social action and social change. Federal funding meant for experimentation was used for the expansion of conventional services: adding a wing to a settlement house, hiring additional social workers, and increasing what are correctly judged as inadequate salaries. In addition to these goals, however, the social welfare power structure saw the giving of control of programs to the poor as a threat to the role of social workers in reference to its client. In the past control has been in the hands of the social worker and the decisions were his. The new programs were conceived in the notion that the poor were to have control over their own destiny and that they should have the right not to ask, but to demand certain rights and privileges. No longer would the interpersonal relationship between social worker and the client be one of direction from the middle-class source, however permissive and non-directive, but rather a meeting of equals in power. Such a new perspective on the relationship of the poor and the society would require a major re-evaluation of the social welfare structure of the United States.

The Community Action Program's future is not yet a closed chapter. There are those programs where some real attempt has been made to engage the poor in their own futures, but these often have been well out of the mainstream of the locus of the major problem, that of the urban slums. Some programs have been held up because cities have not complied with even the minimal suggestions of the O.E.O. (Los Angeles, location of the disastrous Watts riot, is one of these). Others are honeycombed with political appointees and still under attack for internal corruption.

Whether the Project Headstart programs will have any greater success currently is a moot point. They have been organized on a very narrow front of day nurseries in which only a minimal amount of activity goes on and there is already gathering evidence that early learning of certain skills may wash out by the second and third years of schooling. One cannot tell whether this is a result of catching up by children who



have not been in the experimental programs or whether the schools have a basic stultifying effect and those children who have had earlier training are being slowed down by the lockstep of the conventional school systems.

### War Profiteering

Our major objection, it should be clear, is not fixed upon the costs of these programs, the waste involved, nor even the possibility of misappropriation. If one had the sense that the poor were the ones who had the opportunity to do the wasting and the misappropriating, it would be an advance of some sort. The great society can easily afford such waste and such misappropriation, for there is really enough money around to do all this. Our objection is that the poverty program can serve to further alienate the poor and confirm what all of their prior experiences have told them: *that they are the invisible men in this society.*

Much of this could have been avoided if the agencies which were concerned with the problems of the poor and the problems of education had not allowed themselves to be stampeded into an area that they really knew nothing about. Both the universities and the major corporations which undertook the operation of the Job Corps programs allowed their schedules to be set by the needs of the government and the language of pressing change.

The universities which had the moral responsibility and the corporations which should have known better from an economic point of view leaped into the non-existent breach and began to assimilate government money. Corporations which needed five years' research and development money before producing a

satellite or launch vehicle thrust themselves into an area of responsibility that they knew nothing about. They absorbed teaching machine and textbook houses to get in on the education business, the greatest growth business in America outside of space. Yet the firms they absorbed had know-how only for middle-class populations and their conception of the teaching process was confined to these areas entirely. In addition, the corporations had no ideological commitment to social change nor to engaging the poor in a power struggle in the American society. There are already too many contenders in that area.

The role of the universities is more dubious. Their commitment to knowledge and the responsibility that they have for the creation of better men was swamped in the flood of money. Even they did not call a halt and say that this was a problem they had never had to face and that needed time for research. The enemy wasn't really at the gates.

What was required was time and experimentation on a small scale in methods of teaching not only skills in working, but skills in using language and formulating meaningful questions. Techniques for the teaching of political and social participation do not exist and were bound not to be learned, given the rate at which the enterprises were required to start. This period of experimentation was not taken and most of the miserable, immediate results may be laid at the door of these failures of nerve on the part of the universities which failed to assume a critical role.

### Social Change in a Democracy

Where does this leave us after the expenditure of some billions of dollars which in our estimation has





attacked the poor but not their problems? One hopes that we are not left with the feeling of bleak despair that so often accompanies an overthrow of what has been accomplished, though there are times when that seems to be the only rational feeling to have about the War on Poverty and its prospects.

There are things to be done, but they require a different sense of the problems of the poor and different goals of social change and a different timetable for success. First, a different sensibility about the poor and what we want them to become is required. We should not wish them to become grotesque caricatures of ourselves, to take our habits and illusions, for this is neither possible nor appropriate. We should wish something better for them and at the same time for ourselves. We need a sense of a society that can take risks with its own self and a people who are prepared to give something of themselves to their own society.

We must face the fact that not all of the poor are going to be able to take on the responsibilities of mass automated society. They have been too long deprived and damaged. But there must be a way of giving them the dignity of citizens, if not through work, then through other forms of social life. For these who cannot work we must concede that there are certain fears that they should not have to face: those of want, illness, and fear for their children.

We must be prepared to let people make demands upon our time, our energies, and our future. This means that the housing projects that constrict the poor into new ghettos must be abandoned. They must be distributed throughout the society so that there is engagement, and at the same time sufficient leavening of others who are poor so that they do not become

lonely and isolated in middle-class tracts. Only in this way can the child of the lower class find his way through the school of the middle classes where new standards are applied and new norms for both sets of children can be sought. The middle classes must give of their children and their time to the poor. We cannot run some schools exclusively for the bright child and others for the dull child, since these differences often confirm the already existing social class structure.

There is a model of commitment to others in such projects as the Peace Corps and Vista. They have about them some feeling of hope. Engagement in such projects for some years on the part of all young people as an alternative to military training would seem useful. At the same time, any of these projects should have attached to them a program of evaluation so that they will not be allowed to run without some estimation being made of their effectiveness and success.

By allowing the poor control of their own lives we will without doubt be running grave risks of inefficiency, waste, and the problem of their having to learn old lessons all over again. There is no doubt that a university professor can design a scheme more efficiently than a committee of the poor. In a democracy that is the risk that we must run—that people will be wrongheaded, foolish, and incompetent. But there is no way to avoid it. If anyone wishes that the poor should become real members of this society, then there seems to be no alternative to allowing them this freedom over their own destinies. They may fail, but let part of the failure be theirs and not a failure imposed on them from the outside.





# "MEANTIME, THE WORLD ..."

*(for Daniel Berrigan)*





Babies are born with closed eyes. People good at life hold them and grow them into not remembering the dark stomach (something I recall since the alley), where we prepared for preparation. Layers of flesh to cover eyes and cushion bones before the people good at life take over (and

life is so relative: someone good here is not good there, and so on). We babies are protected by flesh and socialization. I was shiny pink when I thought I had forgotten the dark stomach, and walked down a gray day street and a cinder night alley

right into the anonymous dead, (people

not good at life) stinking at my feet. Till cold, skinny children came shuffling cinders I could forget the flesh stepped on. ("Is

dead flesh still protective?" I did not even wonder) But the children hardly fleshed brought the stomach through the alley—with a pain in their bones that was hope. The thin ones carry gestation with them like a black sponge hollow on the right track. And

the stomach became my black sponge walls till the pain in the childrens' bones boiled in my marrow: "Who is good at life to close my eyes and flesh my pain?" I wondered. And black

skinny children, enduring, were hopeful.

—KAREN WAYNE



ETCHING: REOPEL



# BUDDHISM: far

By RICHARD BUTWELL

Thailand's comparative tranquility in the troubled times of recent years has been ascribed to the calming influence of Buddhism, its majority faith. In South Viet Nam, on the other hand, Buddhism, albeit of a different sort in a denominational sense, has been the source of seemingly continuous trouble for successive Saigon governments. The most pervasive opposition to military rule in self-withdrawn Burma, however stilled temporarily, may be that of the country's saffron-robed monks. Burma's Buddhists accord only the minimal formal loyalty to their country's fiercely autocratic government, while those of Cambodia solidly support the benevolently dictatorial rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk—partly because Sihanouk has sought to legitimize his regime through appeal to traditional religious values. Communists and anti-communists battle one another in Laos, where the apparent political neutrality of the Buddhists contrasts with South Viet Nam's chronic demonstrations and boycotts.

Communists have grabbed most of the headlines in the five mainland Southeast Asian lands of Viet Nam, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. But it may yet be the Buddhists, the religious majority in these lands, who more decisively influence the evolution of their nations in the years ahead.

Buddhism has been called a "passive" faith, a belief-system that views present existence as the inevitable consequence of deeds done in prior states of being. It is a "religion" that is not a religion because its adherents seek escape from rebirth through demonstrated worth and do not worship—or at least are not supposed to worship—any kind of supreme force. These images, as often happens when complex phenomena are defined in simplified terms, are far from fully, if at all, true.

Monks played a leading role in the Burmese nationalist revolt against rule by the Englishman, exhibiting no more passivity than they did in the pre-British days of the Burmese monarchs when they jealously guarded their prerogatives as favored subjects of a "god-king" who was possessed of sacred as well as secular authority. A Thai prime minister in the 1950's devoted much energy to encouraging construction of temples, not as a function of a fate predetermined by a prior existence, but reportedly as a means of making sure that his next incarnation was a satisfactory one. Bud-



# from fatalistic faith

dhists are not supposed to worship *the Buddha*—he who first obtained Enlightenment and so escaped the cycle of rebirths—but they do so in all the mainland Southeast Asia lands. Also, some Burmese used to fall to their knees in worship-like pose before strongly religious former Premier U Nu, who was widely regarded as being in his last incarnation and so virtually a Buddha himself.

Buddhism is not a passive philosophy—least of all politically. Nor is it necessarily fatalistic politically or otherwise. A ranking Southeast Asia politician once asked: "How does a Buddhist know what his fate is—if he does not pursue one course as contrasted with another? It may be his fate that *with effort* he will succeed—and without it he will not."

Buddhism is not the old order, as has often been claimed in explanation of the resort to demonstrations and other political activity by monks and other faithful in South Viet Nam. The old order passed away long ago in Viet Nam in the sense that monks and mandarins enjoyed any kind of officially sanctioned status. This was perhaps the most momentous general consequence of the unintentional modernization process known as French colonialism. But Buddhism survived not only as the spiritual faith of most Vietnamese but also as the symbol of the quality of being Vietnamese. The other aspects of old Viet Nam that remained were petty; men do not usually die for dress or tongue. But they do lay down their lives in defense of their sense of self-identity, which, when that identity is collective, is called nationalism.

President Ngo Dinh Diem, deposed and murdered in 1963, was a Catholic. Diem had to be discarded—not because Catholicism was objectionable as such to many Vietnamese (or even because of the growing arbitrariness of his rule) but because his religion (and that of his chief supporters) was the most conspicuous remaining legacy of a formerly colonized Viet Nam that denied the Vietnamese his identity. A Vietnamese to be Vietnamese—in the eyes of more of his countrymen than is realized even today after much Buddhist protest activity—had also to be Buddhist or at least not "French Catholic" (as Catholics are still viewed by many members of Viet Nam's Buddhist majority). If Diem had been the most democratic and benevolent of rulers, which he was not, he would probably not have enjoyed Buddhist backing.

The Buddhists who took to the streets in Saigon,

Hue and Danang earlier this year were nationalists—like the Buddhists, many of them the same persons, who demonstrated against Diem. They were distinguishing, as all nationalists do, between "us" and "them." "Them" were the Westernized soldiers who ran the government and the foreigners whom that government allowed to assume such an important role in their country. The Americans, as many Vietnamese see it, are the European returned—a not particularly differentiated cousin of the ousted Frenchmen.

Viet Nam's Buddhists are an important factor in the adjustment process called modernization which is taking place in that country—a process in which prominent parts are also being played by communists, soldiers, Catholics, peasants, ethnic minorities, and others. This adjustment process is largely psychic—and it has its counterparts in emerging nations the world over. In Cambodia, South Viet Nam's neighbor to the west, Prince Norodom Sihanouk skillfully has employed Buddhist symbols, such as the concepts of "selfless sacrifice" and "self-help," to rally his countrymen behind his effort to modernize a still quite backward nation. Burma's U Nu, deposed as premier in 1962, pursued a similar approach, explaining economic and social reforms in terms of Burmese Buddhist folklore and religious doctrine.

Nu failed—not because he did not adequately interpret modernization to his traditionally oriented countrymen—but because Burma's increasingly impatient soldier elite failed to appreciate the strategy he was pursuing. The military, confidently headed by General Ne Win, now governs Burma, and they are fighting the Buddhists, however concealed that power struggle may be temporarily. A year ago Buddhists attacked the offices of the Burma Socialist Program Party, the only legally permitted political organization, and nearly a hundred monks were arrested. At least one monk fasted to death at the time of the attack. Only one Burmese monk, however, has so far burned himself to death as many monks have done in South Viet Nam. This was in August when a monk in Mandalay set fire to himself "to provide light for the Buddha," according to a Rangoon newspaper—a very unusual thing for a Burmese monk to do.

Thich Tri Quang, outspoken leader of South Viet Nam's more militant Buddhists, went on a hunger strike for 100 days in June-September, 1966 in opposition to the September 11 Constituent Assembly elec-



tions (but did not fast to death). Other monks have burned themselves to death in Viet Nam as apparent acts of political protest, and still others may have been similarly burned involuntarily as a result of being drugged.

The political roles of the Buddhist opposition in Viet Nam and Burma, not surprisingly, are quite similar. In Burma the monks are opposed to General Ne Win's leadership not only because he has increased state regulation of their activities but also because he is attempting to modernize the country in terms of values that appear alien to many Buddhists. Ne Win has proclaimed a "Burmese Way to Socialism," but there is nothing Burmese about it. Correspondents and scholars have labelled Ne Win "anti-foreign"—but in fact, and as many Buddhists see it, he is trying to make Burma more like "foreign" (that is, other) lands.

Viet Nam's Buddhists unquestionably reflect the war-weariness of the people of their sorely distressed land. But they, also, embody a spirit of nationalist opposition to the alien—whether it be symbolized by the presence of foreign soldiers (particularly American but also South Korean, Filipino, Australian, and New Zealand), the Western orientation of the army leadership, or the dependence of that leadership on foreigners. Whether or not the communists or the anti-communists win in South Viet Nam, the victor must come to terms with the Buddhists. Nationalism has already colored communism in different lands, as the experiences of the Chinese Cubans and Yugoslavs indicate. If Vietnamese Buddhism is in large measure a nationalist phenomenon (as well as the twentieth-century perpetuation of an ancient faith), communism will be no less influenced by it than other more secular nationalisms.

The end of colonial rule was followed by Buddhist revival movements in all the mainland Southeast Asian lands. Buddhism has grown in strength in recent years. There has been a general resurgence of the sacred—of perhaps greater intensity than the force of the increasingly intruding secular—which, if so, suggests that the communists, if they ever come to power, will find Buddhism no less formidable than Poland's communists have found Christianity.

In Thailand Buddhism seems so far to have been a stabilizing force politically. The Thai leadership has sought to use Buddhism to bolster the regime. To date this effort has been fairly successful. Young King Phumiphon Adunyadet, willing ally of his country's military rulers, has periodically entered the priesthood, had his head shaven, and gone among his people in the yellow robes of their common faith (as Thai males regularly do in their adult years). King and faith are the most prized traditions of the Thai people, who escaped colonial subjection during the heyday of European expansionism. So far, however, Thailand's leaders have only sought to increase and display their support of Buddhism rather than to attempt systematically to justify their modernization efforts in terms of traditional religious values. The fact that these leaders are outspoken adherents of Buddhism, whatever their personal behavioral deviations from some of the main tenets of the faith, could mean that there will not be a clash between traditional religion and the forces of modernization now abroad in the country.

The influence of Buddhism as a politically relevant

force will continue in Thailand as elsewhere in Southeast Asia partly because of the role it plays in the formal education of the young. Even in Burma the soldiers do not seek to destroy Buddhism but rather to neutralize it as a potential opposition and to use it wherever possible. Hence the Ne Win government conducts courses to increase the competence of monk-teachers in various subjects in which they offer instruction. But Buddhism as an agent of socialization is not limited to the formal educational system. Buddhist values also are inculcated in the home, and few young men grow to maturity without spending a little time as novitiates in a monastery. The values to which the young are thus exposed (and in which older males who later return to the monastery are reinforced) cannot help but have political consequences.

The contemporary Buddhist protest movement in both Burma and South Viet Nam is conspicuous for the youth of its participants. Indeed, in Viet Nam small children are often recruited from the schools to demonstrate in the streets and otherwise support the opposition cause. Buddhism in its mainland Southeast Asian setting is by no means an "old person's religion," nor are its leaders of advanced age.

Buddhists in both Burma and South Viet Nam frequently have resorted to force. Young militant monks led a mob in Burma in 1961 which lynched two Moslems in protest of the action of the government of then Premier Nu, himself an extremely tolerant man, in amending the constitution to establish religious freedom. The attack against the office of the government party last year was another example of the willingness of Burma's Buddhists to employ violence for political purposes. Likewise, Vietnamese Buddhists have battled with police and soldiers—and even held newsmen as hostages—to advance their cause.

Nowhere as yet in mainland Southeast Asia, however, have the leaders of organized Buddhism (and Buddhism is more organized and centralized than ever before in these countries) opposed modernization *per se*. Thai monks in large numbers have taken advantage of educational opportunities designed to expand their awareness of the world around them. In Cambodia the Buddhist clergy have been among the strongest supporters of Sihanouk's modernization policies. Even in South Viet Nam it has been foreign influence and a foreign presence, not modernization, that has aroused Buddhist opposition.

But it is nonetheless also true that Viet Nam's Buddhists appear opposed to many things but have not yet adequately articulated what they are for. Burma's soldier leaders gave their clerical opponents an opportunity in 1965 to express their views on several matters, but very few indicated their true feelings.

Is Buddhism, then, more a force for stability or a source of trouble in present-day Southeast Asia?

It is neither *per se*. It can be—and is—either. Nor is the choice the Buddhists' alone although it may be theirs in part, even if some of them dispute this. But Buddhism is a major factor in the lives of the overwhelming majority of the peoples of mainland Southeast Asia as it has been for centuries. Today Buddhism has an evangelistic air and a degree of organization greater probably than it has ever before known in these lands. It is difficult, accordingly, to think of any type of public policy or act that could not potentially provoke its disapproval—or support.



# Christianity: Historical or Personal?

By ROBERT T. OSBORN

*Hermeneutics designates the entire interpretive venture of bringing all language, either written or spoken, to clarity and meaning. As such, hermeneutics is constantly taking place when one individual attempts to relate himself to and to understand another individual, whether that individual be a biblical author or an intimate friend.*

The problems pressing contemporary Protestant theology root almost wholly in the axiom that Christianity is a historical religion—a religion defined by its relationship to an event in history that occurred two thousand years ago. The problems posed by this relationship are two: first, to ascertain through historical investigation precisely what did happen then, and second, to establish in the present situation a meaningful relationship to 'or understanding of' that event. These two issues are commonly referred to as the historical and the hermeneutic questions, and there is no general agreement about which is the prior question.

Answers to the question of priority reflect the particular scholar's vocational interest or commitment. If he is a historian or textual critic he will likely insist on the priority of the historical question, and if he is a dogmatic or biblical theologian, perhaps with a philosophical bent, he will probably give preeminence to the hermeneutic question. Each will rightly complain about the other that he makes the revelation in history contingent upon a rather dubious human enterprise. The theologian protests that the revelation cannot depend upon the vagaries and the relativities of historiography and the historian that it cannot be contingent upon the philosophical or theological prejudices ("pre-understanding") of the hermeneutician. Meanwhile, ignoring the other's criticism, each pursues his enterprise, impossible though it be from the other's point of view. It is probably the case today, however, that the hermeneutician has front stage, with the result that historians

and textual critics carry on in relative isolation from the discussion of the "mainstream." Dogmatic or systematic theologians also operate in a similar, meaningless vacuum, waiting to receive from the hermeneutician that key to scriptures without which theology has neither source nor norm. In effect, the main stream of biblical studies and whatever remains of theology are now identical—they are hermeneutics. Scientific historians and dogmatic theologians are anachronisms. Such, roughly, is the situation resulting from the axiom that Christianity is a historical religion.

The second problem has to do with the fact that the word "history" in this context refers altogether to the event of human decision—to what men have decided and to the present event of human decision. This question is how these two dimensions of history, the past and the present, are related; the hermeneuticians respond with a variety of solutions. There is common agreement, however, that the past can be meaningful only in terms of its ability to help man negotiate his present, and because the present is distinguished from the past only in its consciousness of the future, the meaning of the past must lie in its usefulness for man's encounter with and decision about the future. But when we ask what in the past is meaningful for the present, then hermeneuticians part ways. Bultmannians say it is simply the pastness of the past, it is proclamation of man's "being toward death." Thus its message is the message of a "nothingness" that bestows upon man the burden of freedom and the responsibility of the decision to make of the future

what he will in the resolution of his own spirit. In theological terms, the meaning of the past is the cross. In effect, this position contends that the past is meaningless, without "being" at all, whereas man in the present moment of decision before the threshold of his future is the very substance of reality. As a fact of the past the Jesus of history can therefore be of little value or interest.

Another group of hermeneuticians, some post-Bultmannians, uneasy about this solution, would find some way of preserving the past in the present and for the future. There are some differences among this second group and they speak in many tongues, yet their position amounts fundamentally to the common conviction that the past as such does participate in "being," and that therefore it really has something instead of nothing to say. The being that comes out of man's present existence and decision is understood as having a debt to the being expressed or uttered in the past. This perspective insists that man not only decides but that he decides something; his decisions are articulate—in response to the message or words of the past and expressing itself in words which shape and structure the future.

The solution to the problem of meaning is not the existential decision of the individual but the utterance of being as it is expressed in the language of the past and is reiterated in the witness and language of the present. The first kind of solution tends to sacrifice the past to present existence and the other to reduce both past and present to the depth of being which



comes to expression in both. Neither viewpoint, it appears, really hears from the past as such; despite disclaimers neither party appears effectively interested in the so-called "historical Jesus."

But an even closer look at the historical axiom poses the most crucial question for theology. Even should we imagine that hermeneutics solves its problems and provides us with a bridge to the past, how has it helped us? History by definition is the realm of human decision, yet theology has contended that God and not man is the primary subject of the historical event called Jesus. This I take it is the meaning of the story of Mary's conception by the Holy Spirit and the virgin birth of Jesus. How then—if it be that Christianity is a "historical" religion—can it also be a religion of God and revelation? This problem is beginning to be acknowledged under the guise of a so-called "religionless" Christianity. This notion alleges that the real meaning of religious statements is not religious, but secular. Bultmann pointed in this direction by insisting on demythologizing and reducing all theological statements to existential statements. With disarming honesty, Paul van Buren has suggested that Bultmann and all like-minded people be consistent and not speak about "God"—either to the world or in their own reference to Jesus (letting the issue of his divinity fall where it may). Perhaps embarrassed by their theological vocation, others prefer linguistic confusion and simply label as "God" the ultimate and last word about man and history—whether it be the universal and eternal "ground of being" or that

invisible, eschatological presupposition of existential decision (the God of the cross—the God who wasn't there, isn't here, and is always yet to come).

**H**ermeneutics *vis-à-vis* historiography, and man *vis-à-vis* God—these are the irresolvable and impossible tensions created by the axiom of "historical" religion, the overcoming of which allegedly will decide the future of Christianity. I for one am hard put to understand the survival of the faith for these two thousand years if it really be a "historical" religion.

The history to which the New Testament witnesses is, however, a history which does not witness to itself, to its own historical form.\* It does not point to a past person, but to a present person. There is no evidence that faith arose because of a relationship to that event as past; to the contrary it testifies unequivocally that it arose by virtue of the presence of that past man—Jesus. The faith of the New Testament is resurrection faith. Of course such an "event" as resurrection is impossible on the axiom that Christianity is a "historical" religion, for death is the end of human decision and so the end of history; what is beyond death is beyond history.

Let us then, for the sake of the argument, forget the axiom of "historical" revelation and accept the simple biblical testimony that Jesus lived again to live forever and so to become and to remain a present rather than a past person. For this reason Paul, who lived as a Christian several years after Jesus' death, could say that while he of course lived (and so was historical), nevertheless "it is not I, but Christ" who

lives. Christ was not made alive for Paul by virtue of his coming into Paul's vision or understanding as a historian. No, Christ was not in him so much as he was "in Christ." In this sense the revelation could not be said to have taken place in history, in the decision of Paul or any other person after the event, or within the process of a historical or hermeneutical investigation. To the contrary, history and historical understanding occur in revelation. What Paul understood *about* Jesus was a consequence and an instrument of his being *in* Him.

In effect, the resurrection of Jesus and the rise of faith through a meeting with him means that faith is not a meeting with a past person—an event of "historical" revelation—but rather a meeting with a present person, and the model for understanding the knowledge of faith is not the historical but the personal; the questions are not first of all the historical and hermeneutic, but the questions concerning the mode of personal knowledge.

Personal knowledge, while it is not historical knowledge, is not unrelated to history and historical knowledge. I would indicate in a brief, introductory way the nature of personal knowledge and its relation to the historical in five main theses. These can be stated with reference to the experience of human love and the knowing that takes place in love.

1. The knowledge of love is wholly "objective"; it seeks to know its object exclusively and "has eyes" only for its beloved. The object of a lover's knowledge is only secondarily the love relationship, the so-called I-Thou relationship; he is not in love with love.



Certainly the lover is not primarily concerned to come to a new self-understanding, even though the knowledge of love does indeed create such. No, love seeks only to know the beloved; all else (and there is more) is secondary.

2. The knowledge of love is personal and not historical; it is not properly described or defined by temporal and historical coordinates. More properly we should say that history occurs in love. That is, what love knows is not first of all a historical necessity, a conclusion and consequence of a historical investigation, nor an insight gained by a hermeneutical perception that pierces the veil of historical facts. It is not a creature of a decision of the moment. There is, in other words, no ground, historical or otherwise, upon which love or its knowledge occurs. To the contrary, love simply happens, and as it does it brings with it its own historical possibility and actuality. When it happens it embraces and gives speech to the past, and claims and gives vision, voice, and decision to the present. Thus a man who "falls" in love becomes free to see and hear in the historical and present facts of his beloved certain and articulate evidence of love and its knowledge, to echo in the present a confession in word and deed of his love, and to enter into the future on the promise of this knowledge and the hope of its fulfilment. The knowledgment of love is personal; it is historical in the sense that it creates history and not so much because it happens in history. Simply stated, persons and not history reveal personal knowledge.

3. The knowledge of love is both immediate—mystical and mysteri-

ous—and mediate—rational, and cognitive. It is immediate and mystical in that it pierces to and knows the truth of the loved one before the empirical and historical evidence articulates it. In the sense that it arises prior to the evidence and never fully expresses itself in the evidence it is mysterious. On the other hand, given the event of the mystical, mysterious knowledge of love, love articulates itself and gives rise to language and to the rational and cognitive understanding mediated by the speech of fact and history. These two types of knowledge coincide in the event of love. The second, mediate knowing, is kept open and incomplete by the mystery known at the first level. Thus love knows and does not know at the same time. It is present and realized, yet future and unrealized. A lover knows what he hears the loved one say and what his lips confess in response; but just as certainly, he knows that not all he hears nor all he says can begin to exhaust the reality of the heart of his loved one nor the heart of his love. Not all the facts of her life can tell the whole truth about her, nor do the facts of his obedient response tell the whole truth about him. Therefore love, which comes so eloquently to life and speech, is also often content with rest and silence.

4. The language of a knowing that is also a not knowing may be designated "absolute symbolism." It knows absolutely, yet it is radically transcended by the reality of which it speaks. Love, for example, cannot live without the language of love and fact of the beloved; it makes all the difference to love that the loved one in fact be present;

yet, not all the facts exhaust the depths of that presence. The facts are essential and thus absolute, yet they are only symbolic. In terms of history, it appears that while the revelation of persons does not take place in history it does not take place without history. The historical and hermeneutic questions must be raised and answers sought—but as penultimate and not ultimate concerns. A lover wants to know the facts about his love, not in order to understand or translate, but rather to have more symbols for the revelation of her spirit; i.e., not so much in order to know as to be known by her.

5. The language and symbolism of the knowledge of love is reducible only to the personal name on the objective side, and to freedom on the subjective. The poet can finally say no more about what his love knows than when he utters the name, the personal name of his beloved. The personal name is at once the most concrete, and the most expressive, and yet the most mysterious and symbolic of expressions. The revelation of another in a personal name is also the invocation on the subjective side of freedom, for it makes relative all that love otherwise hears and says, suffers and does, thereby liberating and freeing the lover from himself, his word and deed, for the open mystery of his loved one.

Certainly more can be said about personal knowledge, but these five points are essential: it is wholly objective, and yet for that reason radically subjective; it creates history, but only in a secondary way does it occur in history; it is genuine knowledge, yet



radically mysterious; it is symbolic, yet essential and absolute; it is reducible to the personal name and to freedom. In sum, as regards its relationship to history, it does not occur without historical symbols, yet the ground of the occurrence is non-historical. When it does occur it is expressed in historical symbols and creates genuine knowledge.

The parallels to theological understanding are evident:

1. Theology, like love, is concerned above all to have eyes, ears, and word for its object—for that one person, God in Christ, with the personal name, Jesus, and like love, to find in this one the most radical freedom and subjectivity. Like Paul, it strives to know Jesus Christ.

2. The knowledge of Jesus is neither the product of historical investigation nor hermeneutical understanding; it is rather an event of the grace and spirit of Jesus Christ that articulates the past and gives understanding to the present; it creates the dialogue between past and present in which the future and history are born. It makes possible and necessary the historical investigation and theological understanding; these are not the source but the fruit of faith.

3. This knowledge is mysterious; faith knows, and yet it does not. Paul speaks of knowing Christ, and yet of counting his every gain as nothing. The first epistle of John says both that the Christian knows himself as free from sin, and yet that he is a liar if he says he does not sin. "We see," says Paul, but "through a glass darkly." The Christian possesses Christ now, as a gift of His advent in the Holy Spirit, but he also lives toward the second advent when he will see "face to face." Therefore theology is serious

and yet not serious; dogmatic and yet open.

4. The language of faith with which theology is concerned is absolute and symbolic—as evidenced by the way in which tradition speaks of the "infallible" creeds as "symbols." This means only that theology is absolutely dependent upon the facts of incarnation and Church tradition, yet as symbols which are transcended by their mysterious depth which never appears without these symbols.

5. Theology will reduce the object of its concern to that name above every name—the name of Jesus; this means that the theologian is radically free—free from all other "objects" witnessed in the Bible and free from all the concepts, preunderstandings, and commitments with which he inevitably comes to the Bible and history.

This way of thinking is not wholly unique; it is as we have seen, similar to the way we understand our relationships to one another. This parallel should not surprise us, inasmuch as he whom theology would understand is the firstborn of all creation, the Adam before and after us all, the initial other, our alpha and our omega.

Theology and faith are personal, so if the person, Jesus Christ our Adam, be not raised, then we of all men are most to be pitied. Our God is dead, and neither history nor hermeneutics will raise him. It is in this context that we can understand the so-called "death of God" theology which acknowledges God's death and yet, probably for professional reasons seek to have a "Christian" Godless theology. Thomas J. J. Altizer, for instance, looks for a mystical sort of "*coincidentia oppositorum*" that will

prove the secular to be sacred, the dead God the really living God, the future of Nietzsche's superman the Kingdom of God's Christ. This and similar desperate theologies have made happy use of Bonhoeffer to suggest that modern man has come of age and does not need God anyway.

Sooner or later, however, the Church will die with these theologies or it will awake to their futility and absurdity and refuse to pay for the propagation of a Christless Christianity and a Godless theology. I submit, however, that on the axiom that Christianity is a "historical" religion the Church will have no place to go. As a radically historical event Jesus is nothing but a man, and a dead man at that, and historical knowledge will help little. But if Christ is not dead, if he is resurrected and living as the New Testament declares and the historic Church witnesses, then we are free by the mysterious grace of his presence to know him—not historically, but personally, much as we are free to know each other. Otherwise, to say it again, Christianity and Christian theology have neither *termini a quo* nor *ad quem*.

\* See the interesting and suggestive article "Revelation Through History in the Old Testament and in Modern Theology" by James Barr in *Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology* (April, 1963) reprinted in *New Theology* No. 1, ed. Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 60-74. See especially p. 61 where Barr asks ". . . is it true that the biblical evidence of the Old Testament in particular, fits with and supports the assertion that 'history' is the absolutely supreme milieu of God's revelation?"





LITHOGRAPHS BY KAREN LAUB-NOVAK

# A NEW APOCALYPSE

DECEMBER 1966



## BY LUCIO P. RUOTOLO

When Karen Laub-Novak first conceived of projecting her early sketches into a full series of lithographs on *The Apocalypse*, she resolved to ignore Albrecht Dürer's famous woodcuts on *The Revelation of John*. Her efforts to avoid traditional symbols in conveying the Biblical text typifies the spirit of artistic and religious renewal we have come to associate with contemporary ecumenism.

Karen Laub-Novak had never been encouraged to read the Bible. Significantly, she traces the inception of her artistic plan to the excitement she experienced in 1962 when, through the gift of a Dartmouth Bible, she first studied the last book of *The New Testament*. The commentators' suggestion that the cryptic and apparently chaotic form of this book were clear, indeed revelatory, to the Christians of the first century no doubt challenged an artist of Karen Novak's talent and imagination to create those symbols through which John's vision might speak to a largely secular age. She had long despaired of finding an authentic idiom in the conventional forms of religious art. Similarly striking in this Bible was the strong effort of the Dartmouth commentators to relate the St. James text to the modern *Zeitgeist*.

Paul Tillich's assumption that the modern artist has experienced a complete breakdown of the categories and structures of reality applies readily to Karen Novak's paintings and prints: formulations of the past no longer serve her as foundations for the present. While Dürer's vision of Scripture undoubtedly typifies the immediacy with which fifteenth-century Christendom responded to John's revelation, to modern artists such as Karen Novak, his conceptions,

however brilliant, speak of another age. Since two of her lithographs, "The New Jerusalem" and "Seek Refuge from the Wrath of God," include the central themes of this entire series (the latter is the fitting climax of *The Apocalypse*, the culmination of a mounting vision that the artist confesses grasped her throughout the enterprise), it may prove helpful in discussion to view the form and content in these two prints against Dürer's corresponding woodcuts.

In most of the Nuremberg artist's fifteen woodcuts of *The Apocalypse*, we are confronted by God's literal presence in his proper place above the angelic host and man. To employ here C. S. Lewis' description of the hierarchical principle implicit to *Paradise Lost*, the idea of cosmic order is not merely connected to each print at points where







doctrine dictates: "It is the indwelling life of the whole work, it foams or burgeons out of it at every moment." By contrast, how empty of form and structure, not to mention God's immanence, Karen Novak's conceptions would surely appear to one of Dürer's learned contemporaries! And yet, neither structure nor Deity is absent; her sense of both appears once we consider those radically different assumptions that distinguish one age from the other.

The Biblical text has sparked each artist's conception of New Jerusalem. Dürer's picture of man's recovered Eden is a medieval city whose well-defined spires and sur-



rounding walls form a protective haven from nature run wild. Above the symmetry of this blessed city, birds fly in disarray while the angels standing guard before each gate seem to check the advancing foliage. Behind the walls stretch the disorderly hills, like hunchbacks turning in dumb awe from the architectural grandeur of God's art.

Karen Novak's lithograph reveals the transformation in aesthetic and theological idiom that has occurred in four centuries. Where Dürer has focused on the detail of permanent structure listed by John, Karen Novak is drawn to the images of light and color that are no less central to the Scriptural description. We read in *John* that the streets and indeed the whole city was of gold, that there was ". . . no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine in it: for the glory of God did lighten it." The image that first strikes us in the contemporary lithograph is that of refracted light and the subtly defined motion of wings. One receives the impression of shifting time and space, of majestically orchestrated movement. Unlike Dürer, Mrs. Novak does not allow our vision to come to rest





25th April 1966

The New Jerusalem

Edmund Spenser 1597



upon the finality of an eternal city. She thereby conveys man's historical redemption in terms that speak of beginning rather than end. Stated another way, the glory of Being is manifest as "something evermore about to be."

Dürer felt compelled to root his sense of the New Jerusalem in the present, within the relevant conception of the ideal city; the very towers show scars of war. While it may appear that Mrs. Novak has formulated her picture in a rather nonsubstantial manner, nothing could be further from the artist's intention. Her effort has been, through the richness of color, to translate her vision into clearly terrestrial terms. Here, through the use of brown-gold she achieves a sense of "earthiness" (the description is her own). She explains that her effort in these prints is to work "up-

down" and never "down-up," a deficiency she believes marred Blake's genius. In his etchings, literal and often doctrinaire, contention stands above each artistic representation.

Her richer colors and thrusting images of light appear throughout the entire series as does another important image: the pit with its disseminating blackness. Tension between the forces of light and of darkness is part of the whole golden fabric of time. Even at the culmination of history, modern man conceives of that dark chaos against which and through which new patterns of Being may arise. Karen Novak's "New Jerusalem" expresses modern man's notion of expansive space and of the tension that must accompany all conceptions of growing. The figures arising from the black pit, like the group surrounding the rich golden floor of





1930 approx. 15-6

Seal - third specimen of the type

Presented Nov 24





DÜRER: THE HORRORS OF THE SIX SEALS

the city, grow out of the opposition of colors. Through form (the expression of color) and content she creates a sense of that enveloping presence which philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and writers such as Virginia Woolf have felt and expressed. Significantly, against the background of this common experience, or, more accurately, through it, the twentieth century artist has sought to convey human character.

Karen Novak insists that literal characterizations as well as symbols should grow out of her whole conception as the necessary culmination of the struggle between form and content. Ideally she would like her figures to emerge from the structure at the last moment of composition. Consequently, we must not view the forms that surround the more objective elements in her compositions as mere "background" or as any less central to the statement of the entire print.

The lithograph, "Seek Refuge from the Wrath of God," perhaps best

illustrates the artist's effort to convey the revelatory character of her encounter in essentially non-literal terms. Hesitant to discuss or explicate her own compositions, she leaves it to viewer and critic to extend and develop her symbols through the idiom of language. In this print she has utilized the same detail expressed in Dürer's treatment of "The Horrors of the Six Seals": the black sun, the bloody moon, the rain of fire and man alone "in the rocks of the mountains." Dürer's visual effect, however, establishes an order directed from top (heaven) to bottom (earth). The flaming stars, in the form of a pointed triangle, its apex descending from the angelic host, fall in orderly symmetry upon all mankind—king, bishop and bondman. The heavens proclaim the order of God, sun and moon balanced on each side of the flaming triangle. Below, man, blotted by sin, lies in disarray (like the natural objects surrounding "New Jerusalem") among the weeds and fruitless soil.






1960 Apr 6.12-17

Man Seeking Refuge from the Wrath of God

Karen Laut Nival '64





Karen Novak informs us that the initial effort in her own lithograph was the struggle between the black areas surrounding the small moon (in the right corner of the print) and the adjacent lightness. In her "New Jerusalem" light carries with it a sense of liberation from the restricting forces of night; here it conveys a white emptiness in keeping with the scriptural emphasis upon man's uprooted alienation from God. Though pitted against one another, neither light nor dark offers the means of Grace. The conception (before figures have appeared) empties perception of dimension: there is no up or down, no surface or depth. Sun and moon stand in absurd juxtaposition to one another, while the falling stars, stim-

ulated by blotted spots of red swirling across the print, have neither form nor direction; if they have a source it is from the side rather than from above. Dimension appears (the artist tells me "in the last minute" of composition) with the emergence of human figures. They are part of the barrenness conveyed by the non-objective elements of the composition. Hanging as they do between life and the inanimate (the figures at a glance could be rocks, frozen in permanent isolation from all sources of life), their being borders on definition. As in her most successful prints, this is precisely the tentative impression the artist has strived to create. From wrath to redemption, the mystery of God's inten-








tion remains for her a non-verbal mystery. The only objective sign she feels free to convey is a quality ironically close to the idea of stone. What the figures do is to supply an impression of rooted endurance that evidently inspired the artist when she first read the Dartmouth Bible commentary. The one word Karen Novak underlined in this preface was "fidelity"—man's courageous willingness to persevere. It is the same heroic dimension that typifies so much of our secular literature, the absurd quality in man that encourages him to wait in loyal resignation for a God that has long since vanished.

Whether by intention or not, Karen Novak has subtly imparted a Christian direction to her abstract com-

position. At the center of the lithograph, rising from the stone-like characters who hunch in postures of suffering, two figures emerge in the familiar stance of a pieta. The central character, holding the defined and emaciated corpse, stands with head slightly bowed in the midst of adversity waiting with that patience the Dartmouth commentary extolls in early Christendom. There is no note of sentimentality in the statement, no easy exit from the atmosphere of cosmic despair. Karen Novak's setting has conveyed. The body, recalling the dead Saviour, is one more burden for the faithful to withstand. The head of the standing figure, half dark, half light, likewise reinforces the ambivalent tentativeness of all human affirmation.





1970 Apr. 12 11-16 *Confrontation Between "Man" and "Beast"* Johnson - Wood 29



Karen Laub-Novak, like her famous predecessor, has translated *The Apocalypse* into the idiom of her day. Whether her conceptions move modern day Christians to a valid sense of immediacy in John's revelation is for the learned theologian to decide. She has succeeded, however, to free one viewer from outdated symbols and to evoke through her new and exciting forms a welcome sense of renewal. No doubt her lithographs are speaking to many more.

Karen Laub-Novak currently maintains a painting studio in Palo Alto, California, where for the past year she and her husband, Stanford University professor and author Michael Novak, have made their home. They have an infant son, Richard. Mrs. Novak received the B.A. from Carleton College and the M.F.A. from the State University of Iowa, where she studied painting and print making. Oskar Kokoschka was her teacher in Salzburg in 1958. Her lithographs on *The Apocalypse* and a series of etchings inspired by T. S. Eliot's "Ash Wednesday" were done while she was in Rome with her husband during the second session of the Vatican Council. Her work is in private collections, at institutions including Yale University and Carleton College, and has been seen in one-man shows at galleries throughout the country, most notably in Boston, New York, Des Moines, Chicago, and San Francisco.



*Works of literature, especially those of poets and the Bible, have been a major source of inspiration for all my prints and many of my paintings. I try to recreate the spirit of the entire work, but frequently a single word or phrase will stimulate a series of visual images. These images grow out of but are not forced by the words; I try to understand the author's meaning as deeply as I can, reading and re-reading all the time that I work. My primary concern in a painting or a print is structure, the organization of color and forms. I also want to express certain human concerns. I am interested in man's attempt to find himself, his struggles with hope and despair, suffering, death. I find the discipline of recreating verbal imagery into visual structure liberating, not confining.*

—Karen Laub-Novak





W/30 Dec. 17: 1-18  
DECEMBER 1966

The Harlot Babylon

Karentaut Nov 64 35





10/30 apr 1618

Death Knight Horseman of the Apoc

Raven Lant Wood



# CHRISTIANS and the POLITICAL REVOLUTION

By JOSÉ MÍGUEZ BONINO

In the little town of El Carmen, Colombia, on Tuesday the 15th of February Camilo Torres, the priest turned *guerrillero*, was ambushed and killed. The news flashed like lightning throughout Latin America. Was Torres an apostate? Couldn't he have chosen a different road without betraying his vocation and his human authenticity? Was he lured by a romantic illusion into forgetting his specific task as priest? A careful study of his career—his itinerary to violence—provides an excellent case-study of the situation, the options, the pitfalls and the risks for a Christian who becomes aware of the conditions in which his people live and tries to respond actively at the political level. "I am a revolutionary," said Torres, "because I am a priest and because I am Catholic."

Born of a wealthy and aristocratic stock and destined to become a lawyer, Camilo felt the call to the priesthood. After completing his theological studies with honors, he was sent to Louvain to receive special training in sociology. Back in Colombia, as teacher and chaplain at the National University, he began to analyze the Colombian situation and to relate for himself and his students the meaning of his analysis. He believes that to be a Christian is to be concerned for men in their concrete, particular daily needs. He asked that the traditional top priority of the Church—external worship—be reviewed. "In my view, the hierarchy of priorities should be reversed: love, the teaching of doctrine and finally worship. "Love meant concretely a conscious and intelligent effort to change the basic economic and social structures which produced the dire conditions in which the people lived. But the Cardinal primate returned a formalist answer to Torres' concerns: "Revolution is only justified when there is absolute tyranny." Furthermore, the bishop argued, "In the social realm there are debatable issues, and the Church does not enter into debatable areas because its truth is permanent."

Camilo would not accept this formal answer. He pressed his point: "Revolutionary action is a Christian, a priestly struggle." He was removed from his post in

the university. When he announced publicly his platform for social reform—a rather simplest socialist program—the cardinal forbade him to speak further on social questions and denounced publicly his doctrine as "pernicious and erroneous." Torres had to request reduction to the lay status. "Revolutionary action is a priestly struggle . . . I have resolved to offer myself, thus fulfilling a part of my mission to carry men through mutual love to the love of God."

Camilo's program was to gather and integrate all groups interested in a revolutionary change, to form a "united front." How did he expect to succeed? He could not place any hope in the political system of his country. Too many gentleman's agreements between conservatives and liberals ensured that the same traditional oligarchy would hold power in successive periods under different names. At the polls, the people had two choices and both meant the same. Camilo preached abstention. But this was not enough. A general strike, peaceful disobedience was the next step. But this meant repression.

Torres was driven to admit that only a violent revolution could change things. "Now . . . the people do not believe in elections. The people know that legal means are at an end. . . . The people know that only armed rebellion is left. The people are desperate and ready to stake their lives so that the next generation of Colombians may not be slaves." At this point the Castroist movement offered the most efficient organization and Torres joined it. A dupe of communism? "I would rather be that than a dupe of the oligarchy."

How can a devoted, intelligent Christian be led to such a position? A brief analysis of the situation in underdeveloped countries can help us to understand the answer to this question and give us a perspective on the political revolution. In making this analysis we need to remember that human civilization, taken in a large sense, covers at least three basic different levels\*:

\*This three-fold analysis of civilization has been taken over from an address by Prof. Paul Ricoeur ("Taches de l'educateur politique," in *Esprit*, 7-8/1965; pp. 78 ff.)



1. The level of goods, which not only includes instruments, machines and technics, but also accumulated knowledge and everything which is instrumental for the creation of wealth and comforts for the community.

2. The level of institutions through which technical and economic realities are put to use; here we must include both the juridical system which regulates the possession, production and use of goods and the different instances of power applying and regulating the exercise of the law. (In this essay, the political is represented quite clearly by this second level. It is also clear that it is at this level that goods and values are integrated and made functional in the life of the community.)

3. The level of "values," understood as the attitudes of men towards the others, the community, work, happiness and the meaning of life.

Latin America is a dramatic illustration of a revolutionary situation. The population doubles every 25 to 30 years and will reach 600 million by the end of the century—almost double the calculated population of the USA for the same time. For 120 of the 200 million now living there, hunger is a normal condition of life. While food production has increased considerably since World War II, the level of per capita consumption has decreased in several countries. Four out of every ten people are under 15 years of age. In Chile 13% of the population gets two-thirds of the total production of the country; in Brazil 3% of the population owns 62% of the productive land. Income comes to 10% to 20% of what is normal in Northern Europe and the USA—and is distributed according to the line indicated. The statistics of disease, health, literacy and housing likewise reveal radical disparities.

On the other hand, Latin American investments yield considerable dividends; the world centers of fashion never fail to make their displays and obtain their gain in large Latin American cities. Latin American films, football teams and musical shows compete successfully in the world capitals and the number of high-brow books, illustrated weeklies and popular magazines in cities like Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro or Mexico City compare favorably with that of New York, London or Paris. The truth of Latin America is symbolized by the begging, tattered children at the door of the Hilton Hotel in any large Latin American capital.

Reduce statistics to people and you will see the wrinkled face of misery. This is the face that Torres learned to love, the man for whom he was ready to offer his life.

Let us push the analysis further. The scientific and technical revolutions are now creating the possibility of producing a phenomenal amount of goods. Land can be made to yield fifty times more than it is now yielding in these countries. Food production, diversification of production, and the use of natural resources are all technically possible today. At the same time, a new set of values spreads all over the world: the idea of human dignity, the sense of the paramount importance of the highest standard of living possible, the conviction that man's happiness and plenitude must be realized here, on earth and in history.

This is the revolutionary situation. Need is not new, what is new is the consciousness of need and of a plenitude to be reached. First, you have poverty, the objective disproportion between human need and available resources. Then, there is misery which comes from knowing that goods are ultimately available but presently denied. Finally, frustration begets irritation and anger at the real or imagined obstacles that stand in the way between the beckoning goods and the unsatisfied need. These felt needs are increased by what is called "the revolution of growing expectations." It is not merely that sixteen-year-old Latin Americans of the slum weigh 95 pounds and are 5 feet tall; the point is that at the other side of the avenue he can see other boys the same age who are 5 foot 6 and weigh 120 pounds. It is not just that they will hardly live to see their grandchildren—their life expectancy being way below forty; they know that disease and death can be pushed back and the joys of life can be extended for twenty years more. Rapid and luxurious cars, TV sets, new dresses, fun and comfort are displayed everywhere and even backwoods populations can see them in the newspapers in which their miserable purchases are wrapped. Commercial and political propaganda—Sears and Roebuck catalogues and communist pamphlets—produce the same results. The eyes of the poor are transfixed by the picture of this heaven which he must obtain at all costs. Life without it is intolerable! This is the revolutionary temper. This is the face of Latin America and of the whole underdeveloped world: a face contorted by hunger, expectation and wrath. This is the face of revolutionary man.

But now the political situation of institutions becomes crucial. The institutions relating goods and values in the community are today—at least in Latin America—totally useless. That is, they prevent this integration of goods and values. This integration requires a regulation of economy, but the economy of underdeveloped countries is dependent. There is no international law or institution to regulate it effectively; therefore the usual checks to the profit motive of Western capitalist countries are not operative at the international level. There is no international institution which regulates the use of national power toward a successful distribution of goods in terms of total human needs. There is no law and no judge between rich and poor countries, no political institution wielding real—which means compulsory—power. Nationalism is therefore the only defense: the political revolution of our time is almost inevitably nationalist.

The liberal decentralizing theory is equally negative in most underdeveloped countries. This theory tries to disconnect as much as possible different sectors of social life from the political function. Culture, science and above all economy are autonomous and assert their presence in society according to their own internal dynamics and momentum. Government acts simply for the maintenance of order. This is naturally a function of conservation: it tends to keep the existing balance. But, in unjust and intolerable situations such as exist in most underdeveloped countries, the system can only perpetuate injustice and make it even more intolerable. The result of this system: countries with one single product developed exclusively for exports, misused or underdeveloped land, or a useless luxury industry; in

motive



sum, a totally lopsided economy which has had no regard at all for the common good. Inevitably, the redressing of an unjust situation requires a centralizing power which will assign to each sector its proper function and will regulate its functioning for the common good. The political revolution of our time is almost inevitably centralizing.

Finally, the electoral system is proving equally deceitful. Curiously enough, the failure of the liberal system has made it possible that all power—beginning with economic power—become concentrated in a few hands (landowners or any other type of oligarchy). Inevitably this minority will use political power for its own ends. Other interests in the country—cultural, scientific, even ecclesiastical—will depend upon the favor of this powerful minority. The vote becomes merely a way of trading formal legitimation of this power for a measure of security for these dependent sectors of society.

Thus, elective democracy is at best, a highly legal and formal game through which the landed aristocracy exercise control; at worst, a facade behind which the landowners, the army, international interests and the ecclesiastical hierarchy defend their privileges. In any case, the masses of population are untouched and uninterested in this game. They can expect nothing from it except the continuation of their age-long serfdom. Recent elections in Santo Domingo and Bolivia prove how useless an election can be. The simplicity and popular indifference in which the whole democratic constitutional life of Argentina was swept away in one day is another proof of its irrelevance. The political revolution of our day is almost inevitably a breach in the institutional order and at least a temporal suppression of traditional politics.

The attempt to by-pass the political question by substituting for it the so-called technical or scientific revolution, however well intended, is necessarily reactionary. Revolution can only be used in such cases in a metaphoric or analogical sense. In any proper sense, revolution can only apply a rapid and radical change, involving all the basic structures of society, deliberately produced by and responding to an ideology. Basic to any such change is the question of power; a revolution is necessarily a transference of power and consequently a political event. Moreover, in the present situation, characterized by a growing and abyssmal inequality in the distribution of goods and the universal extension among the people of the ideas of human dignity, the contents of this revolution will be social. And given the fact that the structures of power inimical to change are identified with Western imperialism and have usually worked—at least in Latin America—through the formal elective democracies allied with supposedly decentralized free-trade economies, the revolution will be nationalist, centralizing and disruptive of the formal order.

The types of revolutions of this kind are numerous. The Belgian priest, Francois Houtart, has distinguished at least four types in Latin America: the utopian, based on a vision of social organization derived from a certain ideal model (characterized by some of the patriots of the early times of Latin American independence); the anarchic, which absolutizes the revolutionary moment without paying attention to the post-

revolutionary process of building up a new order (corresponds to some extent to the first moment of the Cuban revolution and to some of the "guerrilla" movements); the Marxist, which is increasingly drawing to itself many of the idealist and anarchic groups because it offers a solid ideological foundation and clear models of social organization from the local to the international level—thus providing a workable means of attaining the radical change so earnestly desired; and the "humanist" revolution, usually led by Catholic liberal groups, moderately socialist in aims and trying to obtain changes by the least painful means and preserving as much as possible legal continuity. The typical example of the latter in Latin America is Chile. (Some would like to mention as a fifth type the "nationalist Nasserist" type, usually centered in the military forces—but I have not witnessed a radical social change effected in Latin America by this type of force.)

The preceding suggests the inevitable impact of the situation of the underdeveloped world upon politics, and some of the characteristics of the political revolution. But the urgent question for us is: what is the Christian's responsibility as he faces this revolutionary situation? A pietist attempt to avoid the issue or a "secularist" denial that there is any particularly Christian view of the question are equally untenable. The former only succeeds in fact in adding up its weight to the forces of reaction (as pietism has done many times) and the latter in surrendering to some kind of revolutionary optimism devoid of all prophetic ferment and thus betrays the revolution itself.

"Revolution is a Christian and a priestly thing," said Camillo Torres. And in that, he was right. A Christian must think through the question of revolution on the basis of his faith and he must express this interpretation in the concrete situation and translate it into action.

The first task is the development of a dynamic political ethics, including an ethics of revolution. Traditional Christian political ethics—both Catholic and Protestant—has been centered in the notion of the rights and duties of the ruler as the embodiment of the political function. Righteousness and peace have been conceived as adjectives to government. Therefore the idea of continuity of government was thought to be the guarantee of the continuity of political order. I submit that this is not the necessary—not even the best—interpretation of the biblical teaching in this respect. Rather the political function: the creation, maintenance and redressing of God's order: righteousness and peace (*shalom*—not the negative peace of the Roman juridical tradition) are the substance, and the ruler is subordinate to this function. For this reason Jahweh (and his prophet) deposes and raises up kings and rulers—in Israel and elsewhere. A dynamic political ethics must define order in terms of a healthy and efficacious structuring of the exercise of power for an integration of goods and values in the service of the human community. Legal continuity is a valuable element of order but not necessarily the most important one or the one that must be preserved at all costs. (The argument for obedience on the basis of the New Testament seems to me quite questionable; on the one hand, the only thing which could be deduced is that religious persecution is not a valid reason for attempting to overthrow the



government—curiously enough almost the only reason that Christian moralists have justified; on the other hand, in all cases the obedience enjoined to the ruler is based on the fact that he is the preserver of order and peace, the avenger of evil and rewarder of the good; i. e. he is clearly subordinated to the political function!) Continuity, moreover, must not be reduced to the legal order as a traditionally aristocratic or monarchic dynastic mentality has led us to assume, nor can popular representation be identified with the electionary system, which is only one of its possible forms and which is adequate to a certain time and place, culture and mentality. The basic political categories of organic continuity and popular representation can be worked out in a diversity of forms which an intelligent political ethics must be able to include within its purview.

An ethics of revolution needs to deal with several other important questions in which the Christian understanding of man and society are of paramount importance. How can the disruption of community (inevitable in a revolutionary movement which is always against some and for others) be kept in relation to the re-creation of community which is necessary for the constructive phase of the revolutionary process? In other words, what are the guidelines in the unavoidable questions of suppression, revolutionary vindictive justice and the recuperation of the classes displaced from power? How is the relation of person and structure to be defined in such a way that the dehumanizing tendency inherent in all revolution be checked without allowing individual obstinacy to neutralize necessary reforms (such as agrarian reform, compulsory work, etc.)? How can the mystic identification necessary for a successful revolution—and the corresponding ideology—be kept from becoming dogmatic idolatry or personality worship?

Finally, an ethics of revolution cannot avoid discussing the question of the use and justification of violence. This question, nevertheless, needs to be placed in its proper perspective as a subordinate and relative question. It is subordinate because it has to do with the "cost" of the desired change—the question of the legitimacy of revolution is not decided on the basis of the legitimacy of violence and vice versa. "Violence" is a cost that must be estimated and pondered in relation to a particular revolutionary situation. It is "relative" because in most revolutionary situations—at least in those with which we are concerned—violence is already a fact constitutive of the situation: injustice, slave labor, hunger, and exploitation are forms of violence which must be weighed against the cost of revolutionary violence. The ethical discussion of the question of violence must not therefore be restricted to the problem of its absolute justification (which is usually a purely theoretical question) but must deal with the problem of the conditions and limits of its use: its relation to post-violent pacification, the clear possibility of controlling it, a rational probability of success and the proportionality to the unjust situation. This may sound too casuistic—but then, in politics we deal finally with the situations of communities and persons and this, rather than abstract principles, is the touchstone of the value of a political ethics.

The second task of the Christian church—and one

which flows from the one we have just mentioned—is the task of political education—both within and without the Christian community. Political education in general has to do with the three levels of civilization to which we alluded in the beginning: It is an education for the planning of production and the use of goods, for the regulation of institutions, and for the criticism of values. It is the particular task of the Church to point out the ethical significance of decision at the three levels: when production is transferred from the area of private decision to that of collective planning (as it necessarily happens today whether in East or West) a number of ethical questions devolve on the political institutions. All the questions can be summarized in one sentence: a responsible politics must be concerned with the creation of economic democracy as much as with juridical representation. At the proper political level—namely that of the political institutions—the Church must constantly push the ethical question as an instrument of analysis of the concrete choices of compromise which are the stuff of political action. In other words, there is always a prophetic task of challenging the existing institutions in the name of God's righteousness and peace. This prophetic task is legitimate only when it is coupled with a permanent stimulus on the part of the Church to its own members to participate in the political sphere, without avoiding the tension and ambiguity inherent in the exercise of power in this age. Finally it is clear that the values which a community receives from its history and accepts must be constantly both criticized and upheld. Christian apologetics has a new task—the task of bringing up for conscious analysis and criticism the myths by which a community lives and acts, certainly not with the purpose of creating some kind of Christian "ideology" which would then shape a Christian politics, but with the intention of ferreting out dehumanizing elements present in those myths and values which work themselves out in a distortion of political institutions.

We must not forget that a revolutionary situation is one always shot through with tension, confrontation and conflict—in which men suffer (whether justly or unjustly does not matter at this point) and are sacrificed (whether necessarily or not does not matter at this point). The Church is a community of reconciliation, a catholic community which cannot be for some and against others but always with Christ and therefore for all men—whether proletarian or oligarchs, exploiters or exploited, revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries. To be for them does not mean to tone down the prophetic witness or to silence potentially conflictive issues. It means to accept and fulfill a pastoral duty of comfort and restoration, the faithful stewardship of the gospel of forgiveness. It means refusing to make any human conflict (however apparently justified) into a "holy war." It means keeping for the Church and the Christian the freedom of those who know that, however much they may and must be involved in the struggles of this world and age, the final peace and righteousness are not attained through human exertion but will be given by God in that Kingdom, the coming of which man can neither hasten nor delay. This is the only true and final revolution, the work of Him who said: "I make all things new."



# THE BLACK HORIZON

two new poets of the Latin revolution

translated by MARGARET WILDE

poems by MICHELE NAJLIS

## THE SIGN

How long, the silence of so much dry-eyed sorrow?  
Over this sterile surface  
over this piece of desert  
they raised an enormous signpost:

HERE SORROW HAS NO FORM, NO COLOR  
LIFE IS A PILE OF STONES  
WHITE  
AND DRY  
TIME IS A SUCCESSION OF MINUTES  
NOT YET BORN  
AND A CRY IS AN ECHO  
FROM EMPTINESS TO EMPTINESS

*Hasta dónde llegará el silencio de tanto dolar sin  
lágrimas?  
Sobre esta superficie estéril  
sobre este pedazo de desierto  
han extendido un cartel inmenso:*

*AQUI EL DOLOR NO TIENE FORMA NI COLOR  
LA VIDA ES UN CUMULO DE PIEDRAS  
BLANCAS  
Y SECAS  
EN TIEMPO ES UNA SUCESION DE MINUTOS  
QUE AUN NO HAN NACIDO  
Y EL GRITO ES EL ECO DEL VACIO  
QUE REGRESA AL VACIO.*

Here the dimension of sorrow is too long to understand without coming to bloodshed.

## UNIVERSALS

The world  
and in the world  
a street.

In the street a gaslight.

Under the light  
a shivering child.

This is the simple dimension of the universe.

*Aquí la dimensión del llanto es demasiado larga  
para que se la comprenda sin llegar a la sangre.*

*El mundo  
y sobre el mundo  
una calle.*

*En la calle un farol.*

*Bajo el farol  
un niño tiene frío.*

*Esta es la simple dimension del universo.*

## SOLIDARITY

They followed us in the night  
they corralled us  
leaving us no defense but our hands  
united with millions of united hands.  
They made us spit blood,  
they lashed us;  
they filled our bodies with electric charges  
and our mouths with lime;  
they left us at night among the wolves,  
they threw us in timeless dungeons,  
they tore out our nails;  
our blood covered their rooftops  
and their very faces,  
but our hands  
are united to millions of united hands.

*Nos persiguieron en la noche,  
nos acorralaron  
sin dejarnos mas defensa que nuestras manos  
unidas a millones de manos unidas.  
Nos hizieron escupir sangre,  
nos azotaron;  
llenaron nuestros cuerpos con descargas electricas,  
y nuestras bocas las llenaron de cal;  
nos dejaron noches enteras junto a las fieras,  
nos arrojaron en sótanos sin tiempo,  
nos arrancaron las uñas;  
con nuestra sangre cubrieron hasta sus tejados,  
hasta sus propios rostros,  
pero nuestras manos  
siguen unidas a millones de manos unidas.*



**THE SUMMONS**

Where can we go  
since the horizon  
closed in on us?  
Where can we go  
when on all sides  
we find ourselves  
on the same inevitable road?

To whom shall we tell our sorrow  
when we are bleeding  
from utter absence and oblivion?

God has forgotten the soldier  
he sent to the front lines to fight  
against the wind,  
against himself,  
against the reapers  
of the sweat of his brow.

**EMPLAZADO**

*A dónde ir  
si ya el horizonte  
nos encerró?  
A donde ir  
si en todas partes  
todos nos encontramos  
andando el mismo camino  
ineludible?*

*A quién contarle nuestros dolores  
si estamos todos sangrando  
de pura ausencia y olvido. . . ?*

*Dios se olvidó del soldado  
que puso al frente a luchar  
contra el viento  
contra sí mismo,  
contra los segadores  
del sudor de su frente.*

**THE ROAD**

What good are gods  
when beyond our hope  
poverty smiles?

Why go around in circles?  
The road at last  
is swallowed up by time.

Take up your road, but slowly;  
you are your own time  
and your own road.

*Para qué los dioses  
si más allá de la esperanza  
sonríe la pobreza?*

*No hay que desandarse  
el camino será al fin  
recogido por el tiempo.*

*Recoge tu camino lentamente;  
tu eres tu tiempo y tu camino.*

**GOD IS BLACK**

God is black, like Nkrumah  
like Lumumba or Kwabnah.  
No one has seen him, so  
no one believes in his blackness.  
Ascochinal agrees  
and that is enough.  
God is black, black, black.  
There is white in his teeth,  
black in all of him.  
His anger is like blackness  
slow and furious.  
God is black: uncolored,  
and the most inhuman men  
dressed him all in white  
to ridicule the holy one  
they can only conceive  
colored like their countrymen;  
but God is black, black. Black,  
to the astonishment of those  
who adore the white. . .

**DIOS ES NEGRO**

*Dios es negro, como Nkrumah.  
como Lumumba o Kwabnah.  
Nadie lo ha visto, por eso  
nadie cree en su negrura.  
Ascochinal está de acuerdo  
ye eso basta.  
Dios es negro, negro, negro.  
De blanco tiene los dientes,  
de negro lo tiene todo.  
Su cólera es como el negro,  
lento pero furibundo.  
Dios es negro: incoloro,  
Y los hombres más bestiales  
le han vestido de gaban blanco  
para burlarse del santo  
a quien sólo se imaginan  
del color de sus paisanos;  
pero Dios es negro, negro. Negro  
para sorpresa de todos  
los que adoran a los blancos. . .*



# NATIONALISM:


## Politics in a Biblical Perspective

By COLIN M. MORRIS

When we seek the Bible's word for politics in our time, we sit down to a banquet of paradoxes, garnished with dilemmas when we had hoped for imperatives. How can a Christian evolve a political philosophy out of the contradictory and enigmatic material of the Bible? Unequivocal committal to the world, which is the essential condition of true political action, seems to be endorsed by the proclamation that God so loved the world that he gave his only son that it might not be condemned but saved. But turn the pages and we are confronted by a stern warning not to love the world and the assurance that friendship with the world will earn us God's undying enmity. How do you make practical politics out of that paradox?

So massive and central are the biblical contradictions that only one of two explanations is possible. Either we must adopt the most mechanical view of the progressive revelation of God's truth in the Bible and assume that what is said chronologically later is to be preferred to what is said earlier as a clearer reflection of God's unfolding will, or else, we face a possibility with terrifying implications. It is that the Bible confronts us as a great slab of history marked by God's footprints. This history is a vast, untidy, messy picture of a world where ambiguities are so deep-seated that it is impossible to address oneself to them except in paradox. This is the world as it is and will continue to be through historical time—utterly resisting all attempts of the philosophers, priests and kings to make sense of it.

But if we take the Christian doctrine of redemption seriously, by what right could we expect any simpler, more rational explanation? If history had been a triumphant procession of cause and effect, transparent in meaning but swung slightly off course by the failure of men and nations to realize their destinies, then God's necessary action would have been limited to the letting loose of a redemptive idea which would have checked the drift and got the world back on track. Instead, the very rigorousness of God's action—the Incarnation—indicates the centrality of ambiguity and the desperate difficulty in dealing with it within the limitations he has imposed upon himself. The total biblical picture is of a universe rocked about its foundations, a cosmic upheaval, a widening circle of consequences, both good and bad, flowing from the demonic actions of



The real danger lies within.

men and societies. What political philosophy could make sense of that?

And if we are brutally frank, we must confess that God's redemptive action and event—Jesus Christ—appears to deepen rather than clarify the ambiguities of history. Marxism—by contrast—sees the end of history, from the beginning, as a great monolithic structure within which even catastrophe is predictable and usable. In Marxist philosophy men need not wait for perfection to evolve from the working out of historical processes but can carry perfection forward with them, justified in using any degree of guile or force against those who do not agree.

But no simple dogmatic assertions can really speak to the moral precariousness and ultimate tragedy of the whole human enterprise. The Christian is denied the luxury of being able to treat history as a series of problems and answers. Indeed, whenever we talk in terms of the 'Christian' answer to a political problem, we have strayed far from biblical faith and are almost certainly reading into the situation our own ideological biases. We are compounding the Marxist and secular idealist errors by assuming that history itself is redemptive.

The Bible addresses the world in paradox in order to define the limits within which the divine and demonic



operate in historical situations. It recognizes with ruthless realism that no human institution is likely to exist either in the pure form of an ordinance of God or as an utterly diabolic perversion of it, but will oscillate between these two poles. So the Christian finds himself speaking a paradoxical word to the world, the apparent contradictions of which serve both to encourage it in well doing and act as a corrective to contemporary error and sinfulness. We speak not to offer a blueprint or lay down a policy so much as to respond to a mood.

### Apocalyptic Utopianism

The contemporary mood of the world to which Biblical faith must speak and testify of God's rule is apocalyptic utopianism. The title of a recent Stanley Kubrick film puts it much better and less pretentiously: ". . . How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb!" Our postwar world has learned quickly to transmute its fear of atomic extinction into a strange hope. Because the unthinkable has not happened, hope grows of a world community flourishing in the shadow of the H-bomb's mushroom cloud—its unity assured by a balance of terror, its optimism vested in a gigantic paradox. The possibility of the instrument of our destruction becoming the guarantee of our security tempts us. Over the imposing entrances to our multiplying international institutions might be graven those words of Winston Churchill: 'Peace Shall Be the Sturdy Child of Terror!'

Certainly there is little of the old liberal utopianism about. Two wars have purged the world of any expectation that universal brotherhood can issue either from the conquest of the darker side of man's nature or the expression of his innate selflessness and goodwill. Ours is truly an apocalyptic utopianism because it is based upon the blinding perception that in the nuclear age the whole world is the smallest possible unit of survival. The appropriate image of our time is not the Greek one of Man as Apollo, the charioteer of the sun, rising ever higher, untrammelled in achievement, but an African one of Man welded into one tribe by the fear of a common enemy, friend and foe huddled round the fire, driven together by terror of the nameless things in the dark beyond the flickering light.

Yet there is impressive evidence that the world has succeeded in making law out of its necessity. The dogged survival, against all odds, of the United Nations organization; the international agencies which testify to the fact that there are certain elemental things such as food and education and health which the whole world owes to any part of it; the evolution of a sketchy international morality, whose existence nations acknowledge, even in their breach of it, by their attempts at self-justification—all these symbolize the struggle for world community. Thanks to Hiroshima and Nagasaki for their wonderful gift: fear more potent than love and more durable than goodwill!

This strange hope is also bolstered by another great reality of our time which is partly a by-product of the balance of power which the nuclear age has made inevitable: the collapse of the old empires and the rapid spread of nationhood. Willingly or unwillingly, the right of peoples to become nations has been conceded and has found expression in the appearance of hundreds

of new sovereign states, many with unpronounceable names, all desirous of expressing their peculiar genius through political institutions they have created, borrowed or inherited. Rich new content has been poured into the concept of the nation as men of many races savor for the first time the strange pride of patriotism and the rich, heady wine of selfhood.

The technology which has made one world a scientific miracle has been harnessed to guarantee the viability of these new nations, spawning highways, bridges, universities, dams, modern cities, and industrial complexes where once was desert, jungle, silence, darkness. So men have emerged from their deep shelters and are making yet another attempt to build a tower up to heaven, which this time, thanks to modern communications, need to be no Babel.

And in many areas of the world, the Church has been caught up in this intoxication. For the first time since the end of the liberal era it is possible to hear Christian leaders talking about a historical kingdom of God as a biblical skeleton, fleshed out into the shape of existing or hoped-for international institutions. In the most unlikely quarters, men are succumbing to the old Marxist heresy that history has a political goal, and the sombre biblical truth that the meaning of history is found only beyond itself is ignored. The new heaven and earth are not the final shapes wrought out of the material of history but are the gifts of God from beyond.

Upon this scene of frenetic activity, the Christian bursts with a word which sounds as appropriate as the choir singing 'Sheep may safely graze' at the butcher's funeral. It is the paradoxical word which God speaks, according to Genesis, as he surveys the original Tower of Babel: 'You have done well. Therefore I will bring your efforts to nought!' This word sounds to the world—and possibly to the Christian charged to deliver it—both monstrously unjust and utterly opaque. The word combines both blessing and curse. It is a riddle; a lifting of one hand in benediction while the other fist crashes down in anathema.

God's word to the nations is one of blessing for every effort of mankind to win a little more order from chaos; for every political arrangement within which men can be more truly human; for every evidence of responsible stewardship of God-given resources; for every sign of national transcendence in the willingness of powerful nations to allow the moral claims of the weaker against the stronger; for painstaking negotiation and cool-nerved statesmanship which have enabled the world to skirt the brink of disaster.

'You have done well,' says God. 'Therefore I will bring your efforts to nought.' Why? cries the politician, the humanitarian, the man of goodwill. In God's name, why? Can we do better than our best? We are men, not gods!

Jesus answers with a parable which describes the paradox of God's blessing and curse upon history. The Parable of the Wheat and Tares tells how good and evil, nourished from the same source, exist and grow together, and are often indistinguishable and certainly



inextricable until the harvest. Here the ambiguity at the heart of history is pitilessly exposed. Man's dream of the gradual extension of good and the slow suppression of evil can never be realized. Increasing order does not diminish the area of chaos; the possibilities of evil grow with each extension of good. The very best action of which we are capable, twisted out of shape in a flawed creation lets loose a flood of consequences, both good and bad, upon the world.

That parable spells the death of apocalyptic or any other utopianism for it demonstrates that we have put our trust in that which cannot save. We cannot expect unalloyed good to issue from any human institution, especially those institutions—the nation and the world of nations—which constitute the highest degree of man's togetherness. Ill-received though it might be, we are required to administer a large dose of biblical deflation to man's trust in the power, authority and status of the nation. We must expose it as theologically defective, morally blind and transient and therefore unable to bear the weight of all the hope men have placed upon it.

When we hear it claimed for a nation that it is enlightened, responsible and generous, we are forced to retort with Paul, 'Your nation is separated from Christ, alienated from the Commonwealth of Israel, a stranger to the covenant of promise, having no hope and without God in the world.' (Ephesians 2:12) When national leaders and statesmen pride themselves on their realism, percipience, and clear-sightedness, we must echo Paul's flat statement: the nations are blind—to God, to themselves and to all men. (Romans 1:24, 29)

These rigorous, pessimistic biblical judgments upon the nation must be clearly sounded because, as Reinhold Niebuhr has eloquently emphasized in *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, the nation, by virtue of the fact that it embodies the largest concentration of earthly power, is prone to a monstrous egotism and idolatry, claiming universality for its values and seeking a pseudo-immortality.

Because it is the contemporary mood for nations to pride themselves on their scientific achievements, their enlightened laws, their foreign aid appropriations (measuring themselves approvingly against their rivals) it is necessary to point out that God shows a massive indifference towards national achievement. At the level at which his judgment operates, the distinction between righteous and unrighteous nations is obscured, and coming to terms with this truth is the only possible source of humility in nations which are tempted to regard their good fortune as proof of their virtue.

So our tendency to assume that the democratic system is of God, communism is of the devil, is a blasphemy and any belief that our nation is closer to the kingdom of God than another is a delusion. Democrats and totalitarians, advanced and under-developed nations, civilized and backward societies are all unceremoniously lumped together by God and constitute that 'mere drop in the bucket' of which Isaiah speaks. China with her 600 million people, the U.S.A. with her trillions of dollars, Britain with her thousand years of



I'm ready to sink to the lowest depths . . .



to spare myself no degradation . . .



no humiliation for sainthood.



Huh? Go and serve? Be square? Join the group?



Corneil

Do you suppose He doesn't keep up on current literature?



democracy all share 'the gross darkness that covers the peoples' with those nations they regard as enemies of their national survival and threats to world peace.

I am very reluctant to think in terms of God having a special will for the particular nation as opposed to the nations. That evocative juxtaposition of Bible and national flag central to civic ceremonies seems to me productive of an identification of national policy with the Divine will which reinforces that monstrous egotism of which Niebuhr has written. Quite apart from the ever present danger of fascism, there seems to be little biblical ground for the assumption that God finds any value in our national particularities or desires to use those elements of nationality which mark us off from other peoples to further His purposes. It must surely have been in one of those rare moments when Victorian fervor overwhelmed profound biblical insight that F. D. Maurice declaimed, 'We cannot attain Christ's likeness if we do not care for England as he cared for Palestine. We have as much right to call England a Holy Nation as the prophets had to call Judaea a Holy Nation!' It is truly ironic that Maurice's proclamation of England as 'the Holy Nation' should coincide with the opening of the intensive phase of her Imperialist policy, the consequences of which, in Asia and Africa, have demonstrated that inextricable mixture of good and evil of which Jesus talked and have revealed how morally ambiguous are the actions of even the most civilized of nations.

There is one exception to this stricture on placing too much weight upon the idea of God's will for the nation as opposed to the world of nations. We have New Testament warrant for distinguishing one nation from the nations in the sense that its peculiar identity is part of God's purpose and its separateness a testimony to the world. That holy nation is the New Israel, whose citizens are drawn from every nation under heaven, and which is marked off from the world of nations in several important ways. Her citizens, unlike those of the nations, are called and chosen rather than thrown together by biological accident. The Christ who is hidden within the nations, is manifest in and reigns over the New Israel. Where the nations are agglomerations of great power and maintain themselves by the exercise of it, the New Israel glories in her powerlessness, choosing suffering rather than self-assertion as her key-signature. And the conflicts of color, class and special interest groups which are resolved by compromise within the nations are totally transcended in the New Israel by reconciliation, the destruction of all particularities through and in Jesus Christ.

It might well be legitimately charged that the endorsement of this harsh biblical view robs the Christian of any ground from which he can speak or act in a politically relevant manner. But we are not consigning the world of nations to an outer darkness beyond hope and lost from God. Relevant political action as testimony to God's rule can only issue from the abandonment of any secular hope for nations. And the clear distinction between God's will for the nation—the New Israel—and the nations, provides the essential base from which this testimony can be offered.

The New Israel testifies to the rule of God over the world of nations by three dimensions of action: the evangelical, the prophetic and the eschatological. Each takes historical ambiguity seriously—the first in the human heart, the second in the sphere of immediate political action and the third in the total meaning of history. But each involves a wrestling with paradox.

### Evangelical Role

The Church has never been allowed to regard the plight of the nations with either contempt or complacency. She has lived always under a powerful missionary compulsion to preach the gospel to all nations. The New Israel exists as a mission to and in the nation within which it is set, testifying to God's claim upon it and presenting a living picture of what redemption could mean to its life. Within the nation, the New Israel testifies to God's rule by proclamation of Christ's Lordship, by the office of intercession and by a quality of witness which is a steadfast refusal to allow the commands of God to take second place to those of men. Its witness reminds the nation that its primary engagement is with God.

The evangelical imperative offers the nation proof that God graciously acts within history. This proof is a matter not of philosophical speculation but of personal encounter—the humility, true repentance, creativity and lack of pride which are characteristics of those who have been with Jesus. By enabling a man to respond to the new commandment, the gospel strikes at a three-fold ambiguity in the human heart. His relationship towards God is clarified (Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . .); inner harmony is restored (. . . with all thy heart and soul and mind and strength); and his relationship with other men is purged (. . . and thy neighbour as thyself). Unless the gospel offer occupies the forefront of the life of the New Israel, the other dimensions of her activity are bound to degenerate into a vapid moralizing, eloquently described in Richard Niebuhr's epigram as testifying to a 'God without wrath, who brings men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through a Christ without a Cross!'

But the evangelical concern of the New Israel must not be interpreted narrowly as spiritualizing men out of concrete human situations. It is not merely the person within the nation who needs to be redeemed but also those elements of nationality which divide him from other men, within which he hides and which are expressions of his egotism and self-assertiveness. I would challenge the adequacy of any gospel proclamation which allowed a man to come to Christ in South Africa or the Southern States of the U.S. but left his racial attitudes unchanged; or did not affect tribal prejudices in Africa; or jingoism in China; materialism in the West; Xenophobia in Asia, and so on. The validity of our conversion is attested by the power to deal with our most persistent and characteristic social sins.

Here we must grapple with a paradox which cannot be evaded. The particular fruit of the evangelical experience which Christians seek to apply conscientiously in the fields of political and international affairs is the love-ethic. And there is no doubt that Jesus enjoined



the law of love upon his followers—whatever else in the Gospels is obscure, that most certainly is not. Yet the paradox is that the love-ethic we are commanded to make the law of our being is, by definition, impossible of fulfilment within history. And further, if we attempt to carry it through too rigorously we forfeit any possibility of relevant political judgment and action. Indeed, pressed to its limit, it becomes self-defeating and destructive.

It could of course be retorted that the paradox I am stating is a false one; that the love-ethic only seems impossible of fulfilment because no group or nation has yet had the courage to test it. And no doubt you could also quote G. K. Chesterton's aphorism that it is not that Christianity has been tried and found wanting but that it has been found hard and not tried. But I would maintain that this paradox is a genuine one in the sense that the Bible itself furnishes proof of it. The heart of biblical truth—the Cross—is at one and the same time the utter vindication of the love-ethic and also proof positive that this ethic is beyond fulfilment within history and certainly in the area of political action.

The classical theory of the atonement depicts a struggle between the crucified Christ and the legions of hell which is cosmic in its significance. Though defeated in principle, these powers in fact still operate to extend the area of chaos not solely in the human heart and in the realm of interpersonal relations, but also within the collective institutions of society. It is all too clear that in concrete historical situations the only barrier against the onset of this chaos is the use of a degree of constructive power, involving compulsion, which the pure love-ethic must rule out of court. Indeed, it is good Reformation theology that the state as sword bearer has its origins in the fall of man, where the break up of the original pattern of divine order resulted in the necessity of a degree of compulsion to impose order and social cohesion upon the life of man.

Or if you encounter the fundamental moral meaning of the Cross (that love can only be fully realized at the expense of life itself), it is obvious that whereas an individual can choose the way of the Cross, no larger grouping such as a nation ever has or ever will. According to the love-ethic, the way of sacrifice must be personally and freely chosen; no one can either enjoin it upon others or choose it for them without destroying the basis of the ethic. One could go further and claim that if any degree of validity is accorded to the state as a divine ordinance it exists for purposes which are the precise opposite of the way of love unto death. It is the purpose of the state to preserve life, to shield its members from extinction whether threatened by outside enemy, internal chaos or natural hazard. That is what the state is for, and therefore it has a divine function which, within the ambiguities of history, is the precise contrary of the ultimate logic of the love-ethic—fulfilment at the expense of life itself. So the attempt to enjoin the love-ethic upon the state is to invite it to deny the law of its being.

The truth is that the love-ethic in its pure form can-

not come to terms with the compulsion which is a necessary feature of all organized life. And it obscures political problems when it causes Christians to seek an ideal possibility in situations which offer only a number of realistic alternatives, none ideal, few satisfactory, all morally relative. Follow the love-ethic through to its limit and it will deny the Christian any participation in political life at all because he will seek in vain for a political system pure enough to deserve his devotion.

Unless the Christian is to retire to the mountain top and pray his life away, he must operate within society as a responsible man, which means that in certain fields he must make decisions on behalf of others—in industry, through the ballot box, within the family circle. He is perfectly entitled to follow the love-ethic in sacrificing his own interests without hope of reward but he cannot justify the sacrifice of interests other than his own. He cannot compel those for whom he is responsible to choose sacrifice. Hence, willingly or unwillingly, he must follow the hard law of collective relations and choose the only kind of justice that society has ever known—that which issues from the harmonizing of legitimate conflicts of interest, if necessary by the imposition of superior power. And when he has got that far, he is thinking politically. He has faced up to the unpalatable fact that all collective relations are so morally obtuse as to make a strategy of pure disinterestedness impossible.

The unwillingness to accept the tensions which this paradox sets up results in the prevalent political heresy of evangelical Christianity, namely, the belief that if only men would love one another all political problems would disappear. This majestically simple theological position can easily be exposed by examining the life of the Christian church, whose members by definition, are committed to the law of love and are, or ought to be, converted men. Yet conflicts of interest, problems of power and authority occur here also and must often be settled (dare one say it?) by political means.

This lofty indifference to the complexity of political problems and the insistence on attributing all national and international tensions to simple unbelief leads to monstrous parodies of the true evangelical role of the New Israel. It enables the most noted mass evangelist of our time to wash his hands, in a public statement, of the Viet Nam tragedy because his job is "to preach the gospel" and Viet Nam is the responsibility of the politician. It provides thousands of Christians, all devout and sincere, with justification for blinding themselves to the stark injustices of racial discrimination in their land, city or street because their business is to offer all men Christ but only some of them a seat in their parlor or a vote in their elections.

It provided many missionaries in Africa and Asia with a pseudo-biblical warrant for resisting the claims of subject peoples for freedom and self-determination, marking off the New Israel from the political arena so absolutely that young nationalist Christians were forced to make a straight choice—their political allegiance of their Church membership.



Is it possible to attempt both to obey the law of love and yet recognize the impossibility of its fulfilment within history? Certainly, we can't strike asunder such a paradox and cling to the half which is the least painful to come to terms with. Neither can we resort to a personal pietism which is too naive to recognize that in refusing to make political decisions one is making a political decision with terrifying implications, nor to a worldly cynicism which abandons altogether the attempt to make relevant the impossible law of love and accepts the power-structures of this world on their own terms. All deny any possibility of achieving that truly biblical stance which describes the New Israel as being *in* the world but not of it.

### Prophetic Role

The very possibility of the Prophetic Role of the New Israel rests upon us a paradox. The only way we can act prophetically within the world of nations is to grant them a status which, in our evangelical role, we must categorically deny. In evangelism, we must offer Christ to a lost world, to warn men to 'flee from the wrath to come. . . .' In prophecy we are seeking to encounter what Niebuhr calls the 'Hidden Christ' within history; to search him out where he is doing some good thing in an area beyond hope. Obviously therefore, however pessimistic may be the ultimate theological judgment upon the nations, there are still in the here and now proximate goals, various levels of achievement, morally significant situations which demand a response from us.

Here of course is the point at which our abandonment of any secular hope for the nations allows us a freedom to operate within specific political situations, to accept the immediate task as worthy of our very best efforts. For the great danger of all political action is that it tends to absolutize itself—to project itself forward into the future towards some great historical denouement. Every political ideology incorporates its own eschatology—a doctrine of last things in terms of which the past and the present are given meaning. Truth in the political realm, carried through too consistently, becomes falsehood. (It is the great merit of democracy that it rarely allows any political ideology to be worked out to its logical conclusion without modifying it by the flux of public opinion through the ballot box.) The Christian is able to bear his share of responsibility for the good order and justice of the community, free to seek the truth of the moment, accepting the limits of the possible. He need fall prey to no political messiah, inerrant ideological Word, inner voice of fanaticism—all inviting him to leap from the pinnacle of the Temple in order to inherit the kingdoms of this world.

The most important of all the prophetic gifts of the New Israel is political realism—a freedom both from utopian optimism and fanatical despair. We above all men recognize that the effectiveness of politics lies in its harnessing morally dangerous forces to constructive purposes. The self-regard and national pride which Christians are required to shun are the forces which the politician must use to motivate men for socially beneficial ends. Listen to a debate in the House of Commons or the Senate of the United States on aid to underdeveloped countries. The moralist delivers a fervent oration on the reality of the one world family and the

responsibility of the well endowed for the weak and poor. But it is the politician who gets the bill through by pointing out that communism feeds upon poverty and that if we do not do something for Africa and Asia the Chinese will. So the end result is an act of political morality, achieved by the beguiling of deadly dangerous sentiments.

To condemn this hard truth about political motivation as evidence that politics is 'a dirty game' is a pious hypocrisy and to pretend that there is some other more enlightened, noble means of accomplishing political ends is a delusion. The ambiguities of political morality cannot be evaded. The suggestion that in politics, the Christian alone can march confidently forward through the murk, guided by heavenly radar, speaking what is true and doing what is good while others wallow in confusion and compromise is gratuitous nonsense which will survive neither the realism of the Bible nor the experience of history.

The Christian politician is not wrong less often than others—though he may tend to be wrong about different things. All politicians are limited by the material they must use. If we wish to speak and act in political terms we are forced to deal in power in order to get a rough approximation of justice in any area where interests clash. And the truth about power is that it always exacts too high a price for its services. We may proclaim the theological truth that it is utterly futile to attempt to organize life around the self—personal or collective—but we must recognize that often the dynamic energy released by this egotism is the only force available to motivate men towards good ends.

Thus it is part of the prophetic role of the New Israel to free Christians from illusions about what is possible and not possible in politics; to get those who are committed to the great absolute to see value in the relative. Tentative harmonies, provisional equalities, proximate justice—nothing grander or more sublime is likely to emerge from political action within history.

But to heap paradox upon paradox, the New Israel as prophet must sacrifice a degree of relevance in order to be truly relevant to the life of the world of nations. Take, for example, the question of justice. The Bible's view of justice, as thundered forth by the prophets, is nothing like so simple, sublime and cogent as Aristotle's majestic 'To each his due!' The prophets would have none of this business of equal justice. They declaimed that God was angry with princes and kings because they turned the poor away from their doors. Biblical justice always has a built-in bias towards the little people of the earth—'He has torn imperial powers from their thrones, but the humble have been lifted high. The hungry he has satisfied with good things, the rich sent empty away!' The Bible is certainly not a politically impartial book. It announces that God is against all concentrations of power and wealth and influence, however legitimately obtained and benevolently used.

Or take the power of imagination through which God enables the Christian to identify himself with others, to 'put himself in their shoes.' The political value of this gift is beyond question for it enables us to penetrate



the barriers of perception and get some idea of what our policy looks like from the other side of the Iron Curtain, or East of Suez, or South of the Equator, or on the wrong side of the bread line, or from the Negro side of town.

Or consider the highest exercise of earthly love—the love of one's enemies and the forgiveness of wrongdoers. Without doubt there are socially redemptive possibilities, in the strictest political sense, from the discriminating exercise of this degree of forbearance, not to mention the embarrassment we would be saved whenever we have got to stop punishing former enemy nations in order to build them up militarily so that they can form part of our defense bloc against our former ally, the new enemy.

Now none of these political qualities, to which the New Israel testifies, is relevant in the sense that it is an accepted value of politics, a logical outworking of any forces operating within the concrete situation. Yet each of these qualities is supremely relevant because it testifies to the truth that the nation's main engagement is with God, not with an economic crisis, a strategic problem, a political dilemma. We are required to sacrifice relevance in the sense of speaking solely in terms of what is given in order to be relevant in the sense of identifying the true seat of ambiguity and exposing it before God.

So far we have been relating the prophetic insights which the New Israel offers her members as they testify to God's rule over the nations. But is there any corporate action open to her when the world of nations is heedless of her admonition and blind to the political witness of her saints? One and one only—the vocation of suffering, with its threefold stages of protest, disobedience and martyrdom. The Church *qua* Church cannot match power with power in order to restore that equilibrium we call justice. The only power she possesses is the power to receive the full brunt of power and transform the pain and hardship of it into suffering. In the words of Theodore Beza, the Church is an anvil which has worn out many hammers. Her only initiative, in the limiting situation, is to exhaust the capacity of the powerful to use their power against her—to use the pain inflicted by others to alter relationships and shame men into changing their policies.

This strategem was used earlier in this century by Mahatma Ghandi who neutralized the power of an Empire with his ragged legions of hungry, fanatical, sad-eyed men. In our own time, the martyrdom of the Kenya African Christians during the Mau Mau uprising, the slaughter of missionaries in the Congo counter-revolution, and the casualties of the U.S. civil rights marches are examples of the political power as well as spiritual significance of suffering. Things have changed because men have suffered. The suffering Church is a testimony to the world that all early forms of power, from the most benevolent to the most despotic, are only permitted to persist 'Till He come . . .'

#### Eschatological Role

'Till He come . . .—a challenging phrase which leads us straight into the eschatological dimension. The para-

dox is easily stated but virtually impossible to discuss. The New Israel is called to live out its life in the midst of the world of nations as though something utterly beyond human comprehension had actually occurred; to testify to that which cannot be put into words; to point the nations to an utterly-beyond-history in the midst of history.

How does the human enterprise end? What form will the grand finale of this glorious, tragic pageant of history take? Anyone who can rise above his own immediate interests and project himself beyond his own life span must wrestle with this question. And if he is reasonably intelligent he will be seeking not so much an answer as a reassurance. He will not delude himself that this great sprawling thing we call history can be summarized in a simple, intelligible statement—an original, luminous truth. But he does want to know that the end result is not utterly futile and aimless. He would like to feel that all that has been nobly and well wrought by mankind will not be totally evanescent.

Whether the Bible's answer to his heart-cry will nourish hope or despair depends upon his faith. Certainly we are not permitted to treat history like some detective story, where, in the last chapter and the last paragraph the significance of the obscure becomes plain, where every enigmatic word and gesture and action falls into a pattern which we ought to have been able to trace all the way through had we been clever enough. The last page, paragraph and sentence of history will be a record of the same old order and chaos, ambiguity and meaning, good and evil.

For biblical faith, the meaning of history is seen as being beyond itself. We are not waiting for something to happen *in* history but for something to happen *to* history. We can grasp this much; that for mankind the kingdom whose seed is hidden within history will be perfected, and history must end before it is fully revealed.

Since by definition what happens beyond history can be neither described nor comprehended, we could well claim that it is pointless to worry about what we cannot be expected to understand. But not so. The New Israel is commanded to live with the End as a present reality rather than a tentative hope. It is made clear to us that the End is not what comes *after* everything else but what has been inaugurated by the Christ-Event, and since we cannot possibly claim ignorance of the fact that the Christ-Event *has* taken place, we must also take seriously the implications of Christian eschatology for our life and conduct.

The apparent contradiction in the New Testament between the kingdom of God as a present reality and as an imminent event do not trouble us too much as an intellectual problem, for having swallowed the camel of the presence of the End from beyond history, we do not have too much difficulty in digesting the gnat of the weird concept of time this must involve. So we can face up manfully to paradoxes such as Christ saying both 'The Kingdom is come upon you . . .' and 'Pray . . . thy kingdom come on earth. . .' But the more daunting question is: What are the political implications of eschatology? What is the significance for the world of



nations of the presence within history of the utterly-beyond-history?

Albert Schweitzer, in *The Secret of the Kingly Rule of God*, wrote of the Jesus who, whenever he had performed one of the miracles which were signs of the kingdom, warned those who had eyes to understand the significance of what had happened that they should 'tell no man!' The kingly rule of God over the nations is a secret. It is not to be spoken of lightly nor can its relationship to specific political and international events be announced with any degree of confidence. Why? Because the open proclamation of it to those who cannot understand will do little more than add one more area of ambiguity to already confused situations. Indeed, to designate a concrete historical happening as an outworking of God's will is to subject Him to the relativities of good and evil within time.

The wisdom of this diffidence is reinforced by the nature of political truth itself. It is characteristic of political decisions that they can rarely be described in principle as right or wrong. They are only proved to be right or wrong by their consequences. Should Britain enter the Common Market? Even after a full and careful analysis of all the facts has been made, no answer in principle is possible. The decision to enter or stay out of the Common Market will only be revealed to have been right or wrong in the light of its consequences. Hence, the 'crunch' of a political decision may only come in five, ten or twenty-five years' time. What did Jesus say? 'God's wisdom is proved right by its results' (Matthew 19:11).

Confident declarations in principle that God's will is embodied in a political policy or the general stance of the nation in an international crisis are less likely to be prophetic than foolhardy. The kingly rule of God is a secret because we must not 'use' him—enlist him to our schemes, seek his sanction for policies which are shot through with our national self-assertiveness and therefore doomed. God's will is both so simple that a single fallible human being can respond to it, and yet so majestic that it bursts out of any attempt to contain it within a national policy or an international situation.

Certainly Isaiah could put into the mouth of God the words, 'Ho, Assyria, the rod of my anger and the staff of my fury!' But in the modern world, judgments of this order are more likely to issue from our partisanship and subtle political analysis than from any confidence of speaking a divine truth. Ask a group of Christians from two contending nations to interpret into modern dress a slice of Bible history like this passage from Isaiah and it will be too clear that Assyria is the nation that oppresses us, resists our will, challenges our supremacy. We will go so far as to grant it the status of a scourge in God's hands, but we are in no doubt who represents Israel. We do!

So though the New Israel is always conscious of God's rule over the nations, she is reverently agnostic about the concrete political events which are revealed as

bearers of it. The world may cry 'Thank God!' when some miraculous deliverance is received or curse God when a disaster occurs, but the New Israel keeps her secret well. She is too conscious of the imminence of the End to attempt to usurp the role of her Lord as judge of all the earth.

Only in one way can the New Israel be sure that her proclamation of God's kingly rule is not in error and that is when, by the power of Christ, she performs those miracles which are the signs of the kingdom—and they can rarely be translated into the material of political policies with any close degree of relevance.

It might be thought that this attitude of agnosticism about the concrete evidences of God's rule must restrict the Church to an other-worldly pietism, dumb and paralyzed before the events of our time. But it is the very fact that God's kingly rule is a secret within the world that lends moral urgency to our actions in the political realm. For if we could proclaim with utter confidence that God's will demanded this or that course of action, then the result would be complacency and arrogance, a nonchalant reliance upon God to vindicate his own plans. Instead, we are those who must see every political issue as demanding knife-edge moral application and prophetic insight lest, when all things are made plain, we are revealed as having confused the trivial and the important, and discarded as of no great significance the fulcrum about which God was to move the nations.

Because the world is prone to make facile distinctions between what are called major and minor political issues, the seeds of catastrophe and war often drop unnoticed in some obscure corner and germinate in darkness until they burst forth in a poisonous growth that desolates the earth. The Christian who is vigilant to enter into the mystery of the kingdom and seek out the evidence of God's rule ought to be the one least likely to overlook the tiny hinges upon which great things move. But in political terms, his gifts to the dialogue of our time ought to be subtlety, sensitivity and keen moral perception, for his search for the secret will make a politician out of him.

But we must not be so carried away by the rich imagery of the return of our Lord that we fall into the trap of assuming that this explosive bursting into history of God's reality will be the first inkling we shall have that the consummation of history is upon us. Nor should we be so seduced by that phrase 'The second coming of our Lord' that we imagine that in the meantime he is somewhere else, in heaven perhaps, preparing for his triumphal entry into history for the second and last time. There are New Testament images which describe our Lord sneaking back into history like a burglar at night or like the unannounced return of our boss when we thought he was safely away on holiday.

In other words, it is a biblical insight that the One who will come again is always coming, imperceptibly, silently, persistently. The concept of his constant entering into specific historical situations cannot be recon-



ciled with the vision of a final consummation unless it is to be seen as a problem of the inability of spatial language to describe what is both timeless and timely. However, the problem is not the concept but the reality—Christ confronting us as the End in the midst of history in imperceptible ways. But how?

If the personality of Christ the judge bears any relationship to that of the historical Jesus we can be sure that the One who is always coming encounters us in the form of the casualties of this world, the lonely, broken, outcast, imprisoned, defeated, dying. He slips into history and confronts us with the End in shape of those, right under our noses who are easiest ignored, or whose plight is too painful or costly for us to ameliorate.

This eschatological truth translated into political terms means that the members of the New Israel engage in the battle against poverty, disease, racial discrimination, injustice and oppression not as a humanitarian concern but as an acknowledgment of the presence of the One who always comes in a hungry child, a despised man of another skin pigmentation, an oppressed minority. And the judgment upon us if we should be careless and complacent is correspondingly severe. It is a theological judgment, not merely a failure of human concern or lack of benevolence. We have been found wanting at the End. The New Israel as watchman has failed in vigilance and not noticed that the thief in the night has slipped past us as we strutted proudly in our lofty perches. Charles Peguy once said that everything begins in mysticism and ends in politics. Certainly the mystical vision of our Lord's glorious return ought to be the inspiration of a political radicalism which makes most current expressions of political radicalism seem pallidly conservative. We can never ever be sure whether the next person we meet on the street, regardless of color, race and class, confronts us as a casual encounter or an ultimate judgment.

Christian eschatology presents us with the vision of a world of nations haunted by the presence of the One who is the object of all national policies and political programs—the Son of Man. Man who is the goal of history, not man as he is, has his true being revealed in Christ.

The greatest proof of God's rule over the world of nations consists not in any of the dimensions of the action of the New Israel I have described, but in her very survival. Against all odds, assaulted from without and sapped from within, lifted up and cast down, never permitted to rest but always on the move, the story of the New Israel has been one of sudden ends and strange new beginnings, of decay and restoration, of death and resurrection, of humiliation and glory. To what end? To the end simply that in every time and place, in a thousand accents, she can cry in the midst of the world of nations, 'Fear God and give him glory, ye who dwell upon the face of the earth, of every nation and tribe and tongue and people, for the hour of judgment has come. . . .'

## JOURNEY

Always willingly I have gone  
beyond caring  
at least more often than usual  
for others.  
Still it is not enough  
for some  
would have you gladly  
move past everything  
and await your return  
with surprise.  
It is never like this  
when they go.  
Bands play madly  
while you march  
through caravans of confetti.  
What have you seen  
that I did not?

—Glenn F. Jackson

## EARLY OCTOBER SNOW

The question is, How do you handle the problem of evil? Solve that, all else is also solved. It snowed October seventh and I was happy, Christ I was happy! not knowing then who would winter-die, his sex of him as yet unborn, eleventh month child that he was: none of this. I guess it was the still-leaved trees stood white in green wells, *real*, a holiday decoration at a fashionable place to shop: Yes, it said, this with the no as yet not seen—Neat, good—the cold contrast of spring at one with winter, so rare in this hemisphere for Easter to come in the fall of year.

—James H. Bowden



# Hurrah for the English

It is hard to find out exactly why good English films tend to be more nourishing and more contemporary than good American films. In camera technique and directorial skill, both countries have their masters; there is not much difference in actual acting ability on the part of the casts; even the idea material for plots and movie stories is not that different. Nevertheless, when you see an English film which deals with the theme of loneliness, or urbanization, or sex, or death, etc., it is gripping, clear, forceful and moving in a way that American pictures cannot equal.

Why? Well, for one thing, in English movies the people look like people. They don't look like plasticized, moving, fantasy models—they have more than two-dimensional sex appeal and personal appeal. English directors are not afraid of mediocre-looking, even homely, men and women who can act. Let's face it, movie stars are more important to Hollywood than actors and actresses—and our films and finally our entire culture suffer from that fact. And, if you have ever known anyone as I have, who has been given the treatment by some agent and some studio of being turned into possible movie star material, you understand a little bit of the reason why a good movie from Hollywood is just a bit of a miracle. Hollywood finally is involved in its own docetic heresy (the heresy which was embarrassed by Jesus' humanity and claimed only his divinity.) Hollywood doesn't want actors who smell, look or feel like human beings smell, look and feel. Because people pay more money to see other people on a screen who look odorless, blemishless, and unsensory because they are ashamed of their "humanness." And, rather

than doing what great or even good art always does—namely challenging us into accepting our humanness—Hollywood has chosen to feed our fears of being human. And what it does to actors Hollywood also does to themes and stories. It vulgarizes the most profound ideas into a kind of comfortable, bland fantasy which reinforces every smug sentimentality which the movie-goer brings to the theater. English movies that are good somehow don't end up seeming condescending to the popular audience. There is a hard edge to them which is uncompromising and exciting. Now, it may be that this attitude boils down to a kind of courage that is based in part on snobism. The English don't like to cater to anyone. If that is true, I say, aesthetically, hurrah for snobism. It produced two lovely movies recently, *Alfie* and *Georgy Girl*.

*Alfie* is a movie which should be shown at church conferences around the country. It won't be because it is too risqué—but it should be. It is a moral tale. It is the perfect contemporary existential version of the scriptural injunction, "The wages of sin is death." An eternal Don Juan to whom every woman is an irresistible challenge until she is conquered and an unbearable threat after she succumbs, is the basic story. But it is retold with skill and cleverness. The device of having a character address the movie audience in a film is often either boring or annoying. Here it works perfectly. One comes to know Alfie as one comes to love or hate him. Of how many movie characters can this be said? Michael Caine is excellent as the lead. His consistent underplaying of the vivacious, lonely Alfie is touching

and brilliant. The women whom he conquers and leaves are uniformly well-played. There is one moment of actual physical horror during an abortion scene. Nothing is actually shown on the screen, but the dingy and anonymous quality of the whole operation is chilling. Paradoxically, its strengths are finally its weaknesses. Although it is extremely sophisticated, it is ultimately too pat, too moralistic, too neat, to really profoundly illuminate the particular terror and moral tragedy of the classical Don Juan. With more thought and possibly less suavity, it could have been a great movie. As it is, it is a good one. It would be ungrateful to complain too much.

*Georgy Girl* is also a delight. It is a film which depends absolutely and unabashedly on the extraordinary talent and charm of its star—Lynn Redgrave. Her subtlety and delicacy in handling the role of a girl who thinks she's homely—and thus finds it difficult to accept anything from anyone—is remarkable. The movie is thoroughly iconoclastic in its attitudes towards both sex and death, and both themes get a hilarious and frightening workout. It is erotic in the most human way imaginable and, for a change, it makes sex look like fun. The picture attempts less than *Alfie* does and the story line is less gritty and modern, but paradoxically it is more successful. The sheer simplicity of the plot allows one to be moved by the theme. It is never pretentious and there is a straightforward quality to its presentation which is memorable. It stays with one like a very good dream. I recommend it highly.

—AL CARMINES



# BOOKS

*Religion in Life*, Spring, 1966, Vol. XXXV, No. 2, \$1.50.

This journal, in this issue devoted to a discussion of "the new morality," ably succeeds in its intent to be "a Christian quarterly of opinion and discussion." Canon Douglas A. Rhymes of London wrote the central essay, "The 'New' Morality," and Robert E. Fitch, Tom F. Driver, Bernard E. Meland, Joseph Fletcher and others responded.

This interesting set of articles raises a number of questions, among them some question as to whether there may be some misunderstanding of Canon Rhymes' position.

Canon Rhymes reports that youth want to work things out for themselves and "to experience in personal relationships the exploration of another personality and the greater understanding of oneself." A quote from a survey in *New Society* indicates that younger people have little confidence in a morality "based upon conformity to generally accepted absolute standards." From this Rhymes concludes that the norms to help man "will not be absolute norms but rather norms worked out by previous observed experience." Rhymes's position is therefore very much like John Dewey's. He also quotes Harvey Cox's claim that much of modern thinking has an empirical basis. On this point Professor Meland argues that not all modern men are specialists in science or technology and holds that many men and women have ultimate concerns about men and nature which go beyond the scientific.

Perhaps the issue is more complex than Canon Rhymes has stated it, but he has given a survey in support of his position, and he of course would not argue that *all* modern people take the basically empirical approach he has claimed. But surely the tendency of the time is worth noting.

Professor Fitch complains that Canon Rhymes's empiricism is too shallow because he has forgotten history. The Bible, he says, never really gets out of date. Canon Rhymes's argument is that, as a source of authority, the Bible is out of date to a great many of the younger people. But perhaps I shouldn't put it that way, since, according to Professor Hiltner, the Bible itself is contextual. In any event, has Canon Rhymes forgotten history when he merely recognizes that now many do not accept the absolutes which were perhaps accepted before?

Rhymes claims that his view is supported in general by the Gospels, but notes with regret that "so often the whole teaching of the Church, especially on matters of personal sexual morality, seems to have been tainted by this dualistic view of man as an individual perpetually involved in a war between flesh and spirit in which the flesh is the lower and the unredeemed part of nature." He quotes Dr. Sherwin Bailey to the effect that "the general impression left by the Church's teaching upon simple and unlearned people can only have been that the physical relationship of the sexes was degraded by religion as unworthy if not shameless and obscene." Professor Fitch takes considerable exception to some of Rhymes' claims, especially the one that Puritanism for years prevented all sensible discussion of moral difficulties, and the claim that the Church's attitude has been rooted in a refusal to accept sexuality as part of the wholeness of man. Perhaps some of Canon Rhymes' passages are extreme, and he might more carefully hold to Dr. Bailey's comment. Bailey's claim had been in regard to the general *impression* left by the church's teaching on simple and unlearned people. This would be an empirical question as to just what such an

impression was. But some radio programs today might lead "simple and unlearned" people to think as Dr. Bailey says they think, and the same would be true, I suggest, of many writings.

Canon Rhymes' claim that there has been a concept of man as an individual involved in a war between flesh and spirit is exemplified by the passage, "To secure the mastery of man's higher self over the whole world of animal desire is a task" which takes a great development of will power. And the claim is made that the oath of voluntary celibacy aids marriage in that its existence "prevents married people, in their relations to one another, from feeling themselves as the mere slaves of obscure natural forces, and leads them to take their stand against nature as free being able to command." But these quotes are from fifty years ago. More recently Bishop Sheen, then Monsignor Sheen, wrote in *Peace of Soul* that concentration on perishable things tends to stimulate "cravings for bestial satisfaction," that sometimes standards of morality "give way to the practices of the barnyard," and that in man there is body-mind conflict. These comments are surrounded by rather pious phrases about the Church's not being opposed to sex, but I submit that Dr. Bailey's judgment of the impression left on simple and unlearned, and doubtless also learned, people is correct, and I think it is this *impression* about which Canon Rhymes is just concerned.

Let it be thought that I am beating a dead horse by quoting old sources, I suggest that the impression about which Canon Rhymes is concerned is fostered by very recent broadcasts and articles. Billy Graham, on a radio broadcast on September 18, 1966, argued that if you don't let Christ enter your life, lust and moral depravity will enter to fill the void. And Bishop Sheen, in *The Cleveland Press* in January, 1965, wrote the following:

When she (woman) sees herself as a messenger, she is the image of the highest aspiration of the soul. This is her power. But when she refuses to see herself as a messenger of God's love, she arouses the lowest instincts of a man. This is her weakness.

A woman, therefore, can be either an object of adoration or an object of scorn. Her beauty can evoke the beauty of the angels; but the moment she surrenders her role as courier of the Divine, she can drag man to the depths . . .

Men or women who do not feel nearer to God when they fall in love, ought to ask themselves if they are not beasts rather than persons.

Perhaps no comment should be made on such passages.

The charge is made against Canon Rhymes that he is for the elimination of rules. Professor Fitch gives the example of the young couple who killed four men, and says, "Or would it be necessary to drag in outside rules, or principles, or standards?" Professor Meland holds that in the current efforts to secularize Christianity the result is that "nothing exists but immediate acts." And Professor Driver argues that on this type of view "The child who is given no negative injunctions has to form himself out of himself."

One wonders if these writers have really read Rhymes' argument. Rhymes quotes with approval the Bishop of Woolwich's view that the law's place is at the boundaries and not at the center, and adds that the law is not to be viewed as an unchanging code of authority but guidelines which experience throws up for us. This is far from saying that there are to be no rules, unless you argue that for laws to be laws they must apply with no exception, no matter what the situation. Professor Fletcher,



a supporter of the "new morality," argues that there "is no law, none at all which might not have to be set aside if loving concern for others should happen to require it." Principles are maxims, not rules. To consider the case of the young murderers, can it really be said that their murdering could be excused on the basis of "loving concern for others"? And Harvey Cox hardly takes a flippant tone when he warns that we should not lightly dismiss the conservatives because they "will turn out to be right unless we are able to manifest a degree of maturity, accountability, and adulthood which has not yet emerged, at least in the American mentality and probably not in the mentality of most nations today."

In general, then, it does not seem to me that those defending situational morality are holding a position in which laws are to be dropped out. They are to be guides, to be broken when loving concern for others requires. I think this is quite a different view from that with which they are charged, and thus I think the critics are attacking a straw man.

Canon Rhymes also urges maturity and responsibility, and does give a definition of "maturity." Professors Fitch, Driver and Meland object to these terms as being too vague and rhetorical, and their objection is well taken. A simple example should suffice. Professor Driver argues that premarital intercourse is not wrong in principle. If for the sake of argument we grant this point, what is the "mature" action of a young person who decides to have such relations? I suppose many Protestants and humanists would argue that birth control is the action of a mature person in such a situation. Some individual Catholics would agree, but I suppose the Catholic Church would say, at least today if not in the future, that birth control would be a sin, and thus I suppose we could conclude that the Church would hold that the person using birth control would not be acting maturely. My example is far from perfect, since I assume the Catholic Church would not allow, as Professor Driver does, that premarital intercourse is not wrong, but the case still illustrates the point that "maturity" can mean quite different things, depending on the person making the judgment. I think that the terms "mature" and "responsibility" fare no better, however, when used by absolutists and other conservatives in ethics. One gets the feeling that the term "mature" is used to mean "agrees with my position." Perhaps it would be better if the two terms were dropped by both sides, or better, all sides, of the issue.

Tied to the rejection of the terms "maturity" and "responsibility" is a general rejection of rhetoric by Professors Driver and

Fitch. But surely from the viewpoint of some situational moralists, the conservative side indulges in rhetoric too, when such phrases as "maturity," "responsibility," "eternal truth," "God's word," and "natural law," are used. Professor Fitch does not himself indulge in such cliches, but they are not hard to find in the literature.

A final comment. Professor Driver rhetorically asks the question, "Was there ever a Christian legalist who did not acknowledge the supremacy of love and the necessity for responsibility, or who did not advocate growing up into the fullness of mature manhood?" I think at least one example can be given in which there is considerable question as to whether the supremacy of love has been acknowledged. More could be given, but I'll content myself with one. I turn to the famous quote from Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, in which he says: "The Catholic Church holds it better for the sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say, should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, or should steal one poor farthing without excuse."

It is to be granted that "situational" morality may be vague and have some dangers in application, but perhaps it would be well for those who incline to absolutism to consider Newman's words. They might then agree that it would be preferable that laws be used as maxims and guides, not as unchangeable rules.

—ARTHUR M. WHEELER

Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*. University of Chicago Press (1965), 380 pp., \$7.50.

One is hesitant to use the term 'official history' about a serious work by serious scholars, for, unless the work is deliberately identified as expressing an official point of view, the terms suggests at least a lack of objectivity. In this instance, nevertheless, the authors' disclaimer of official sanction does not suffice and we must recognize that their book is indeed an official history in the less formal but more meaningful sense that the authors have not found a critical vantage point outside their subject.

This observation does not invalidate the effort which this book represents. We should doubtless be grateful that Professor John-

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF OCTOBER 23, 1962; SECTION 4369, TITLE 39, UNITED STATES CODE.

Of **motive**, published monthly, October through May, at Nashville, Tennessee, for October 1, 1966.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor and managing editor are: Publisher: The Division of Higher Education of the Board of Education of The Methodist Church, Nashville, Tennessee; Editor: B. J. Stiles, P.O. Box 871, Nashville, Tennessee; Managing Editor: Ron Henderson, P.O. Box 871, Nashville, Tennessee.

2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given.)

The Board of Education of The Methodist Church, P.O. Box 871, Nashville, Tennessee 37202.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities (If there are none, so state).

There are none.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief

as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear under the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner. Names and addresses of individuals who are stockholders of a corporation which itself is a stockholder or holder of bonds, mortgages or other securities of the publishing corporation have been included in paragraphs 2 and 3 when the interests of such individuals are equivalent to 1 per cent or more of the total amount of the stock or securities of the publishing corporation.

5. Circulation: (as of Sept. 1, 1966)

	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 months	Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date
A. Total No. Copies Printed	36,345	36,984
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors and Counter Sales	724	882
2. Mail Subscriptions	32,379	32,906
C. Total Paid Circulation	33,103	33,788
D. Free Distribution	924	1,037
E. Total Distribution	34,027	34,819
F. Office use, Left-Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled after Printing	2,318	2,165
G. Total	36,345	36,984

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

B. J. STILES, Editor



son and Dr. Colligan have found time from their respective academic and official duties to prepare such an interesting account of a program with which both have been intimately associated. A number of federal programs having academic implications would be well served by such a careful and detailed description. But we still have to ask whether the performance, useful though it may be, satisfies the requirements of history.

In what could hardly be expected to be a disinterested Foreword, Senator Fulbright reflects on the objectives of educational exchange—"to acquaint Americans with the world as it is and to acquaint students and scholars from many lands with America as it is" and "to bring a little more knowledge, a little more reason, and a little more compassion into world affairs and thereby to increase the chance that nations will learn at last to live in peace and friendship." Hardly objectives that men of good will could refuse to honor! But it does not necessarily follow, as Fulbright contends, that either the book or the program it treats contribute "to the better understanding of education in international relations." The book is in fact such a faithful replica of the program and the assumptions on which the program is based that the uninitiated reader would be hard put to discern any other way of serving these important objectives. The ill-advised first chapter, entitled "An Over-All View," might equally well have been called "In Praise of the Fulbright Program," so effectively does it demolish any expectation of a critical history.

The remainder of the first part of the volume relates the early phases of establishing the Fulbright program—the reaching of decisions required to translate a legislative mandate into administrative actuality. Neither the legislative nor administrative history that one might wish to have, this part yet has the great virtue of conveying some of the excitement that surrounded the implementation of an essentially new departure in American foreign relations. And it includes the subterranean debate over the program's justification—whether it was to be an educational program or merely an aspect of overseas information policy—along with the more conspicuous threat posed by McCarthyism.

Part Two, which samples the program as it has actually operated abroad, is unquestionably the more satisfying part of the book. Instead of attempting a cursory review of the whole program, the authors here concentrate on certain particular focal points such as American studies in the UK and Italy and English language studies in the Philippines. Each of these chapters shows the way\*in which exchanges with a given country were shaped to serve a single academic purpose instead of the more random selections of personnel generally characteristic of the Fulbright program. It is no accident that these chapters are interesting, only surprising that a conclusion is not drawn, namely that the whole program would have been more effective if it had been guided to a greater degree by such rubrics of acknowledged academic need. In fairness it must be said that federal programs have no easy time if they are subjected to rigorous qualitative shaping to the exclusion of "democratic" distribution patterns (pork barrel), but "Fulbright" would have fewer derogatory connotations today if the program had been conducted along stricter academic and qualitative lines.

The account goes on to cover passage of the new Fulbright-Hays legislation (Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961) but, regrettably, only a short span of the ensuing program. Some of the deficiencies of the old program have been reduced by the manner in which the new legislation has been implemented. But the treatment here is too scanty to suggest even that the old program had defects, much less to show the benefits, for example, of new programs conducted by the Office of Education in close collaboration with American colleges and universities. In this sense, the book not only falls short of the "definitive" status accorded it by Senator Fulbright, it is not even a particularly good guide for future developments in the field of educational exchange. Nowhere does it direct attention to the alternatives, conceptual and operational, that might have avoided the bad flavor which the program has so often awakened precisely because it advertised itself as an educational venture. Some of the activity currently visible under the Fulbright-Hays mandate plainly raises at least two basic questions: first, can an educational exchange program be mingled with day-to-day foreign relations and still serve its larger if also vaguer objectives? and secondly, is it not better to adopt proximate but tangible educational or scholarly goals than to try to serve the cause of international understanding directly? A critical history of the Fulbright program, it seems to me, would have to confront such issues directly. Short of that, the work in question remains at best a chronicle and a celebration of its subject.

—LYMAN H. LEGTERS

## United Church Press announces a portfolio of specially commissioned lithographs

Philip Evergood  
William Gropper  
Jacob Lawrence  
Karl Knaths  
Eric von Schmidt  
Doris Lee  
Reed Champion

Widely divergent in stylistic expression, but all nationally or internationally known, each of these seven American artists was commissioned to translate his vision of a different Christian theme into graphic form. The resulting portfolio of seven original 18- by 24-inch lithographs — all but two of which are in color — has been cited by such sources as the *New York Times* for its brilliance.

**Christian Concepts in Art, \$20.**

available from  
U.C.B.H.M. — Periodical  
1505 Race St., Phila., Pa. 19102

## "What Was Hiroshima Like, Jesus, When the Bomb Fell?"

And why is it that "It Takes Away My Guilt When I Blame Your Murder on the Jews, Jesus"?

Just two of the twenty-one devastating thoughts offered by Father Malcolm Boyd in this unique album of prayer

Each is accompanied by the stunning guitar of Charlie Byrd.

Prayers like these don't happen often. They ought to.



ON COLUMBIA RECORDS



# CONTRIBUTORS

**JOHN H. GAGNON** did his graduate work at the University of Chicago. He has done work in prison administration and urban social problems. He has been a member of the faculty of the Department of Psychiatry at the Medical School, Northwestern University, and is currently associated with the Institute for Sex Research and the Department of Sociology at Indiana University. He has done work in drug addiction, problems of imprisonment, socialization, and deviant behavior.

**WILLIAM SIMON** completed his graduate work in sociology at the University of Chicago. He has been on the staff of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and the Institute for Sex Research at Indiana University. He has taught in departments of sociology at Southern Illinois University and Indiana University. He has done research on urban sociology, mass communications, community development, and deviant behavior.

**RICHARD BUTWELL** is director of the William Andrew Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. He is co-author (with Amry Vandenbosch) of the newly published *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia*. Professor Butwell has visited all of the mainland Southeast Asian countries on various occasions. His article is the first of a series on Religion and Politics in Southeast Asia.

**ROBERT T. OSBORN** is associate professor of religion at Duke University.

**LUCIO P. RUOTOLO**, regular film reviewer for *Christianity and Crisis*, teaches English at Stanford University. The two Durer woodcuts reproduced in the art feature are reprinted from *The Complete Woodcuts of Albrecht Durer*, published by Dover Publications.

**JOSÉ MÍGUEZ BONINO** is president of the Union Theological Seminary in Buenos Aires, and was one of the leading Protestant observers at the Vatican Council.

**COLIN M. MORRIS** is president of the United Church of Zambia, and the author of *Nationalism in Africa* (Edinburgh House Press). His article is adapted from an address to the World Methodist Conference which met in London last August.

**AL CARMINES**, director of the arts at Judson Memorial Church, New York City, is *motive's* regular film reviewer.

**DECEMBER POETS: DAVID McFIELD** and **MICHELE NAJLIS** are two of a group of young Nicaraguan poets and artists associated with the new magazine *Cantera* in Managua. Sr. McField is on the faculty of the University and Colegio Bautista, and is president of the SCM of Nicaragua; Srta. Najlis is a student at the University as well as a high school teacher. Clear-eyed young poets such as these are adding a crucial revolutionary edge to the international development of poetry. The translator,

**MARGARET WILDE**, is a member of the Latin America Committee of the UCM; she met the *Cantera* group while attending a Central America SCM consultation last April. Mrs. Wilde is a graduate student at Yale.

**STAN STEINER** makes here his second contribution to *motive*; his first, "The Infant Exile," was one of two *motive* poems selected by the Borestone Mountain Foundation for the annual volume *Best Poems of 1965*. Long intrigued with Indian themes, Steiner includes "The Africans Walked . . ." in a forthcoming collection to be called *Where Are the Daughters of Geronimo?* Steiner's poems have also appeared in *Poetry*, *Saturday Review*, *The Nation*, and many others.

**GLENN F. JACKSON** writes a delicate, pendulum-like line calling up the interaction of present experience and memory/illusion. He lives and writes in Salem, Missouri.

**KAREN WAYNE**, a long-time friend of *motive*, is a graduate student at the University of Chicago.

**JAMES H. BOWEN'S** last contributions to *motive* attracted more letters—both fulsome praise and horrified damnation—than any poems we've yet printed. He is on the faculty of the University of Indiana-Southeastern Campus, and studying theology on the side at Louisville Presbyterian Seminary.

**ARTISTS** in this issue include: **SYLVIA ROTH** did this drawing originally as the May, 1966 cover of *Africa Today*, a journal of opinion published by the American Committee on Africa. **TOM HAMMOND** is assistant professor of art at Madison College, Harrisonburg, Virginia; he teaches printmaking and art education. **FRITZ EICHENBERG** is a German lithographer now residing in New York City. His "The Labor Cross" is from a series of drawings appearing in *The Catholic Worker*. **JOYCE REOPEL**, a new *motive* contributor, is a noted American printmaker; her etching is from the collection of the Peabody College art department. **JAMES CRANE** teaches art at Florida Presbyterian College, St. Petersburg; his new book, *The Great Teaching Machine*, has just been published by John Knox Press. **PRANAS** is an outstanding Lithuanian graphic artist who has been working and exhibiting in Paris since 1945.

**KENNETH PATCHEN**, prose writer, poet, painter, lives in Palo Alto, California; his work was featured in *motive* in the January-February 1964 issue.

**BOOK REVIEWERS: LYMAN H. LEGTERS** is a member of the faculty of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington. **ARTHUR M. WHEELER** is associate professor of philosophy at Kent State University in Ohio.



# motive

for Christmas  
at special gift rates

Please ( enter my new subscription;  enter my renewal;  extend my subscription an extra year) and send the following gift subscriptions in my name. (First, \$3; each additional, \$2.40).

CHECK ENCLOSED     BILL ME  
 Send gift card, signed "\_\_\_\_\_"

DONOR'S NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_ STATE \_\_\_\_\_



NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_

STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_

STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_


STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_

STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_



INTRA MUROS XIII 13/30

prancy



# CONTRIBUTORS

**JOHN H. GAGNON** did his graduate work at the University of Chicago. He has done work in prison administration and urban social problems. He has been a member of the faculty of the Department of Psychiatry at the Medical School, Northwestern University, and is currently associated with the Institute for Sex Research and the Department of Sociology at Indiana University. He has done work in drug addiction, problems of imprisonment, socialization, and deviant behavior.

**WILLIAM SIMON** completed his graduate work in sociology at the University of Chicago. He has been on the staff of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and the Institute for Sex Research at Indiana University. He has taught in departments of sociology at Southern Illinois University and Indiana University. He has done research on urban sociology, mass communications, community development, and deviant behavior.

**RICHARD BUTWELL** is director of the William Andrew Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. He is co-author (with Amry Vandebosch) of the newly published *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia*. Professor Butwell has visited all of the mainland Southeast Asian countries on various occasions. His article is the first of a series on Religion and Politics in Southeast Asia.

**ROBERT T. OSBORN** is associate professor of religion at Duke University.

**LUCIO P. RUOTOLO**, regular film reviewer for *Christianity and Crisis*, teaches English at Stanford University. The two Durer woodcuts reproduced in the art feature are reprinted from *The Complete Woodcuts of Albrecht Durer*, published by Dover Publications.


**JOSÉ MÍGUEZ BONINO** is president of the Union Theological Seminary in Buenos Aires, and was one of the leading Protestant observers at the Vatican Council.

**COLIN M. MORRIS** is president of the United Church of Zambia, and the author of *Nationalism in Africa* (Edinburgh House Press). His article is adapted from an address to the World Methodist Conference which met in London last August.

**AL CARMINES**, director of the arts at Judson Memorial Church, New York City, is *motive's* regular film reviewer.

**DECEMBER POETS: DAVID McFIELD** and **MICHELE NAJLIS** are two of a group of young Nicaraguan poets and artists associated with the new magazine *Cantera* in Managua. Sr. McField is on the faculty of the University and Colegio Bautista, and is president of the SCM of Nicaragua; Srta. Najlis is a student at the University as well as a high school teacher. Clear-eyed young poets such as these are adding a crucial revolutionary edge to the international development of poetry. The translator,

First Class  
Permit No. 607  
Nashville, Tenn.



BUSINESS REPLY MAIL  
No Postage Necessary If Mailed in the United States

Postage will be paid by

**motive** magazine  
P.O. Box 871

Nashville, Tenn. 37202





INTRA MUROS XIII  $\frac{13}{30}$

prancy



# If You Can Lose Your Head



When all a ground you  
Are busy clothing bares  
Then we may let you in  
To greet a rather different kind of King