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DRAWING: THOMPSON

FLINT AND STEEL

Look at the spearhead lying on the hill,
Thirsty for blood, pale as a flake of sky
Fallen among the shoots of corn. A plow
Found it, losing a winter's rust in soil.


It took a hunter's hands to give it shape,
His eyes holding his memory of it sharp,
Scanning days and a clear or misted moon
For an old mystery, geese migrating north,
Formations which, by steady fate or habit,
Suggest the pattern for a weapon system.
The bowstring of an equinox will always
Shuttle them south in autumn, north in spring.

Conjure the arrowmaker from his mound,
His hands and eyes rested, his flair for form
Resurgent. What weapon will he be chipping
From jasper in his mind, while he is watching
A jet plane rift the sky above the geese
On their way home to summer, so disturbing
Their rapid wing-beat that the truest ranks
Waver and swerve? What relic will he leave?

Never another now. And his successor,
A living farmer, holds a plowshare hard
Against the stiff sod and his fading eyes
Against a broken dream—present or past
Bearing no signature. He hears no plane.
He sees no spearhead rising on the furrow.
The harrow and a hard rain leave it bare
And the hill wears it for the morning sun.

Someday, the plowing done, he will unhitch
The grays and stable them, walk to the house
For supper, and slumber beyond his dream,
Leaving a scarred plow to the caustic rain.

—WILLIAM BATTRICK



R. O. HODGELL

MOTIVE

JANUARY 1966

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I was sorry to see the interesting and provocative content of the November issue marred by White's article, "Some Reflections on Beatle-ese." The pedantic and pretentious tone of this piece was surpassed only by the author's apparent lack of knowledge of the nature of rock 'n roll.

Beatle songs, like most contemporary popular music, are meant for dancing or emotional release, but not to comprehend—an impossibility with most such music. The lyrics are merely to augment the tune, and while critics have extended their favor to the Beatle music, not one that I have seen has taken the words very seriously. John Lennon has done well with his books of poems, but they were much different than the Beatle lyrics.

Too, it is pure folly to think that Beatle-ese is close to becoming our only means of communication: we do not have to worry as long as we have writers like Mr. White. His thesis also assumes that all other literature of the past and future will lose its impact, and that all English teachers will capitulate to the simplicity of Beatle-ese. Finally, Mr. White neglected to point out that throughout history our language has changed to its present form, and we adopt new words and syntax to meet our needs for new methods of expression.

I am sure that this article came as a disappointment to others who daily must deal with the problems of prejudice, poverty, apathy on campus, Viet Nam, politics, etc. We thought that in the Beatles we had at last found that charm and innocence which hardly presented a threat to civilization. Please, Mr. White, our idols are so few—let us enjoy the Beatles in peace.

H. HAYES MIZELL
atlanta, georgia

(White's article on the Beatles has evoked some provocative responses. An article challenging White's point of view will appear in a spring issue of motive. the editors)

While religious periodicals are not ordinary reading for me, my attention has been drawn to your October, 1965 issue. In that issue, Jack Newfield wrote:

It is in the East Village that several drop-outs from society have coalesced to cheer LeRoi Jone's scorn for Mickey Schwerner and Andrew Goodman; to join the Peking splinter, the Progressive Labor Movement; to confuse drugs and homosexuality with political actions, to buy "Support the National Liberation Front" buttons for a quarter.

In other words, the same kind of people who join Progressive Labor are also likely to be drug addicts, queers and traitors. Your Mr. Newfield is not original. Hitler denounced "the world-wide conspiracy of communists, drug addicts, homosexuals, and traitors" more than forty years ago. Surely in all that time, you people could come up with some new charges, accuse us of new fields of perversion. Perhaps you might even confront our ideas . . . but, no, I guess that is too much to ask of such "revolutionary Christians" as yourselves.

Your printed nonsense to the contrary, we in the Progressive Labor Party will continue our struggle for a revolutionary government controlled by the working people, the poor people, the black people . . . all who have no power in capitalist America. If this be treason (or drug addiction or homosexuality), then make the most of it. We are winning the people . . . and the people will win!

ED CLARK
southern editor
progressive labor
louisville, kentucky

Having read several articles in the November issue, including a discussion of the pros and cons of fornication by Hefner (editor of a magazine devoted to sex and supported chiefly by the liquor industry) and Cox, and having observed that this discussion is preceded by the statement: "both (Hefner and Cox) are committed to a style of life and fundamental moral posture, and both are able to provoke reflection and evoke serious inquiry"; I urgently request that the Board of Education take the necessary measures to bury the corpse of what was once a beneficial organ of The Methodist Church. It has been putrifying for some time now, so the burial service should not be prolonged. It was later than we thought.

G. KENNETH TULLOCH
meadville, pa.

Regarding Van Harvey's article, I find myself in violent disagreement with his declarations that the church allows college students, seminarians and other aspirants not "fully trained" to preach and perform other ecclesiastical functions in contrast to other professions, namely law, medicine, teaching, social work and psychiatry.

In every profession, of course, the "students" work: students in education curricula do practice teaching in real schools with actual pupils; social work students in the schools with which I am familiar take required field work of various kinds; medical students go on the wards in their third and fourth years (some medical schools are now experimenting with having the students see patients from the beginning of their first year); and in psychiatry, as in any other medical specialty, the very means by which the candidate earns his speciality board certification is through four or five years of practice in his skills before he is fully certified.

The main difference I can see between the way the church handles the "on-the-job" training of ministers and the way the other professions do it is not that only in the church are the untried and inexperienced given professional responsibilities (for how else would any student in any field learn his trade?) but in the fact that student teachers, social workers and doctors are recognized as such and have the benefit of close and competent supervision. True, we (laymen or professional church people) should not look on the seminarian as possessed of the same ability and maturity as a minister who has had twenty or thirty years' experience, but the neophyte still needs desperately (in no profession more than the church) the opportunity to learn his skills first-hand.

JEAN BLANKENSHIP
berkeley, california

I have just finished reading "On Separating Hopes from Illusions" (November, 1965) and feel compelled to let you know that here is one who agrees completely. I am one of those college students with a church, even though I am serving only as a guest speaker for the service of worship until the parish calls a new minister. What Mr. Harvey says is true: by doing such, we degrade the image of a minister as a professionally trained person; we say, in effect, that all the church needs is someone who can write a half-way decent sermon and then deliver it well; we emphasize Sunday morning at 10:30 as being the only time for worship. What college student, with course and campus responsibilities, can truly minister to any congregation? And if he does have the time, just how prepared emotionally, spiritually, and intellectually is he? Not very.

As for the pre-theology undergraduates, if we were to eliminate all those who are entering some phase of the ministry because of parental persuasion or hopes of social status, the number would be greatly reduced. Seldom is the pre-theo student a leader on campus in anything, and even more seldom does he tell anyone he is a pre-theo student. A real witness!!

How anyone without a broad background in the social sciences could possibly think himself qualified for the ministry is unthinkable to me. The ministry today needs people with imagination and insight, ready to encounter every conceivable (and inconceivable) situation, anxious to present the Church as relevant to society (and yet, present it in some new way!). For too long now the Church has been in the world, but always in its isolated corner, seemingly unaffected by the changes about it. Perhaps we should try being of the world for a while and see if we can find a relevancy.

The Church needs men and women who see the world as a challenge and who can present it as a challenge to all "christians" everywhere. Foresight, not hindsight; 1966, not 1900. People who will alert the Church, stimulate the laity, anger others because they step out of the middle of the road! We can no longer merely subsist as a retreat from the rat race: we must become more a part of it so that those outside the Church know that we exist.

(MISS) DEE FOY
marietta college
marietta, ohio

Van Harvey's article (November, 1965) states that today's ministry and church institutions are semi-professional and amateur. In opposition to Bishop J. A. T. Robinson's insistence that the institutional church should decentralize and move into the world, Harvey contends that the institutional church should become more institutionalized and professional. He further contends that the lack of professional competence is the main reason why most of the ministerial candidates are seeking other avenues of service.

I think Robinson and Harvey have fallen into the same temptation in thinking that our primary need is church renewal. It seems to me that the exodus from the institutional church is clearly the redemptive judgment of God. We have made an idol of the institution so God leads his people out of their idolatry. Renewal of the Body of Christ has never been dependent upon man. The church is being renewed today. The sadness over institutional failure is caused because we, like Mary, think that someone has stolen the body.

The young men who are not going into "christian" work, and the older more successful men who have left the "christian" work for secular employment, and the still larger group who have decided to leave but as of now they have not found a way, give as their reasons for leaving: "I can't preach the gospel in the church" or "I'm leaving the 'christian' ministry because as a profession it opposes Christ." I am sure that it is very far from the truth to say that the reason why men are not going into the ministry or that they are leaving it is because it is amateur or semi-professional, or even incompetent. The cause is the self-seeking, self-centered idolatry of the institutional structure frequently called the church.

Whether the institutional churches in America will live or die is hardly the question. But if they do fail and decline into death, I am sure of this: that failure will not be because they were not well trained and skilled in what they were about. The hard truth is that institutionalized religion in America continues to be extremely effective in attaining its stated goals. However, the question is whether we can stand the death and collapse of the Ameri-

can religious institution. The most perplexing part of Harvey's article is how he can so accurately name the disastrous consequences of institutionalized religion on the one hand, and so ardently propound its expansion on the other hand.

The rather apparent fact that institutionalized religion continually in the name of Jesus and God refuses to accept the gospel which it proposes to espouse, seems to me to be the crucial issue. If this springs from idolatry, then perhaps Bishop Robinson's proposal to destroy or move away from the idol is a faithful proclamation of the gospel. If, however, the institution is calling Satan "Jesus" and Jesus "Satan," the proposal is inadequate and will only serve the purpose of recruiting still greater numbers for bondage.

I think that it is only our self-centered religious pride that causes us to view the decline of institutional religion as something bad. I think that it is one of the most manifest signs of God's action we have known in generations. God is bearing witness to the truth that "he who seeks his life shall lose it" and "if these people will not do my works, I will raise up a people who will." Our preoccupation and despair over the failing church is none other than our worship of it.

THE REV. ELBERT B. JEAN
franklin, tennessee

I am proud that *motive* is being published with Methodist credentials and hope that it continues to shake up audaciously the closed minds among us, as well as to challenge the very critical. I believe, however, that it is possible and necessary for this to be done with charity and not vindictiveness, with tolerance and not scholastic arrogance.

For example, I wish that Van Harvey had not mounted an attack on the clergy in general in order to make his point. There is great diversity among our people (it is worse than useless to deplore it) and our ministers must minister to all. This requires a most outstanding man: one who is both highly trained and humble, sophisticated and simple. The miracle is that we do indeed have men like this, though certainly not enough. They are the ones who work to reconcile these same diverse elements which threaten to tear us all apart and which makes *motive's* continued existence so tenuous.

Incidentally, if you had mailed *motive* directly to my daughter at college as requested instead of to me, both you and Mr. Harvey might have been spared this blast.

MRS. C. P. MERRELL
northfield, minnesota

Whereas *motive* magazine has been a vital instrument in the intellectual life of the total campus ministry, and

Whereas *motive* has been a useful means of communication with students and faculty who often have no other relationship with our ministry, and

Whereas *motive* has been helpful to members of Wesley Foundation Boards of Trustees in understanding the change that is constantly taking place in the areas of theology, art, psychology, and social concern, therefore

Be it resolved that the Association of College and University Ministers of the Methodist Church go on record supporting the editorial policy of *motive* which constantly leads us into creative and controversial fields of thought, and

Be it also resolved that the Association of College and University Ministers of the Methodist Church support the staff of *motive* magazine as persons who reflect the consensus of our thinking in mood of direction and who are sympathetic and supportive to the work of Methodism in its campus and university ministries.

a resolution passed December 2, 1965
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
MINISTERS OF THE METHODIST CHURCH
lincoln, neb.

I am bothered by the use of Robert McGovern's art in the October issue. Does the art director expect me to believe that this girl carrying a sign is identical at the end with what she was at the beginning? That would be a sorry state. I hope I have misinterpreted the meaning of this picture sequence. Talent is better used than clever manipulation of figures and color. A little meaning and purpose, please.

KARL GALBRAITH
ithaca, new york

motive

THIS ISSUE

A college campus in January impresses me as being very sober. There seems to be an air of suspension: everybody hangs between beginnings and endings. A feeling of quiet desperation hovers like a pall over those cramming for finals, and a mood of paralyzed expectancy pervades those just registering for a new quarter.

It's the same kind of feeling I have after the third act curtain falls on "Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?". I'm never sure whether to burst into the "Doxology" or to weep softly in the fervent hope that penance will absolve me from any responsibility for the state of mankind.

These reflections seem to me to parallel the prevalent dilemma in American foreign policy. We appear to be caught near the final exam in a very short course in our own Nation Building, yet already propelled into a cram course in World Caretaking. We've met the technical requirements in the former (though we've missed the spirit of the undertaking) and we're nervously unprepared for the latter (though we're certainly not going to ask for a transfer or a drop). But the metaphor evaporates at the point of grade-giving in either instance. Students, when confronted by borderline grades, can opt for an incomplete, but when it comes to foreign policy, we're going to have to bear manfully some arbitrary "passing-failing" judgments.

Despite the onslaught of competent and definitive writing on American foreign policy, we felt it even more imperative for motive to do a special issue devoted to a critique of contemporary developments in our foreign policy. Though our limitations were abundantly apparent to us, we believed that a magazine which concentrates on the academic community was obligated to present an issue on this theme at this time.

This special issue assesses certain options which lie before us. There are no simple solutions, no patent panaceas offered as definitive answers to the choices being presented us. But, without exception, the authors in this issue make it clear that we as citizens are under a mandate to think, speak and act on civilization's behalf. Foreign policy is a matter for individual attention and is not a matter to be relegated to the "experts." We have only to recall that less than two years ago our Defense Department declared December, 1965 to be the target date for removing our troops from Viet Nam to recognize that professional judgments can be as remiss as amateur analyses.

As citizens, we cannot absolve ourselves from involvement in this particular moment. As intellectuals, we can't content ourselves with abstract theories unrelated to the inhumanities of modern warfare. As Christians, we must search for the modern application of the injunction to turn swords into plowshares.

The spectrum of ideas and positions in this issue is broad. The contributors were simply asked for "articles which would focus upon possible alternatives and new factors which may affect the course of American foreign policy in the next five years." A definitive historical perspective was not sought, nor, for that matter, a geographically-balanced perspective.

We present what in effect is an "intuitive testimony" to the possibility, and the necessity, of contemporary collegians taking responsibility for their world. Each of us has but one life to invest in the stream of history. This issue suggests that that investment be made on behalf of the continued future of humanity, not the preservation of once-pertinent but now inadequate myths.

—B. J. Stiles

AMERICAN

By J. William Fulbright

There is an inevitable divergence, attributable to the imperfections of the human mind, between the world as it is and the world as men perceive it. As long as our perceptions are reasonably close to objective reality, it is possible for us to act upon our problems in a rational and appropriate manner. But when our perceptions fail to keep pace with events, when we refuse to believe something because it displeases or frightens us, or is simply startlingly unfamiliar, then the gap between fact and perception becomes a chasm, and action becomes irrelevant and irrational.

There has always—and inevitably—been some divergence between the realities of foreign policy and our ideas about it. This divergence has in certain respects been growing rather than narrowing, and we are handicapped, accordingly, by policies based on old myths rather than current realities. The divergence is dangerous and unnecessary—dangerous because it can reduce foreign policy to a fraudulent game of imagery and appearances, unnecessary because it can be overcome by the determination of men in high office to dispel prevailing misconceptions through the candid dissemination of unpleasant but inescapable facts.

. . . I should like to suggest two possible reasons for the growing divergence between the realities and our perceptions of current world politics. The first is the radical change in relations between and within the Communist and the free worlds, and the second is the ten-

dency of too many of us to confuse means with ends and, accordingly, to adhere to prevailing practices with a fervor befitting immutable principles.

. . . The astonishing changes in the configuration of the postwar world have had an unsettling effect on both public and official opinion in the United States. One reason for this, I believe, lies in the fact that we are a people used to looking at the world, and indeed at ourselves, in moralistic rather than empirical terms. We are predisposed to regard any conflict as a clash between good and evil rather than as simply a clash between conflicting interests. We are inclined to confuse freedom and democracy, which we regard as moral principles, with the way in which they are practiced in America—with capitalism, federalism, and the two-party system, which are not moral principles but simply the preferred and accepted practices of the American people. There is much cant in American moralism and not a little inconsistency. It resembles in some ways the religious faith of the many respectable people who, in Samuel Butler's words, "would rather be equally horrified to hear the Christian religion doubted or to see it practiced."

Our national vocabulary is full of "self-evident truths," not only about "life, liberty, and happiness," but about a vast number of personal and public issues, including the cold war. It has become one of the "self-evident truths" of the postwar era that, just as the President resides in Washington and the Pope in Rome,

FOREIGN POLICY:

Old Myths and New Realities

the Devil resides immutably in Moscow. We have come to regard the Kremlin as the permanent seat of his power and we have grown almost comfortable with a menace which, though unspeakably evil, has had the redeeming virtues of constancy, predictability, and familiarity. Now the Devil has betrayed us by traveling abroad and, worse still, by dispersing himself, turning up now here, now there, and in many places at once, with devilish disregard for the laboriously constructed frontiers of ideology.

We are confronted with a complex and fluid world situation, and we are not adapting ourselves to it. We are clinging to old myths in the face of new realities, and we are seeking to escape the contradictions by narrowing the permissible bounds of public discussion, by relegating an increasing number of ideas and viewpoints to a growing category of "unthinkable thoughts." I believe that this tendency can and should be reversed, that it is within our ability, and unquestionably in our interests, to cut loose from established myths and to start thinking some "unthinkable thoughts"—about the cold war and East-West relations, about the underdeveloped countries and particularly those in Latin America, about the changing nature of the Chinese Communist threat in Asia, and about the festering war in Viet Nam.

... There is little in history to justify the expectation that we can either win the cold war or end it immediately and completely. These are favored myths, respectively, of

the American right and of the American left. They are, I believe, equal in their unreality and in their disregard for the feasibilities of history. We must disabuse ourselves of them and come to terms, at last, with the realities of a world in which neither good nor evil is absolute and in which those who move events and make history are those who have understood not how much but how little it is within our power to change.

... American policy has to one degree or another been less effective than it might have been because of our national tendency to equate means with ends and therefore to attach a mythological sanctity to policies and practices which in themselves have no moral content or value except insofar as they contribute to the achievement of some valid national objective. I believe that we must try to overcome this excessive moralism, which binds us to old myths and blinds us to new realities and, worse still, leads us to regard new and unfamiliar ideas with fear and mistrust.

We must dare to think "unthinkable thoughts." We must learn to explore all of the options and possibilities that confront us in a complex and rapidly changing world. We must learn to welcome rather than fear the voices of dissent and not to recoil in horror whenever some heretic suggests that Castro may survive or that Khrushchev is not as bad a fellow as Stalin was. We must overcome our susceptibility to "shock"—a word which I wish could be banned from our news-

papers and magazines and especially from the *Congressional Record*.

If Congress and public opinion are unduly susceptible to "shock," the executive branch, and particularly the Department of State, is subject to the malady of chronic and excessive caution. An effective foreign policy is one which concerns itself more with innovation abroad than with conciliation at home. A creative foreign policy—as President Truman, for one, knew—is not necessarily one which wins immediate general approval. It is sometimes necessary for leaders to do unpleasant and unpopular things, because, as Burke pointed out, the duty of the democratic politician to his constituents is not to comply with their every wish and preference, but to give them the benefit of, and to be held responsible for, the exercise of his own best judgment.

We must dare to think about "unthinkable things," because when things become "unthinkable," thinking stops and action becomes mindless. If we are to disabuse ourselves of old myths, and to act wisely and creatively upon the new realities of our time, we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom, remembering, as Woodrow Wilson said, that "The greatest freedom of speech is the greatest safety because, if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking."

The

By DONALD GRANT



PRINT: HODGELL

United States and the United Nations

THE Washington cliché is that the United Nations is one diplomatic instrument among many by which the United States protects its national interests. There are other instruments: traditional diplomacy, the bilateral exchange of ambassadors, the national military force-in-being, posing a threat of nuclear or non-nuclear punishment; various economic programs carrying at once the promise of benefit and the implied threat of deprivation.

Altogether, the power of the U.S. is imposing, whether exercised inside or outside the U.N. No nation has more power. The apparatus of government in Washington has at its disposal the largest aggregate of power of all kinds ever assembled under one management in the history of the world. But power politics in its most direct form is really not the business of the U.N. And in any event, to the extent that the U.S. is all-powerful we really would not seem to need the world organization. Why is it then that both Adlai E. Stevenson, the late chief American delegate to the United Nations, and Arthur J. Goldberg, the present chief delegate, have said repeatedly that if the U.N. did not exist it would be necessary to start all over again and build one?

One obvious answer is that although the power of the U.S. is indeed impressive it is not omnipotent. Another and related answer is that in a nuclear age—and in a period of history in which advanced technology has created a situation of timely-meshed interdependence—naked power has a much reduced usefulness in achieving foreign policy

objectives.

On Nov. 9, the night following the great power black-out in the north-eastern portion of the U.S., I happened to attend a dinner party given by the Mauritanian Ambassador to the U.N. Sitting next to me was the Ambassador from Finland. Inevitably we all exchanged thoughts on the black-out. As a citizen of the world's most powerful nation, sitting with representatives of two very small nations—one in Africa and the other in northern Europe—I was at first a little startled by the Finnish Ambassador's comment.

"It would appear," he said, "that small and underdeveloped nations may be able to fight wars in this era—but not large and powerful nations like the U.S. If a mere accident could cause so much chaos in your country, what would a few nuclear bombs have done?"

Something like that, I reflected, has been said by Communist China's Mao Tse-tung. China is not a small country, but Mao, despite China's development of nuclear weapons, continues to believe that a nuclear war would be more serious for a highly industrialized nation like the U.S. than for relatively underdeveloped China, with its vast population spread over equally vast areas.

Is it true, then, that peace is more important for the U.S. than for Communist China? Is the U.S. in fact "playing Red China's game" in keeping the Peking representatives out of the U.N.?

This much seems certain, that the piling up of military-industrial instruments of power makes a nation more vulnerable once the destructive force

of war is unleashed in the world.

Furthermore, it is increasingly plain that the use of great power is subject to real limitations, inherent in the interdependent complexities of life in this second half of the 20th century. Why does Washington permit Fidel Castro's Communist Cuba to exist only 90 miles off the coast of Florida? Not, to be sure, out of good will, or even because of a moral repugnance toward crushing Cuba by force—and certainly not because our instruments of power are inadequate to do so. The truth is a good many men in Washington have come to realize that such an act might have extremely unfavorable consequences for American policy. The Soviet Union has threatened to retaliate against the U.S. if we should crush Cuba; we are not sure this threat would be carried out—but neither are we sure it would not be. Quite aside from that, we have been forced to consider the reaction of the whole world. And Washington has concluded that violence against Cuba, now, would arouse resentment, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America, that would more than outweigh any temporary advantage.

WHAT good is great power if it cannot be used effectively? More than one American diplomat has begun to ask himself that question as he looks at U.S. ventures in the Dominican Republic—and in Viet Nam. In both instances we had the advantage of being invited to send our forces by some kind of local authorities—an advantage not present in the case of Cuba, where the Bay of Pigs venture turned

out so disastrously. Yet the policy advantages of the Dominican venture and the Viet Nam venture—despite the loss of more than a thousand American lives and the expenditure of billions of dollars in Viet Nam—are to say the least dubious.

What are the legitimate objectives of American foreign policy?

What the U.S. wants, it is said, is a world environment in which American values and aspirations may flourish to the practicable maximum. This statement obviously leaves a great deal of room for interpretation. What American values? What is the practicable maximum? Are we talking about the flourishing of values inside the U.S.—or everywhere in the world? The term "aspirations" is at least equally vague: from Peking it sometimes appears that the U.S. aspires to world conquest. To some more insular Americans the maximum foreign policy aspiration, no doubt, is simply to be let alone.

Useful answers to these questions can only be found in terms of specifics, by experience. Nations, perhaps even more than individual persons, tend to want everything—and then, in wisdom, to settle for the possible. To help nations discover what is possible is perhaps the most important function of the U.N. This is what the Charter means when it speaks of the U.N. as a "center for harmonizing the actions of nations."

There are two ways of discovering the probable results of a given national action. One way is to try it and see what happens. But once a national action is begun the die is cast. Sometimes such actions can be reversed if they prove to be in error, but not always.

The second way is not as easy as the first; it is laborious and lacking in precision. It is the way of diplomacy—especially U.N. diplomacy—to talk about the problem with everyone concerned and then arrive at a judgment as to the probable consequences before action is taken. This has the advantage that judgments can be altered as new facts come into view and as wisdom ripens.

It is easy for those who are not responsible for the nation's welfare

to make suggestions that we bomb China's nuclear installations or use nuclear weapons in Viet Nam. If such rash adventures are attempted, and they work, those who suggested them can claim the credit. If they do not work, if they elicit a nuclear response, few of us will be around to blame anyone.

Harmonizing the actions of nations through the U.N., to avoid the possible disaster of trial-and-error, is a never-ending process which takes place on many levels all of the time.

It is most obvious, perhaps, during the annual meetings of the General Assembly. At the outset of such meetings most of the 117-member nations participate in what is known as the general debate. This exercise is looked upon by some observers as a great bore—as indeed it is, if one merely listens to the endless speech-making by foreign ministers and ambassadors. In many instances they repeat what everyone already knows, outlining national policies long since made apparent.

And yet the nations of the world—especially the great powers—each appoints a "listener" whose job it is to consider carefully each word spoken. Painstaking reports on the speeches are written for study by the various foreign offices of the world. Often subtle but important policy changes can be discovered in this way. There is no other way of knowing how the policies of all the nations fit together at any given point in time.

Secondly, as issues arise in the U.N.—whether in the Security Council, in the General Assembly or in one of the committees—a more dynamic process of national policy formation becomes visible. "In principle" the Soviet Union may be opposed to U.N. peacekeeping as now conducted, but considering all of the concrete circumstances the Soviet Union may approve of specific peacekeeping operations—as in fact it has in Cyprus and Kashmir.

FINALLY the U.N.—and for that matter the city of New York itself—is a place where more diplomats are gathered year in and year out than any other place in the

world. The U.N. buildings form an important meeting place. In addition each delegation has its own headquarters somewhere in the city. Each diplomat has an apartment in the city—or a house in the suburbs. This situation allows representatives of various nations to meet informally, even when not under the pressure of immediate problems. From their random conversations, each can discover details and shadings of other nations' policies—and perhaps most importantly, diplomats can get to know each other as human beings.

Despite the war between India and Pakistan, Indian and Pakistani children of diplomats stationed here often went to the same schools and were—and remained—fast friends. Soviet-American unofficial friendships are not at all uncommon. Even the Ambassador from Albania—who often speaks in the U.N. for the absent Peking government—is a friendly human being, as I discovered quite accidentally. At a Cuban reception I was talking to his wife when my elbow dislodged a glass that was standing on the edge of a table. It fell to the floor, broke, and a piece of glass cut her foot slightly. The next day I sent her flowers and a note of apology. From then on the Ambassador from Albania was my friend.

These human contacts are not unimportant. The Berlin blockade was lifted following a chance encounter between an American diplomat and a Soviet diplomat in the washroom at the U.N. The limited nuclear test ban treaty grew out of many casual conversations between Adlai E. Stevenson and his Soviet opposite numbers; such conversations often taking place at receptions after hours.

The total process of harmonizing national actions can best be accomplished through the U.N. because so many nations are represented there. If all nations were represented it is not difficult to see that the process would be more complete. Few foreign affairs problems involve only two or three nations; most often a majority of the nations of the world are involved, directly or indirectly. Only at the U.N. can an American diplomat talk to diplomats from

scores of other nations in the course of a single day.

Talking is one thing, you may say, but can the U.N. really do anything about the problems that are discussed there? My answer is to examine a few concrete examples and judge for yourself.

The U.S. Marines moved into the Dominican Republic in the classic go-it-alone pattern. Then, to get Washington off the hook, to retrieve the reputation of the U.S. in the rest of Latin America, every effort was made to have the Organization of American States take over.

The Organization of American States reports to the U.N. The U.N. also sent, independently, a team of observers to the Dominican Republic. Without this international action U.S. policy would have been much more severely damaged than it was.

Or take Viet Nam. Having watched France bog down there, the U.S. attempted to take France's place, with—so far—very nearly identical results. France eventually decided it wasn't worth the cost and negotiated a settlement with a group of interested nations. The U.S. at first made every effort to avoid negotiations—but lately has asked the U.N. to help arrange a negotiated settlement. Unfortunately it is not certain that the U.N. can do much in this case because the most important of the interested nations in the area—Communist China—has been excluded from representation at the U.N. by U.S. action.

Another case: A communal civil war in Cyprus threatened to become a full-scale war between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies of the U.S. As in Viet Nam, the U.S.—and Britain—at first tried to avoid going to the U.N. for help. But when go-it-alone policies didn't work the U.N. was handed the problem. The civil war was stopped and a war between Greece and Turkey avoided.

In another situation, a war between India and Pakistan broke out last August. Communist China threatened to come to the aid of Pakistan—but prompt U.N. action stopped the war before that could happen.

NO one pretends that U.N. action as now organized works perfectly. Wars stopped often continue to smoulder. The Congo action, for instance, was particularly difficult. But even in that case a direct confrontation between the U.S. and Russia was avoided; this could have been the beginning of World War III, but was not. Suez, Lebanon, West Irian—the list of U.N. actions is a long one. So far a general world war has been avoided, since the U.N. was organized.

But the real test lies ahead. The situation is this: the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and Communist China all have nuclear weapons. Between them, they have enough of such weapons to destroy all civilization on earth, and perhaps life itself.

On several occasions there have been close calls—notably during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The U.N. had a hand in defusing that crisis, but it is clear that the danger of nuclear war is still increasing. Five nuclear powers are too many for safety; but it is estimated that within the next few years there may be 20 nuclear powers. The probability that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of persons who will be tempted to use them without taking too much thought will approach certainty, diplomats fear.

Diplomats—particularly American, Russian and British—are well aware of this pressing danger in the spread of nuclear weapons. Avoiding the danger, they are discovering, involves fundamental problems of world organization. To be effective, a treaty prohibiting the dissemination of nuclear weapons must include all five nuclear powers. Conversations with China and France have hardly begun. Furthermore, nations capable of building nuclear weapons, but which have not yet done so, must be given some kind of assurance that they will never need such weapons.

In the end, it is beginning to be realized, safety lies in a wholly denuclearized world—and a world in which the rule of law prevails to an extent beyond the dreams even of the men who framed the United Na-

tions Charter. There simply does not seem to be any way in which nations can act on a go-it-alone basis in a nuclear world without taking terrible risks of nuclear destruction of that world. To continue piling up nuclear weapons in such a situation doesn't make any sense at all to the diplomats who have studied the problem most carefully.


At this point we have reached the frontier of United States participation in the United Nations. For many years successive governments in Washington have looked on the world organization as an instrument—one among many—of American foreign policy. But surely the overriding self-interest of the United States is survival.

Now we are beginning to see that some kind of responsible and universal world rule of law is the minimum condition for survival. It is too early to say where this vision will carry us. Responsible diplomats at the U.N. know that the present world system must be extended to include all of the nations of the world. They know that the liberty to blow up the world must be curtailed in the common good.

American leadership, I believe, would be welcome if it were to point the way ahead and take the initiative in moving in the direction that survival dictates. So far, that leadership has been sadly lacking. American representatives in the U.N. are still working harder to keep nations out than they are to include all of the nations of the world. They are still insisting on the right of the United States to go it alone when Washington believes it expedient. As long as we claim this right for ourselves we cannot expect other nations to eschew it.

The United Nations is a brave beginning. Because the United States is the most powerful nation in the world organization it also bears the most responsibility. We can use our immense influence to help build a United Nations adequate for the world in which we find ourselves, if we choose to do so. We cannot, to be sure, do it alone, but as first among equals our voice will be heard if we raise it.

COMPUTING



SCULPTURE: MILONADIS

THE FUTURE

automation and economic development

IT IS NOW TWENTY YEARS since the end of World War II and about fifteen years since the rich countries committed themselves to help the poor countries achieve an adequate pace of development. The general condition of most of the poor countries has not improved significantly during this period and there appears to be no real prospect that major progress will be made in coming years unless a dramatic shift in approach and philosophy occurs. The object of this paper is to suggest the changes which will be required if we are to achieve satisfactory social and economic development in the second half of the twentieth century.

Most economists would reject such a pessimistic statement of the position, using evidence derived from national income figures which can be shown to have increased steadily, if not rapidly, in most poor countries. However, it appears that the rate of growth in national income has slowed in many poor countries in recent years while the ever-rising pace of population increase insures that income per person is little better than static in almost all the poor countries and is even falling in some countries.

The overall situation can be summed up in a quotation from the United Nations Development Decade Report: "Taken as a group, the rate of progress of the underdeveloped countries measured by income *per caput* has been painfully slow, more of the order of one per cent per annum than two per cent. Most indices of social progress show similar slow and spotty improvement. Moreover, the progress actually achieved in underdeveloped countries has often been uneven, limited to certain sectors of the economy or to certain regions or groups of countries. As a result, the disparities in levels of living within underdeveloped countries are often as pronounced as those between developed and developing countries taken as a whole."¹

In addition, it should be remembered that national income figures are generally accorded a degree of reverence that they do not deserve, partly because their conceptual basis is unsatisfactory, and partly because they

are subject to severe upward biases during the process of industrialization. An individual who moves from a village where he paid little or nothing for a room of his own to a slum where he pays a large amount for part of a room and whose food costs rise because of transportation charges would be the cause of an increase in total national income although his welfare would not necessarily be increased and would certainly not rise in the ratio suggested by the crude income change. Skepticism about favorable rates of increase in national income figures necessarily increases when physical production indices are examined, particularly those for food, for they show no substantial rise in calories per head since post-war days in most poor countries.

IT IS urgently necessary that we face the hard facts and recognize that most of the developing countries are not making enough progress to avoid disaster in the long run and perhaps even in the short run. It is time that we recognized that the income gap between the rich and the poor countries is widening and will continue to widen unless we adopt drastically changed policies. It is time we recognized that the nineteenth century process of growth which was achieved by starving the worker and by the voluntary thrift of the manager has no place in the second half of the twentieth century when work and saving can be most effectively carried out by the machine.

The bankruptcy of attempting to secure development through the process of encouraging individual saving is made obvious by experience. Some fifteen years ago it was commonplace to produce development plans on the assumption that marginal saving rates might amount to 50 per cent, that is, it was assumed that half of any additional amount received would be saved. Experience has shown that marginal saving rates have been far lower, rising little above zero in most poor countries.

Development theory has failed to keep up with the fact that the world is entering a new era in which the power of the machine (the automatic tool) is being combined

¹ This article is adapted from "Needed: A New Development Philosophy," originally published in the *International Development Review*, March, 1964.

with the skill of the machine (the computer) to develop a cybernated system with effectively unlimited productive capacity. U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations has stated: "The truth, the central stupendous truth about developed economics today is that they can have—in anything but the shortest run—the kind and scale of resources they *decide* to have. . . . It is no longer resources that limit decisions. It is the decision that makes the resources. This is the fundamental, revolutionary change—perhaps the most revolutionary mankind has ever known."²

The implications of cybernation are far-reaching, and for this reason are destructive of the validity of many existing patterns of socio-economic analysis. The initial setting up of computer systems can be explained, at least in part, by traditional economic analysis: it represents an attempt to increase efficiency through rationalization of operations. But when computer systems become fully operative, they set up a drive toward the reorganization, for purposes of compatibility, of interacting systems and institutions. The greater the number of areas of computer application, the greater the force behind this drive becomes, with a consequent trend toward the emergence of a total computer system organized for maximum efficiency in terms of the immediate defined task.

WITHIN such cybernated productive systems, there will be little place for men. Only a relatively few top decision-makers will be required to ensure production. If, therefore we allow present trends to continue, we will see the rapid development of a new type of organization of the socioeconomy within which incomes and nonwork time would vary in inverse proportion. Starting at the bottom of the scale, there would be a great number of totally unemployed workers subsisting inadequately on resources derived from highly bureaucratized schemes designed merely to ensure survival; the greatest proportion of the population would work considerably shorter hours than at present and would receive wages and salaries which would provide for necessities and even some conveniences, but would not encourage them to develop a meaningful pattern of activity; and a small number of people with the highest levels of education and training would work excessively long hours for very high salaries.

The United States Department of Labor has recognized the existence of these trends. Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz has stated: ". . . virtually all of the occupations providing expanding employment opportunities in recent years have been those requiring long periods of education and formal training. Our projections indicate that these are the occupations which will also be expanding in the future: little or no increase is expected among the semi-skilled and unskilled occupations."³

AS IT IS only in recent years that there has been examination of the effects of technology even in the developed countries, it is not surprising that there has been little attempt to examine its effects in the underdeveloped countries. Recently, however, David Morse,

Director General of the International Labor Office, examined this issue in the following terms:

From our present standpoint in time, there is reason to be more optimistic as to the production capabilities of advancing technology than as to employment expansion. Let us look for a moment at the employment needs of the future as measured by changes in the size of the population of working age [during the period 1950-1975]

On a world-wide basis, during this 25-year period, the number of persons of working age will increase by 800 million. From this, it can be estimated with reasonable accuracy that the labor force will be increased by more than 550 million persons—or, in other words, that more than 550 million jobs will be needed. And this figure does not take into account the current backlog of unemployment and underemployment, particularly widespread in underdeveloped countries.

Out of this world total, the increase for the industrially advanced areas of the world would be about 100 million, split in three roughly equal parts among North America, Europe and the Soviet Union. The increase for the underdeveloped areas of the world would be some 450 million, that for Asia alone being estimated at 380 million. For comparison, just this increase in the labor force in Asia during the 1950-1975 period will be greater than the total labor force of 340 million in the industrially developed world in 1950—North America, Europe and the Soviet Union combined.

That represents a lot of new jobs. And in considering how they might be created, we are confronted with the fact that the technology, whether in agriculture or in industry which is most capable of yielding the *greatest increases in production* is least capable of expanding employment. This is why automation has become a major public issue in America, because it has been held responsible for the present unacceptable levels of unemployment. I believe automation is only partly responsible; but it is proving to be extremely difficult to adjust economic policy and particular levels of effective demand to a situation of rapid technological change. Nevertheless, the figures I have cited show that the magnitude of the employment problem will be very substantially greater in the underdeveloped parts of the world.


. . . The world employment problem—and particularly the employment problem in the underdeveloped areas—may grow alarmingly, and prove a source of social and political tension, even as progress is made toward satisfying the production needs of rising populations.⁴

Morse suggests that the progress of technology will provide us with the means to solve the productive problem—if we are able to develop new institutions which will allow the full use of our total technological capacities. Indeed, he goes further and argues that only through the use of the new technologies will we be able to feed, clothe and provide shelter for the rapidly growing populations of the developing countries. He adds, however, that the use of the new technology may well make it impossible to provide conventional work for the rapidly rising labor force in the poor countries of the world.

Morse therefore poses two major issues. First, will the necessary capital and skilled manpower resources be available to make it possible for the developing countries to utilize the new technology? Second, what changes in the development process are implied by this perspective? We will take these two issues up in turn.

THERE are good reasons to assume that more capital will become available to the poor countries in the relatively near future. The first reason depends on an

motive



analysis of market forces; the second on considerations of economic policy in the rich countries and the third on growing world solidarity of purpose.

Despite much talk of a severe profit squeeze in the rich countries, profits and rates of interest remain higher than are justified by market forces; this is particularly true in the United States. The equilibrium rate of interest which would lead to full employment of American productive resources is lower than the existing level; rates of interest are not allowed to drop, however, because, it is argued, such a drop would lead to a worsening of the United States balance of payments situation.

This is probably true so long as we continue to insist on the continuation of an obsolete international payments system. It is to be hoped that the opposition of the bankers will eventually be overcome and that the rate of interest will cease to be the first line of defense against devaluation. At this point, profits and rates of interest in the United States would fall and investment in the developing countries would immediately appear more attractive. The classical doctrine that gaps in income between the developed and developing countries would tend to close was not completely wrong. The use of power by the economic communities of the rich countries has, however, prevented this development up to the present time.*

Capital would move more rapidly toward the developing countries if power was not used to prevent market forces from operating. In addition, however, economic policy can be expected to dictate larger transfers of capital goods to the developing countries, as soon as the realities of the present technological situation are understood.

The tendency toward larger transfers of aid will be reinforced by a slowly growing recognition that the welfare of all the nations of the world is indissolubly linked in present conditions. It is increasingly argued that worldwide poverty in the midst of abundance is not only morally wrong but also highly dangerous.

It will be therefore in the interest of the rich countries of the world to develop new mechanisms which will make it possible to provide more resources of capital and manpower to the developing countries. As a necessary concomitant to the development of such new mechanisms, there will have to be a fundamental reconsideration of the purpose of development: it can be hoped that this will eventually lead to an understanding that the whole world is actively engaged in a search for new values which will allow people to live in the technological age which is so rapidly being created. We will have to come to recognize that the conventional wisdom of the past has little, if any, relevance to the real problems of the future.

* It is extraordinary that so little effort has been devoted to examining the effects of "power" on international economic relations. It is now accepted that patterns of competition are entirely different when only a few firms compete (oligopoly) or a monopoly situation exists as compared to situations of perfect competition: in conditions of monopoly and oligopoly power to control prices exists which is absent in conditions of perfect competition. It seems almost certain that an equally drastic shift in theorizing would follow any analysis of the use of "power" in international economic relations.⁵

IT IS possible, however, that this new examination will never get underway but will be drowned in ever-increasing pressures for economic growth. The only dynamic philosophy in the world today is that of economic growth; this philosophy suggests that everything worthwhile is possible, and only possible, with a high standard of living.

An increasing number of Americans are suggesting that all American surplus production should be provided to the poor countries. They hope in this way to preserve their own socio-economic system which has been out-moded by technological developments and thus continue scarcity which is its basis. They fail to recognize that the primary problem in achieving development is not economic but results from the need to change values to allow people to live in the conditions which are being created.

The rich countries should provide the poor countries with all the resources which they can use to help achieve their desired process of development. However, the amount of resources which should be supplied cannot be determined solely on the basis of the maximum feasible rate of economic development which could possibly be achieved but depends, more importantly, on how much economic growth is actually desirable. Our problem today is that we face completely novel social questions to which there are no available answers.

The most crucial questions are how we are to provide incomes for everybody if there are not enough jobs to go round and what are people to do with their time when machines can produce more efficiently than men? It has been assumed up to the present time that as industrialization proceeded, everybody who wanted a job would be able to find one, that the possession of a job would provide everybody with an income adequate to live, that the income would be spent to buy goods and that the demand for goods would provide enough jobs to go round—thus closing the circle.

It has been believed up to the present time that the relationships which have existed in the past in the countries which have already industrialized would turn out to be equally valid in the countries only now industrializing. The poor countries have therefore accepted and even welcomed the destruction of their informal "social security" systems which ensured the rather wide distribution of any available production. This process is still continuing despite the fact that it is now clear that full employment is not a feasible goal in the developing countries and that the method of distributing income presently applied in the industrialized countries cannot be applied to the countries only now industrializing for it depends completely on the ability to provide a job for everybody seeking one.

Western methods of distributing income have been invalidated by the process of automation and technological change which ensures that it will no longer be possible for everybody to find a job within the economic system. I have suggested that in America, where informal distributive mechanisms have already been almost completely destroyed, the only possible solution is to provide every

individual with an absolute guaranteed right to an income sufficient to enable him to live with dignity.⁶

Different approaches will be required in the developing countries where extended kinship systems and other informal transfer mechanisms still exist. Each country will have to work out an approach which accords with its own history, economic status and values. In most poor countries, however, the most urgent necessity is to prevent the gradual whittling away and even the deliberate destruction of present informal distributive systems so as to gain time in which new approaches can be developed and accepted.

The development process in the poor countries has so far been conceived as the method by which they could approximate the *present* condition of the rich countries in the shortest possible span of years. Today, we must recognize that this definition is totally inappropriate. Mankind confronts a world-wide challenge, how to live within a technological system and still preserve his humanity. Development can only be achieved at an adequate pace if we use the productive potential provided by technology, but unless man controls the technology we will find the human being conforming to technological imperatives.

Our problem is not a scarcity of human or material resources; man can be made more intelligent through education and new material resources can be developed through research. Our problem is a lack of imagination to take the major leaps in understanding and policy which are essential if we are to be able to live in our totally new world. We will only be able to secure development if we recognize that the technological problems of providing everybody with reasonable standards of living can be solved within a generation: and that our problem is therefore to find ways to alter our values and institutions to allow us to use this technological potential for the benefit of humanity.

Development cannot stop while we re-examine it from this perspective. On the other hand, we must recognize that we are not going to secure satisfactory patterns of development until we do adapt our plans to the realities of the present situation. We urgently need imaginative research, within a suitable institutional framework.

In an earlier paper, I suggested some of the institutional arrangements which would be required.⁷ They ranged from the purely technological to the almost philosophical. I suggested that the keystone should be *The Institute of World Social and Political Organization*. I described it as "an international body to examine the social, political and economic systems which could be viable in a world where unlimited destructive powers exist, where there is no real shortage of resources, and where new techniques to meet problems can be developed through research and development. The Institute would aim to discuss the real questions in today's world: What methods can be found to allow peaceful settlements of disputes between sovereign nations? What are the criteria on which wealth should be distributed both nationally and internationally? How can the freedom of the individual be preserved in a

technological world? What are the real limits of learning at various levels of intelligence?

"The Institute would operate on both a philosophical and a social science level. Its staff would try to develop the principles on which questions should be resolved. They would also attempt to translate these principles into concepts which could be used in the policy-making process, thus replacing the present terminology of the social sciences which is often irrelevant or positively misleading."


IT IS not possible to achieve economic growth, let alone social development, without a major change in our approach. We do, however, now possess the means to achieve economic development; our problem is to create the necessary institutions and to ensure its subordination to human and social priorities.

Such a redefinition of the task promises one immediate and substantial benefit. Up to the present time, the process of development has been seen as involving transfers in only one direction: from the rich to the poor countries. It has been argued that the poor countries needed to accept not only the technological knowledge but also the social ideals of the West. The poor countries cannot help but resent the inevitable obligation to remain in a dependent role.

The argument of this paper, however, demonstrates that the West has just as much to learn from the poor countries in terms of social values as the poor have to learn from the West in terms of scientific and technological skills. The West needs to discover from the poor countries how it is possible to find satisfactions in life without constant, frenetic activity. It seems more than probable that this cultural lesson, which the West needs to learn in order to live within future conditions, will be less easy to teach than the scientific and technological lessons the poor countries have to learn from the West.

The developing countries have never looked on work as the supreme virtue; this fact has been one of the reasons preventing economic development in the past. Most of those engaged in trying to secure development at the present time still believe that they should change the values of the developing countries so that work becomes central. It is hoped that this will make possible a nineteenth-century process of development. We must understand that this is inappropriate. Instead, we must recognize that many of the present values in the poor countries are highly suitable for a cybernated age. We must preserve them where they are still strong and find ways to introduce them into the countries already rich.

We need a true partnership of all the countries of the world if we are to ensure that we benefit from technology. If we fail to find a viable partnership we must simply await the outcome of rapidly increasing tensions throughout the world. The hopeful and attainable alternative is that a new willingness to work together would make it possible to provide a reasonable standard of living throughout the world by the end of the century.



SCULPTURE: MILONADIS

FOOTNOTES

1. **The United Nations Development Decade** (Sales No. 62.II.B.2), 1962, pp. 6-7.
2. Speech by U Thant in connection with the launching of the Development Decade, May, 1962.
3. Testimony of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, before the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, 1963, p. 7.
4. Speech by David Morse, September 26, 1963.
5. For an analysis of some aspects of this subject, see Robert Theobald, **The Challenge of Abundance**. Potter and Mentor, 1961.
6. Robert Theobald, **Free Men and Free Markets**. Potter, 1963. Anchor (paper), 1965.
7. Robert Theobald, "Technology in Focus: The Emerging Nations," **Technology and Culture**, Vol. III, No. 4. Fall 1962.

CAN AMERICA REJOIN HER OWN REVOLUTION?

IN REVIEW: HODGELL



I

We have to face the fact that a commonly accepted metaphysical and ethical foundation which a Christian view on world order could be built upon no longer exists. Max Huber, writing on "An International Ethos" in a special issue of *The Ecumenical Review* (July, 1956), makes the following observation:

As long as a *corpus christianum* existed, even after the religious cleavage, a Christian ethic was internationally valid for the European society of states. But with the Enlightenment and the opening up of relations with non-Christian peoples, the question of a postulatory international ethic became urgent. One may say that Natural Law was a kind of international ethic, or took the place of one. Within Christendom, the first attempts to formulate an international ethic for our time may be seen in the Papal Encyclicals issued during the two World Wars, the resolutions of the Ecumenical Assembly at Evanston, and the work to be expected from the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs.

In view of the brutal reality of the facts of international life, it would be necessary to investigate all the so-called political peace programs in order to discover how far they really express the desire for an ethic of international life, or how far they simply camouflage actual power politics. Before even an approach to a formulation of the substance of an international ethic can be made, the following preliminary questions would have to be clarified:

a. Are the subject and object of such an ethic the states now existing, or is it also to apply to peoples which were once independent (right of self-determination)?

b. Is the international ethic to be conceived as an ideal, or is it determined by the need to come to grips with the actual necessities of the relations between independent communities?

c. Is such an ethic intended for a comity of coexistent



sovereign states, among which it seeks to establish, if possible, a peaceful *modus vivendi*, while recognizing the right of such states to assert or defend their interests by force, if need be?

d. Is the ethic intended for a comity of states which adjures war and acts of violence on principle, except where a breach of the peace can be forestalled by the threat of force, and, if necessary, peace restored by force (League of Nations, United Nations)?

e. Does the ethic envisage an absolutely non-violent comity of nations?

To speak of an international ethic without having first clarified these points involves a risk of cross-purposes; hopes may even be awakened which may lead to further conflicts, and finally the disappointment caused by the contrast between the ethic and the realities of political life may result in a sterile pessimism.

Paul Tillich, addressing the International Convocation on the Requirement of Peace, in New York City a year ago, gave an evaluation of Pope John XXIII's encyclical, 'Pacem in Terris.' Though appreciating the emphasis throughout the document on the ultimate principle of justice and the acknowledgment of the dignity of every man as a person, Tillich raised some important points:

a. The agreement as to the determining principle of the encyclical reaches only as far as the Western, Christian-humanist culture, but not essentially beyond it.

b. There are situations in which nothing short of war can defend or establish the dignity of person.

c. In several of the encyclical statements, power is identified with force and authority. A direct discussion of the ambiguities of power is lacking.

d. To what degree can a political group be judged in the way in which one judges human individuals? Such an analogy, if taken seriously, has dangerous consequences. No government can make a total sacrifice of its nation, such as an individual can, and sometimes ought to, make of himself.

II

The critical questions which have been raised by Huber with regard to the ecumenical approach to international affairs, and Tillich's comments upon 'Pacem in Terris', are an indication of the problems we have to face when we are looking for some basic viewpoint for a common understanding of present-day world order.

It seems to me that this points in the direction of a more fundamentally *biblical understanding of our situation*. Any Christian approach to the questions of world order has to start from the consciousness that we are living in the midst of human history, between the times of Christ's coming as the Messiah of Israel and all the nations and of his final coming in the consummation of history.

The Tower of Babel has no top; and it is not the business of Christian theology to fill that vacuum, either by providing the unfinished Tower with a Christian top or by showing that the top which the non-Christian religions are trying to build in fact largely resembles the Christian one, so that the most it could require would be a Christian 'finishing touch.' No, the point of encounter between the Christian faith and the non-Christian religions does not lie at the top, but at the base; or rather, it lies in cooperation of Christians with non-Christians in a concerted effort to 'build ourselves a city and a tower' without a top in the heavens (Arend T. van Leeuwen, *Christianity in World History*, p. 417 f.).

Related to the question of world order, this means that we are not in a position to design a specifically Christian

pattern of world order based upon some kind of authoritative Christian philosophy or theological presupposition. The specific Christian contribution, to the contrary, is to emphasize the basically human (that is, involved in a fragmentary, ongoing, continuously changing scene of human history) character of all attempts to design and to build a universal order and to witness to the radically historical quality of any approach, and to the impossibility of any claim of any ideology, system or religion, to fulfill the ultimate and universal goal of mankind.

III

A certain parallelism can be seen between the decisive hour of history which is being faced in Matthew 24 and between our present-day situation. Like Jesus' disciples, we have passed the point of no return: there is no possibility to overcome the present-day world disorder by means of the limited concepts of a Western-Christian order, safely protected behind its religious and moral walls; nor is there a chance of facing the challenges of an unprecedented future by means of the familiar answers of the past. There is no alternative; in various ways, we have definitely to *transcend* the familiar patterns.

We have to become radically aware of the fact that we are living in a *revolutionary* world. Arnold J. Toynbee (in a series of lectures titled "America and the World Revolution") has launched the thesis that "since 1917 America has reversed her role in the world. She has become the arch-conservative power instead of the arch-revolutionary one. Stranger still, she has made a present of her glorious discarded role to the country which was the arch-conservative power in the nineteenth century, the country which, since 1946, has been regarded by America as being America's Number One Enemy. America has presented her historic role to Russia." Is this reversal of roles America's irrevocable choice? Can America rejoin her own revolution?

These challenging theses and questions, put forward by a critical friend like Toynbee, should be taken seriously, even if some of his presuppositions and therapeutic advices are dubious.

If it is true that the history of the U.S. started with a revolution which was rooted in a Christian vision of man's calling and of nation-building, then the question how to "rejoin" the original perspective and how to translate it with a view to the present-day revolutionary world situation is a crucial issue for Christian thinking about world order.

Closely linked with this issue is the necessity of transcending our familiar patterns of thought and of coming to a *real encounter with communism*. Any discussion of questions of world order which tries to dodge this crucial issue is doomed from the very outset to end in illusions and in sterility.

The Western-Christian world, and the U.S. in particular, apparently have a number of splendid possibilities at their disposal to escape a real encounter or to enter upon this arena from the wrong side and with inadequate weapons.

The Christian church, in the 19th century, in general has failed to meet the fundamental questions which were put to it by Karl Marx and by the rise of the socialist and communist movement. In addition, for the U.S., there was a great geographical distance.

The atheistic materialism of communist philosophy has a rather old-fashioned make-up, being the heritage of 19th-century popular idolatry of science.

The Marxist prophecy of a communist revolution in the

motive

capitalist West has been disavowed by the facts and, apart from France and Italy, the communist parties in Western countries are of negligible political importance. Communism appears only to have a serious attraction in underdeveloped countries, so that efficient aid to these countries seems to be in the future the adequate answer of the Western, highly developed world to this challenge.

In communist countries there is no freedom for the Christian church and all missionary activity is radically suppressed. Western churches are cut off therefore, from contact with the communist world.

The communist victory in China means a scandal and an obsession particularly for American churches and missions which so suddenly have got cut off from a mission field which had been the apple of their eye and to which they had devoted their dearest forces and expectations.

In the short run, there seems to be no other possibility than political and military vigilance abroad and defense against communist penetration at home. In the long run, there may be a chance of decay and increasing incoherence of the communist block, of doctrinal and social evolution of communist countries into a mitigated "bourgeois" direction, and of winning the underdeveloped world by the attractive perspectives of the "free world."

This being, in broad outline, the situation, there seems, indeed, hardly to exist any reason or incentive for the Christian church to start a real dialogue with communism and to take its spiritual challenge with profound seriousness. On each of the above-mentioned points a critical comment may, nevertheless, be made.

The missed opportunity of the 19th century forces the Christian Church to make up for a hundred years of negligence. The class-struggle within 19th-century Western society was a minor problem as compared with the worldwide challenge which communism is offering today.

Communist materialism, far from being an outdated philosophy, is a double heritage of modern Western civilization. As historical materialism it designs a comprehensive explanation of the meaning of world history, and as dialectical materialism it attempts to summarize all scientific knowledge about the structure of the universe. Its atheism is a protest against the failure of Christian theology to answer the questions of our technocratic age and a consequence of that atheistic humanism which lay in the background of the rise of Western bourgeoisie and of modern science and technology.

Marx, from the very outset, has put his analysis of the capitalist system within a much wider context of a worldwide struggle between industrialized and pre-industrial societies. Over against his wrong prognosis of Western development stands his farseeing prediction of the chances in Russia and upon the Asian continent.

The fact that communism appears to be attractive for underdeveloped countries may be an indication that its social system and its concepts are more adequate precisely for these situations. In this case, the Western world will have to learn a good deal from the communist approach.

The attitude of communist governments in relation to the Christian Church is decisively determined by a deep-rooted resentment of the European proletariat in the 19th century against the Christian bourgeoisie, and by the conviction that the Church cannot be otherwise than a handmaid of the Western-Christian, capitalist world. This attitude, in the future, can only be changed when the Christian churches in communist countries and the Western churches are capable of a different encounter with communism than the anti-communist fear and hatred

of 19th-century bourgeoisie.

Chinese communism, instead of being felt as a scandal and an obsession, should be approached by Christian missions as the great historical opportunity and challenge radically to rethink the missionary obligation for our time.

A merely negative long-term perspective gives evidence of a sterile mentality and a lack of vision which can never hope to win the adherence of developing countries which, more urgently than material aid, are in need of an approach which opens up new tracks towards a better future. The crucial issue is not whether in the long run communism will fail, but whether we have a real alternative.

Communism is the ideology and the movement which most comprehensively confronts us with our theme "prophecy in a technocratic era." It pretends to know the meaning of history, as this was revealed by its prophet, Karl Marx: discerning the signs of the time, forecasting judgment and catastrophe to the existing society, appealing to conversion, prophesying the coming era of abiding justice and peace. It is the most important heresy of the 20th century: anti-church, anti-Christendom and anti-civilization.

It is clear that the answer to communism cannot be given by the Christian Church alone, but only by an approach which sees both Christianity and communism in the context of the total perspective of Western-Christian history and of the future of mankind in a technocratic era.

The *basic dilemma* which our world is facing today is that an atomic war will return the whole earth to chaos. Karl Jaspers, the noted German philosopher, has stated that the invention of the atomic bomb has transformed international politics into a completely new quality, as different from traditional politics as ice is from water. All of us—the 'communist world,' the 'free world' and the 'uncommitted nations'—have to learn skating. All traditional systems, with their mutual competition, quarrels and wars, are now like joining a swimming race in mid-winter. For Christian thinking this implies a fundamental reinterpretation of our designs of a "free world order."

Over against any type of moralism (from the most lofty ethics to the most degraded specimens of ideological propaganda and smug Pharisaism), the only ethics which are adequate in the present-day international order are 'survival-ethics!' The survival of man depends on man's ability to meet the challenge of the atomic age—which is, by the way, the modern significance of Darwin's concept of the 'survival of the fittest.'

Closely related to this is the basic need for *dialogue*. A world order will never arise from the logical concepts, emerging from monologue-thinking, but only from mankind's capacity to enter upon a variety of dialogues. The basic condition of a dialogue is the capacity and willingness to transcend one's own closed circle and to enter the circle of one's fellowman, i.e., one's own counterpart or enemy. Real dialogue is the presupposition of freedom. Any discussion of world order should be accompanied by and result in practical suggestions for new ways of starting or continuing the dialogue.

Realistic thinking about the world order should be *comprehensive*, i.e., it should have an overarching view of various aspects of the international order and disorder. One specimen of a comprehensive view is the concluding chapter of the book, *Shaping the World Economy*, by the international economist Jan Tinkergen. The author points out that we are faced in today's world with three great challenges: to avoid nuclear war, the misery in de-

veloping countries, and the challenge of the communist political and economic system.

IV

The problems of world order in our century have to be faced from the basic viewpoint that we are living in a *rapidly developing world*. The idea of development has made its career in the modern period of Western-Christian civilization as the outcome of a secularized view of the meaning of history. In this idea of progress we find dialectical relationship between evolution and revolution.

In a pre-revolutionary period, wherein it has to struggle against the ancient regime and the *status quo*, the appeal to development has a revolutionary attitude. As soon as victory has been won and the revolution is over, the same appeal to development gets an evolutionary twist.

Today, Chinese communism pretends to continue the ongoing revolution, in contrast with post-revolutionary Soviet Russia, which is being accused of becoming "bourgeois."

The development problem can be aptly described by the dialectics which are inherent in the declaration of the "Four Freedoms" made in Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidential address to the Congress in January, 1941, in the midst of World War II.

Roosevelt declared that in future days we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms: freedom of religion, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of want, and freedom from fear. There is, in this splendid declaration, a hidden problem.

The declaration keeps silent about two other freedoms which have accompanied the growth of the first and second freedoms, namely the freedom of the sovereign nation and the freedom of enterprise. These two neglected freedoms are increasingly interfering with the growth of the third and fourth freedoms.


The first and second freedoms have hardly any connection with the third and fourth freedoms. Furthermore, the first and second freedoms are becoming increasingly problematic: by the growth of an agnostic and atheistic pattern of modern life; by the rise of modern mass society; and by the reaction of anti-liberal philosophies and movements.

The U.S. has had the privilege of passing through the history of discovery, proclamation and development of these freedoms in a protracted evolutionary process. Therefore, standing on the solid foundation that the first three freedoms have been to a great extent realized at home, it can proclaim these principles as a worldwide program. And, starting from this self-satisfied optimism, it can declare to the rest of mankind its willingness to contribute to the realization of the last freedom, freedom from fear.

There are other countries, however, which approach the question from a completely different viewpoint. They look at the first and second freedoms as the presuppositions which, closely connected with nationalism and free enterprise, have enabled the U.S. to reach a stage of affluence, that is, of economic and military power, which, far from being the condition for universal affluence and peace, is the very barrier which baffles the way to worldwide welfare and disarmament. Those countries which have not passed through this historical evolution but, as latecomers on the scene, find themselves confronted with the final result of this evolution, namely, the overwhelming power of the U.S., are inclined to revert the sequence of the four freedoms and to give highest priority to free-



ME CALLED TO BE A PROPHET?



AND EVEN MINISTERS HAVE A RETIREMENT PLAN.

motive




GOOD GRIEF! IT'S AN OBSOLETE PROFESSION AND NOT ACADEMICALLY RESPECTABLE.




HOW ABOUT THEOLOGIAN? THERE'S GOOD MONEY IN PAPER BACKS.



COULDN'T WE COMPROMISE ON A SIT-IN OR TWO?



WELL IF IT'S ALL THE SAME TO YOU, I'LL JOIN THE PEACE CORPS FOR A HITCH THEN SETTLE DOWN TO INSURANCE OR SOMETHING.



e. The communist revolution has succeeded in some non-Western countries and is expanding to other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

FOR the Christian Church, in comparison with the 19th century situation, the problem has become proportionately aggravated.

The partial success of Christian diaconate and social welfare action in attacking the national poverty problem in Western-Christian countries stands in sharp contrast to the traditional helplessness and sterility of Christian thinking and action facing the war problem.

There is a real danger that the present-day Christian diaconate on a world-wide scale (Inter-Church aid; Church World Service, etc.) may repeat the tragic errors of the Christian diaconate in Western Europe in the middle of the 19th century—an error which can be summed up as a micro-approach to a macro-structural problem. The error does not consist in the micro-approach itself, which has great merits and is of the utmost urgency, but in the inability and partial blindness in facing the macro-structural problem of a failing world economy.

In spite of the growth of an ecumenical community of Christian thinking and action on a world-wide scale, this community has not even a shadow of the coherence and consistency which national churches had and still dispose of. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Christians is living in the Western, affluent countries and the demographic trend of world population growth will even tip the balance more and more to that side. Western-Christian countries are increasingly becoming the world's "Christian bourgeoisie."

The Christian Church is just in the beginning of rethinking her traditional approach to social problems and she has hardly begun to discover the dimensions and the unprecedented character of world-wide poverty in our century.

The Church's failure to give an adequate answer to the ideology of class struggle in the 19th century has made her enter the second-half of the 20th century facing utterly unprepared the challenge of communism on a world-wide scale. The Church has succeeded, throughout church history, in adapting herself to successive social changes, but she stands puzzled and confused facing the unprecedented consequences of the industrializing process for the structure of international relations.

The basic dilemma of the development issue can be characterized in the question how to break through two vicious circles: the vicious circle of underdevelopment; and the vicious circle of development.

The vicious circle of underdevelopment consists of the self-perpetuating character of the traditional "neolithic" civilizations, rooted in age-old religions. The vicious circle of development consists in the linking together of competition, cold war and armament.

Both circles are intersecting and mutually aggravating each other's problems. The total complex of these intertwined lines is the basic dilemma of the total process of development, seen in a planetary view. The fundamental challenge in our century is the question where and how to break through the vicious circles, each by itself and together as an interdependent whole. It will be a long way to realizing this rethinking of our task.

dom from fear and to universal freedom from want. They assume that in a disarmed and affluent world, there will be room enough to guarantee the first and second freedoms.

The social question of the second half of the 20th century, to a certain extent, is a worldwide expansion of the social question which Marx was facing in the middle of the 19th century. There are, to be sure, some important differences which make for an immense aggravation of the problem:

a. The rapid progress of industrialization in Western countries has led to the rise of the welfare state which, in principle, is on the way to overcoming the poverty problem. The same process, however, has been accompanied by, or has led to, the unprecedented phenomenon of two world wars and to the threat of atomic war.

b. Whereas the industrialized nations of the West, in principle, have overcome class struggle, their affluence has not contributed to world-wide progress but is in process of widening the gap with the underdeveloped nations.

c. Whereas there was essentially (and still is), within the context of the national state, a possibility for a successful national "war on poverty," there does not exist even a shadow of an analogous international world order to attack the same problem on a world-wide scale.

d. The character of the poverty problem on a world-wide scale is different today from, and much more serious than, the analogous problem, on a national scale, was in the 19th century.



WOODCUT: HUBAND

UNTITLED

it didn't matter that there was no snow at all, his wife had sent him to shovel the walks and by god the clamor was terrible. a bent old man, scraping the cement with a shovel didn't bother us one bit, though. (singing little pieces of irish songs to each other, we went right on building our snowman as if nothing else in the world were happening.)

—DAVID SANDBERG

JAMES BOND:

THE phenomenal success of Mr. Ian Fleming's creation in print and the subsequent stampede at world box offices for the film translations of the master's works into the universal language of film has probably disturbed at the most a small coterie of accountants, responsible for trying to keep track of the rapidly mounting loot, and a few professional hand-wringers in search of new material for a barren season. The rest of the world, apparently, troops to the book stalls and the theaters in a high state of euphoria, untroubled by speculation as to the possible psychic implications of their ecstasy.

As the opportunity has recently presented itself for me to conduct a small and astoundingly unsystematic survey of Agent 007's popularity, I testify that I have so far counted representatives from some seventeen different nationalities—including Scot, English, Irish, Welsh, Jamaica, Haitian, Fiji, Panamanian, Nigerian, French, Persian, Italian, Canadian, Australian, New Zealander, Japanese, Indian, Argentinian, West Indian (B.G.), and Yugoslavian—who are prepared to cross barren wastes, wine-dark seas, and city streets to beat a path to wherever a James Bond film is playing. (If the numbers don't add up to seventeen it is due to certain inadequacies of the accounting division.)

The implications of all this seem to be that the films are popular. Mr. Bond is an international hero, and we must avoid the delusion that he, like God, is an American.

What, if anything, is new, novel, or nasty about all this? Rather little, I suspect. Mr. Bond is no novelty insofar as his character is concerned. The post-World War I version was Simon Templar, The Saint. Mr. Charteris' creation, it will be remembered, was his own judge and executioner (at least in the earlier versions; he mellowed with age); a debonair rascal exquisitely garbed, lethally armed; with a passion for high powered automobiles (a hundred horse power Hironde!), a refined taste in wines; a gourmet, and a gadgeteer. The Saint's contribution to society was to kill without a qualm all those undesirables whom the law would fuddle about with if left to its own devices. When time permitted he was a wow with the ladies, apparently oblivious to the various cuts and con-

tusions suffered in the preceding chapter. His books are still selling and have gone through more editions than *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

So what else is new?

Ah, when old Doug Fairbanks disarmed a foe he always returned the saber with a flourish. Not for him the stab in the back. Oh, when Errol Flynn swashed and buckled and slipped on a banana peel it was always The Villain (Basil Rathbone, as a rule) who Took Advantage of The Situation. Not our hero. He would help you up and dust you off before returning to the fray. There were things that were done and things that were not done. The Lady was safe until the last reel—though not from villains. Today, with heroes like she's got, who needs enemies?

BACK before the last ice age when kids wore corduroy knickers, one was taught to Fight Fair. There were rules. Then came Judo, Karate and other refinements on how to maim, cripple, disable, and otherwise devastate the opposition without regard to any mandate other than success.

"Give to me this one day," said the wily Odessus to the honorable Neoptolemus when the latter protested that what he was being asked to do for his country was at the sacrifice of personal honor, "and you may live honorably for the rest of your life." The War depends upon You!

Winning is everything, says the coach.

You will not lose, says A.T.&T. to Southern Bell.

Nice guys finish last.

Mr. Bond is the original corporation man. He lives high on the hog off the expense account and drives the ultimate company car. His clothes are tastefully chosen to fit in with what the other young corporation men are wearing while the tools of his trade are furnished by the company store, designed in the company research labs, and their use explained to Mr. Bond by serious-faced intellectual types in white coats who are clearly products of our Better Universities. Mr. Bond has no need of a conscience. The Big Picture has been decided by the

motive

AMERICA'S NEW HERO

By JOHN CLAYTON

executives in leather arm chairs. Mr. Bond simply has a job to do. He is a professional. His job is to win—which is Right. Not to win is wrong. He is never instructed how to win, nor is he offered rules. The executives would Rather Not Know.

As a professional, the ultimate corporation man, Mr. Bond has no time for amateur rules. "You've had your six," he says sweetly to his disarmed opponent. Then he kills him.

As a businessman, Mr. Bond is efficient and, on the job, he is amoral. It is not that in private life Mr. Bond might not have time for the niceties of life, but on the job these considerations are not relevant. When Agent 007 embraces a young lady and gazes deep into her eyes, he sees not an awakening emotion, but rather the approach of a rival corporation man. His solution to the problem is characteristically efficient. He places the young lady in the path of destruction, protecting his own lily white body which is, after all, government property. No, Mr. Bond is not amoral, he has simply sold his soul to the company store.

Why then question his popularity? Drama has always presented us with heroes we could identify with, but even more with the Priest-King who is ritually sacrificed as Frances Ferguson has pointed out in *The Idea of a Theater*. There is an absolution in these heroes. They take upon themselves the burden of our own guilt and raise that guilt to the level of the heroic. Simon Templar, The Saint, was after all, an amateur, an independent agent. We loved to dream of such a life, but knew ourselves to be something else again—members of an incredibly complex termite colony, carrying out our slice of the corporate task, morally bound to the commitments made by others, morally plagued with individual guilt for our actions, morally diseased by the abandonment of our spirit to the corporation.

What a friend we have in Fleming! We are not pawns, we are heroes; we are not amoral, we are gay; we are not uniformed nonentities, we are agents whose every action is momentous; we are not guilty, we are successful; we are not drab, we are technicolored swingers; we

are not materialistic, we have sophisticated taste. We are FUN!

And let us not overlook the virtues in Mr. Bond. His approach to life is zestful. He is a healthy animal, and God knows we are tired of the sick whiners inflicted upon us by a generation of disturbed gentlemen in the novel and on the stage. He is physically fit, heterosexual, and competent. He has—in Mr. Kennedy's phrase—grace under pressure. He does not quit. He is loyal to the firm. He has a wry, puckish sense of humor about the madness of the tasks he is assigned although he never questions the necessity of those tasks nor the desirability of accomplishing them.

HE has been described as the kind of man we would like to be. This, of course, has long been the role of drama, but the paradox is, as we have seen, that it begins with presenting us with the man that we are and then offering us a heightened version.


If we find this disturbing, it is because we find ourselves disturbing. Most, apparently, find this glorification of the corporation man rather rewarding, even, perhaps, comforting. But a few of us—shameless romantics from the distant past—miss old Doug. We miss the debonair Mr. Flynn handing back the fallen sword to the vile Mr. Rathbone. We miss the young boy's cry of "Fight fair!" We miss a world where it was better to take a beating than to hit below the belt. We still believe, fools that we are, that it is not whether you win or lose, but how you play the game. Perhaps that is what is meant by being a fool for Christ's sake.

Not so long ago, a national picture magazine presented a series of photographs (in glorious color) of good Vietnamese torturing bad Vietnamese. It was explained to us by the magazine and by our American representatives present that this was necessary in order to obtain certain information. It was explained further that it was all right, because it was a custom among the bad Vietnamese. James Bond would have no difficulty understanding this at all. Good torturers are on our side.

But some of us are very slow to learn.

ETHICS

By JOSEPH L. ALLEN



U.S.I.C.B.M. ETHICS III

Crane

motive

AND THE IMAGE OF STRATEGY

THE most crucial differences of opinion in the American public concerning military strategy are rooted, not simply in different goals, nor merely in differences in available information, but in different images of what strategy is.

Usually we think *with* images rather than about them. What we think about in strategy is more tangible—Viet Nam or Cuba or Berlin; machine guns and missiles and megatonnage; or, more abstractly, policy concepts such as deterrence, arms control, or escalation. An interested citizen will have some information about ideas of this order, will form opinions about them, and will argue over them. But he is far less likely to think about the framework within which he thinks about them. Yet this framework is far more important, both for the way he understands the problem and for the way he decides about it, than all the bits of strategic information the framework organizes. For the general public the image of strategy is the least recognized and least examined of all its notions about the subject.

An image of strategy is one's mental "eyes," the pattern of interrelated basic assumptions that guide his thinking—assumptions both about the way strategy actually functions and about its purposes. One receives an image of strategy from society, and having received it, looks with it at the world of strategy with little concern for the image itself. The image may enable one to see the subject poorly or well. If poorly, he will not necessarily reject the image, but may be content indefinitely with blurred vision or colorblindness or worse, provided he has no reason to suspect there is a better way of seeing. He will be like the schoolchild who tolerated extreme myopia for years because he thought nobody else could read the blackboard either. If the prevailing picture of strategy frustrates a country's efforts to pursue its interests, some individuals may recognize the fact and develop another image. In the

last few years this has happened to the image of strategy in the United States.

Presently two conflicting images of strategy are widespread in this country. They might be called the "dichotomy image" and the "continuum image." The dichotomy image imposes sharp divisions on the subject-matter of strategy and on strategy vis-a-vis politics. The image begins by making an absolute distinction between war and peace. This outlook has a low tolerance for borderline cases, as shown by the occasional comment, "We should either get out of Viet Nam or declare war!" Furthermore, once the dividing line has been crossed, the dichotomy image tends to lump all wars into the same category, minimizing the distinctions between types and levels of wars. Thus the intolerance for limitations in war: "If we're in this war, we ought not fight it under wraps!" One should not suppose, however, that the war/peace dichotomy is the possession solely of a militaristic mind. Pacifists also look at strategy through the dichotomy image, the difference being that they believe the only moral response consists in staying on the peace side of the dichotomy.

Once the war/peace dichotomy is accepted, other dichotomies follow. The image identifies conflict with war and harmony with peace; the use of power and force with war and the use of negotiation and diplomacy (without reference to power or force) with peace; and, except among militaristic glorifiers of war, evil-doing with war and morality with peace. In this image normality is peaceful, harmonious, and reasonable; conflict, power, and force are deviations from the normal that need not even exist, and participation in them is seen as morally evil.

Military strategy itself, according to the dichotomy image, can have to do only with war. Its purpose, therefore, becomes detached from peacetime political goals and becomes narrowly military—to "win." This becomes the goal of the militarists; this same goal is attributed to



Loose spending has to stop.



We already are bled dry by taxes.



Operating costs are up.

strategy by the pacifists and is rejected; and often the very same goal is adopted by many otherwise pragmatic and unabsolutist persons. President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill apparently reflected this outlook at the Casablanca Conference in 1943 when they demanded "unconditional surrender" as a military goal without considering its bearing on political and social purposes. They were saying in effect, even if unintentionally, that once we are at war, our one goal must be absolute military destruction of the enemy without regard for the kind of social values we want to preserve during the war or the kind of world we want after it is over. One sign of this attitude was that President Roosevelt felt no need to discuss the policy beforehand with his Secretary of State, who had the chief responsibility to advise the President about the nation's political goals in the world. Presumably for "unconditional surrender" to be a military goal meant that it displaced political goals. The results of this policy were destructive in many unnecessary ways for victors and vanquished alike.

With the use of this image men can easily combine a great sense of devotion to peace with unrestrained participation in war. General Douglas MacArthur expressed this combination with no apparent sense of contradiction in his oft-quoted testimony before a Senate committee after he was relieved of his command in Korea. The Truman administration's policy in Korea, he claimed, ". . . seems to me to introduce a new concept into military operations—the concept of appeasement, the concept that when you use force, you can limit that force." Later in the hearings, this same man, who believed that limiting military force by political purposes in war was tantamount to appeasement, could also declare:

I am just one hundred per cent a believer against war. . . . In war, as it is waged now, with the enormous losses on both sides, both sides will lose. It is a form of mutual suicide; and I believe that the entire effort of modern society should be concentrated on an endeavor to outlaw war as a method of the solution of problems between nations.¹

¹ Hearings before the Joint Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, *Military Situation in the Far East* (82nd Congress, 1st session), Part 1, pp. 145, 39-40.

The latter statement could easily have been made by an ardent pacifist rather than a general who did not believe in limiting military force. MacArthur did not glorify war, but he did believe that it involved an inherent push to an extreme of violence. However evil it was, it should have nothing to do with politics; its goal was "victory," not specific political purposes. One's very moral fervor for peace can intensify his crusading spirit in war, for when war comes, it is attributed purely to the evil machinations of a diabolical enemy, one who has committed the worst sin and must be punished without restraint. Thus an absolute moral limit can easily turn into a limitless crusade.

The dichotomy image has its source in political liberalism, with its faith in the rationality and goodness of man, its belief that human interests are naturally in harmony rather than in conflict, and its rejection of conflict as abnormal and evil. That this liberal credo is shared by American "conservatives" and "liberals" alike helps to explain why the dichotomy image is so widespread. Because the image does so dominate popular attitudes, individuals who do not share its faith in human rationality and goodness are often at a loss for a better way to look at strategy. They are trapped by the dominant image, troubled by it but unable to supply an alternative.

Although the dichotomy image remains the dominant public image of strategy, its grip has weakened in recent years, especially in government and strategic circles. The increasing availability of a large body of literature by professional strategists is providing the interested public with an alternative image.

II

THE continuum image rejects the sharp divisions that dichotomy image imposes on strategy. Instead of an absolute war/peace separation, it interprets the world of strategy as a *continuum of conflict*. At one end of the continuum is the imaginary condition of no conflict among nations; at the other is the equally imaginary point of utter and unrestrained conflict. In between are endless gradations of greater and less. This image recognizes some degree of conflict in peacetime as well as in war and some degree of harmony in wartime as in peace. War may in-

motive



Crowe

It costs us thousands each year for lobbies alone just to maintain our defense contracts.

Sure it would be nice to have schools for the kids and medicine for the old folks . . .

. . . but we must be fiscally responsible.

involve many different levels of conflict; war is not all of one sort, nor does the onset of a war lead relentlessly to a high level of conflict. The continuum image accordingly sees a legitimate function for power and force at all points along the line, whether at peace or war. Power becomes a prerequisite to successful diplomacy, and continued diplomatic contacts are necessary even during war as efforts to achieve an agreeable basis for peace. Furthermore, it remains possible to make better and worse moral decisions at high levels of conflict as at low: one's moral responsibility is to make the best decision possible under the circumstances. With this image the purpose of strategy is integrally related to the goals of politics; military policy becomes another arm of political life.

Although the continuum image has deep roots in the past, it has undergone a revival since World War II under the stress of continuing United States responsibility as a world power. By now this image has become second nature to most specialists in strategy and international politics. It underlies the concept of limited war, the current strategic policy of "graduated deterrence" or "flexible response," the calculated limited escalation of a conflict to preserve vital interests, the conduct of some military operations without declaring them "war," the pursuit of arms control, the effort to reach limited areas of agreement even with adversaries, and on and on. None of these ideas make much sense from the standpoint of the dichotomy image; they are all understandable in terms of the continuum image. In short it is impossible to understand current strategic policy unless one replaces the dichotomy image with the idea of the continuum of conflict.

Because most strategists take the continuum image for granted, while the general public continues to think largely in terms of a war/peace dichotomy, significant risks result for government policy. It is more difficult for the government to communicate to the public what it is doing and why and to find public acceptance for what the government thinks is the most appropriate policy. Public opinion sways quickly between the poles of complacency and panic, whereas the government must resist these erratic swings. The public may demand policies it

deems absolutely moral, but which may seem quite immoral from the standpoint of the other image. Worst of all, the public's confusion is projected to some extent into the government itself, creating similar problems within the workings of Congress or the Executive branch.

An image of strategy is not merely a descriptive instrument. It is descriptive and can help one understand what is happening in the world, but it is considerably more than descriptive. It also contains numerous ethical assumptions and implications. It brings together ideas about the purpose of strategy, the nature of human behavior, the character of moral claims, and the goals men may reasonably hope for in international politics: all essential questions for ethics. It helps to determine what one thinks is a moral dilemma and what is not, what he thinks are the acceptable means for resolving a dilemma, and what information he needs if he is to resolve it. One's image of strategy is, in sum, the most important element of his ethic of strategy. By the same count, every man who has an image of strategy has to that extent an ethic of strategy, whether he is policy-maker, operations analyst, or interested private citizen, even if he vigorously declares his ethical neutrality or denies that strategic issues involve moral considerations.

III

THE continuum image began to develop its present form about the middle of the 1950's. Several influences converged then to spur its development: the invention of thermonuclear bombs (roughly 1000 times as powerful as the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan), the development of booster rockets that could be used to fire intercontinental missiles, the growing awareness that the United States would no longer be safe from attack in a nuclear war, and the very intensity with which the dichotomy image was finding expression, both in the public's reaction against the limited war in Korea and in the subsequent doctrine of massive retaliation.

"Massive retaliation" became the chief target of the continuum thinkers. When Secretary of State Dulles enunciated the doctrine in early 1954, he stated that the government wanted "a maximum deterrent at a bearable

cost." Toward that end, he said, "local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. . . . The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing."² Although the statement was ambiguous in several respects, it was widely taken to mean that in the event of another brush-fire war around the edge of the communist territories, the United States might instantly strike the Soviet Union or Communist China with nuclear weapons.

Ironically it was just at that time that many professional strategists were declaring that an all-or-nothing strategy no longer made sense in an age of unlimited weapons. Now that the Soviet Union could also respond with thermonuclear weapons, massive retaliation would mean mutual suicide, or at least massive suffering on both sides. The Soviet leaders would know this, and therefore might look on the doctrine as a bluff. They would think it inconceivable that the United States would commit national suicide over some small chunk of overseas territory. If the Soviet Union then called our hand by some small-scale aggression, we would either have to back down (inviting more aggression), or carry out the threat and take the consequences, or else quickly devise some less-than-massive response for which the cutbacks in defense spending made us ill-prepared. Mr. Dulles had emphasized repeatedly that his strategy would save money, but he did not seem to recognize its greatly increased cost to American security through weakening our ability to respond to aggression in a manner tailored to the threat, with minimum risk to national existence. One did not have to assume, the critics reiterated, that every war must become all-out. The Soviet Union might launch a total war if it had no fear of nuclear retaliation, and for that reason it was necessary to develop and maintain an invulnerable retaliatory force. But other weapons had to be ready for the most likely types of wars, wars that were less than total.

Out of this criticism of "massive retaliation" there arose as an alternative the doctrine of limited war, otherwise known as "flexible response" or "graduated deterrence." Limited war doctrine developed over the years from 1954 to 1960 and persists as the basis of current American strategy. By whatever name, the doctrine requires two conditions for strategy: (1) the capability to cope with a military challenge at any level, from major nuclear war down to minor irritation, with a response tailored to the challenge; and (2) direction of the military response toward the attainment of specific, limited political objectives.

The first condition, the capability, still calls for weapons of massive retaliation, not as the answer to all ills, but as the ultimate incentive for an enemy to keep hostilities limited. Massive weapons are, on the one hand, to deter an enemy from a massive attack, and on the other, to deter him from escalating cheaply to higher and higher levels of violence when he is stopped on lower levels. But the massive weapons alone are insufficient. If a country is to avoid both extremes of total war and surrender, it must

have the capability for intermediate resistance. Limited war capability requires an array of possible responses as varied as the likely challenges; it requires small nuclear weapons as well as large ones, short-range missiles as well as medium- and long-range ones, speedy fighter-bombers as well as B-52's, counter-guerrilla as well as conventional forces, and highly mobile units that can be deployed rapidly to the scene of a crisis.

The second condition is the more difficult to attain, because it is a matter of control of the will. If wars are to remain limited, their goals must be limited, and limited politically. Whatever other conditions are required to limit wars—limited war capability, limited geographical area, effective command-and-control, careful war plans—the crucial one is limited political goals. The military cannot be expected to set its own limits. Limits can be effectively imposed only through an act of governmental will. A country can be influenced by considering its interests, and therefore a rational element enters into the conduct of war. Yet countries will not necessarily see or follow their interests, and hence there is no assurance that desirable limits will actually be imposed. But for the leading contemporary strategists—men like Henry Kissinger and Herman Kahn, Robert Osgood and Bernard Brodie—no other idea of strategy makes sense but the pursuit of limited, specific policy goals. If the dominant goals in almost any limited war situation are to restrain an attacker and at the same time to minimize the chances of a major war, the military action must seek to affect the enemy's will, not to destroy his country. Ultimately the effort is psychological, to increase his incentives to make peace.

Limited goals in war require qualities that cut against the habitual American outlook: qualities of disciplined restraint, continuing controlled effort rather than hot-and-cold extremes, acceptance of the losses necessary to avoid even worse results, toleration of long and indecisive action rather than the demand for an all-or-nothing quick "solution." The doctrine of limited war may make sense in and of itself but still be difficult to maintain in the face of absolutist public attitudes. If the United States is to keep its capability for a flexible response, it must be able to gain public understanding and support for the image that underlies the doctrine. This understanding requires grasping some relatively subtle points, but their importance justifies the effort.

IV

THE continuum image retains meaningful distinctions in degree at the same time that it undercuts the penchant for absolute, either/or alternatives. For example, war and peace no longer appear as absolutely separate conditions, but as levels of greater or less violence along the continuum. Yet it will still make a considerable difference whether a country declares war, for two reasons. First, the announcement may lead to false expectations from a public that still thinks of war as absolute, so that people might demand extreme, inordinate measures following a declaration of war. Second, a declaration of war is a warning to the enemy that greater violence is to come and might provoke him to a sudden escalation of the war. Therefore governments should and do try to anticipate the effect of a declaration of war on the conduct of hostilities

² John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXX, No. 761 (January 25, 1964).

Both these reasons have probably influenced the United States in its reluctance to declare war in Korea or Viet Nam. "War" has thus become an ambiguous term, meaning to some an absolute threshold beyond which reason, morality, and limitation cease to operate, and to others a relative, shifting condition in which nations deploy force against one another in a more or less calculating, controlled fashion. The very term "Cold War" reflects this ambiguity: it is war in the second sense but not in the first. The strategists' point should not be lost here, though, for according to their position, any "Hot War" should also be war only in the second sense. The very attempt to impose an absolute war/peace dichotomy on strategy becomes for them a critically dangerous and irresponsible effort.

In keeping with this reasoning, strategy has to do with peacetime as well as wartime activities, insofar as they concern a country's security policy. Clausewitz's classic work of the 1820's, *On War*, discussed strategy as one sub-topic within the general subject of war. Today he might entitle his treatise *On Strategy*, and he would discuss war as one of the sub-topics. Accordingly strategy is concerned not simply with the application of force, but with "the exploitation of potential force," to use Professor Thomas Schelling's phrase.³ When weapons are as destructive as today's, the ultimate, if not the complete reckoning, had best be only theoretical—the projection of possibilities. Strategy necessarily becomes a much more inclusive and subtle process under these conditions, a process of bargaining not unlike the bargaining between seller and buyer or labor and management. The problem is how to influence the adversary through the possession of weapons and the threat that they may be used, not necessarily through their use. As in these other bargaining fields, one must assert his interests—bargain—or else accept the other's terms. The refusal to bargain, in strategy as elsewhere, inevitably means sacrifice of one's interests.

To draw another analogy, this time from contract bridge, strategy today is as though one were to concentrate on the bidding, not the play of the hand. Correspondingly, a successful strategy might involve no play at all, but only bidding. The analogy suggests a problem for strategy, however: How does one know the opponent is not bluffing in his bids? In bridge one determines this when he plays the hand; but if the play were eliminated, the alternative would be to steal a glance at the opponents' cards. In strategy with unlimited weapons, this is what must be done—"look at the opponent's cards." To make the situation even odder, one must take care to allow the opponent to see at least some of one's own cards. The enemy must have a general knowledge of one's strength, through pictures, parades of missiles, news releases, well-publicized test shots, and so on. The enemy must not conclude that one is bluffing, or else he might test the bluff in a crisis or war. Today's nuclear strategy cannot ignore actual "war-fighting" plans, or else a country could not as likely control its behavior in a war. Even so, war-fighting must be only one sub-heading under the much more inclusive category, "conflict management,"

the art of working with any point along the continuum so as to attain the desired policy goals.

The continuum of conflict calls attention to the vast array of available alternatives for strategy and their endless possible combinations to suit a country's many goals. The image is obviously still an over-simplification, because the choices in strategy are multi-dimensional, not merely one-dimensional in the fashion of a straight line. Furthermore the "line" will actually have some bumps or breaks in it, such as the distinctions between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, or between population centers and military installations, or between an antagonist's homeland and his outlying bases. These breaks, however important, are still part of an over-all more or less since on either side of these distinctions the continuum of possible levels of conflict resumes. Furthermore the breaks may not be complete or fixed, either as physical possibilities (some military targets are so close to cities that they raise the strategic problem of city-targeting), or in the minds of men (the Hawaiian Islands are geographically outlying but politically part of the homeland of the United States). Often the breaks are only partial, and sometimes they appear for a period of history and then disappear. The strategist needs both the idea of the unbroken continuum, to remind him of the almost infinitely varied possibilities, and the awareness of the existing breaks, to remind him that his choices in fact are limited. He is rather like a pianist, who can play either C sharp or D and not halfway between, on his "continuum" of eighty-eight keys, but who finds this limit not unduly confining.

The continuum image assists ethical decision in several respects. First, it points to the wide array of alternatives available for meeting problems of strategy. In social action the alternatives are almost never reducible to two. This image can readily form part of an ethic of responsibility to persons with concrete needs, rather than an ethic of the pursuit of abstract, absolute ideals.


Second, the image takes conflict seriously, without the illusion that it will ever completely go away, or that men will naturally be agreeable. It is therefore adaptable to an understanding that man always has potentialities for good and for evil.

Third, the image demands that action always be directed toward identifiable, limited purposes. Thereby it undercuts the spirit that crusades for limitless, unachievable goals, a spirit that leaves untold destruction in its wake. The continuum image therefore takes seriously both the finitude of man's vision and the importance of responding to pressing human needs.

In view of these contributions it is surprising that more theologians and ethicists have not made a greater effort to understand contemporary strategic thinking as a basis for their comments on international problems. It must be confessed that very few theologians and church leaders have taken the field of strategy with the seriousness they should if they are going to issue statements about moral responsibility in military policy. An understanding of the image back of contemporary strategy, over and beyond information about day-to-day events, is a prerequisite both for constructive criticism and for critical support of strategic policies.

³ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 5.

Reassessing



Communism*

By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

IT IS now a truism to say that the communist world has been split through the Sino-Soviet split. Nonetheless, it seems to me important to begin by reiterating the great historical significance of that event. The Sino-Soviet dispute further has destroyed the unity of the international communist movement and of the communist world.

I

It is, therefore, a phenomenon of historical importance, comparable in many respects to the split in Christianity several centuries ago. I use that analogy advisedly, for communism in our age had become a dramatic, powerful force capable of mobilizing support, and apparently preordained to dominate this globe. It had captured the imaginations of many people. It claimed to offer an absolutely accurate scientific insight into the nature of our reality, just as religious movements have done in the past.

There are those who still minimize the significance of this split. They argue that while, indeed, there are differences between the Chinese and the Soviets, both of them do agree on the ultimate objective of creating a communist world. Here, too, the experience of Christianity is relevant. Both the Catholics and the Protestants were gaily slaughtering each other for thirty years while agreeing on the desirability of having a Christian world. Their experience suggests that in theologically- or ideologically-oriented movements, disagreements about means, about the more immediate future, can escalate into fundamental organizational or institutional conflicts as well as into doctrinal conflicts, and this is precisely what is happening to international communism today.

Its hitherto uniform ideology has been splintered. Indeed, increasingly the divisive issue in communism is not simply the legacy of Stalinism, it is not the role of Stalin itself; but the debate increasingly points to the issue of the relevance of Leninism itself, which added an important ingredient to Marxism—a doctrine of an industrializing capitalist society—and made it relevant to conditions of backwardness and political underdevelopment.

Thus, in the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Leninism has increasingly been exposed to an implicit attack on both the Chinese and the Soviet sides. The Soviets, in systematizing and developing their opposition to the Chinese, have increasingly exposed Leninism to revision. Certainly, the Soviet precepts concerning the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism involve a veering away from the Leninist tradition. The Soviet willingness to accept an increasing diversity of doctrinal opinions among the communist parties means a dilution of the Leninist tradition of "partyiness" and of absolute commitment to systematized beliefs.

The Chinese, too, in their critique of the Soviet position, and by their elevation of the role of the peasant in the national liberation struggle, have been jettisoning some of

the significant principles of Leninism, and increasingly moving toward a form of radical Populism. It is, in fact, a historical paradox to think that the two principal enemies of Leninism were the Mensheviks and the radical social revolutionaries; and that the debate between the Soviets and the Chinese has again involved this kind of polarization within the communist movement itself.

The Sino-Soviet dispute accordingly undermines the unity of the doctrine; it increasingly points toward the relativization of its beliefs, and eventually toward the erosion of its commitment. We know from the history of ideas that the relativization of absolute ideas is often the first stage in the erosion of the vitality of these ideas. The institutions bearing the ideas can continue, but in time they become increasingly preoccupied with their own vested interests; they become increasingly doctrinaire, rigid, and sterile, and lose much of the revolutionary momentum and commitment which is so much the point of departure for the doctrine's success and for its magnetic attraction. All this, I submit, is happening to the communist ideology.

Moreover, on the organizational level the split between the Soviets and the Chinese only transitionally will involve a polarization of communism into two blocs. Much more important is the process of overall fragmentation of the unity of the hitherto united movement. To be sure, we still have a majority of the communist parties supporting the Soviets. According to the latest count, out of a total of 111 communist parties around the world, sixty-nine more or less support the Soviets, twenty-seven support the Chinese, with the others wavering. But even more significant is the fact that many countries have not one, but two communist parties devoting most of their energies to fighting each other. There are approximately twenty countries in which there are now such mutually hostile communist parties. This, of course, is highly debilitating from the organizational point of view and pushes further the process of fragmentation which I do not see ending merely with the Sino-Soviet polarity.

II

All of that cumulatively creates a profoundly different context for the further evolution of the communist world from the one that we have become accustomed to. In the Soviet Union itself the post-Stalin phase and the phase dominated externally by the Sino-Soviet split has seen a significant change in the character of the ruling regime. It is no longer a personal, autocratic totalitarianism. Increasingly it is a political system characterized by bureaucratization and emphasis on professional bureaucratic skills.

I have somewhere else described the present govern-

* Reprinted with permission from the *Political Science Quarterly*, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Political Science, April 1965, Volume 28, No. 1, pp. 55-63.

ment as a "regime of the clerks." I feel that this is an accurate shorthand expression. It is perhaps the only political system in the world today which is run from top to bottom by professional bureaucrats. Most other political systems, even those with established and important bureaucracies, have mechanisms for the introduction of non-bureaucratic political blood at the top. This applies to the Vatican Curia or even to the French government. But the Soviet political system is now entirely run by professional bureaucrats. This gives it a special character. It prompts an emphasis on order, on stability, on continuity, on the avoidance of adventures, on regularity. It is, therefore, an important change from the Stalinist and even Khrushchevite pattern of extremes of commitment in one direction or in another.

I lay stress on the bureaucratization of Soviet politics, for it to me suggests the most probable direction of future Soviet political development. I do not see Soviet political development in the near future as involving liberalization or a democratic evolution. I see a political system which is increasingly bureaucratized and still authoritarian, a political system in which power is concentrated in the hands of a relatively narrow spectrum of a few professional bureaucrats who wield power organizationally.

More broadly, Soviet life is becoming increasingly Westernized and Europeanized. Now, the process of Westernization and Europeanization, in my mind, also is not synonymous with the process of democratization, for we should remember that a democratic political system is a minority system, even in Western Europe itself. Nonetheless, Westernization does involve a certain communion of thought, a certain mutual identification, a certain mode of life and a sense of shared aspirations, which cumulatively create the context for a closer relationship of Russia to Europe. This change has been very much accelerated by the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The process of Russia's Europeanization and Westernization has thus been accelerated and intensified both by internal Soviet development, which creates the preconditions for it, and by the Sino-Soviet dispute which creates the impetus for it. But it is not to be confused with the process of democratization for which, at the present time, I see very little social basis in the Soviet Union, given its political traditions, the way it industrialized, the way its political system developed, and the vested interests of the ruling oligarchs in the preservation of the bureaucratic monopoly of power.

III

The process of change in East Europe is, of course, more mixed. Nonetheless, there are certain parallels. At the present time I do not see East Europe, even though in many respects it has become de-Stalinized, and in many other respects desatellitized (and the two processes do not always go hand in hand—see the difference between Hungary and Poland), also becoming democratized or liberalized. I fear that the devastation of the war and the legacy of the Stalinist subordination of society to the political system has been such that in the foreseeable future little objective opportunity exists for a significant democratization of the political system in East Europe.

As the East European states gain increasing autonomy from the Soviet Union externally, unavoidably their political systems increasingly become dependent on domestic support, and in so doing they tend to revive and to draw succor from reviving some of the antecedent political

processes of East Europe, including—and this is quite marked in some cases already—a heavy-handed reliance on nationalism, chauvinism, anti-intellectualism, and, whenever relevant, even anti-Semitism. Indeed, increasingly national communism in East Europe is beginning to resemble social fascism and we should not forget that the prewar fascist movements, which were not dominant but which had been gaining strength, preached nationalism, chauvinism, anti-intellectualism, certainly, whenever relevant, anti-Semitism, and also modernization of the states including their economic development and social reform. It is perhaps not an accident that some of the prewar fascists find a welcome haven and a major role in some of the new national Communist regimes of East Europe.

Thus in the foreseeable future, I tend to be pessimistic about the internal development of East Europe, even though externally the region is acquiring greater diversity and more autonomy. But in the long run East Europe is far more susceptible to, and far more interested in, the West European development than Russia, in spite of the Europeanization of Russia. The East Europeans—and this applies particularly to the younger generation—see in West Europe the image of the future. The concept of Europe is a substitute for the waning ideology. To the extent that in the present context of greater diversity the East European states can be responsive to that appeal, they can also serve as transmission belts for a similar evolution of the Soviet Union, and, perhaps, in the future, for a different pattern of international relationships.

IV

To be sure, we are still far away from such a fundamental change. While objective conditions for a new East-West relationship are now maturing, subjectively the situation is not yet ripe. It is not yet ripe because primarily the Soviet leadership, but also the communist leadership of East Europe, is not yet ready for such a qualitative change. There is already, of course, a greater inclination on their part to accept stability and adjustment. Indeed, Soviet foreign policy has undergone a profound revision in recent years. In the period 1958 to 1962 the Soviet leaders pursued what can be described as the policy of break-through. On the essentially erroneous assumption of possessing a strategic advantage, the Soviet Union attempted to use the Berlin crisis as a source of leverage for breaking through to the West and for dismantling the Western system of security and alliance.

Frustrated in Berlin, they attempted to use the Cuban "short cut." This, in my view, was the basic origin of the missile crisis. The confrontation in Cuba, however, forced the Soviet leadership to recognize that the balance of power was not as favorable to them as they had assumed. This, in turn, forced them to reassess the basic relationship of violence to international change in the nuclear age. The Soviet leadership, in accepting the coerced evacuation of its missiles from Cuba, accepted with it the notion that the policy of break-through was bankrupt. Thus the end of the Cuban crisis marked—and we know this historically—the end of the Berlin crisis.

For about a year afterwards Soviet policy was almost entirely adrift. It was marked by incertitude and confusion. But by late 1963 and early 1964, we see the outlines of the new policy clearly emerging. The Soviet leadership now concluded that its interests would be better served by

what I would call a policy of fragmentation, designed to fragment politically the Western alliance. This approach was clearly spelled out in a large number of articles in 1963, emphasizing a three-pronged attack—but a political and diplomatic attack this time—on the peripheries, the north and the south, and on the central front through a direct approach to de Gaulle's France, using de Gaulle's self-assertiveness against the United States as a source of leverage for undermining Western unity.

The visits paid by the Soviet leaders to the West, by Kosygin to Italy, by Podgorny to France, by a large number of top-level Soviet officials in the course of 1963 and 1964—particularly 1964—testify to the shaping of this policy. After Khrushchev's political "death" the new leadership chose to emphasize particularly the approach to France, as Professor Lowenthal pointed out in his very able *New York Times* article.

The current Soviet policy is still grounded in the basic assumption of the desirability and of the inevitability of Western fragmentation. But it is now a policy based on the revolutionary principle and not on military pressure, which was the essential ingredient of the policy of breakthrough. Therefore, it creates the preconditions for some limited adjustments and eventually perhaps even for reconciliation, since our own policy toward the East is now based also on the assumption of the evolution of the East, even though we postulate in the wake of this expected evolution a basic change in the character of the communist systems.

There is thus at least the beginnings of an East-West consensus on the desirability of European stability, on the desirability of avoiding a nuclear confrontation, and on evolution as a basis for international change. In turn, that gives rise to the possibility of a greater growing together of the East and the West, first on the social and economic plane, primarily by the development of a variety of multilateral relationships, but eventually perhaps even politically.

Eventually the time may come for the undertaking of a common East-West multilateral economic development scheme designed to cut across the present frontiers partitioning Europe, a plan designed to build multilateral ties, to narrow the gap in the standard of living, to eliminate the restraints which still exist on communication and contact between the East and the West in Europe, eventually thereby creating the preconditions for the reunification of Europe, and, in that context, for the reunification of Germany.

V

This policy differs fundamentally—and it *should* differ fundamentally—from the policy that we ought to pursue toward the eastern part of the communist world. At the present time, the situation in China and in its associated states and supporting parties is of a fundamentally different character. The Chinese are still in a more retarded stage of their revolutionary experience; they are still operating in more primitive conditions; they are still in a more expansionist mood. They are undergoing, indeed, a unique historical experience, the coming together of three immensely destructive and emotionalizing historical experiences: a nationalist revolution which creates a basis for mass commitment and national political self-awakening; an industrial revolution which ruptures the fabric of established traditional society and creates the conditions

of alienation and loneliness, the basis for more total political organization; and last but not least, a communist revolution, still in its intense utopian and revolutionary stage.

Neither in Russia nor in East Europe were these three revolutionary processes experienced together. In China they have come together and this creates a degree of commitment and an ideological perspective on the world which is not subject to rapid change and which makes China qualitatively different from the Soviet Union and East Europe.

Indeed, the Chinese have developed the conception of the changing geographical vortex of the center of the revolution during the last one hundred years—from France to Germany, from Germany to Russia, and now from Russia to China—to justify their own role as the center of the revolutionary activity in the world. Their commitment, their sense of pride, this fanaticism, if you will, does not create at the present moment a favorable setting for stability and adjustment. This is why, while in the West the moment is approaching for adjustment and reconciliation, in the East the task is still to create international stability as the first order of business on the international agenda.

I feel that this is the task the United States ought to undertake; indeed it has undertaken it, and it ought to persist in that task, for otherwise Asia will become destabilized. America has a major stake in Asia; one cannot envisage the development of Japan, of Taiwan, the rural reforms in Pakistan, or the Indian economic development, without American economic presence and involvement. This economic involvement in turn requires political presence, and it is American political presence which is in the process of being challenged.

VI

There are those who argue that the maintenance of American presence in Asia is impossible, but I am very much impressed by the fact that some of the most distinguished people who argued that way more than fifteen years ago argued in the same journals that the policy of containment in Europe was impossible. Some of them described the policy of containment as a "strategic monstrosity doomed to failure," and recommended American disengagement from Europe.


The long road to international morality leads through the creation of international order, and international order necessitates, first of all, the creation of international stability. We can only create international stability if all the major powers in the world accept the principle that in the nuclear age no side can change the political *status quo* through the use of force and through direct challenge to another side. We restrained ourselves from doing that in Hungary, in spite of our policy of liberation. The Soviets learned that lesson more painfully in Cuba. That lesson is still to be learned in many parts of the world, but I believe that the cause of peace, the cause of global reconciliation, the cause of international adjustment, requires, first, the creation of stability, and stability in Asia will not be achieved by American disengagement or Chinese expansion.

It is in terms of these broad generalizations that I see hope for the future in our relationship with the communist world and that I see room for optimism in assessing change in the communist world.

THE X MEETING

This is the curb where
the car stood, see the dry
square on the pavement wet
with rain, and here the elm
tree dripped its tears.
This is the very ground
she stood on as she fled
(in her mind, her step
slow and reluctant), this air
for all I know is what they
breathed, this sun broke through
to mist the windows of the car,
this bird sang, this grass
must have heard the news, but
something's gone, lost, dissolved,
vanished, frightened away by sobs
and anger, X marks the spot on the map
of a make-believe country where she
gave back to him what she had never
had although he said she would not
pledge a straw to keep it hers. So
the tears she shed so piteously for
her release blamed him for what he was,
yet lacked his signature, as money
spent on grief or love never
exceeds the debt.

—JAMES HEARST



"....that doomed wilderness whose edges were being constantly and punily gnawed at by men with plows and axes who feared it because it was wilderness, men myriad and nameless even to one another in the land where the old bear had earned a name, and through which ran not even a mortal beast but an anachronism indomitable and invincible out of an old dead time, a phantom, epitome and apotheosis of the old wild life which the little puny humans swarmed and hacked at in a fury of abhorrence and fear like pygmies about the ankles of a drowsing elephant; — the old bear, solitary, indomitable and alone; widowed childless and absolved of mortality—old Priam reft of his old wife and outlived all his sons."



DRAWING: POTTER

LATIN AMERICAN

JOURNALISTS frequently resort to the three "T's"—torrid, turbulent, truculent—in describing contemporary political attitudes and moods in Latin America. These descriptions disturb North American readers, in part because they call into question our sixth grade image of "Good Neighbor" policies and relationships. These two extremes symbolize the disparity in our understanding of and attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy as it relates to Latin America, and suggest the urgency for a reassessment of what that policy is. Such a reevaluation is what Senator Fulbright was advocating when he spoke about "Old Myths and New Realities."

We once had a fairly adequate vision of how the world was divided. On the one side was an aggressive, monolithic communist bloc of nations, and on the other, a bloc of non-aggressive and more-or-less democratic nations. This is no longer an adequate guide to understanding the modern world as it is evolving. If one must think of the world in simple models, perhaps the one suggested by Dom Helder Camara (Roman Catholic archbishop in the poverty-stricken Brazilian northeast) is useful: "the conflict (is) between the developed world and the developing world." A similarly effective image is Bishop James K. Mathews' insight: "The great dividing wall of hostility in our time has become the 30th parallel in the Northern Hemisphere, reaching all the way around the world except in Asia where it swings north to follow the Chinese boundary."

Our policies in Latin America consistently indicate that we have been trying to catch up with history. Via the Monroe Doctrine, the United States saw itself as a brave and stalwart young man standing between the young nations of Latin America and the colony-hungry nations of

Europe. Via the "Big Stick" and "Send - in - the - Marines" policies, good-hearted and strong Uncle Sam intervened when necessary to keep minimum order among the immature and perpetually corrupt Latin nations who were basically incapable of self-government.

A legitimate argument can be made that the U.S. government and public opinion only began to take Latin America seriously with Franklin Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy, which theoretically marked the end of North American tutelage and began the era of partnership.

The pressure of world events shifted American concentration elsewhere after Roosevelt, and the "Good Neighbor" policy was allowed to lapse. The stoning of an American vice president and Castro's shift to Marxist anti-Americanism awakened us quickly. Again we sought an adequate model and policy for dealing with our Latin neighbors. Thus John F. Kennedy, recognizing the potential tensions between the "haves" and "have-nots," enunciated the Alliance for Progress. He helped to make us aware of the necessity to force the entrenched upper classes in Latin America to make necessary reforms in the name of social justice, political liberty and economic progress.

But long before the intervention of U.S. Marines in Santo Domingo, it had become apparent that the Alliance for Progress had not succeeded in either capturing the imagination of the Latin American peoples or in motivating their governments to initiate progressive reforms. This most recent failure to be a leader for reform and progress in Latin America is, regrettably, nothing new; it is simply the latest in a long series of failures to institute change. The truth is that Uncle Sam looks very little like a leader of Latin America but very much like

a bumbling, on-again-off-again meddler who neither understands exactly what he wants nor from whom (or why) he wants it.

THE military intervention of the U.S. in Santo Domingo was a shock felt 'and still reverberating' throughout Latin America. Before Santo Domingo, anti-Americanism was simply a series of slogans designed to unify a people behind a single cause. This sentiment made possible the nationalization of American business interests but it certainly wasn't a deep-seated popular attitude. But the landing of Marines in Santo Domingo and the steady American support of the military dictatorship in Brazil has changed popular attitudes. The U.S. is now looked upon as a monster that has to be dealt with as such.

Recent American policies in Brazil and the Dominican Republic are largely responsible for this shift in opinion. In Brazil, the U.S. recognized (before any other nation had done so and while ex-President Goulart was still in the country) the military government that overthrew the legally-elected Jango Goulart. The American ambassador in Brazil has repeatedly praised publicly the military government and expressed strong confidence in it. At the same time he has refused thus far to place the U.S. government on public record as opposing the continuing harassment of Brazilian professors, students, journalists and labor leaders.

And then came the intervention in the Dominican Republic. What stunned many Latin Americans was that the U.S. had reverted to direct, massive military intervention in a small republic. The reasons for this intervention were, and will continue to be, widely disputed. Many Latins now feel they have clear proof that the U.S. has been misjudged for

REACTIONS

By BRADY TYSON

decades. Despite their shrillness and false solutions, the communists are being applauded for depicting the American eagle as a huge vulture hovering over its Latin American prey. The U.S. is no longer thought of as a good-hearted but sleeping giant whose shrewd capitalists export Coca-Cola culture and rig the prices of Latin American raw materials in order to reap fantastic profits. The U.S. is now thought to be an intemperate monster, capable of hasty and extreme action.

The crowning blow to Latin images of the U.S. came when there was hardly any public outcry in the U.S. against these Brazilian and Dominican actions, particularly the landing of the Marines in Santo Domingo.

The lack of public protests in the U.S. really surprised the Brazilians who have always believed the American people to be liberal and non-interventionist even when their government was otherwise (particularly when it was influenced by economic pressure groups protecting their Latin American holdings). Thus, this image of Uncle Sam as a good-hearted but bumbling and absent-minded neighbor who was often taken advantage of by some of his own rapacious citizens is now thought to be an illusion, to be replaced by a new and as yet still-forming image.

There is today a deep current, and not just among students, of disappointment and dismay with the U.S. The leftist press in Brazil has been subdued since March 31, 1964, but when Brazilians become freer and the controls of censorship and repression are relaxed, the leftists will speak loudly again. They will reap a rich harvest by being articulate and strident in their characterization of this new trend in American policies. Political anti-Americanism will be greatly enhanced by this exploitation.

What will such a press say? They will accuse the U.S. government of being too closely aligned with exploiting capitalists, and use as an illustration the extremely profitable concession granted to the Hannah Mining Corporation shortly after the

change of government in Brazil. They will say that the U.S. is a nation of militarists, and fully exploit the open secret of the close liaison between the American military mission in Brazil and the Brazilian Army Officers who conspired and overthrew the government of Jango Goulart.

THIS press will say that the U.S. has helped prop up an unpopular military government (as the recent state elections showed conclusively), and in exchange for this support were guaranteed relatively free access by American private firms to Brazilian natural resources. They will ask with ironic bitterness where the American commitment to civil liberties, freedom of speech, judicial processes and academic freedom was during this twilight period of military semi-dictatorship. The left will, of course, exaggerate, distort, and oversimplify, but the germ of truth is there to be exploited.

The greatest disappointment in Brazil was that the U.S. was not, in the hour of need, a staunch champion of justice and liberty, reform and democracy. Rather, the U.S. became allied with a military attempt to stave off the collapse of the decadent institutions that have limited the progress and democracy of Brazil for over three hundred years. It isn't so much what the U.S. has done or let happen, but what the U.S. has failed to do that has hurt.

For a hundred and fifty years, the U.S. has longed to be the leader and example for Latin America (even though some of its citizens were at the same time busily exploiting Latin American interests, and when official American policy was captured by private interests). But now the U.S. has failed (at least it has missed two of its most strategic opportunities) to lead rather than impede the Latin American revolution. The U.S. is allying itself more and more with the *status quo* (in the name of anti-communism, of course) in those Latin countries where radical social change is most imperative.

Many Latin countries, like Brazil, are temporarily in a forced "Prael-

torian Pause" but no one can seriously believe that these military governments can last forever. These old structures must give way and the old institutions must make way for newer, more democratic and just ones to emerge. But when these revolutions occur, they will tend to be violently anti-American, especially in Latin America. Those who once looked with great hopes to the U.S. as a liberal, democratic leader now feel themselves betrayed. The wave of future popularity in Brazil, both on the right and the left, is with who can be the most anti-American. Today only the Army officers, some industrialists and men of commerce remain firm "friends" of the U.S., and there is some reason in each of these instances to believe that this is a tactical alliance rather than a commitment to the ideals that the U.S. professes.

Why has the U.S. failed to lead the Latin American revolution and share from its experience in nation building? Why has the U.S. become a bulwark of the Latin American *status quo*? Though the reasons are many and complex, it is imperative to enumerate the major ones.

First, Yankees have been and still are peculiarly unempathetic toward other cultures. There is a built-in tendency to see everyone as an underdeveloped American. We think everyone is eager to become like us. Our difficulty and unwillingness to learn other languages, to get inside another culture, is a great handicap in dealing with Latin America. Our popular understanding of Latin American problems and culture remains low. Our disinterest and stereotyped vision is omnipresent, ranging from old-guard Latin American academic "specialists" to the perennial and widely influential flippant attitude of *Time Magazine* toward all things Latin American.

Secondly, the prevailing U.S. interest in Latin America has derived from commercial or financial commitments, and lately, from military objectives. Our interest in aiding reform movements has been marginal or opportunistic. As a Brazilian politi-

cal scientist said recently, American foreign policy toward Brazil has been dominated alternately by one of three phases: the moralistic or messianic, the commercial and economic, and the military and strategic. This particular observer believes that we are presently in a military phase. In any event, it seems fair to conclude that in recent years American interest in Latin reforms has been in direct proportion to real or imagined "Red threats" or "new Castros." The Alliance for Progress was probably supported by many people more because it was an anti-communist measure than because it was a way of stimulating the development of a more modern and just society in Latin America. American participation in Latin America has become increasingly heavy-handed since the decline of communist prestige occasioned by the Sino-Soviet split. American interest in popular reform measures has declined in the same proportion as the Marxist threat has declined.

Thirdly, the thrust of U.S. aid to Latin America in the latter days of the Alliance for Progress has been centered almost entirely upon economic and administrative reforms, thereby ignoring the basic political mobilization and organization which must be achieved in order to break the hold of the small traditional elites. U.S. technicians tend to take for granted the political and national consensus that exists in the U.S. and assume that this also exists, at least in embryonic form, in Latin America. Political modernization and mobilization and consensus-building must accompany administrative and economic development and indeed in some it must precede administrative and economic reforms when the old institutions and groups are determinedly against such changes. This preoccupation with social and economic engineering from above as a near-panacea has been typified by the so-called "developmentalists"—the technocrats—who assume for instance that the introduction of a hard currency in Brazil and the stopping of the upward inflation spiral can in

itself solve the country's problems.

THE problems of the underdeveloped world are of such a nature that even ruthless, powerful and competent technicians can never alone solve them because there always appear to be new seeds of dehumanizing tendencies in every reform. It is dangerous to leave the direction of society to technicians, even if they happen to be the most able and conscientious technocrats around. Directing human society to human ends must involve as much of humanity as possible in the steering process. Government "for the people" must finally be government "of" and "by" the people. Human progress depends exactly upon the raising of the popular capacity to participate self-consciously and responsibly in the historical process. In the modern world, this means political participation through political organizations. The basic assumptions of a pluralistic, open and democratic society are still valid, at least because they seem to be the best guardians against the despotism of either ideological or technological tyrants.

The U.S. has failed to lead Latin America because we have not offered a revolutionary ideology. We have been content to offer technical advice and to talk about a vague "American way of life" that appears to be (at least as presented through the U.S. Information Service) only an affluent society mildly involved in amateur do-goodism. No real revolution has been achieved without an informing, organizing, and inspiring ideology. With its technical know-how, wealth, and human resources, the U.S. needs to help Latin America find its own revolutionary ideology, especially since recent ideologies such as communism are discredited for having led to anti-human ends and fanaticism. The greatness of the ideology of the American Revolution was that in its time it avoided these fanaticisms, and produced a model for an open and evolving society not tied to static doctrines.

But the U.S. is no longer a young, radical nation interested in exporting revolutionary ideologies. We have

become an old, rich nation which basically wants nothing more than to enjoy its abundance and gadgets. It seems unlikely that the U.S. will turn into a crusading nation again.

A Brazilian university student, an ex-member of the communist party, said to me recently: "We were very wrong about a lot of things. We thought the Soviet Union was on our side, but we have come to see that they are just self-satisfied opportunists. We thought the People's Republic of China was on our side, but we've come to see they are just out for themselves too. We even thought our own government was on our (the student movement's) side, but they were just trying to use us to stay in power. We thought history was on our side and that the revolution was inevitable and very near. We thought that all that was needed was some agitation. Now we know differently: a revolution isn't made without work and sacrifice, without identifying with the hopes and aspirations of the people. And if the revolution comes, we will have to make it ourselves. We've learned not to expect help from anyone."

These student revolutionaries will make it, even if it takes twenty-five years. I only hope they will be competent and ready when the revolution comes; that they will have a clear and human vision and model of a better and more just Brazil. I also hope that the policy of the U.S. toward Brazil, and the other Latin American countries in similar situations, will not always be based on the short gains of opportunism and affiliation with the *status quo* but will be based on empathetic identification with the disorganized masses who presently suffer from foreign-supported dictatorships. It is to be hoped that some Americans will identify themselves in their own ways with these aspirations and goals of the awakening but yet leaderless people of Latin America, and that through such a minority of concerned Americans the U.S. can pursue a positive contribution toward the realization of a creative revolution in Latin America.

AMERICA

DRAWING: ROTH

TODAY



The Voices of Africa

It would be presumptuous of me to claim or pretend that I speak for Africa, for there are many voices of Africa, as indeed there should be. What is of importance is that the different voices should be heard above the din of noises that come from almost every quarter about Africa, for it is very easy to be an African specialist today. All that one does is go to Africa for a summer, and when one comes back one is an authority on all aspects of African life: not that the outside world should not talk about Africa and the Africans. Indeed it should. But it is equally important for the outside world to stop and listen to what the African has to say, and not to fret at the hard, almost rude stare that he fixes on it. As Jean-Paul Sartre has pointed out, the African has been looked at without looking back for too long. He has been talked about, analyzed, put under a microscope, all his ills diagnosed, and he has borne all this unseemly curiosity from the West with amazing fortitude, and has listened to different doctors and prophets declare his doom with exceeding calm.

It is only in the last decade that the African has begun to look back at the rest of the world, to talk back to it and attempt to define himself and his world. At times his efforts at self-definition have seemed unduly truculent and a little too shrill to the outside world, but we must remember that the African is an angry man—a man who knows that he has far too long been overlooked, trampled upon, abused and silenced. When he does talk even in what seems to him a whisper, the outside world hears a shrill shout because it has been used to his muted silence.

To explain the African's deep sense of hurt and grievance, one has to remember, without bitterness, that Africa was carved up like Dutch cheeses and distributed among European powers without so much as "by your leave" to the African. He found himself "a lousy, despised man," with no voice, no opinions, and, to the West, no feelings. In fact, he was reduced to the status of a sub-human. As the African sees it, the plunder of Africa, and his final degradation as man, reached its lowest point with "chattel slavery."

Apart from being despised and abused, the Africans have had the common experience of depersonalization which was the result of their colonial status. All the colonizing powers had three things in common which, in turn, were the expression of the Western world's attitude toward Africans. First, there was a deep contempt for the culture and civilization of the Africans which was regarded as either negligible or nonexistent, simply because it was neither Christian nor white. Secondly, there was a fixed will to alienate Africans from what was basic to

their beings by forcing them to assimilate the rules, prohibitions and taboos of the newly imposed civilization: and, for good measure, to confuse and humiliate him by rejecting them as persons, for "East is east, and West is west, and never the twain shall meet." Those of the assimilationist school, like the French, chose assimilation as the crucial instrument in African depersonalization as it is the most effective means of tutelage. The British went about it in a different way. Their profound contempt for the cultures and civilizations of African peoples was shown in their condescending solicitude for the "lesser breed without the law" whose customs were to be recognized as long as they did not offend against British concepts of law and justice. Unlike the French, they were not going to throw the pearls of British culture before swine, so they allowed native customs to continue, which they proceeded to undermine by introducing British structures in government, British financial and other economic institutions. Thus the Africans found that the paradise of delights prepared for their enjoyment in the preserved laws, customs and traditions had turned sour and were not so very enchanting after all.

FINALLY, and as a consequence of the above factors and circumstances, Africans everywhere were fed with negativisms. They had the experience of being told everywhere: "You are incapable of doing this or that." They were told that it took the white man two thousand years to develop the things which are now regarded as the essence of civilization, and that the black men could not achieve those dizzy heights! It has always seemed to the Africans that they were being told that since it took the white man a thousand years to invent the bicycle, then it would take them the same number of years to learn how to ride the bicycle. Everywhere, they had to listen to insulting questions like: Are they ready for self-government? Can they really make good doctors? Can they understand our science and the intricate and subtle aspects of our philosophy? What for the European was hailed as a feat of endurance, for the African was unmistakable evidence of his brutish origins. A brilliant military victory for the whites was a bloody massacre for the Africans. When Europeans carried away thousands of African cattle and horses these were legitimate spoils of war. When the Africans did the same thing, it was malicious theft of European property and an intolerable provocation. White rights were not negotiable, but African rights were, because they were gifts from the white masters!

It is this which has led to the depersonalization of the African, as a result of the experience of colonization. It is from this that he wishes to save himself, and the images and myths which have been created serve to reinstate him as a man with dignity in his former state and to help

By ABSALOM L. VILAKAZI

JANUARY 1966

him recapture the feelings of belonging to his native Africa. That is why African politicians have devoted considerable time and energy, first to destroy the old images and myths about Africa and the Africans, and secondly, to create new ideologies. If you like, these ideologies or "myths" are affirmations of a readiness to act—to act politically. Ideology is something to believe in, and to give orientation to one's life and experience. It has a function analogous to religious commitment. The commitment effects a transformation in the life of the individual and, as a consequence, in the lives of those about him. The ideologue is committed to an idea which transcends present reality. His aim is to transform existing life.

What, then, are the slogans and ideologies used by African politicians and opinion makers in this landscaping exercise? The central one from which all others derive is Pan-Africanism. Africa, as a continent, needs a high degree of unity; that is seen as the way in which the aspirations of African nationalism can be met. In this sense, it is not only an ideal but a grim necessity—the only answer to Africa's needs. As I noted, Pan-Africanism embraces all other slogans of Africanism. One of these is "African Personality."

AFRICAN personality, as a slogan and as a concept, has captured the imagination of Africans throughout the continent, and nothing meaningful can ever be said without invoking it. It is, I suggest, an index of the African's awareness of his alienation. When used in speeches, it is often as an expression of the determination to regain lost ground and the lost dignity of their persons as Africans and not to live or exist as someone else's copy. The dignity of being an African, and thus the African personality, can only be regained, however, by regaining the cultural lost ground. This is the meaning of the African renaissance of morale and culture, for this is truly the quest for the African personality, a determination to recast African society in its own form, drawing from the past, and marrying what is valuable and desirable to modern ideas! It is this which Leon Dalmas asks for when he cries:

*Give me back my black dolls to play
the simple game of my instincts . . .*

To recover my courage, my boldness

To feel myself myself, a new self from

the one I was yesterday

Yesterday without complications,

Yesterday when the hour of uprooting came.

The renaissance is not just a dream. African art forms have become fashionable everywhere. African dancing has come into its own, and everywhere, leaders wear national dress and clamor for the resuscitation of African traditional customs and practices.

The extraordinary thing about the concept and slogan of African personality is that it is exceedingly potent in influencing behavior. It has had the magic effect of boosting the morals and the images of the self of Africans and thus giving them a dignity and poise (sometimes, unfortunately tinged with arrogance) which they have never had before. One is struck by the self-assurance and dig-

nified carriage of African students whom one meets abroad. They walk with their heads high and shoulders thrown back, conscious of the fact that on their shoulders rest the future of Africa. Contrast this with the half apologetic and mincing manners and servile speech of the older generation who grew up under colonialism and were anxious to win the respect and plaudits of their colonial masters.

Another of these new slogans and concepts is that of Negritude. As a concept, it was originated by Africans of French expression living in Paris, and it "stands for the new consciousness of the Negro, for his newly gained self-confidence and for his distinctive outlook on life with which he distinguishes himself from the non-Negro." Negritude is a fighting faith. In this, as in many of its features, Negritude has a close similarity to the concept of African personality. Both are an answer to the echo of the past African world. Both are seeking an integration with all that is good and constructive about this past in order to salvage (the African) personality and to find a foundation on which to build (new) institutions.

Both concepts have been accused of fostering racism because they press the claims of blacks and extol their virtues and also because, it is alleged, they both encourage what could be a bitter black confrontation with the white supremacists. It seems clear to us that these accusations are based on a false analysis of the problem and an insufficient understanding of the things behind these concepts. After all, there is a distinction between racism and race consciousness. To assert that I am a Zulu and proud to be one is not to say that I am therefore against the Afrikaner. Negritude and African personality are a vigorous defense of, and a statement of belief in, the worth of the African person. Both make very strong, even bold, claims for their group; but so far, none of the spokesmen of either have preached race hatred. On the contrary, one can discover throughout the literature, positive statements of an all-embracing humanism.

Yet another of these words which are building blocks of African images and policies is neo-colonialism. The African political leaders, meeting in Cairo in March, 1961 declared neo-colonialism as "the greatest threat" to the emerging nations, through which they become victims to an indirect and subtle form of domination from the developed Western nations, particularly America, The Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Britain, Belgium, and Netherlands, South Africa and France.

THE methods of operation of all neo-colonialist nations are the same: they grant some sort of independence to a country with the concealed intention of making it a client state, and controlling it effectively by means other than political. Or, neo-colonialism will fabricate an elite devoted to it, and falsify elections and set up quislings devoid of popular support but armed with the watchful confidence of the mother country. It constantly raises obstacles likely to delay real independence and tries to involve Africa in Euro-African economic associations by the expedient of aid to underdeveloped countries. President Nkrumah of Ghana, speaking of neo-colonialism and its methods, said that "the imperialists of today endeavor to achieve their ends not merely by military means, but

by economic penetration, cultural assimilation, ideological domination, psychological infiltration, and subversive activity even to the point of inspiring and promoting assassination and civil strife."

In discussing African ideologies, one must mention the concept of African socialism. Perhaps no part of African ideological development has given more trouble to the communists than has the concept of African socialism. One of its most articulate spokesmen, M. Senghor of Senegal, has warned again and again of the danger of using foreign models to solve Africa's problems and he and other African socialists have insisted on a home-grown product. Senghor declares: "We must never tire of repeating that dialectical materialism was born of history and geography: it was born in the 19th century in Europe. Conceived in that milieu, it was essentially designed to analyze and transform it . . . and what of Asian and African realities? The Israelis, like the Chinese, have been able to find their road to socialism adapted to the spirit and realities of their native soil." It is this strong bid for ideological autonomy which is of importance in the development of Africa and which has some pointed lessons for the West.

What I have stated above has far-reaching implications for the outside world in its relations with Africa. The first thing which seems of crucial importance is that the world should take Africans seriously. The Africans are in dead earnest about what they say, and here I wish to suggest some of their problems insofar as the West is concerned.

In the first place, the most serious problem which the Africans face is the one posed by their friends from both the Eastern and Western blocs. Both blocs are eager with their solicited and unsolicited advice about how the Africans should conduct their affairs and themselves. They also stipulate conditions under which their friendship with the Africans can continue, and the most embarrassing condition is that Africans should be enemies with the enemies of their friends. It was to this kind of embarrassment that President Nyerere referred: "we like and respect our friends but we wish they would not choose our enemies for us!" This is not unrelated to the tendency of the West to want to get the African committed to their course. Perhaps this is a peculiar weakness of the Americans, that they want to be popular and to be loved. They seem to be incapable of grasping the fact that if I am not devoutly pro-American, I am not therefore anti-American. In Africa, this is one of the most distressing things about meeting and talking to Americans.


Another side of this problem is the fact that the Western nations see a communist in any African who is not enthusiastically for the West, while the communist bloc of nations have an uncanny facility for discovering dirty capitalists or stooges of the imperialists in most African leaders who are not communists. Tom Mboya referred to this tendency of the outside world in a speech in Cairo. He told the world what the Africans mean when they declare themselves positively neutral. "We find," he said, "that both the Westerners and the Russians look at Africa through the same pair of glasses: one lens is marked 'pro-Western' the other, 'pro-communist.'" It is not surprising that looking at Africans in this way, most foreigners fail to understand one great reality about our continent: that

Africans are neither pro-Western nor pro-communist, but pro-African.

ONE of the facts of life is that Africa and her peoples are very poor at the present time and stand in great need of economic assistance. The Africans know of their need, but the rich nations will be making big mistakes indeed if they imagine that they can exploit African poverty for their political ends and for cold war purposes. Much of the aggressive behavior of some African powers in recent months in their relation with the U.S. can best be understood if this is taken into consideration. Westerners may smile a little at this kind of pride, but they had better take it seriously. It takes only a careless or ill-advised statement of an officer, say, of the aid-giving country to create the impression that the poverty of the receiving country is being exploited for political purposes. This is the main reason behind the "no strings attached" attitude to foreign aid which might seem to the aid-giving country like looking a gift horse in the mouth. The Africans know as well as the next man that development needs money. They know, too, that money does not grow on trees, and that States, like individuals, cannot live on the abundant air and sunshine of mother Africa. The case against "strings" to foreign aid is that it is blackmail, that it is taking advantage of economic power to compromise African independence. Such aid is also wrong because it is humiliating.

The Christian Church has some important lessons to learn from what has been said. It ought to remember that in Africa, and in the minds of the Africans, it has always been associated with colonialism, and in many cases the connection between the Church and the colonial power was such that the missionaries were agents of their governments. Missionary practice was based on the colonial pattern and reflected the same racist attitude which marked the secular governments. It behooves the Church, therefore, to conduct itself clear of the taint of colonialism.

Finally, I think it is important for the Church in the West, especially in America, to make up its mind about its public and private stand on the issue of civil rights. It is important because the Africans measure the sincerity of American missionary or Christian activity by the way American churches accept or reject the Negro in their midst. It is something of an anachronism for the American churches, which discriminate against the Negro at home, to send missionaries to Africa. You can rest assured that the African will begin to believe in the sincerity of American Christianity when the churches will have ceased to prevaricate on the issue of civil rights; when a man will be respected not because he is white or yellow, but because he is a man. Discrimination against the Negro in the U.S. is an affront to the man of color anywhere in the world, and when practiced by the churches, it gives religious sanction to a practice which is, by every standard, unChristian, barbaric, and contrary to all the democratic principles for which this country stands. To the Africans, all the breast-beating and the angry outbursts against South African apartheid are a colossal pose and deception so long as the American churches condone or practice racial discrimination!



DRAWING: WENGER

PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

By I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

INDPENDENT Africa today is a continental buffer area between East and West. (In classical terms, a buffer state is a region between two competing powers that each is willing to leave outside its control as long as the other does too.) Today, the Soviet Union and the United States may vie for *influence* in Africa, but both have generally restrained themselves from seeking *control*. The Congo crises have been an exception; Russian and Chinese attempts at control necessitated a firmer response from the United States, which used direct support as well as the United Nations. The African policy of neutralism, as well as sporadic use of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), is the continent's form of a buffer policy.

Although respect of a buffer policy by outside powers is one means of preserving the integrity of an area that is also a power vacuum, Africa

benefits from an additional way of compensating for its weakness. European states still occupy a position of preemptive presence and primary responsibility in Africa. Their African responsibility is reflected in their large contribution to economic aid and technical assistance. The military agreements and intervention capabilities of European states, particularly France, are a means of compensating for the weakness of African armies contribution to maintaining order in the continent.

It is in America's interest to preserve this neutral buffer area, just as it is in American interest to encourage continuing European attention to order and development in Africa. Yet the problems that arise in connection with the promotion of these interests are often as broad as the goals of freedom, order and development, themselves. Problems occur on every level of policy operations: the ends

to be attained, the adversary to be overcome, and the means to be used. Representative problems can be viewed under the heading of democracy, communism and aid.

Democracy

THE new nations of Africa have attained independence, but in general they are far from exercising their self-government democratically. This is not a condemnation; it is a fact. The people are largely deficient in the experiences of living in a modern society that make participation in modern state government possible. Because of this, they have no grounds on which to base realistic expectations about the role, possibilities and performance of government. In fact, frequently people's hopes have been raised out of proportion to their government's capability to fulfill them; thus the other side of the coin of the Revolution of

Rising Expectations is the impending Revolution of Falling Satisfactions.

Leadership in the new African nations today is in the George Washington stage, where the "historic chiefs" who led the successful struggle for independence are still in power. Because their past experience required a united mass movement against their colonial rulers, they still tend to regard opposition as treasonous and parliamentary institutions as divisive and dangerous. This attitude also reflects the absence of a more basic precondition for democratic government: consensus on the basic aims and rules of government.

The gap that exists between the modern segment of the population, including the leaders, and the large mass of the people, frequently still primitive, makes a free exchange of ideas and an effective exercise of popular responsibility impossible at the present time. The result is that it is not only unlikely but dangerous to install democratic methods now. To make a government dependent on an uneducated and inexperienced public is to bring about a harmful inversion of the roles of leader and people.

In this situation, the wisest measures are those which increase the capabilities of the people eventually to fulfill a responsible, democratic role. Many of these measures are long-range, and they include such broad goals as political and economic development. For the moment, the best form of government in the circumstances is often a single-party system with strong, responsible leadership. Although there are great dangers in such a system, it has certain built-in advantages: the people are given civic education and practice in democratic procedures, traditional divisions are overcome within a spirit of national unity, the country tends to enjoy conditions of stability propitious to development, and at least the slogans of popular responsibility become embedded in the public mind. In the long run, these advantages can train the people and push the leaders towards democracy. For this to be effective, however, certain other features

should accompany the single-party system: the judiciary should be free and independent, free speech and other political liberties be respected, and opposition be allowed to take place within party councils.

The United States position in this situation is precarious; our influence must be subtle. First, it is important to recognize that our formal system and even some of our ideals are absolutely inapplicable to the current African scene. In fact, in Africa, a military regime can be more conducive to political development than, for example, a corrupt leader or a dictatorial party. Egypt, Sudan and Algeria can be cited as examples. Second, the United States can discreetly applaud policies and achievements which enhance the well-being of the people, the liberty of the country and its inhabitants, and the stability of the governing process, and which prepare the country for the future attainment of democracy. Such approval can be expressed through public statements, the use of aid, and support in the United Nations. Third, the United States can, in its statements, its cultural and information program, and its personnel exchanges, emphasize the political values which are important to us and applicable to African countries. The intellectual is an important element in the political development of the new nations, as he was in their campaign for independence, and his position is due essentially to his infusion with Western ideas. In an ideologically-charged atmosphere such as that of the cold war, ideals are the basis of allegiance, the source of action and the background of policy. Ideas, as well as aid, underlie the strength of Britain's and France's post-colonial ties with Africa, and also the threat of Russia and China. They are an element, frequently neglected, in the appeal of the United States as well.

Communism

THE most remarkable aspect of communism in Africa is that it has been unable to capitalize on the political revolution which has brought independence to thirty-

three new nations. Theoretically, communism has something to offer both of the primary goals of Africa today; as in Viet Nam under the French, it can infiltrate the nationalist movement and aid independence, and, as in Eastern Europe, it can bring about a form of national and regional unity. The fact that it has not been able to do so in Africa is a testimony to the single-mindedness of Africa's new leaders, who want independence and unity on their own terms.

There are still, however, a number of situations through which communism may come to individual African countries. If Western aid fails to foster the goal of development effectively or if it is misused for blatant political interference in internal affairs, the communist model for development may be borne in on slogans of neo-colonialism; the Congo was almost a case in point. If the single-party system decays into a personal dictatorship, the government can find affinity and support in the dictatorship of Russia and China; Ghana is close to being an example. If a nation turns to an aggressive foreign policy in the absence of a satisfying domestic policy, communist states can aid and encourage violence; Somalia may be a case in point. If Western allies continue to flout the equality of men and the drive for independence in southern Africa, communist assistance can become a habit; Angola could be an example. If African nationalist governments fail to provide unity and stability or to satisfy the expectations they have raised, the way can be opened to a revolt of intellectuals or, eventually, of labor; this is perhaps the greatest long-run danger, since modernization has attracted thousands to the new cities but has neither provided jobs nor satisfactions to give them new social and economic roots.

The United States attitude toward communism in Africa must be comprehensive. First, it is important to see the situation as it is: Africa defending and developing its own values, Western Europe still the primary foreign influence in Africa, the Soviet bloc a late-comer with not a

single ally and making progress only very slowly. Second, it is continually important to strengthen Africa's realistic attention to its own independence, interests and values, stressing those areas where indigenous values coincide with its own. It is in our own very real interest to see truly independent African states, imbued with a strong sense of cooperation with their neighbors and conducting an external policy that will insure the increasing liberty and well-being of their citizenry. Third, since the most prominent characteristic of these states is their developing nature—whether the field be economic, social, political, or ideological—the United States can help shape this development in a sound direction. Beyond economic aid, political aid can be expanded. Seminars can be held on matters of ideology, methods and programs; leader grants can be used for training and indoctrination as well as visiting; grass roots assistance such as the Peace Corps can be carefully expanded. In addition, private enterprise can be encouraged and even aided to increase its own assistance: groups such as American labor unions or the Congress of Cultural Freedom have an important role to play in organization and education. Fourth, much can be done to encourage Africans' efforts to solve their own problems, and most notably to support use of the Organization for African Unity to turn intra-African disputes from violence to peaceful conciliation. Its capabilities for positive cooperation towards development can also be enhanced.

Aid

FOREIGN aid is designed either to develop a country or to support a government. Development aid is used to relieve specific deficiencies in areas where other necessary human and material elements already exist. It also has important political purposes, in that it brings American presence to areas that might otherwise be occupied by hostile competitors and it encourages long-range stability instead of violence-breeding dissatisfaction. The Marshall Plan, Point Four and the Al-

liance for Progress are examples of such aid. Support aid has a shorter-term and frequently more political aim, since it can be used to reward deserving governments, although in an optimum situation, stability and development are its by-products. Where possible, such support involves cooperation toward common policy goals that are held by both governments; minimally, the government is supported as an alternative to chaos. Mutual Defense Assistance, Food for Peace, and aid to the Congo are examples of this type.

Obviously, there is and should be overlap between the two types, but there are also some built-in dilemmas. One is that development aid is posited on the belief that change is desirable, while support aid is to some extent based on the contrary notion. Yet, if stability is to exist in developing nations, it will be mobile, evolving, and pluralistic; even more than elsewhere, change among new nations is the rule of life. The purpose of aid, therefore, is to promote gradual evolution in order to build the social and political foundations for strong, free societies.

The United States, as the world's most affluent nation, has a general moral obligation to aid less favored lands. The specific allocation of aid, however, is not a matter of altruism; it is a matter of strategy, and should correspond to the interests and other policies of the United States. Aid is a political weapon and the granting of aid is a political act (even though it is frequently unwise to announce it as such). This is not to imply that aid should have specific "strings." Nothing beyond a reasonable assurance of the value and feasibility of the project is likely to be obtainable. Nor can aid be used to insure that the recipient will adopt American policy or think like an American. Such alignments on American policies tend to be false and artificial, and are frequently only covers for an ingratiating government wishing to hide its domestic inefficacy. Aid can, however, and should be used to promote governments which are realistic in handling their problems of development and sincere in promoting

values that are common to both nations. On the other hand, there is a limit to the financial assistance that developing nations can absorb. The need for coordination and for technical aid is therefore greater than the need for pouring in large sums of money.

The United States position is therefore complex. First, an aid project must be technically sound, and the allocation of aid must be consistent with the political and social as well as economic goals we wish to promote. Aid is merely one of the instruments of national policy which should be coordinated within our over-all policy towards a country. Second, in most cases in Africa, the United States does not need to shoulder the major burden of foreign aid. The American role can be primarily one of backstopping and filling in behind the European aid programs; there is, therefore, need for coordination both with the receiver country and with the other sources of Western aid, in an open spirit of cooperation. Third, between the two equally doctrinaire approaches of rigid planning and unyielding free enterprise, neither of which can be transplanted unchanged to the African scene, the United States must develop a reputation for realism, using elements of both approaches where applicable. One ingredient of realism in Africa is the encouragement of regional cooperation rather than petty national rivalries. Fourth, the goal should not be the reduction and ultimate elimination of aid upon the recipient's attainment of either the "take-off" or the "stand-alone" stage. The goal must be the continuing and effective use of aid as an instrument of national policy, to further American interests and encourage worthy governments. "Take-off" and "stand-alone" are not once-and-for-all processes, just as American interests are not simply momentary; viewed in this way, "take-off" can too easily become "fall-back" and "stand-alone" become "fall-alone." African economic, social and political development, like American interests, are continuing processes, deserving careful constant attention.

BOOKS

American Friends Service Committee, *A New China Policy*. Yale University Press (1965), paper, 95¢, cloth, \$3.

Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*. Oxford University Press (1965), \$7.50.

These well-groomed heroines carry five-foot rifles, On this parade ground in the first rays of the sun. Daughters of China have uncommon aspirations, Preferring battle-tunics to red dresses.

Mao Tse-tung

The American Friends Service Committee, in its *A New China Policy*, makes a plea that Americans seek to "break through the barriers to communication which separate the government and the people of the United States from the government and people of China." I would suggest that we might begin by reading some of Mao's poetry; its plethora of military images is conspicuous. Lacking Mao's keen appreciation of the functions of power and violence in the international order, the AFSC calls for "trust and confidence" on both sides as an essential step in the solution of the China problem. The Quakers are guilty of the naive assumption that prescriptions for international politics can be based on beliefs about human nature without careful regard for the nature of individual states and for the anarchic system within which they function. Ironically, the dilemma for which the AFSC seeks a solution is itself aggravated by Chinese adherence to the Leninist doctrine which makes the opposite mistake, putting overwhelming emphasis on the implications of the nature of the individual state for the international order. Lenin: "No war can be separated from the political system which begets it." Capitalism leads to imperialism and imperialism precipitates wars. Mao, as a Leninist—and he does accept at least this tenant of Leninism—cannot be expected to have trust and confidence in the Western powers. Quaker reliance on the good inherent in human nature seems all the more futile, and even irrelevant, in the face of Chinese belief in this Leninist doctrine.

That our relations with China are a source of great international tension, and that our policy toward China must become more flexible, are undeniable. But the Quaker approach would present dangers to world peace at least as serious as those with which we are presently confronted. They argue that "the attempt to apply moral principles in nation-to-nation relations requires that men first give humanity itself top priority in their scale of values. . . . We assume the moral capacity of the Chinese." It is perhaps unfortunate, but nevertheless true, that the moral capacity of the Chinese people is irrelevant to our policy toward China. Their leaders have said time and again that they could not only survive a nuclear war but that "socialism will be built on its [a nuclear war's] ruin." The Chinese undoubtedly have a "moral capacity," but it is parochial to assume that they have a Western morality that gives top priority to individual life. A policy that assumes that there is an inherent morality in the Chinese which places human life above all else is a policy of vulnerability, not of understanding. Until there is an international consensus that human life has an ultimate value above all other policy considerations (a slim possibility in a world of nation-states), a nation which unequivocally opposes violence is sending an invitation to be destroyed by those who remain willing to use it.

This Quaker abhorrence of the use of violence in the international order is in part a product of an often-made confusion of tactics and goals, of means and ends. "Though it is not a simple or an easy matter to overcome evil with good, it is even harder to overcome evil with evil." I am reminded of Max Weber: "No ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous instances the attainment of 'good' ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the price of using morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones—and facing the possibility or even the probability of evil ramifications. . . . The decisive means of politics is violence." So long as Mao continues to believe that "political power comes from the barrel of a gun," 'good' (read non-violent) means can produce nothing but catastrophic results for American security. The AFSC accuses the United States of assuming that the Commu-

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nist government of China understands only the language of force; but what other inference can be drawn when even Mao's poetry contains the metaphors of war. (The Ch'en biography contains thirty-seven of Mao's poems.)

In emphasizing what the implications of their view of human nature for American policy are, the Quakers have disregarded the impact of the nature of the present Chinese government. In the final analysis, the people of China, and of the United States for that matter, are only relevant to the extent to which they influence the behavior of their leaders. Particularly in a totalitarian state such as Communist China, policy discussions must take the peculiar nature of the leadership, namely of Mao, into account. Jerome Ch'en's *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* serves as a useful portrait in this regard. Two aspects of Mao's biography emerge as especially important to his foreign policy; he is a nationalist who places great emphasis on military considerations, and he is a man willing to negotiate and compromise when he feels it to be in his interest to do so.

Though Ch'en's book deals primarily with Mao's domestic practice and theory, the implications for his foreign policy are obvious. The author warns of the danger of considering Mao's doctrine to be completely peasant-oriented. It was "the establishment of rural bases and the build-up of a peasant-based Red Army" that was Mao's emphasis and his great contribution. In the debate with Li Li-san over the traditional doctrine of proletarian leadership, Mao clearly stressed the importance of the peasantry; but the peasantry was largely useful in supporting the army. "Every communist must grasp the truth: political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. . . . Everything has been built up by means of the gun. Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun." As a progeny of the marriage of Marxist-Leninism and the traditional pattern of Chinese peasant revolts, Mao's thought binds political power and physical force inextricably together, at least "as long as imperialism and feudalism remain."

But this is not to say that Mao is merely a dogmatist who understands only brute force and cannot be dealt with except on the battlefield. Mao finds no solace in abstract doctrine. As Ch'en puts it, "Mao is definitely utilitarian, having no patience with learning that has no practical value." He understands the utility of com-

promise in the proper situation. The Second United Front, nationalist coalition established by Mao with the moderate KMT (Chiang Kai-shek) against the Japanese in the War of Resistance amply illustrates the point. He even adopted a moderate land reform to stabilize the coalition by not alienating the support of the rich peasants and the small landowners. In all this we see him to be flexible and calculating; such a man can be negotiated with.

A *New China Policy* calls for negotiation over a wide range of issues including the Taiwan problem, recognition and admission into the United Nations in conjunction with a massive educational campaign to inform the American public of the realities of China. These are valuable suggestions, but the Quaker political style, based on a rather simplistic moral concern for human life, cannot effectively handle the realities of Chinese doctrine and foreign policy. Mao understands force and national interest, though in his case national interest has the distinctive internationalist tinge of world revolution. Combining AFSC's emphasis on education and negotiation with a more realistic appraisal of power politics, a new group, Americans for Reappraisal of Far Eastern Policy, has been formed. Without asking for or expecting "trust and confidence," ARFEF calls for the United States to "announce its readiness to negotiate towards the recognition of the People's Republic of China . . . [and] towards the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. The United States should declare its readiness to join China in projects of mutual advantage and concern, including establishment of controls over the production and testing of nuclear weapons and the end of special restriction on trade, communications and exchange of personnel." The United States and China can certainly trust each other to act out of self-interest and on that simple basis much can be accomplished. To use Senator Fulbright's apt phrase, we should seek to establish "competitive coexistence" with China, working toward the type of relatively stabilized relations we presently enjoy with the Soviet Union.

—MITCHELL COHEN

Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. Grove Press (New York), 255 pp., \$5.

A persistent problem among the new African nations has been their seeming inability to escape the era of colonialism: the constant references to the necessity for 'total independence,' the militant 'pan-Africanism' of its leaders, and the continuing denunciations of Europe and its works, betray the existence of a heavy historical burden. The debate in Africa today is essentially over the meaning of the colonial period, and indicates that African leaders have not yet come to terms with their origins.

That the origins of the new Africa are almost exclusively colonial cannot be doubted. The 'native,' as Frantz Fanon tells us, is a 'creation' of the white man; likewise, the native's country is a creation of the colonial powers, a political entity that did not, in most cases, exist before the 19th century, and one which often includes fantastically diverse elements. Africa doubts her paternity; it is this ambivalence which informs the search for a new political culture for Africa, and for an understanding of what colonialism has done to its children.


Today that search takes the form of a debate over the form and function of government. Who is the state responsible to?; what is the nature and purpose of leadership?; what is the nature of sovereignty, and how can it be reconciled with 'African unity'?; how can the state fulfill its economic and political promises without becoming beholden to white creditors?

The Wretched of the Earth is a discussion of the nature of colonialism and the violence it calls forth, and the effects of both upon the culture and politics of Africa. Fanon was an Algerian psychoanalyst; his work was the product of his experiences in treating the victims—both French and Algerian—of the Algerian war, certainly one of the most bitter and protracted of the colonial conflicts.

Violence, like everything else during the colonial period, is created by the master-slave relationship which supports the system. The colonial system is above all else an artificial one, where two essentially symbiotic classes do battle: the settler and the "national bourgeoisie"; the latter is a class which includes all those who have "come to terms with" colonialism—the intellectuals, the merchants, petty industrialists, and city-dwellers in general. The national bourgeoisie is a symbiote of colonialism because it was created by the West, and because it constantly tries to ape Western values. Its goal is not national independence, but the expulsion of the settler, who has become a barrier to its further aspirations.

Beneath this battle of Tweedledum and Tweedledee, the mas-

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of people grow restless. While the "responsible" leaders of the national bourgeoisie advocate non-violence, the peasantry comes to understand that violence is their only alternative, for only violence will give them what they want most: dignity. Violence is the reaction of a humiliated majority who want more than anything else to retrieve their manhood. The minimal demand of a peasant army, says Fanon, is that "the first shall be last and the last . . . first," a clearly non-political goal which the colonial government would probably grant if it did not undermine the psychological position of superiority which is the white settler's only bulwark.

The national bourgeoisie, once it has led a successful colonial rebellion, begins to imitate the manners and ideas of their Western counterparts, but, unfortunately, in the wrong context. The behavior of the Western middle classes arose, Fanon argues, in response to very specific conditions, conditions which have not been duplicated in Africa. The native bourgeoisie takes the place of the white bourgeoisie but lacks the latter's most important asset: money. Fanon argues that since it is the historical function of the middle class to spark economic activity, the penniless African middle class is literally "good for nothing," and ought to be abolished at all costs. Fanon predicts that the African middle class will go the way of the colonial governments: lacking any support among the people, and devoid of any historical mission, the national bourgeoisie will come to rely more and more upon naked force to maintain its position; will foment divisions among the people based upon religious and tribal conflicts; and will eventually find itself completely dependent upon the former "mother country" for support. As the people become more dissatisfied, the black bourgeoisie becomes more frightened, more dictatorial. One-party states appear, with charismatic bourgeois leaders at their head, and the bourgeois state eventually sells out to the West in order to shore up its weaknesses at home.

The bourgeois phase of African government is thus only a temporary one. Convinced for generations of their own impotence, the colonial peoples discover their manhood in participation: in attendance at meetings, in carrying out projects during the war, even in killing. But because of the dominance of the Westernized elements, the participation of the peasantry is at first mainly superficial: the city distrusts the country, partly because it shares with the West the distrust of 'natives.' Nothing, however, can hold the people back once they have discovered their potential. Participation in the colonial war—i.e., violence—raises expectations, and increases the political sophistication of the masses. Consequently they await the arrival of the benefits independence is supposed to bring. All over Africa, says Fanon, the masses of peasants are discovering that the ascendancy of the national bourgeoisie has done little to change their condition: they will wait only a short while longer before taking matters into their own hands.

Fanon is not entirely unaware of some serious problems in this situation. The violence of the colonial period begets the violence of the war of liberation. If this is true, we might ask what the violence of the war of liberation will beget. Fanon the psychoanalyst provides the answer: the habit of violence only begets the expectation of still more violence in the future, and the willingness to hasten its arrival.

If the intensity of the colonial war raises the political sophistication of the masses, it also raises the level of their expectations. The period of independence might be likened to a political 'hangover,' anti-climactic in nature and peculiarly frustrating to those accustomed to flag-waving and *camaraderie*. This problem is further complicated by the new state's need for legitimacy and mass support: the masses, used to much more than dreary 'state of the nation' reports, want *color*.

Now, any political leader must constantly repress the tendency toward excessive cant; it is hard enough for a leader of a 'stable' Western nation to resist appeals to the greater glory of the Volk. The temptation is doubled for the leader of the African nation, for there is little else, at this early date, to appeal to: no grand traditions, no glorious accomplishments other than the fact of independence, no *history*. Fanon contrasts the psychology of the charismatic African leader with that of the bourgeois political figure of the West. The latter's power rests upon rational economic foundations; the bourgeois African leader, lacking any economic background, shores up his rule by appeal to "moral force," a tendency which is all the more tempting because of the experience of charismatic violence during the war of liberation.

The nationalism of the African bourgeoisie is a direct product of this appeal to "moral power" and the glory of the war of liberation. To Fanon, it is a fake nationalism, one that eventually degenerates into out-and-out racism. The nationalism of shop-keepers and

merchants is merely an attempt to end competition: first the Europeans, and then anyone else, including Africans of another nationality or religion, who get in the way of their ambitions. In this project the national bourgeoisie enlists the cooperation of the former colonial powers, who are more than willing to divide and rule. Ousted from the political sphere, Europe returns to power via the economic by providing the ingredient the African middle class lacks: *money*. The purpose and effect of foreign aid is economic domination.

The African bourgeois state, in an attempt to extort capital from whoever possesses it, will therefore adopt a neutralist position in international affairs. Although Fanon points to this extortion as proof of the bankruptcy of African leadership—who he believes ought to try to end the Cold War rather than profit from it—it is difficult to see what other choices are available. All governments are faced with a twin-problem: the need to achieve legitimacy and efficiency simultaneously. A nation must make promises to its people, and it must keep them, for people must feel that they are being ruled wisely and justly. For Africa this problem presents itself in the need for industrialization, a goal to which most of the African governments and peoples have committed themselves in some form or other. And yet Africa has also committed itself to democracy, and democracy, as deTocqueville noted about America, is notoriously inefficient. Inefficiency could be tolerated in a nation like America, which had lots of time to fulfill its promises. In any other situation, when the legitimacy of a regime is temporary at best and depends upon the rapid production of victories, the political system is faced, again in Tocqueville's words, with a choice between "the patriotism of all" and "the government of the few."

Fanon sees the African bourgeoisie as vulgar and opportunistic. The people are learning, he says, that business is synonymous with "robbery." As vulgar as the middle class might be, it might be asked what will happen to a nation that discourages the habit of capital accumulation. America tolerated the "bourgeois" Federalists, who understood what poverty does to a nation's political culture. It was a prosperous and growing nation that the Jacksonians inherited, as much as they might have inveighed against "businessmen." For some reason Fanon does not think the European middle class was "vulgar and opportunistic," but on the contrary, that it was dynamic and inventive. That middle class had a "place" in history; the phase of the African bourgeoisie might just as well be skipped.

But Fanon gives our own middle class too much credit. A steady succession of intellectuals—from Ibsen, Chekov and Yeats in Europe, to Faulkner, Steinbeck and others in America—have appeared to denounce the Western middle class for its vulgarity and degeneration. Jean-Paul Sartre (in what is, by the way, an incredibly silly preface to Fanon's book) declares that Fanon and Africa are not interested in Western values or Western precedents; Fanon himself exhorts his fellow-Africans to find a "new way" rather than imitate the Western past. But similar conditions call for similar developments. Africa—just as much as Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, and America in the 19th—must create an economic system that will mobilize and feed the millions who are now idle and hungry. The revolutions made certain—if anyone needed reassuring—that these people will not be content to live in the fourth century. Africa may some day be in a position to dictate terms to the rest of the world: stranger things have happened. In the meantime, Fanon's advice to avoid foreign entanglements sounds as irrelevant as Washington's similar advice to the Americans. Ironically, the African unity which Fanon so passionately advocates will be impossible until African leaders do what he insists they must never do: sell out. The poor and jobless, when they have no other accessible enemy (and Europe is hardly accessible to the average Congolese), will turn against each other (as they have already done in the Congo). The function of the African leader is to find for his people what they most desperately need: a political culture and the substructure to sustain it. The function of the people is to make sure that the price is right.

—DENNIS HALE

Otto Klineberg, *The Human Dimension in International Relations*. Holt, Rinehart & Winston (1964), \$2.95.

Among the considerable body of literature explaining International Politics by "observing the manners of men" is Otto Klineberg's book *The Human Dimension in International Politics*. This book and the others like it, conscious of the danger that the

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present international system presents to the survival of mankind, insist that "whether or not the danger is to be averted depends on the decisions of human beings, and that as a consequence an understanding of the factors influencing such decisions is absolutely imperative" (p. 1).

The titles of the chapters indicate immediately Klineberg's approach: "The Minds of Men," "Pictures in Our Heads," "I Hate Everybody," "The Character of Nations," and "The Meeting of Minds." Klineberg's conception of the psychological factors that separate men may be divided into two categories: *images* (what stereotypes influence the relation of political leaders and thus affect international relations) and *interactions* (what patterns of culture so influence a nation as to make it susceptible to starting a war).

Images. Klineberg distinguishes two basic types of images in international politics. First is the prevalence of stereotypes due to childhood training. This image (as exemplified by Adorno, et al. *The Authoritarian Personality*) presupposes the existence of a coherent set of attitudes (eg., anti-semitism, ethno-centrism, conventionalism) which generally revolve around a definite relation to certain patterns of authority, in this case childhood experience with a harsh authoritarian father. Here a "bad personality" can cause international tension. The second type of image is associated with writers such as Erikson and loosely may be termed "projective." This involves leaders projecting certain unfulfilled elements of their personal psychological development into the political arena. Thus for Erikson (and also for Klineberg), Hitler can be understood—at least in part—as the "unbroken adolescent" who projects his internal anarchy and need for authority on the German nation. German people in the Nazi era being receptive to this appeal due to the first image, thus are explained by "the fact that they were led by sick men" (p. 65).

The bad effects of the images that men have can be summed up as follows: (a) They lead to rigidity; leaders tend to see events and other people in the light of certain pre-formed and sub-conscious categories which result in "irrational behavior." (b) There exists a "tendency to projection" which often results in the formation of mirror images about the opposition. Truth is thought to lie solely on one side. (c) There arises a sort of mutual stimulation by means of which everything that the other side does is seen as a blow struck against oneself.

The Interactions. This type of analysis is based on understanding the "pattern of culture" that a country may have and its effect upon that country's predisposition towards war. Klineberg cites Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* which, although "unsupported by data," indicates possible cultural causes of war. He is cautious as to any definite conclusions about the "psychological characteristics of nations," preferring to rely upon probability statements. Still one would imagine that he would welcome such studies as Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* as a step in the right direction. Although the relationship between cultural stereotypes and foreign policy may be circular, "its exact nature will be determined by the characteristics of the society" (p. 101).

Based on this analysis of the major sources of war and tension in international politics, Klineberg advocates a variety of solutions based on removing the factors which create misunderstanding. He recognizes that the facts available are often insufficient to warrant general conclusions as to cures for the evils of the international system and calls for more studies. Taking this into account, we must still ask what are the assumptions behind cures such as "the exchange of persons across national lines and the increase of factual information" (p. 121). They seem to be three: First, understanding will lead to peace; if only we knew more about other societies, this would promote peace. Yet, this ignores the fact that ignorance of true intentions often breeds prudence. One could argue that if we were truly aware of the intentions of the Chinese, war and not peace would be promoted. It also ignores the fact that conflicts of interest indeed can be quite rational. It is hard to argue that increased knowledge of each other's society and its intentions would have stopped the Franco-Prussian War, let alone the Second World War. Both were cases where one side wanted what the other side would not give it.

The second assumption is that increasing democratization will shape nations so that they naturally turn towards a more peaceful settlement of international problems. This is hinted at throughout the book; such a solution is the logical extension of the belief that nations often tend to go to war because of their patterns of culture. Presumably if all nations had good patterns (open democratic ones), war would be averted. While this may be true, the problems of ever realizing such a solution are obvious; furthermore, political democratization may, in countries unaccustomed to such a policy, create a power vacuum which precipitates conflict. It is hard to

argue that the injection of democracy into, say the Congo, helped the stability of the international system.

The third assumption is that cooperation is possible. Klineberg takes hope in the fact that, despite the record of hatred, wars and irrationality that history displays, "agreements have occurred" (p. 144). Here he puts faith in the hope that by providing insight and information the psychologist can modify attitudes in a "constructive direction." Most of the proposals put forth are, as Klineberg explicitly acknowledges, based on "group dynamics." Hope is placed in various styles of negotiations as being more conducive to agreement and to the fact that there now exists a common aim of all men in politics: world survival. While no one would deny the reasonableness of this latter statement, nor the potential aid to be drawn from the first, the fact still remains that Klineberg does not seem to be conscious of a basic fact of international relations, namely real conflict does exist and some of it is predicated on well reasoned and mutually incompatible principles. Whether or not the nations of the world will be rational enough to recognize a situation in which their mutual survival becomes a primary concern is an important question. This, however, is not something which is promoted by the "incremental method" of negotiation that Klineberg advocates; nor is it something of which the major powers can be said to be unaware. The international game is such that this factor must constantly be evaluated in every major crisis. International politics is, unfortunately perhaps, not an exercise in group dynamics. There is never any agreement on the rules.

In addition to the flaws pointed out above, the psychological approach seems also to contain the following drawbacks: First, it tends to pay merely lip service to the fact that images are formed by things other than psychological training and childrearing; economic and social factors—not easily changes through education—are also important. Second, it tends to minimize the impact of ideology on behaviour. Since ideology is formed by the total social experience, it can only be called irrational in terms of criteria which are outside the possible cognition of the ideological actor. Any political experience can thus be consistently interpreted along a given line of rationality. Third, this approach, finally, tends to overemphasize the inflexibility in political behaviour. Psychology does not define, but rather limits the range of possible behaviour. Thus all that Adorno's or Fromm's studies of the "authoritarian personality" show is that it was impossible for Germany to have had a viable liberal democratic regime. They do not show that Hitler was necessary. To the degree that one emphasizes psychology as the determinant in political behaviour, especially in that of leaders, one tends to forget other possible lines of action open to a society.

As Kenneth Waltz points out in his *Man, The State and War*, "if all men were perfectly wise and self-controlled, we would have no more wars." The point of the above, however, was not to show that every contribution made by writers such as Klineberg is wrong, but rather that it is rendered ineffective by a failure to comprehend the political framework of international action. Nowhere in this book is there an indication that a key factor in understanding international politics might in fact be politics, and that while there are indeed fixed causes of war (stereotypes, instinctual aggression, etc. . . .), there are also manipulable ones. One never finds that Klineberg goes quite to the extreme of specifically asserting that war and peace are not political problems, but ones of individual and social adjustment. However, to the degree which he admits that they are not, his whole approach must be questioned, and his solutions thus become useful only to the degree that someone—possibly everyone—will accept them. Social psychological realism has become utopianism.

—TRACY B. STRONG

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Philip E. Jacob & James V. Toscano, editors, *The Integration of Political Communities*. J. B. Lippincott (1964), 303 pp., \$2.45.

Messrs. Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune assert at the outset of this book that there is "a new urgency to the problem of political integration." City governments are incapable of meeting the needs of their constituents. The economic and social modernization of developing nations demands political institutions which must disrupt traditional patterns of social organization. Technology has given us the means for self-annihilation, while creating new opportunities for communication. Such developments, we are told, should "prompt large-scale, systematic empirical inquiry" into means of integration.

There may be merit to the authors' contention. It is unfortunate, however, that the book which purports to set the ground-rules for this investigation should be so diffuse in its observations, so contradictory in its conclusions, and so incoherent in its use of the English language as to render it useless to any decision-maker in the field. Each of the essays poses an interesting set of questions and offers ingenious techniques in answering them. Relating one chapter to another is a different story. It would seem that the scientists have a few integration problems of their own.

Professor Deutsch expands the opening chapters relating the study of "transactions" to that of integration. The word, "transactions," in this context becomes an oblique synonym for, "correspondence." He presents three hypotheses: (1) The more people correspond with each other, the better they know each other; (2) The better they know each other, the better chance they have of liking each other; (3) The better they like each other, the more they cooperate with each other. Of course, all of this sounds much more authoritative when the words "salience" and "positive salience" replace "know" and "like," but the reviewer must be forgiven a penchant for the colloquial.

A variety of research techniques are suggested to test these hypotheses. We might construct a ratio of local and long-distance telephone calls. Or we might compare place of residence with place of birth. Or we might construct an indifference map which would equate the actual volume of correspondence with the expected volume were such decisions made by chance. Or, ideally, we might compare functional agreements between different pairs of contiguous communities, relate these findings with "other social, political, and demographic" variables, and decide whether people agree more readily with others of similar social background.

Unfortunately, preliminary findings using these techniques refute the hypotheses. It would seem that transactions are not a cause, but an effect—i.e., if communities are homogeneous, their level of correspondence will be high; if not, it will be low. Nor do any of the findings verify the "spill-over" theory, which speculated that agreements in one area would encourage those in another. If accords were to be reached, social composition had to be considered the cause. Indeed, under the circumstances, one wonders the future value of studying transactions at all. Why not study social structures to determine compatibility?

Nonetheless, elsewhere in the volume the authors continue to apply the theory whose empirical validity they question. Teune's discourse on the relationship between learning theory and social science suggests that successful agreements in one area might create a disposition for agreements in other areas, as the protagonists learned to cooperate. Deutsch himself advocates spill-over in urging that a succession of functional agreements is the only way integration can be achieved in a pluralistic society. How one accord creates momentum for another is not indicated, however.

The same difficulties emerge when the authors discuss "The Price of Integration." Here, Deutsch recognizes that the unwillingness of high income groups to finance the poor both domestically and internationally discourages integration between both cities and suburbs, and rich and underdeveloped nations. His suggested solution, however, begs the question of price altogether. The researcher is asked to find all areas in which services might be incorporated to the "mutual advantage" of the two parties. These, in turn, will form the basis of an integration which can be reinforced by—*you guessed it*—the "spill-over" theory.

The problem here should be obvious. The areas of conflict are not those in which both sides perceive mutual advantage, but those in which one side must accept some disadvantage. Deutsch skirts over the dilemma in cavalier fashion: "Of course, there is a presumption . . . that the government is intended to serve the median or average person. . . . Our assumption is not that govern-

ments ought to do anything in particular but merely that we now live in a period where the bulk of the population cannot be neglected." True, perhaps, but say that to someone who disagrees with it. Deutsch claims that the right "price" can be determined for almost anything. Unfortunately, he can muster but one example in human history where such was the case: the Scottish Union of 1707. One suspects that this is meagre empirical data on which to presume a benevolent human nature.

Juxtaposition of selected observations from certain chapters suggests another resolution of the dilemma. Deutsch acknowledges that the political power of the poor is the key variable to determine the willingness of the rich to compromise. Similarly, Teune and Jacob imply that change must be urged by—"deviants"—those whose deprivations encourage the pursuit of new leadership and political institutions. An adequate exploration of the propositions would have considered why the deprived have not united effectively. If the poor are to be the main beneficiaries of integration, should not methods of bringing them together be discussed? This, indeed, was the approach of the Populists in the 90's and the labor movement in the 30's, in creating new areas of federal authority.

The authors ignore the question. Instead, Deutsch proposes a dictatorship of the bureaucracy which presupposes again the necessity of functional agreements and the validity of the spill-over theory. Power within a community is dispersed between constellations of interest groups. Professionals (lawyers, administrators) mediate between these groups. Hence, momentum for integration can be created by expanding the geographical sphere of the professionals, delineating specific problems over which they exercise authority, and encouraging regional agreements achieved in the name of technical expertise.

Only one step is missing from the progression—the public must accept the omniscience of the experts. Unfortunately, Jacob's comments on values indicate that the people will not, when the "bureaucratic norm" negates intense popular preferences. Teune's application of learning theory reaches the same conclusion. No doubt, the Board of Education of New York City, whose racial integration proposals met few huzzahs from either side, would offer a few comments along these lines. Deutsch criticizes planners for insisting that others set goals. His colleagues, however, suggest the reasons why.

If integration is to be achieved, somebody's got to compromise, either willingly or unwillingly. Even though their own findings suggest otherwise, the authors assume that the public is willing—that only the right study wielded by the right professional will be sufficient to assure success. If the public is receptive, however, why haven't such solutions been found already? Why haven't the planners been able to convince large segments of the population in the few cases when they have proposed integration? The scientists provide no answers. Nor do they explore ways in which those who might benefit from integration can organize, even though they admit that within a community, power is the prerequisite of influence. Yet they urge other social scientists to follow their guidelines, whose application would commit the same mistakes, only in greater detail.

Was it worth 303 pages of sentences like "the normative element in human behavior usually emerges in statements that have a distinctive judgmental quality"? I doubt it.

—ED SCHWARTZ

L. J. Lebert, *The Last Revolution*. Sheed and Ward (1965), 213 pp., \$4.50.

Although Lebert is an economist this book is a Christian journalist's analysis of the problem in, and our obligations to, underdeveloped nations. Since the advent of the Peace Corps the United States public is more responsive to, and knowledgeable about, the world situation. In this respect *The Last Revolution* may be somewhat dated. But, like Gunnar Myrdal's *Challenge to Affluence*, Lebert's argument is a powerful one.

The major thesis of Lebert is that the United States has abdicated its obligations to the last revolution, viz, "the creation of a new civilization" in the world. Lebert is not quite sure whether this defection is "willful" and self-interested or whether it is "explained" less by any basic ill-will than by economic and informational problems. At any rate, the author maintains that the U.S. must, for political and moral reasons, adopt a new attitude toward the "emerging nations" and give more concentrated aid.

"Barbarism . . . is at our gates" in the "anti-humanism" of the Marxist-totalitarian ideologies. The U.S. and capitalism in general must impose "on itself the discipline and self-sacrifice which would

motive

place it, as a whole, at the service of the international common good." The reaction to current patterns of American aid is summed up in this statement by a Southeast Asian official:

We asked for hope, understanding and love, and you gave us money and technology. Are these the things which account for your country's greatness? (p. 167).

After seeing Lebret's analysis of the U.S., Soviet Russia and the underdeveloped nations, one concludes that the author is a bad novelist. His characterizations are flat—not personalities, but types. Despite his contradictory statements about U.S. motivations mentioned above, he sees the U.S. as primarily devoted to the expansion of its profit-oriented capitalistic system. The U.S.S.R. is devoted to a hateful, brutal ideology of conquest and control. The underdeveloped nations are the "hurt ones"—innocent babes with only good on their side. This view of things is patently simplistic.

One may well see as much sincerity in the Southeast Asian official's statement as in the Beatles' assertion that "all I want to do is hold your hand." Underdeveloped countries may well hate colonial powers for their exploitative policies of the past. They do envy the height of development which the West has attained and in which they are not sharing fully. But those very same South-eastern nations were once the most developed and imperialistic powers in the world. Moralisms in the statements of underdeveloped nations are no less suspect than our espousal of the White Man's Burden.

When speaking of the U.S.S.R. it is more important to understand the "increase in the number of contradictions both in its own internal system and in its imperialistic structure" (p. 184) than to ascribe absolute duplicity to it. The U.S.S.R. came out of WW II in very bad shape. It maintained its war-time mobilization less to embark on imperialistic policies than to build up its economic and political stability. Like the United States, Soviet Russia adopted a "missionary" and militant creed to justify the sacrifices its citizens were making for national development. Perhaps the "contradictions" in the Russian system are simply signs and products of maturation: they have outgrown the need for certain political gimmicks in the same way that we outgrew the need for "Manifest Destiny" with all its contradictions.

Lebret's picture of the United States also is somewhat jaundiced. The author describes antipathy to America as a product of our "facile dogma of a limited, self-centered form of capitalism" which is interested in "creating a market." The nations to whom we give aid instead of "hope, understanding and love" see our motivations as a function of the American network of strategic bases . . ." Lebret asserts that to Americans these countries "count less as a nation than as a means to American security and prosperity" (p. 155 ff). Not only is Lebret a bad novelist, he also is a weak analyst of political motivation.

It is obvious that the United States is no longer interested in its single purpose policy of containment—that described by George Kennan as move and counter-move. The chess board is more complicated than that as Lebret knows. But what Lebret fails to see is that a country such as the U.S., as the major protector of the West must be concerned with a number of variables. One of them happens to be a "network of strategic bases." Another happens to be the favor of the emergent nations. Yet another, happily coinciding with the first two, is the economic development of the new nation-states.

Lebret's analysis may be compared to the moralistic approach of Senator Morse to the Viet Nam question. As such it does not see both political necessities and idealistic goals as fitting together into an integral foreign policy. France and Great Britain may well spend a greater percentage of their Gross National Product in economic aid than the U.S. But Lebret never asks to what extent this is a function of the more or less protected position both of countries by virtue of U.S. policy.

—G. DONALD PEABODY

Roger D. Armstrong, *Peace Corps and Christian Mission*. Friendship Press (1965), 126 pp., \$1.75.

Charles Forman extols *Peace Corps and Christian Mission* as an "enriching approach to 'the radically new world of secularization, modernization and science, and to the new ways of working exemplified by the Peace Corps'" (p. 13). The Peace Corps represents a new form of missionary work and can be a valuable lesson to the church. It can also be a viable channel for Christian witness, although its religious pluralism renders this testimony ambiguous and partial. Armstrong maintains that the existence of the Peace

Corps means: "the church is now freed to be primarily concerned with meaning—meaning on many levels, but most certainly ultimate meaning" (p. 103).

To understand Armstrong's thesis that the Peace Corps and missions of the church are complementary one must understand his theory of secularization. It is around this that he defines a new role for the church. The author has suggested:

Our society is secular, concerned with human relationships, historical problems, and the question of what it means to be historically responsible at this point in history (p. 38).

The "sign of secularization is the maturation of mankind. With maturity comes the assumption of responsibility for "the mistakes of the past . . . the terror of the future . . . and the consequences of historical decision" (p. 37). The advent of "historicity" (secularization) "undercuts the tyranny of natural determination and grants permission for men to migrate toward an open future" (p. 48). Secularization dissolves the environment of the "religious" man which has been "complete, unchanging, and whole."

Armstrong obviously is maintaining that the transition from pagan Canaan to Judaic Canaan was a process of secularization. This is radically opposed to most current theories of secularization. However, we shall stick with the author and see how he makes out.

Along with Harvey Cox (*Secular City*) Armstrong makes a distinction between secularization (the process) and secularism (an ideology). The latter is the product of a vacuum in which "new values do not replace the old . . ." and secularization itself is raised to the level of an absolute. How the "non-existence of meaning" follows from the secular "historical meaning" which "realizes that the context of meaning is the world of temporality and change . . ." (p. 45) is perhaps only known to Mr. Armstrong.

If the author is talking about the "underdeveloped and emergent" nations then he should know better than to say "new values do not replace the old . . ." His Christian brother, Father Lebret (*The Last Revolution*), knows that the nationalisms of Sukarno and Nyerere are far from lacking meaning or giving an interpretation of the world. They may indeed be false meanings according to the church, but that is something else again.

I rather think that the author of *Peace Corps and Christian Mission* is gyrating around with misunderstood theories of alienation, secularization and secularism. He is desperate, like many Christians at this juncture. The Church has been supplanted in the mission field by a truly "secular" organization—the Peace Corps—with a truly "secular" ideology—humanism.

Albert Einstein has given us a much more cogent definition of secularization than Armstrong. Einstein saw this process as being characterized by the transition from *theonomous* values to *autonomous* ones. If we view secularization in this way then the Peace Corps is perhaps a sign of the death of the "old prophet" (Christianity) and the triumph of the "new religion" (humanism).

Armstrong's definition of secularization is ambiguous. In the second chapter the author has defined secularization in such a way that the Judaeo-Christian heritage, based on the historical acts of God, must be seen as a secular movement. Later in the book, however, he slips into the popular (and more correct) usage of the term "secular" and makes a distinction between secular institutions and the Church. One could forgive this if Armstrong were not trying to justify his avoidance of very tough problems presented by the second usage of secularization.

The author's justification for avoiding these questions is to define the problem out of existence. If one defines secularization in an advantageous way, we need not question nor reject it. Indeed, we must embrace it. Likewise, stealing. If we define stealing as a "reallocation of goods in the society from an area of greater affluence to an area of lesser affluence" then what is so terrible about thievery? By defining secularization in his peculiar way Armstrong avoids exactly those greater challenges of a secular world which he sets out to face.

G. DONALD PEABODY

David Halberstam, *The Making of a Quagmire*. Random House, 1964 (second printing, 1965), \$5.95.

Remember, back in 1962, when disturbing dispatches from David Halberstam in Viet Nam began to appear in the *New York Times*? According to this young reporter, the South Vietnamese had no chance of winning the war as long as Diem, his brother Uhu and



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Baseball players know the meaning of sacrifice
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so do monks keeping their mouths shut forever
nuns sleeping alone.

The choice was easy and the burden light
because the other way was harder than possible.
Nuns are faithful to a husband who is rich
and the monks are partners
to a damned good deal.

That Sir is the point.
We invest ourselves always in some Return.
Sacrifice is a way of winning
and we have misnamed it.

But Sir I wonder
if there is no way I can deny myself
and everything we give we give in trade
what is sin but witless bargaining
and virtue but a good eye for horses
and a taste for mansions.

I am aware things are done in mysterious ways
and only ask.
You will call it doubt
but Sir you would not believe
how very much it seems like the old praise
you would recall from pentecostal days

a confusion of tongues.

—MILLER WILLIAMS

Madame Nhu continued their autocratic and unrealistic conduct of the war.

To Stateside readers, this news was worse than bad. It was a bitter shock. The Eisenhower and then the Kennedy Administrations had all along insisted that the war was going well in Viet Nam. Ngo Dinh Diem was, said *Life Magazine*, the "Tough Miracle Man of Viet Nam." General Paul Harkins, then our top soldier in Viet Nam, had a victory to report nearly every day. At press conferences in Saigon and Washington officials had for years pumped out statistics about huge Vietcong losses and mountains of captured enemy weapons. And more nasty surprises, everyone was assured, were in store for the Vietcong.

From Agincourt to Iwo Jima, war correspondents have traditionally balanced even the grimmest casualty lists with optimism. In spite of heavy losses, the people back home are told, ground has been gained and victory is in sight. But now Halberstam and his friends were shattering this tradition. And they were very possibly undermining public confidence in the war effort itself.

The Making of a Quagmire tells how they did it. They went to where the action was. Again and again the reporters would slog through the rice paddies with the Government troops. Again and again the troops would be ordered to retreat at the first sign of the enemy. Then the Government general would hold a press conference to claim a great victory while the American advisers gnashed their teeth in frustration. The best parts of *Quagmire* are Halberstam's own eye-witness accounts of these debacles.

Soon the high officers of the American advisory group—though not those in the field—were out for Halberstam's scalp. They complained of sensationalized reporting from immature journalists. They resented Halberstam's inside information from Vietnamese officers, Buddhists and plain people about coups threatening the regime. President Kennedy even suggested that the *Times* might want to transfer Halberstam to another post.

So it was a sweet moment for Halberstam when the official American support for the Diem regime began to crumble, and when he received the cable from his editor: STATE DEPARTMENT NOW COMING AROUND TO YOUR VIEW. Soon General Harkins was relieved. The American Ambassador was called home in disgrace. Ngo Dinh Diem and his wicked brother Nhu were abandoned to bayonet squad. Though nobody had any clear idea about who would take their place, the rascals were kicked out. And 20-year-old David Halberstam from Harvard could say he had helped.

But just what had Halberstam helped to do? In *Quagmire*, he says:


We do have something to offer these emerging nations.
We can get things done; given a problem, we react well.
We are prosperous; we have food, medicine and willing technicians of every sort to export.

Many people today question the relevance of many of these objectives in Southeast Asia. In 1962, Halberstam saw that the Ngo family was not interested in accomplishing any of them. So he joined the anti-Ngo side. He became an actor in the drama he was reporting. On more than one occasion, for instance, he knew of plots pending against the regime, yet did not report them to the authorities. He believed that anything would be better than the Ngos and he got his way. Halberstam should write another book today. It would be interesting to know if he thinks the Vietnamese war is any less of a quagmire in 1965.


Quagmire is written with the zest of a young reporter on an assignment he loves. (Though it's a measured zest. After all, Halberstam is a *Times* man.) Viet Nam, he says "was a reporter's dream. It had everything: a war, a highly dramatic and emotional story, great food, a beautiful setting and lovely women." The story we have of the Vietnamese war today is still substantially the story Pulitzer Prize winner Halberstam told us three years ago. True, he backs his case with reasoned and thorough arguments. Still . . . only David Halberstam knows how much of his story is drama and how much is hard, cold truth.

—RAY KARRAS

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monument is artistry

CONTRIBUTORS

J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democratic Senator from Arkansas, is Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A former Rhodes Scholar and university president, Senator Fulbright is noted for his perceptive and civilized critiques of fundamental social and political issues. He introduced the legislation in 1946 authorizing an international educational exchange program that now bears his name.

DONALD GRANT is the United Nations correspondent in New York for the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*.

ROBERT THEOBALD is a British socioeconomist whose recent work has focused on the implications of cybernetics for the societies and economies of both rich and poor areas of the world. He was born and raised in India, holds an M.A. degree from Cambridge, and did postgraduate work at Harvard. In 1957 he left the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in order to devote major time to studying the effects of abundance on the American socioeconomy.

AREND T. VAN LEEUWEN is director of the Kerk en Wereld (Church and World) Institute of the Netherlands Reformed Church at Driebergen in Holland. His recent book, *Christianity in World History*, is evoking wide comment among American readers.

JOHN CLAYTON is in Jamaica on leave from his position as associate professor of Radio, Television and Motion Pictures at the University of North Carolina. His article appeared originally in *New Wine*, a provocative journal published by the Westminster Fellowship at Chapel Hill.

JOSEPH L. ALLEN is associate professor of ethics at Perkins School of Theology in Dallas. His article explores some of the research and discussions which occupied a year of study at the Hudson Institute. This material will appear later in an Association Press book.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI is director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, professor of public law and government, and a member of the faculty of the Russian Institute, all at Columbia University. He is a native of Warsaw, Poland, and his education was received at McGill and Harvard.

BRADY TYSON taught at the School of International Service of American University before taking his present assignment in Brazil. He is now professor at Escola de Sociologia e Politica in Sao Paulo.

ABSALOM L. VILAKAZI is professor of African studies at American University. He was formerly Senior Social Affairs Officer to the Economic Commission for Africa of the United Nations. His article, as well as Arend Van Leeuwen's, was adapted from an address delivered at the Sixth World Order Study Conference, called by the National Council of Churches, St. Louis, Missouri, October 20-23, 1965.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN is currently on leave to be visiting associate professor of United Nations Affairs at New York University. He is regularly associate professor of International Studies at the University of South Carolina. He has lived more than three years in Africa and written four books, and co-authored six others, on African politics.

ROGER ORTMAYER explored Europe and part of the Baltic countries during a recent sabbatical leave from Perkins School of Theology, where he is professor of Christianity and the Arts.

POETS for January: **JAMES HEARST**, ex-farmer now teaching at State College of Iowa, has most recently had poems in *Poetry* and *Commonweal*. **WILLIAM BATTRICK** is a technical writer at

Fort Knox who also teaches evening courses at the University of Louisville. **MILLER WILLIAMS'** work last appeared in *motive* in November. **DAVID SANDBERG** has just moved from San Francisco up into the Sierras, and says he'll "be able to write new fantastic poems as soon as my head clears." His work most recently appeared in *El Corno Emplumado*.

The book review section this month was compiled by guest book review editor **CAREY McWILLIAMS**, who teaches political science at Oberlin College. **MITCHELL COHEN** and **DENNIS HALE** are seniors at Oberlin, and editors of *The Activist*, a national student political quarterly. They are also co-editors of the forthcoming *The New Left: An Anthology*, a Beacon Press book. **TRACY B. STRONG** is a graduate student in government at Harvard. **ED SCHWARTZ** is a graduate student at the School of Communications at New York University and a regular columnist for the *Moderator*. **G. DONALD PEABODY** is a student of theology and a member of the United Steelworkers of America. **RAY KARRAS** is a Harvard graduate, a former radio news editor for the United Nations, and presently writing for a New York ad agency.

ARTISTS for this issue represent diverse concerns and habitats. **TED POTTER** is a San Francisco artist whose one-man drawing show was held in San Francisco in conjunction with the United Nations anniversary events held there in 1965. **ROBERT HODGELL** and **JIM CRANE** are consistent spokesmen for the preservation of humanity. Both these men have enlarged the vision of compassion of *motive* readers for almost two decades. Hodgell, Crane and Rigg (*motive* 's former art editor) now constitute the St. Pete Trio, since they literally are the art department of Florida Presbyterian College in St. Petersburg. **ROBERT FELDMAN** is a newcomer from Berkeley, California. When he is not making award-winning experimental films or working with lithographs, he attends San Francisco State College, where he is majoring in cinematography. **JON ELSE** has migrated from native Massachusetts to adopted California with interim stops at Yale, COFO projects in Mississippi, and SNCC assignments in Atlanta. He describes himself as a "freelance drop-out" since he is going to school part time in Sacramento and working as a consultant in the anti-poverty program. **SYLVIA ROTH** did this drawing originally as the December, 1964 cover for *Africa Today*, a lively periodical devoted to a contemporary interpretation of events in Africa. **SUZANNE WENGER** lives in Nigeria where she has studied the Nigerian indigenous art forms. She is responsible for preserving and stimulating the art forms native to that part of Africa, and has helped in publishing the contemporary art and poetry of Nigeria through the Mbari Press in Ibadan. We hope to do a feature on her work soon. **JOE ALDERFER** has contributed to *motive* frequently. He lives in Scottsdale, Pennsylvania, where he works for the Mennonite publishing house. **BOYD SAUNDERS** teaches art in Southwest Texas State College in San Marcos. **KENNETH KAY THOMPSON** is a new contributor who just graduated from Peabody College in Nashville. He sings and plays bass guitar for "The Remicks," a Nashville "soul" group. **KONSTANTIN MILONADIS**, a Chicago artist, is making his first appearance in *motive* this issue. Though he also works in wood and heavy welding, the Kinetic sculptures featured here are his forte. "Flower Garden I" (p. 12) is from the collection of Mr. and Mrs. Malcolm A. McCannels, Minneapolis; "Totem" (p. 15) is from the collection of Mr. and Mrs. Robert M. Mayer, Winnetka; and "Berry Tree II" (p. 17) is owned by the artist.



WOODCUT: ALDERFER

HEAVENLY PEACE

The Credentials Department at the Celestial Portal found itself a bit harassed by a sudden influx of statesmen. Something got offside on the Planet Earth and the wrong people had been shot, or otherwise erased from earth-type existence.

CELESTIAL OFFICIAL (subsequently tagged C.O.): Credentials please.

U.S. SEC'Y STATE: Here you are.

C.O.: You have no passport, no visa. These are unsatisfactory.

U.S.S.S.: How can they be? They are out of the diplomatic pouch.

C.O.: The what?

U.S.S.S.: The diplomatic pouch. With one of these, we travel freely. Diplomatic immunity.

C.O.: Never heard of anyone having immunity around here, but I'll check. Do you have anything else that might help?

U.S.S.S.: I represent The American Way of Life.

DE GAULLE: (Interrupting) Humph!

C.O.: What's that?

DE G.: I have precedence over this person.

C.O.: You have . . . how come?

DE G.: He is clearly second echelon. I am the head of state; in fact, the greatest chief of state in the free world and the only Western leader worthy of the name.

U.S.S.S.: He actually believes it!

DE G.: (sarcastically) The American Way of Life . . . indeed!

C.O.: Do you have any credentials, sir?

DE G.: I am my own credential.

C.O.: Who authorized you to come?

DE G.: Only de Gaulle authorizes de Gaulle.

HO CHI MINH: (Arriving on the scene) I would like to enter please; but I don't have any credentials either.

C.O.: Another one!

DE G.: I'll recommend him.

U.S.S.S.: You can't! He's a dialectical materialist. He doesn't even believe in this place.

DE G.: (Ignoring U.S.S.S.) Ho Chi

Minh has my personal backing. Let him in.

C.O.: He has no credentials.

DE G.: I said I would supply the credentials.

C.O.: But you have no credentials for yourself.

DE G.: (Obviously irritated) I told you, I am my own credential.

U.S.S.S.: I have credentials.

DE G.: Worthless. They wouldn't even get you into the Peoples Republic of China.

C.O.: Gentlemen! . . . I'll take your cases to the highest authority and see what can be done.

H.C.M.: Marx?

U.S.S.S.: St. Peter?

DE G.: God! Nobody will do but God!

The scene shifts to THE CELESTIAL OFFICE. Enter Celestial Official and St. Peter. They genuflect to God.

GOD: What's the trouble?

ST.P.: Some applicants who claim they belong in our territory, but they don't have the proper credentials.

GOD: Why bother me? The credentials department takes care of such problems. Me . . . I've got creation to think about.

ST.P.: It appears to be a confused situation. One of them doesn't believe in us, but he still wants in; another claims he's on our side, but all he has is something called diplomatic immunity; the other one seems to confuse himself with you.

GOD: Why don't you send them to the other place?

ST.P.: We considered that. But . . . Satan has had it pretty rough lately and this outfit acts as if it would be rather disturbing. Diplomats and heads of state. . . Maybe heaven could straighten them out.

GOD: We're not a redemption institute. That's supposed to have been already cared for. What do we have Purgatory for?

C.O.: The only one who believes Purgatory thinks he's you and has by-passed the place.

GOD: Well . . . if we have to take them . . . what'll we have them do?

ST.P.: I wonder if we could give them a choice?

GOD: Yes?

ST.P.: They can stay, but only if they agree to a solution of their quarrels within 24 terrestrial hours.

GOD: I'll agree to that.

Return to Credentials Department.

ST.P.: Those are the conditions. You have 24 hours.

DE G.: I'll tell them what to do.

U.S.S.S.: Nobody ever told my President nothin'!

H.C.M.: I'll have to ask Mao.

Their voices rise in decibels as they quarrel. No one listens to another until a cloud of smoke blows upon them.

DE G.: What's that?

U.S.S.S.: Smells as if something's burning.

ST.P.: I just got word. The smoke is from that miserable planet of yours.

H.C.M.: Burnt?

ST.P.: Completely.

U.S.S.S.: Doesn't seem to be much left to fight about.

ST.P.: Problem solved. Here are your permits.

U.S.S.S.: Humph . . . Well, anybody for a game of pinochle?

DE G.: Baccarrat!

H.C.M.: Mah-jongg!

They fight over what game to play. God looks in on the scene, calls St. Peter over.

GOD: Throw them out!

ST.P.: Now?

GOD: Now, and all the way. And change the sign from Celestial Portal to Heavenly Peace. I don't want any more wanderers mistaking this as the location for one of their disarmament conferences.

—ROGER ORTMAYER