



**motive**

Compliments of the  
Colgate University Church

**march 1962**

# Motive

MARCH 1962

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**FRONT COVER ART: RESURRECTION** by MARGARET RIGG, oil, 16"x16", 1961. A painting of the inner resurrection which flashes up out of the depths of blackness (of our inner deaths)—not a resurrection event of past history or of some vague time beyond history, but resurrection here and now which makes our life authentic and whole.

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## **A SPECIAL ISSUE: psychology, psychotherapy and theology**

*"Special Issues" generally achieve the opposite of what was intended. It is often assumed, by editors as well as readers, that by devoting an issue of a publication to a special theme, we thereby present a systematic, balanced summary of all that we need to know about a subject in order to be "well-read, well-informed, and up-to-date on the very latest." But these questions aren't resolved automatically by taking a course, reading the latest book, or publishing a special issue. The relevance of what is said or read can be radically altered by the momentary shifts in our kaleidoscopic setting.*

*Why, then, a special issue? Our concern was to ask persons who are working creatively with some significant concepts which are of mutual interest to psychology, psychotherapy and theology to express via motive their insights and explorations. This special issue on PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THEOLOGY does not attempt to present "all sides" of this vast area of inquiry. The content is exploratory, partial, and perhaps even fragmentary. The approach here is personal and specific, but the impact seems to us to be universally relevant to our contemporary search for meaning.*

*The impact of the Freudian revolution is assumed as part of the given of our age. Yet, many in our psychology-conscious age have thought this revolution to be a phenomenon which could be categorically defined, and summarily dismissed as the "work of the Devil." This revolution is heralded by some as being helpfully cathartic, and ridiculed by others as being dismally abortive.*

*One of the important questions which must be explored by those who read this issue is "What is salvation?" Various religious answers have been posited to this fundamental question in man's life-long search for ultimate meaning. Orthodox concepts of the nature of man and God have evolved from countless attempts to make systematic our experiential understanding of cosmic forces. This issue provides no formulae for discovering meaningful answers to our soteriological questions.*

*And thus, we are confronted by this search for meaning—our own self-identities, our community values, our cultural reformations. This exploration demands a continual conversation with psychologists, psychotherapists, theologians, cartoonists, artists, and the beings within ourselves.*

—B. J. STILES



WOODCUT BY OTIS HUBAND, JR.

# another night, another dying

BY VINCENT HARDING

**T**WO days after Christmas last year, all the tired men had returned to the grey cement barracks from a long holiday pass. Lights were out by 10 o'clock and after a few whispered words, the cadence of heavy breathing filled the long squad room.

Dim arenas of light from two road lamps reflected off the winter-white ceiling of the room; once in a while, a new, flickering brightness up there marked the motion of a passing car. It was cold outside, and the lonely silence of an army night was broken only by rushing motors and the occasional report of a weapon fired into the colder blackness of night training. Shortly after 1 a.m. the silence seemed intensified and stifling. The sound began.

Somewhere near the center of our room I heard pieces of metal being struck together. At regular intervals the noise came again, metal to metal. In the quiet of that dreamers' bay such a sound might have been expected to echo, but not so. Every two seconds the lonely beat fell, almost lost in the darkness, nakedly alone in its disquietude.

A second metallic voice came from near the door. First it was a faltering counterpoint, but before the end of a dozen striking notes there was unison—such a unison as to make it seem but one sound again. It was hard to know the origin of the third, because it picked up the beat almost at once, and a fourth and fifth followed closely. These atonal impositions on the silence of the night came like players in a relentless game of tag. Soon, with fewer pauses each time, the bloated darkness almost burst with the dull, tuneless ringing. By 2 a.m. each of the double-tiered bunks had become a part of the jangling whole.

It now seems natural to recall that Steve Daly's place was the last to join the chorus. A short, blonde kid from Newark, we called him "R.A." He had found a home in the army and was going to stay for twenty years, we would say. He always laughed at that, but never stopped spit-polishing his boots and shining his brass. The silence that came from his bunk was as clear and as lonely as that first beat in the darkness. Finally, the troubled peace ended in a loud, discordant clash. Then there was unison again.

I'm still not sure why I had not tried to get up before, but it was not until the last bed had been violated that I moved the covers back and tried to slip out from between the sheets. I felt the pain in my

right ankle, and when I tore the bedding away I saw the chain and the hammer next to it. So it must have been I who started the scream. Perhaps it was as much a reaction to the discovery as an attempt to awaken the men who slept while swinging hammers in their hands. I did not mean to scream; I wanted only to shout some loud and startling words which would bring at least my bunk-mate to his senses. (I confess now, too, that I had hoped the sound would waken me from the terrible darkness.) With the crying breath forced from my mouth, all other noise stopped; the hammers were placed on the beds. So I screamed (I wanted only to shout) again. The man in the bed below answered me with the same dull, unbelieving cry. Again the sound was torn from my throat; again he replied. We were met in turn with a desperate parroting from every bed. And once more there were no men who called out in separate, rebellious voices: every two seconds the now-joint sound came. It is hard to say whether it was hysterical, angry or what. Only this: it was as close to being a silent scream as anything I have ever heard.

When the first daylight filtered through the screens and blinds, only a sullen sobbing remained. It was as regular as if a platoon sergeant called the count. Then somewhere far off in the cold, new light, a tired man moved a switch and the recorded notes of a bugler's reveille struck through the morning. The sobbing stopped at that moment. It stopped, that is, except for Steve Daly. He beat with hammer against the chain once more and screamed and sobbed and lay sighing.

The Charge of Quarters turned on the lights at 6 o'clock; when he walked through only the cadence of heavy breathing filled the room. He knew nothing of the night. Later, in latrine mirrors, men saw the tear stains and quickly washed their faces. Dressing for breakfast, they spoke softly or not at all, as if they were tired and worn.

By noon, though, there were no signs, and no more was remembered until last night when I heard a man shout in the night. He had forgotten, and had tried to step out of bed into the darkness; he found the chain, hurled a woman's name into the night, and fell into a sleep of heavy sighs again.

# ON BEING HUMAN--

## FIVE LITTLE WORDS

BY ARTHUR L. FOSTER

**W**E are passing through times of great despair about being human! This disenchantment with ourselves has followed hard on the heels of a starry optimism about man.

Philosophers in 1900 thought of man as moving ahead, according to a view of irresistible progress. Theologians spoke of bringing the kingdom of God to pass on earth in their generation. Every day in every way man was getting better and better.

Sigmund Freud through his research exposed the dark, shockingly irrational side of man. He helped puncture the idealistic illusions about man. Yet even Freud contributed his share to false hopes for man. Writing in the early 1930's, he visualized man as moving nobly forward in a disinterested search for truth and reality through psychoanalysis and scientific method. Freud scarcely prepared us for the "shock of recognition" that came to our generation—namely, that science and method are not unambiguously good. Science and technology were utilized by the Nazis for the efficient mass-production of death. And this happened in the most advanced, religious, scientific and culturally developed (art, literature, music, theology) nation of its time!

motive

The principles of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy also make it possible, systematically and scientifically, to manipulate, regiment, or destroy personality. Brainwashing is a case in point—men are depersonalized and turned into puppets who dutifully and idolatrously bow before the false absolute of the state. The brilliant mind of an Einstein blazed a mathematical trail into the heart of the secrets of the universe; yet in 1961, Nehru walked out of the Kremlin speaking these words of pathos:

*The foul winds of war are blowing. I cannot understand why man should do this to man!*

Thus, in our day the greatest irony is accomplished. Just when we have come to know the most about man, we have become the greatest peril and problem to ourselves. We are forced to reflect on who we are, and to what we are committed as human beings. Threatened with meaninglessness, we are driven to ask fundamental questions about our nature and destiny, about the meaning of our lives.

We all participate in crises of values, meaning and identity. Lest we become overpowered by our dilemma, it is helpful to remember that such shaking of the foundations has happened before. It was the end of the world for the devout Jews when Jerusalem was destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar in 586. Imagine how the Romans felt as the structure of law and values crumbled under barbarian assault, after a thousand years! Conceive of the loneliness of Luther who dared to stand out as a new kind of man against the weight of the Holy Roman Empire. Then there was Pascal, mathematician and thinker, contemplating man. Is man a reed—a thinking reed—capable of unique grandeur and profound misery? And, of course, the gifted, solitary, neurotic Kierkegaard, rejected by his own time, but discovering and expressing an understanding of selfhood which was a hundred years ahead of his time. Nor should we forget Nietzsche, sickened to psychosis by the bourgeois conformity and moralistic ethics of his day, proclaiming that God is dead and calling for a transvaluation of ethics and the emergence of supermen who could be their own gods. Little did he know that he was spawning Adolph Hitler, the superman and demigod of "blood and soil." These crises, personal and corporate, carried within themselves both promise and peril, just as our crises do. Individuals and cultures have faced such turmoil as ours before; yet we must find a way through our special, horrendous dilemmas as responsibly and reflectively

as we can. We are all, already, so engaged. There is no exit!

We have learned from astronomy and physics that the notion of purely objective observation is an illusion. The observer participates in his observation. As a valuing, choosing being with peculiar sensitivities and blind spots, he influences every measurement. Similarly, in psychotherapy, the ideal of a detached, aloof, Olympian, invisible healer is being replaced by that of the participant observer, the one who is transparently real and who at appropriate moments is engaged in real encounter in a genuinely personal relation of dialogue. The psychotherapist's selfhood is the chief vehicle and resource of his healing work. The therapist can no longer be conceived (if he ever was) as being the spectator "out of this world" of the patient or client but rather as one who is personally caring for the other and receiving him, just as he is. This shift means that the therapist is more transparently visible, less protected, and more exposed, as a human being. It also means that he is driven to examine, even more, the values and ultimate concerns by which he lives.

**T**HIS is at least part of the reason for the surge of interest in philosophies of human nature, in existentialism and in religion. We are giving explicit attention now to presuppositions that were formerly smuggled into our psychological and therapeutic theory and research. For example:

**Why should a man be accepted rather than rejected?**

**Why should we treat persons as subject? Why not as objects to be manipulated?**

**Why are we committed to democratic valuing of man rather than creating a *Brave New World* where everybody is a serene, adjusted, happy man?**

**Can we adequately understand man by a machine or animal model? Do the organismic or field theory models allow us to comprehend man, aright?**

**Is the study of the personal meaning world of personal selves, the only adequate means for understanding man (phenomenology, existentialism)?**

**Is God the only basis of comprehending selfhood in its highest reaches, as Augustine, Kierkegaard, Buber and Tillich**

declare? "And God said let us make man in our image." Is it a correlate that if God is "killed," the self is killed, or if God is "living," then the self lives?

Are Greek myths (Oedipus, etc.) better than Hebrew myths for understanding self-identity? Should we consider Hebraic and Christian myths seriously before rejecting them out of hand, and turning to Zen Buddhism, Greek mythology, etc.? If one's theistic picture of God is a projection of one's father-image, is one's atheistic picture of "nobody there" a projection of the wish to kill and destroy one's father?

Many sensitive researchers know that such questions can no longer be avoided. The hope for scientific objectivity lies in becoming critically aware of the faith and value-presuppositions, by which we all live and work. These must be subjected to open criticism and judgment. The illusion of detached objectivity must be banished to that special limbo designed for human self-deception. Instead, we seek that "attached objectivity" that comes from aware critical commitment and decision of the self.

But what of those "five little words" in the title? They are five central sentences about selfhood. Each expresses a truth about man and an estimate of man which must be included in any view of man. They are:


\* (My term for that dimension of the self-concept that is meant to deceive oneself and others.)

I think  
I am  
I must  
I can  
I ought

**I THINK.** Who am I? The philosopher-mathematician, Rene Descartes, pressed this inquiry. He, like us, was heavily influenced by Greek philosophy and science. Standing on Aristotle and Plato, Descartes concluded that the central and constituting dimension of man was his intellectual power—I THINK. We see on campus today many persons whose brilliant intellects keep them alienated and who relate to life in defensive, coping behavior. How easy it is to use our reason to maintain a self-decept.\*

For three hundred years, Descartes' concept of man as the "I think" dominated philosophy, theology and psychology until pragmatism, psychoanalysis and existentialism issued their challenge. The "I think" conceives of the self as an encapsulated atom, out of relation with the objective world. It is therefore in an egocentric, individualistic world. And it is a dualistic world with a split between mind and body, and between mind and the world in general. This is mind and a picture of a self that is alienated, out of touch with its body and external events.

In the most exciting book I've read in recent years, *Persons in Relation* (Harper & Brothers, 1961), John



HOW CAN I EVER LEARN TO LOVE YOU WHEN YOU'RE ALWAYS IN THAT SHELL?



Macmurray outlines the damage done by the unconscious reign of Aristotle and Descartes. Macmurray introduces a new understanding of selfhood and of the development of the individual which results when Descartes is reversed and the "I do" precedes the "I think." In this way, the self is a dynamic-centered, initiating agent and process which exists only in the personal field, says Macmurray. This is the self that is becoming, in-relation-to-the-personal-Other, and which never exists for long except in the personal field. This is a relational theory of selfhood, and is quite relevant to the relational universe in which we live since Einstein.



Both are caricatures on being human. Genuine personhood means living one's body life, accepting one's insistent needs and one's limits. It also means willingness to be an imperfect man. No dualism, no immortal soul, no escape from the body is conceived as desirable or possible. To use Gabriel Marcel's words one can even say "he thinks with his guts"—so much are his symbolic selfhood and body in touch.

**I AM.** How often we have heard the cry: "I am nothing," "I'm nobody," "I'm worthless." I can't forget the woman who was puzzled by her lifelong refusal to look in the mirror! Why? Gradually, she discovered that her refusal meant she wished not to be reminded that she existed. She desired not to be and the mirror's reflection would remind her that she was. So both the tragic awareness of not being a self, and the wish not to be a self, are often presented in the counseling process. But what of those electrifying, quiet moments when a person finally says, "I am"? They say it like it has never been said before. One feels he is present at the birth of a soul. What is this mysterious ontic sense of being that only appears in relation with a personal Other? It is a mystery that invites research. It is a mixture of self-discovery and self-creation. It is delight in being (in relation). It is not just communication; it is communion with oneself and the other. It is the fulfillment of a metaphysical quest for reality and yet the beginning of search in a new level of existing. It is hope and sadness, it is realism and repentance. It is being in touch with one's greatness and weakness, with one's virtue and one's guilt. The "I am" experience means to be becoming a self, open to the world, and participating relationally in it. The gap, the dualistic chasm is gone. The formula becomes not "I think, therefore I am" but "I am, therefore I think." "I am" means the overcoming of estrangement through grace and acceptance.

**I CAN.** This is the experience of freedom as a self; always a limited freedom, at best, but real enough so that the strictest scientism cannot make me live as though I believed myself not free and responsible. The "I can" is the sense of potentiality being actualized, of the self's becoming, and of living one's own life purposively.

One of the most tragic human moments is to be with someone facing death, who cries out, "I haven't lived yet; I can't die until I have lived." One is not, indeed, ready to die, when he has lived in the powerlessness and helplessness of the "I can't." Only as the qualitative meaning of "I can" has been tasted can a man say "I am able, not to be." I can consent to die because I have lived.

**I MUST.** Who am I? In Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, the hero speculates as to whether the "I" is not just a "grammatical fiction." When a man is buffeted by compulsions from society, family or from personal drives and physiological needs, he is liable in despair to agree that he is just a fiction. Who am I? Just a "construct," a cork on the ocean of the id, a libido discharger, a high-grade animal, and that's all? And so a man depersonalizes and dehumanizes himself into a machine or an animal.


**I OUGHT.** As one participates deeply in the "I am," "I think," "I must," and the "I can," he is constantly searching for that toward which he ought to move. After the self has rebelled against "introjected shoulds," and criticized the herd conformist morality of his group or society, he still comes back to the question of his meaning. To what am I obligated? What am I called to be? Is anyone calling me? What are the goals and values to which I commit myself? What will my god be—status, income, fame?

Another kind of "must" that can be equally insistent occurs where one refuses to accept his limits as a finite man and drives compulsively on to perfection. He cannot be what he is; he must be a god!

What about the goal of self-realization versus self-giving, of self-fulfillment versus self-sacrifice? Or is this a false antithesis? Is the paradoxical truth of my relational being such that only as I give myself do I find self-fulfillment, and only as I truly find personal fullness do I truly give?

# RECEIVING REVELATION

some theological and psychological perspectives upon processes which are involved in the reception of the Christian revelation.\*



BY MARJORIE L. FELDER

**T**HE Christian community has been given the revelation; we do not seek it in other quarters. We aver that the nature and character of God have been revealed in the life, person and acts of Jesus Christ. The nature of God that is revealed is not his essence, or as he is in himself, but as he is in his dealings with men, and their personal response to him. However, we must ask in every age, how this revelation is to be understood, how it is to be received, and how it is to be communicated. Such details are not given in it. We must seek both within tradition and in the realm of any significant knowledge about man which will throw light upon its meaning.

Psychology is one of the disciplines that can help us understand the processes through which the Chris-

tian revelation is received. We can and must look to such help, and must do so without losing the unique moorings of our Christian faith. In looking at some of the issues involved in discussions of Christian revelation through the ages, we can understand more fully how contemporary theologians approach the meaning of revelation. As far back as Thomas Aquinas, much of the historical discussion has centered around processes of knowing, and has been expressed in terms of "faith" or "reason" with different theologians stressing one or the other of these positions. Both Niebuhr and Temple hold that the

\* For the theological material in this discussion, I am using the positions represented by H. Richard Niebuhr and William Temple. For the psychological factors that contribute to the discussion, I am drawing upon the writings of Harry Stack Sullivan. But the understanding of the relationships between these two perspectives is my own.

reception of revelation does not depend on one aspect of the self such as reason or thought or will or subjective feeling, for none of these would be revelatory of God. Revelation involves assimilation of something "out there" by the "total" man or through the total personality, rather than through some partial or peripheral aspect of man. By the same token, the processes of knowing God are not categorically different from processes of knowing a person, although there may be a difference in quality and in subject matter.

Another issue closely related to this is that revelation historically (and currently, in some theological streams) has been considered a "thing-in-itself" as opposed to a "total event" in which both objective initiative and subjective reception are involved. Again, both Niebuhr and Temple would espouse the latter view. Jesus' actions *plus* the believers' response to him constitute the total event, not one without the other. Our concern here is to explore the processes in which God meets man *today*, the occurrences which have ultimate significance for each person's life, and the events that bring both judgment and new resources, in which man's purpose and meaning are made known.

For Niebuhr, revelation refers to "that part of our inner history which illuminates the rest of it and which is itself intelligible."<sup>1</sup> Jesus Christ is that which is adequate to understand our inner histories, for recalling and assimilating the past in such a way as to achieve unity with ourselves, God and others. For William Temple, who is also pointing to both objective and subjective sides of the event, revelation is understood as "coincidence of event and appreciation,"<sup>2</sup> whether or not these two coincide simultaneously.

Revelation occurs through the personal. A person, with capacities for deciding, choosing, acting in freedom, responding, receives the revelation. Whenever we know and are known, we make personal, valuing, participating responses. We respond as a "whole person" rather than through some one aspect such as heart or mind or will. Revelation comes through persons to us, and our personal response is made to the particular situation and out of our own unique apprehension of it.

We are not, however, responding merely to our own feeling. Revelation has to do with God's disclosing himself, with an ultimate order of existence. Uncalculated events break through the existing order and shatter it in the light of ultimate meaning. God is the source and ground of all that exists. To say that he is personal is not to imply that he is a being alongside other beings. He reveals himself through his creatures in creativity and in re-creativity related to his already established order. It is an order of relevance which we do not make for ourselves, but discover as it is disclosed.


<sup>1</sup> H. R. Niebuhr, *The Meaning of Revelation*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1960, p. 93.

<sup>2</sup> William Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1961. Chapter on "The Mode of Revelation."

IN the revealing of this created relevance, revelation is both judgment and new resource. We are not given new laws, propositions or precepts, but are judged in our efforts to determine our own conditions, and empowered to be delivered from our torturous attempts to live up to some external standard. When ultimate dimensions are revealed in our everyday life, we are in touch with our basic natures against which we cannot go without violating God's creation and our own life. Morality becomes not an attempt to live up to ideals, but a "living out of" one's own depths, created and re-created by God. In the revelatory event, we not only know more fully who we are, but we are more fully able to be that person.

Such revelatory dimensions are everywhere present; God is constantly at work to redeem his people, to bring changes that free us from bondage. Why, then, do we not experience such dimensions so that such changes occur more fully and more often? There are psychological factors present in each of us that are significant for understanding both the processes through which such changes occur, and for understanding why they do not occur more frequently. We come into being as persons and manifest human processes only as a result of many fields of interpersonal forces. A child gains his selfhood only in interpersonal relationships.

Sullivan calls attention to three factors that have particular bearing on the reception of revelation. As an infant grows, his need for love and care and acceptance makes him quickly learn to select and augment those feelings, impulses, thoughts and behavior that will please those who maintain him. His organization as a person, his self-esteem, his evaluation of himself develop out of those aspects of himself that are accepted and will bring him satisfaction. This system of warnings and awareness helps to develop what is known as his self-system. Any infringement of "acceptable" aspects brings on anxiety and a subsequent drop in his feeling of well-being. He tends to think of himself and to behave in such a manner that he can keep anxiety at a minimum. This organization may be tightly or loosely held, depending upon the need for satisfaction, and the amount of anxiety or threat that may be aroused. The relationship between revelation and the self-system may already be apparent. The revelatory event calls for a total response, one that affects the whole personality. When the gospel is communicated, something happens. If it is truly saving knowledge, and is received, the person is not left untouched. It is a message about *his* life, *his* nature, and the meaning of *his* experience. But it is exactly at this point that the self-system casts its shadow. The processes, symbols, signs of warning developed in interaction to ward off anxiety, stop the self from going beyond these notions of itself that have been formed in dynamic interaction. The self-system represents a fragmenting of the total person. Parts of the self



### GOOD LORD! IT'S A FLOWER!

are kept out of awareness by the need for security. One could think too highly of himself (a distortion) or not highly enough (just as much a distortion). Theologically, we would say one is trying to go beyond his own limits (the sin of pride) or one is protecting himself from reaching his own potentialities (the sin of refusing one's selfhood).

Why is anxiety to be so consistently avoided? Anxiety is a threat to our total being. It is a total, pervasive, diffuse and extremely devastating experience of apprehension, uncertainty or helplessness. It threatens our basic security pattern. This is the experience that the self-system functions to avoid. As the child grows, any unacceptable thought, feeling or impulse

that occurs, goes on outside his awareness, because if produced, anxiety enters in and causes disjunctive relationships. He fears losing the relationships necessary to his well-being as a person. The meanings of these "forbidden" experiences are derived from interpersonal responses, and the anxiety can range from mild to stark terror and paralyzing panic. Anxiety is not something to be cured in the clinic. It is inherent in the basic nature of man, precisely because he is free, alone, and must make his own responses. Yet, even as man is alone, he must also be related. If he remains aloof, he loses his selfhood; if he gives up his own responses and his own real inner life, in order to be related, he will also lose himself. The tension between these two poles leaves him anxious. Man cannot know himself unless he is known by another, and that which is hidden about himself must be developed in interpersonal relationships.

When we ask about the revelatory event, and the image of Christ through which we might understand our inner experience, we are standing on the threshold of the channels through which we may touch ultimate dimensions of our experience. The meaning of Jesus Christ, the love, power and good we know in him are most likely to be actualized for us in conjunctive relationships. Yet whatever comes to us as a threat to our total existence causes disjunctive relationships. The anxiety arising from such relationships may cut off the very channels through which overcoming power and love are released. This does not equate the content of revelation with human relationships. We do not infer God from his creatures, but God is met in and through persons. In Luther's words, God puts his Christ in his creatures, who are the *larvae dei*.


**A**NOTHER psychological factor closely related to both anxiety and the self-system is selective inattention. This is the factor of not attending to anything which, if noticed, would have implications for us as persons, and would require some change. We use selective inattention in good cause when we concentrate, for we can shut out irrelevant material and focus upon what is pertinent. But the mischief comes when we fail to attend to factors in situations that are significant to us *as persons*. This kind of attention functions when the self-system is threatened. Factors are simply and smoothly excluded from awareness.

In the revelatory event, we use our freedom to recall the past, to understand it and to assimilate it. Undigested experiences from the past that cause anguish and pain come to the light and we see them in their ultimate meaning for our lives. The *meaning* of the past can change, even though events do not. But when our security as persons is involved, this process comes to a halt. Selective inattention operates to restrict awareness. The event occurs, but the implication of the event, the personal implication, that which would entail some change, is filtered out as if it did not exist. Selective inattention filters out just those dimensions that are of ultimate order, if they are threatening enough to leave the person without any position from which to view himself. Selective inattention works in the service of hidden emotional needs.

These psychological factors cannot be ignored or dismissed as if they did not function dynamically. Knowing about them, and facing and dealing with those aspects of ourselves that we usually hide even from ourselves can be healthy. Sometimes this is enough to break the bondage and allow us to be more open to all levels of our experience. Sometimes we must have help by trained persons, so that we will not be overwhelmed by our own depths faster than we can cope with them. At any rate, wherever changes in the whole person are involved, such factors are at work.

The revelatory event results in healing or transforming of the whole person. Illness, according to Sullivan, deals with that which is exterior to awareness; health deals with communication and perception in interpersonal interaction, with a minimum of distortion. But that from which man needs healing is sin; the Christian faith holds that this is the most degenerative and pervasive illness. The psychologist often settles for adjustment to whatever cultural values are recognized by a person's culture. Health or wholeness from the Christian point of view is faith, which is the opposite of sin; the whole man is he who is free from bondage to any finite or humanly conceived order of value. He is open to the possibilities love demands, when love is conceived of as the ability to be united with another without giving up one's selfhood. In each revelatory moment, inner changes result and these will be changes in the direction of openness to one's depths.





# LET THE HIDDEN BREAK THROUGH

morality and psychotherapy

BY WILLIAM R. ROGERS

**S**INCE Freud first pointed out that the overly strict Victorian moral codes of his day led to severe inhibition, repression, and neurosis in his patients, the idea seems to have gotten abroad that morality is the foe of mental health; and, conversely, that psychotherapy among other things may free man from the "dangers" of morality (which he had always thought were something of a nuisance anyway).

It is true, of course, that Freud thought of the super-ego—the censor or conscience—as a rather irrational and rigid control mechanism, imposing its jurisdiction. And this jurisdiction seemed to be based on regulations assimilated (introjected) quite uncritically from parents or the culture. Furthermore, Freud saw that this jurisdiction, being so completely impervious to the needs of the organism, was sometimes so restrictive of these needs that unnecessary guilt and depression would develop—or else that having remained pent-up too long, the needs would finally explode in a disastrous fashion.

The most recent and somewhat outspoken critic of this theory has been O. Hobart Mowrer (*The Crisis in Religion and Psychiatry*). But much earlier in Freud's own time, Carl G. Jung brought a serious qualification and reinterpretation of the relation of morality to neurosis and psychotherapy. His thought remains crucial to understanding the problem today and deserves our attention.

Jung's interests in morality developed early. His father was a minister in the Reformed Church in Zurich, Switzerland. And Jung saw in this church persons trying to live righteous lives, but who were secretly or startlingly betrayed by their own "unrighteous" outbreaks. "The good which I would do, I cannot. . . ." He saw the violence of a world war erupt and ruthlessly infest the "Christian" nations. In his own clinical

practice he saw the significance of moral distortions as the root of mental illness.

It is not surprising, then, that when Jung began writing about the meaning of neurosis, he thought of it as a moral problem. It is a moral problem, he felt, in the sense that an individual gradually develops a rather rigid conscious "moral" image of himself (related to parental, cultural, or religious standards); and then in the light of this image, he refuses to recognize the demands, impulses, or potentialities of his "shadow" or contradictory side. The refusal to recognize this other side naturally leads to internal conflict or self-division, which for Jung constituted the essence of neurosis.

*Neurosis is self-division. In most people the cause of the division is the desire of the conscious mind to hang on to its moral ideal, while the unconscious strives after its immoral (in the contemporary sense) ideal which the conscious mind tries to deny.*

Thus far, Jung's analysis sounds very much like Freud's understanding of repression. Indeed Jung acknowledged the similarity—Freud was, after all, his teacher. But Jung went further.

Jung came to the surprisingly obvious, but in one way contradictory, realization that one often has a conscious image of himself as *bad* or worthless. And in this case it is the good or worthy side that is unacceptable and must be kept hidden as the unacknowledged "shadow."

*But the conflict can easily be the other way about: there are men who to all appearances are very disreputable . . . but basically this is only a pose of wickedness, for in the background they have their moral (good) side which has fallen into the unconscious.*

In a way this is a corollary statement of the moral problem. The principle is the same—self-conflict in which the conscious image refuses recognition of contradictory (or compensatory) elements—and it is this principle which defines neurosis. But the content may differ. The self-image may be either good or bad, and correspondingly the nature of the unrecognized depths may be either bad or good—it is not always the good repressing the bad!

The implications of seeing neurosis and its relation to morality in this way were obvious to Jung. If, as is surely the case, many people have an image of themselves as weak, negative, or worthless ("moral inferiority" Jung calls it), and if with this, there is a restraint or hiding of good, positive impulses and potentialities; then clearly what is needed is the recognition and release of these constructive resources from those hidden depths. Jung says, in effect, that what we don't know about ourselves—those dark secrets of the unconscious, of which many people seem to be so fearful—may in reality be our strongest resource for

morality, not its hidden enemy. This holds true even if the contents of the unconscious are bad, Jung would assure us; for mature and realistic moral decisions cannot be soundly made even (especially) if these are ignored.

**T**HESSE considerations appear, then, to change the nature of the "moral problem." Perhaps the problem, rather than being one of finding ways to constrict and restrain the unknown impulses of one's depths, is just the opposite—to find ways of allowing these to break through and be constructively utilized.

When Jung comes to talk about "true" or "mature" morality (and concomitantly about recovery from neurosis), he sees the problem just this way. True morality is not seen as torturous (and finally impossible) obedience to any **external** standards—neither cultural or religious codes nor personal ideals, positive or negative. But true morality emerges through one's **own** nature as he is made increasingly aware of his **own** depths, and of the extension of these depths beyond himself—difficult though this process may be.



COURTESY, L.S.A., MADISON, WISC. ARTIST: KATI CASIDA

*(True) morality was not brought down on tables of stone from Mount Sinai and imposed on the people, but is a function of the human soul, as old as humanity itself. Morality is not imposed from the outside; we have it in ourselves from the start—not the law, but our moral nature without which the collective life of human society would be impossible.*

*For a moral man, the ethical problem is a passionate question which has its roots in the deepest instinctual processes as well as in his most idealistic aspirations. The problem for him is devastatingly real. It is not surprising, therefore, that the answer likewise springs from the depths of his nature.*

Perhaps this may look like a dangerous position to take. Are social codes to be disregarded? Anarchy and chaos might result! We are suspicious that while there may be positive potentialities in the unconscious, there may also be destructive potentialities as well.

Jung, however, already takes these questions into account. He does not argue that personal or social standards be disregarded. Rather he asks that in a true morality they be brought together—the conscious standards with their formerly unconscious opposites—so that from this “whole” (health), it will be possible to make mature decisions. “The point is not conversion into the opposite, but conservation of previous values

together with recognition of their opposites.” This should hold true no matter what the content of the unconscious is found to be.

When Jung talks about psychotherapy, then, he speaks of it in this same way: as a process “of conscious realization, whereby hitherto unconscious parts of the personality are brought to light and subjected to conscious discrimination and criticism.” Of course this is difficult because it is precisely this process that the neurosis had sought to avoid by keeping the conflicting claims hidden in the unconscious—though they had only “slumbered restlessly.” But the point for us to note is that, in this view, psychotherapy and true morality go hand in hand. Psychotherapy and psychological maturity are *for* morality, not against it!

This position is not, of course, unique to Jung. It is echoed in the ethic of many contemporary views of psychotherapy in their emphases on self-awareness and self-actualization. But while these emphases in the thinking of A. H. Maslow, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney and others lead toward a generally naturalistic and humanistic ethic, Jung leaves the way open again to go further.

He explicitly refers to a “depth” which extends far beyond the individual's own personal unconscious. And such a depth, even in Jung's perspective, can be understood as extending in the direction of *ultimacy*. This image forms a bridge to the theological considerations of a person like Tillich, for example, who speaks of the religious life and of Christ in terms of transparency to one's depths—understanding this depth ultimately as the Ground of Being, God. Through avenues such as this, Jung's thought on morality and its emergence takes on theological as well as psychological significance and meaning.

**A**T more specific points Jung's thought also has theological relevance. His clinical findings about the type of morality associated with neurosis clearly show the difficulties with voluntaristic or excessively rational theories of ethics. They demonstrate again what has become a rather familiar indictment of “moralism” in the sense of absolutistic, or external authority-vested codes as the main regulators of moral behavior. Yet Jung is both moderate and realistic in recognizing that the conscious appropriation of these codes and ideals is among the factors that are to be taken into account in mature moral decisions. In this he is more profound than those who depict health, or the kingdom of God, as a conflict-free state; avoiding, at the same time, the other extreme of a pessimistic determinism of either a psychological or religious sort.

Jung's considerations of the positive as well as the negative potentialities of the unconscious also lend psychological meaning to a main stream of Christian thought about the nature of man. Man is neither totally corrupt, as some have misused Freudian thought to continue to argue; nor is man totally good, as some ultra-



MY WHOLE DAMNED LIFE IS SPENT IN  
UNSELFISH SERVICE TO OTHERS





liberals and humanistic self-actualizers would lead us to think. Both dimensions are present and must be dealt with as openly as possible in their inevitable tension.

Jung's psychodynamic conception of the way morality emerges has relevance to a Christian understanding of grace. Man does not save himself. Rather, salvation (and health) comes from a dynamic interaction with that which previously has remained hidden and beyond. This breaks in, or "emerges *through*" man; but, at the same time, it does so in relation to his own openness and receptivity—and sometimes with the help of another person (minister, psychotherapist or other).

Finally, an awareness of the emergence of morality as arising from one's depths might greatly affect the ministry of the church. The church, having labored under the doctrine of man's total depravity, the shock of world wars, and the influence of early reductionistic psychologies, has been slow to recognize the growing evidence in psychology and particularly psychotherapy that man's instinctual and frequently hidden life can be trusted and need not be excessively overlaid with external regulators—a point, we may recall, which is not unlike St. Paul's testimony for the working of the love of Christ as over against the restraints of the law. Jung and many since him point to this from a psychological point of view. And it could be the radical opportunity of the church to help free men to a more profound awareness and trust of themselves, allowing into consciousness the hidden and conflicting claims, both of their own depths, and of that which lies beyond.

The references quoted in the text are taken from C. G. Jung, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* and *The Practice of Psychotherapy*.

## no suffering

**T**here is no suffering now.  
We have abolished pain.  
The ills of man have all been done away,  
And teeth and eyes and heart and intellect  
Are medically, and dentally,  
And psychiatrically correct.  
There is no hunger,  
Except for something new.  
No want,  
No unfilled desire,  
Except  
Something to do.  
No people dying in the streets,  
At least  
Where we live,  
And for the hundred neediest  
There's a gift to give.  
But there is death,  
Despite the way we draw  
A curtain on its ugliness  
And hide  
The fact that anyone has died.  
And love  
Which hurt, still cries  
With all the pain of God's creation,  
Adrift upon the skies.  
And self  
At the wrong end of the gun.  
These are poverty and need  
Of a different kind.  
And we are waiting  
For a good Samaritan to find  
The well clothed  
Well fed traveller,  
Distressed  
By the onslaught  
Of his blessedness.

—DANE R. GORDON

# VIKTOR E.

BY ROBERT C. LESLIE



"SUICIDE"

WOODCUT

T. T. BLADE

Since the time of Sigmund Freud the city of Vienna has been linked to the psychiatric tradition. At the time Freud left Vienna to escape Nazi persecution, another Jewish psychiatrist, Viktor E. Frankl, was starting his psychiatric career in the Austrian capital. Dr. Frankl's theories are challenging some of the most basic pre-suppositions of orthodox psychoanalysis in so forceful a way that some see in Frankl a worthy successor to Freud. Referred to as the "Third Viennese School of Psychiatry" (after Freud and Adler), Frankl's work builds upon his Viennese predecessors but goes considerably beyond them to develop a fresh approach based on an entirely different concept of man.

# FRANKL'S NEW CONCEPT OF MAN

THERE have been hints for some years of a growing dissatisfaction with the psychoanalytic view which sees man as caught in the trauma of the past, as bound by unresolved childhood experiences. The whole existentialist mood, in questioning the adequacy of the categories of psychoanalysis for interpreting man's needs in the current hour, has focused attention less on what has happened to one in the past than on what one can do with his life in the present. Among the existentialist voices that have insisted on seeing man as "becoming" rather than solely as "conditioned," Viktor Frankl's stands out prominently. Chosen to write the lead articles for two new contemporary journals in the field of existentialist psychology, Frankl is an acknowledged leader in what Gordon Allport calls "the most significant psychological movement of our day."<sup>1</sup> In America Frankl is known especially for his writing about "the defiant power of the human spirit" as he saw it exhibited and as he lived it himself during two and a half years in four different concentration camps.

Frankl's distinctive emphasis is conveyed even in the term which he has coined to describe his work: logotherapy. The Greek word *logos* is translated neither as "word" (as in John's Gospel) nor as "speech" in the sense of logic, but rather as "spirit" and "meaning." The key word is "meaning." Frankl's view of man is that man seeks primarily neither pleasure (cf. Freud) nor power (cf. Adler) but *meaning*.

The obvious implication for therapy here is that any therapeutic approach which does not take into account man's search for meaning, his meaning-orientation in life, is not adequate to meet man's needs. Frankl designates a sense of meaninglessness as an "existential frustration" leading to a "spiritual vacuum" which then becomes easy breeding ground for any one of many kinds of neuroses. He is convinced that the neurotic problems of our age are more concerned with a life orientation, a lack of sense of personal meaning in life, than with the more familiar defense mechanisms developed, according to the psychoanalytic approach,

<sup>1</sup> Gordon Allport in the Preface to Viktor E. Frankl, *From Death-Camp to Existentialism* (Beacon, 1959), xii.

in the search for pleasure or for power. He finds patients today complaining less about specific symptoms and more about a feeling of inner emptiness, of absence of purpose, of lack of direction.

It is obvious that Frankl believes there *is* meaning in life. His major criticism of existentialism as a philosophy is that, whereas it rightfully stresses man's subjective experience in the midst of life, it tends to ignore the objective reality of values. Whereas Jean Paul Sartre, for example, stresses man's *freedom from* the circumstances of life, Frankl would add a *responsibility to* the world of objective value. All values are relative—not in the presence of the person making the value judgment but in the presence of the absolute value which is God. Imperfection points to perfection, finitude points to the infinite.

It is not enough to assert that there is objective meaning in the world, stemming out of absolute value (God). Man finds a meaning for his own personal life only as he acts in a responsible way, as he commits himself to the search for his personal niche in life, with a basic sense of trust in absolute Being. To find personal meaning in life calls for an action based on commitment rather than on any armchair, intellectual search. Thus to a 17-year-old girl who is confused about life because of her inability to find clear-cut answers, and whose spiritual vacuum is filled with somatic symptoms (heart disorder), Frankl asserts:

*Dedicate your self to the here and now, to the given situation and the present hour, and the meaning will dawn on you. . . . If you cannot grasp it intellectually, then you must believe in it emotionally. As long as I haven't found the supra-meaning and have only an inkling about it, I cannot wait until I am 80 years of age and only then dedicate myself to it, but must rely on my vague inkling and commit my heart in serving it. . . . Intellectual achievement is preceded by existential commitment. Trust in the wisdom of your heart, a wisdom which is deeper than the insight of your brain.*

Frankl does more, however, than simply to assert that life has a meaning and that each person can find the specific meaning which life holds in store for him. This personal meaning can be found in one of three

ways: through creative values, through experiential values, and through attitudinal values. Although most people find meaning through creative accomplishment, this pathway may be denied to some through illness, disability, age, or other circumstances. In this case, the second pathway is open, the realization of value through experiencing beauty or truth or sympathy and through encounter with other persons. Whenever this pathway is denied, values can still be realized through the attitudes that are adopted toward unavoidable circumstances. How one handles his inescapable fate, how one endures his unavoidable suffering, can create values and hence give meaning to life. Frankl describes how these three pathways were experienced by a young professional man who was paralyzed by an inoperable spinal tumor, and hence denied the opportunity to realize any further creative values.

*But even in this state the realm of experiential values remained open to him. He passed the time in stimulating conversations with other patients—entertaining them, also encouraging and consoling them. He devoted himself to reading good books, and especially to listening to good music on the radio. One day, however, he could no longer bear the pressure of the earphones, and his hands had become so paralyzed that he could no longer hold a book. Now his life took another turn; while before he had been compelled to withdraw from creative values to experiential values, he was forced now to make the further retreat to attitudinal values. How else shall we interpret his behavior—for he now set himself the role of advisor to his fellow sufferers, and in every way strove to be an exemplar to them. He bore his own suffering bravely.<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> Viktor E. Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul* (New York: Knopf, 1955), 51-2.



Frankl does not hesitate to point out that there is always opportunity for realizing value, regardless of the conditions of life. It becomes clear that such an approach is a major departure from conventional psychoanalysis. Frankl would agree that repression is often at work in neurotic illness but he would say that what is repressed is the patient's unconscious spiritual needs rather than any kind of instinctual drives. In order to help him to realize his spiritual needs, to fill the spiritual vacuum in his life, Frankl sets about in a direct way to help the patient find his particular meaning in life, correcting, if need be, any erroneous outlook. His approach is implemented by two specific procedures: dereflection and paradoxical intention.

Dereflection is the process of deflecting the patient's attention away from his symptoms by refocusing them on his specific mission in life. Turning attention away from the symptoms, and from an obsessive preoccupation with them, is accomplished as a side effect of finding the personal meaning in life. Whereas most therapeutic procedures center attention on the symptoms, on uncovering their origin in the past or on revealing the extent to which they operate in a person's life in the present, logotherapy reorients the patient toward his life task with the consequence that the symptom becomes an unimportant detail. Symptoms, therefore, are dealt with as indications of failure to measure up to the responsibility of undertaking one's personal mission in life.

**T**O assist in handling symptoms so that they do not occupy the center of attention, Frankl has developed the specific method called "paradoxical intention." This method aims at a change of attitude toward symptoms, at developing a sense of detachment from the symptoms by treating them humorously. The patient is encouraged to intend, paradoxically, that which he has hitherto feared. Instead of fighting symptoms (as the obsessive—compulsive patient tends to do), or of fleeing from symptoms (as the phobic patient tends to do), the patient is encouraged consciously to exaggerate the symptoms. Recognizing that anticipation of anxiety increases anxiety (as in the fear of blushing), the patient is encouraged to wish exactly what he anticipates might happen (e.g., desire to blush) with the result that the wind is taken out of the sails of the anxiety. The patient who fears he will not be able to sleep, who fights sleeplessness is encouraged to try to stay awake, with the result that he becomes very sleepy. The patient who is compulsively neurotic about keeping things clean and orderly is encouraged to become as dirty and disorderly as he possibly can, thus making a joke of his obsessive traits.

The capacity for self-detachment from symptoms is a specifically human trait. It is a part of the human being's capacity for "psychonoetic antagonism," for

exercising the defiant power of the human spirit. There is no symptom so severe, no situation so extreme, that the human person cannot take a stand against it. Even in psychosis the patient can stand over against his symptoms, can detach himself from them.

Frankl frequently combines paradoxical intention with drug therapy, using tranquilizers to quiet anxiety and energizers to mobilize the defiant power of the spirit. Indeed, his major critique of contemporary approaches in psychotherapy is that they do not take into account the full dimensions of human life: the somatic, the psychic and the spiritual. In order to make clear the spiritual dimension within the meaning—orientation dimension (but not necessarily a religious approach to life), Frankl uses the term "noetic"; thus the three dimensions of human life are the somatic, the psychic, and the noetic. Even though any one of these three dimensions may be responsible for a neurotic problem, all three need to be reckoned with in treatment. Frankl points out the fallacy of looking at human behavior as *nothing but* a psychic problem or as *purely* a somatic illness or as *solely* a question of meaning or values. In his own therapeutic practice he employs all three approaches. For example, in the case of a teacher with recurring depressions, Frankl prescribed a drug to deal with a somatic condition, employed psychotherapy to deal with her low self-esteem, and drew on logotherapy to help her to see her depressions as a challenge for her.

*Here was a case where logotherapeutic treatment was necessary. It was the doctor's business to show the patient that her very affliction—these fated recurrent depressions—posed a challenge for her. Since men are free to take a rational position on psychic processes, she was free to take a positive attitude toward it. Her destiny should direct her to the conscious and responsible shaping of her life in spite of the inner difficulties that shadowed it—or, in other words, to the actualization of what we have called attitudinal values.*

Frankl goes on to say that "in time the patient learned to see her life as full of personal tasks in spite of her state of dejection." She eventually wrote to him: "I was not a human being until you made me one."<sup>1</sup>

It is apparent that Frankl reaches out in direct and genuine ways to his patients. Convinced that everyone can be helped, either by recovery from illness or by learning to live with unavoidable suffering, he dares to issue a challenge to live heroically. Making responsible commitment a cardinal feature of his own philosophy, he stands in the Christian tradition which asserts that life is to be found, not as it is anxiously saved, but as it is freely given.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.



# psychology: the problematic science

BY JOSEPH HAVENS

**T**HE science of psychology has reached adolescence. It is in the midst of a critical struggle for self-identity (in what sense is it "science"? what is its legitimate subject matter?); it frequently leans heavily on its elders (physics and biology) and its peers (sociology, cultural anthropology) for guidance and information; and it is still in search of adequate "coping mechanisms" to handle its ever-changing "world" (what methods of investigation are both scientific and yet not overly reductive?). But before attempting any prognoses regarding maturity, it will be helpful to survey a few recent developments.

An important symposium on the problem of motivation and the control of behavior—a persistent and central issue for psychologists—is a good place to begin (APA Symposium, 1958). Neal Miller of Yale reviewed studies attempting to correlate various kinds of changes in the brain or other bodily organs with behavioral change; he deals particularly with the effects of experimental brain lesion, electrical stimulation, administration of drugs, and other biochemical intervention. One recent study (Olds, 1958) will suggest the kind of correlations being made. Dr. James Olds, a physiologist turned psychologist, permanently implanted electrodes in different sections of the brains of rats. Each rat was placed in an experimental situation such that the rat could, by pressing a bar, cause an electric current to pass from the electrodes through a particular portion of the brain. With electrodes in certain areas, the rat received "pleasure" sensations, and proceeded to press the bar many times more frequently than would a rat under normal conditions. With electrodes in other areas, bar-avoidance behavior was noted, and some kind of "pain" stimulus was assumed to occur. Rats receiving pleasurable sensations would endure electric shocks to the feet or learn complex mazes to receive the "reward" of self-stimulation. Such data help us to move toward a unification "between electrophysiological independent variables and standard behavioral dependent variables."

Theory based on the rapidly increasing number of brain-behavior studies such as Olds' has not proceeded far as yet. Perhaps the outstanding psychological theorist in this area is Donald O. Hebb of McGill University (Hebb, 1949, 1958). Hebb's basic working assumption is that mind is an aspect or expression of brain activity. His problem has been to explain psychological "mediating processes" (attention, thinking, memory) which occur between the reception of an external stimulus (e.g., a problem) and a response which may



not occur for hours or weeks later. Hebb suggests a model or construct of "assemblies" of brain cells, in which electric circuits "reverberate" so long as the mediating process is occurring. With an extrapolation of the theory to embrace groups of simultaneously active cell assemblies, such variables as attitude, value, and even "free will" can be hypothetically explained. In a popular exposition of the implication of such views as Hebb's for the traditional mind-body problem, the physiologist R. W. Gerard (Gerard, 1959) states that ". . . it remains inconceivable in the light of our present knowledge that conscious experience can direct the material events in the brain. Rather, the active neurones and synapses seem to be responsible for both behavior and consciousness."

In the same symposium on control of behavior (APA Symposium, 1958), B. F. Skinner takes a decidedly nonbiological and strictly psychological approach to motivation. Taking his leads from Pavlov and early behaviorists he has gone far beyond them both in the range of phenomena to which behavioristic concepts can be applied, and in the degree of control over behavior which can be demonstrated. He has freed conditioning from its narrow Pavlovian framework and demonstrated that almost any response which can be performed at all can be elicited and controlled by proper scheduling of reinforcements. This "shaping" of behavior has been carried on so far mostly with pigeons, rats and monkeys, but Skinner has

written much in lucid fashion indicating its implications and applications for human behavior (Skinner, 1953). He believes that "the world in which man lives may be regarded as an extraordinarily complex set of positive and negative reinforcing contingencies." In *Walden Two* (Skinner, 1948) he has described the fantasied application of the Skinnerian principles of conditioning to create a modern scientific utopia. His *Verbal Behavior* (Skinner, 1957) is a highly ingenious account, based on some experimental data, of the way in which principles of reinforcement and punishment may explain both speech and covert symbolic processes.

The implications of the above for the Christian are too many and too involved to be developed here. Suffice it to point out that a viewpoint of biosocial determinism is maintained by all these writers and that the mind-body problem tends to be resolved in the direction indicated by Gerard. The brain-behavior studies have pointed to a greater role of the lower brain centers in man's "higher thought processes" than we had imagined; Hebb cites studies (APA Symposium, 1958; Heron, 1957) which dramatize how dependent human subjects are on continual stimulation from the outside to maintain their psychic balance. Such evidence seems to favor an image of man as a biological organism, extraordinarily dependent on a favorable electro-chemical internal environment to maintain his sanity and his humanness.

For an ingenious and informed attempt to relate and reconcile the assumptions of scientific psychology with those of orthodox (Missouri Synod Lutheran) Christianity, see the chapters by Paul Meehl in *What, Then, Is Man?* (1958).

When we turn to those psychologists who prefer to start their investigations with man himself rather than the lower vertebrates, and who try to deal with the full complexity of his personality and his peculiarly human behavior, we encounter a somewhat different view. There are of course neo-behaviorist psychologists who extrapolate from stimulus-response theory to human personality; they tend to make the S-R unit of *habit* the "building block" of personality (Dollard and Miller, 1950). Views of personality more congenial to the religious person have grown up particularly around Harvard University. Here the names of Henry A. Murray and Gordon Allport are most well known; both of these men, and many of their coworkers, have insisted on dealing with personality as a Gestalt which must be studied longitudinally (i.e., through years of development, including adulthood) as well as cross-sectionally; and they have tried to correct for Freudian distortions (though, at least in Murray's case, without discarding Freud, Jung, et al.) by insisting on the study of "normal" persons. Robert W. White's *Lives in Progress* (White, 1952) is perhaps the best introduction to this approach. A significant attempt to relate beliefs and attitudes to personality variables with-

in this same general approach to personality is *Opinions and Personality* (Smith, Bruner and White, 1956). Allport's basic theory is contained in his recent *Patterns and Growth in Personality* (Allport, 1961). He deals with the issues of particular relevance to religion in *Becoming* (Allport, 1955) and in his *The Individual and His Religion* (Allport, 1950), a study of "the religious sentiment." In *Becoming*, Allport lays great stress on the importance of a concept of self as the necessary center for any psychology fully adequate to man. He deals sympathetically with the need for man to affirm his freedom, the values of democracy, and the possibility of a unifying and self-fulfilling religious life. His formulation of "self" (including even the ineffable "knower") provides a bridge between scientific psychology and certain considerations of ontology or Being in philosophy and theology.

Carl R. Rogers, best known as the genius behind nondirective or client-centered psychotherapy, has also developed a theory of the self and of interpersonal relations congenial to religious thought (Rogers, 1951; Koch, 1959, Vol. III, pp. 184 ff). In Rogers' view, conscious experience is organized into a self or self-concept and becomes the center of personality and the significant agent guiding behavior. The valuing process and the course of interpersonal relations likewise take their direction from this center. Rogers has also struggled to define the basic conditions under which men can grow to full psychological maturity, either in therapy or outside it, and has tried in several ways to formulate the meaning of love ("being deeply understood and deeply accepted," "unconditional positive regard"). Rogers' attempts to grapple with the problem of freedom have been honest and searching and he refuses to accept any over-simple solution, or one which in any way is not confirmed by his own experience (Rogers and Skinner, 1956; Rogers, 1961.)

Carl Rogers bases his construct of "self" on what has recently been named (perhaps misnamed) "the phenomenological approach" to the gathering of psychological data (Snygg & Combs, 1949; Kuenzli, 1959). The use of the data of self-report has always existed in some area of psychology (e.g., sensation and perception), but the defense and legitimizing of it in the study of personality is relatively recent; the implications of this development for the psychological study of religious experience are evident. There are indications that the field of social psychology is moving in a similar direction; the point of view of Solomon E. Asch is the best example. Asch objects to the application of notions taken from the study of lower organisms to human social settings "without a serious effort to demonstrate their relevance under the new conditions." He proceeds to urge the inclusion of "mental happenings" or the experience of the subjects in social psychological data. One problem for which this has important implications is that of the existence

of "group mind." Asch rejects the concept of group mind as a mystical entity participated in by all members of the group, but he does insist that all of us *perceive* groups as acting as entities. These perceptions of the group and "its" actions differ to some extent from one group member to another, but they are nonetheless of tremendous significance in the analysis of group behavior. Such an approach allows one to take account of genuine concern for "the welfare of the group" on the part of individual members, a variable which is consistently left out of account in current studies of group behavior. This is only one illustration of the way in which Asch tries to take account of "what it is to be human" in his approach to social psychology.

Though psychologists operate with unexamined values at many points, they have tried to come to terms with them explicitly in defining "mental health." The most careful thinkers in this area (Jahoda, 1958; M. B. Smith, 1959) have gone far beyond the criteria of "normality," "adjustment," or "absence of mental illness," and are seeking sophisticated answers more appropriate to the complexity of human values and less dependent on a particular culture. Although a few "frontal assaults" on the problem have been tried (e.g., Maslow, 1954, Chapter 12), the most solid contributions to date have been attempts to draw together, organize and interrelate criteria arising from clinical work (e.g., self-acceptance), from the study of personality (e.g., integration, balance of psychic forces), or from other sources. These writers believe that "positive mental health" is not a unitary concept or state of being, but that there are probably several types of mental health, and that the price paid for an especially high level of health in one of them may be a lower level in another. Thus, for example, William Blake might score high on the criterion of "self-actualization," low on "accurate perception of reality." Smith believes that the best answers in the long run will come from a more adequate understanding of human personality. Both Jahoda and Smith are clear that a fuller knowledge of what *is* can never finally settle what *ought to be*. However, Smith feels that when we comprehend more fully the development of personality and the many forms "self-actualization" may take, we will then see more clearly *goals* of personality development which may indirectly illuminate the problem of positive mental health. Both writers are clear that mental health is not a *summum bonum*, a synonym for the "good life," but that it is only one goal among many, and that it should "compete with other values in the area of personal and social choice" (Smith, 1959).

**F**URTHER to the left among psychologists are a group of men almost polemically concerned with the study of "creativity, love, self-actualization, high values, ego-transcendence, autonomy, responsibility,"

etc. They draw heavily upon the psychoanalytical tradition, existentialism, and the insights of philosophy, religion, and the humanities in general. They have organized an American Association of Humanistic Psychology and have begun to publish a *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*. Their point of view is well characterized by the writings of Erich Fromm, A. H. Maslow, and Rollo May. May is identified with recent developments in "existential psychotherapy" in the United States and is particularly critical of the tendency to reduce the human person to "an object," which he finds both in the orthodox psychoanalytic tradition and in psychological science generally. May was originally a Christian minister who entered the field of psychology and psychotherapy through pastoral counseling. Of particular interest to religionists are recent writings of A. H. Maslow dealing with Agape love, and with the mystical experience. Most psychologists consider the writings of such "humanistic psychologists" as speculative and unsupported by empirical data; nonetheless they are undoubtedly providing an important corrective for contemporary American psychology and may be the source of both the hypotheses and the impetus for more solid research in these areas.

A brief word about the field of the "psychology of religion" is in order, especially since its long winter of dormancy seems to be drawing to a close. Walter Houston Clark's *Psychology of Religion* is the best recent survey of the field. James E. Dittes's two reviews of works in the area point out the one-sidedness of the William James-Gordon Allport tradition and suggest that many findings in the fields of developmental, abnormal, social and personality psychology are of greater relevance to the study of religion than we are aware. Much recent stimulus in the area comes from the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion; the journal of this organization, the first issue of which has appeared, hopefully will contain many of the psychological studies predicted by Dittes.

The adolescent struggles mentioned in the first paragraph are apparent today in the publication of a stupendous seven-volume self-analysis entitled *Psychology: Study of a Science*. The highly competent editor of this symposium summarizes a sentiment which he notes in many of the contributors to the first three volumes: "There is a longing . . . for psychology to embrace—by whatever means may prove feasible—problems over which it is possible to feel intellectual passion . . . (Psychology) seems ready to think contextually, freely, and creatively about its own refractory subject matter, and to work its way free from a dependence on simplistic theories of correct scientific conduct." The Christian who believes there is some connection between man as a Christian and man as the subject of scientific study may be heartened by these words. It is hoped that the references of this article provide some documentation for this viewpoint.



the norwegian artist

# EDVARD MUNCH: 1863-1944

BY MARGARET RIGG

**T**HE creative artist has often been able to supply a troubled and uprooted generation with a healing psychological and spiritual catharsis. Edvard Munch, almost from the time he picked up a brush, explored with great sensitivity the inner landscape of fears, anxiety, grief, lust and death. He stands alone among the painters of his time, probing with ruthless intensity the dark passages of the disturbed mind: his own and Western man's. He was driven throughout his long lifetime to exhaust the many themes coming to awareness through psychology. He was a fellow human, a man of his own times—and therefore, not far from us today. He stood in the midst of the changing attitudes and general malaise, and he searched himself and the times with courage and dedication. As a result, his paintings and prints have allowed twentieth-century men and women to view themselves with honesty and sympathy. Society is richer because of his art, not scientifically, but emotionally, and certainly aesthetically.

It is only incidentally that Munch provided us with any sort of "case history" of himself or of others or of the times. His paintings are not case studies. Munch deals not in private details but in sweeping universal themes.

Edvard Munch was born the second of five children. His father was a military doctor. When Munch was five his mother died of tuberculosis. This proved a double loss to the family for her death also took her surviving husband into an intense religious isolation, suppressed grief and terror. Munch remembers this acutely, and remarked that his father "had a difficult temper, inherited nervousness, with periods of religious anxiety . . . when anxiety did not possess him, he could be like a child and joke and play with us . . . when he punished us . . . he could be almost insane in his violence . . . disease and insanity were the black angels on guard at my cradle." When Munch was fourteen his elder sister also died of tuberculosis. These early experiences and his extreme sensitivity gave Munch, almost ready-made, his great themes.

His earliest paintings were often of final sicknesses and death; of grief and agony in isolated human beings caught and overwhelmed by these basic and central experiences of life. Munch's artistic career began when

he was seventeen, and in an almost unbroken course throughout the remainder of his life he painted the same central themes. He won a scholarship and went from Oslo to Paris, spending three years there as a student. He copied the postimpressionist styles at first and was strongly influenced by Gauguin. During his stay in Paris he wrote a manifesto for himself and entered it into his journal: "No longer should you paint interiors with men reading and women knitting. There must be living beings who breathe and feel and love and suffer. I would paint such pictures in a cycle. People would understand the sacredness of them and take off their hats as if they were in church."

This is a most fascinating manifesto. In these few short sentences he separated himself forever from the popular painters of pretty scenes, much sought after in the art salons of the day. Instead, he selected raw life experiences as his material. And further, he did not merely report from these depths, he revealed the sense of the sacred breaking through this welter of life. And he wanted to communicate it to others, to onlookers and gallery-goers, so that they would be caught in involvement with the heart of life and with its sacredness.

Even more remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that early in his life he began to be accepted by the best museums and galleries. At an exhibition in Berlin in 1892, when Munch was only 29, his work became the center of heated controversy. His style and subject matter were scandalous to the public, yet a painting of his had already been purchased by the Museum in Oslo. In later life he felt that Oslo rejected him and he withdrew from general contact with the capital. But in his will he left all his enormous lifetime collection of work to the Oslo Museum. Perhaps because Munch had the cyclic and fundamental view, a thematic structure to his work, he found it almost impossible to part with any of his paintings. When one was sold he often replaced it with a replica immediately. Thus, at his death he presented Oslo with an almost complete collection of his entire output.

This included not only the 1,008 oil paintings, but also watercolors, engravings, sculptures, drawings and woodblock prints numbering into the thousands. This body of work formed a series of what he called the

*Frieze of Life*, and that idea is inherent in his early manifesto. Johan Langaard, the director of the Municipal Collection of Oslo, said of Munch: ". . . he did not aim chiefly at producing isolated works of art . . . [but] . . . an art which regards itself as a means of searching and plumbing the mystery of life and the universe . . . to observe how the great and lasting powers of Nature controlled life with rhythmic regularity. Munch aimed at freeing himself from an overpowering dread of life, which he had felt so intensely in his youth that it had threatened to crush him completely. The result was an art which with unchanging intensity proclaims a view of life in constant growth. . . ."

HEREFORE, we see why Munch chose for his attention certain symbolic themes, areas of life, experiences and moments. He painted about himself in a scattered, lifelong series of self-portraits; he painted about sickness and death; he painted a series of landscapes (in the late 1890's); he painted about man and woman and love and hate; about isolation and insanity; about guilt and depression; and he painted about the working man. And when he was commissioned to do some university murals, his final solution combined two themes: mankind and the forces of nature, and a broad conception of education. The symbolic figures bear note: History is symbolized by an old man seated under a great oak tree, telling a story to a child. On the opposite wall is *Alma Mater* symbolized by a mother nursing a child with other children beside her exploring the life of the seashore. Munch could use "everyday life" in an overarching symbolic and monumental way, to express over again in each new work his great schematic view of life.

The university paintings were in themselves a series, but individually his works, like the university work, always bear upon his great theme of life. Four years before he died, Munch did his *Self-portrait Between the Clock and the Bed* (1940) in which he considered himself as an old man, standing in awkward dignity in the brightly colored room where years before he had painted many nudes. Time (the clock) draws the old man's attention and he seems to be straining to hear its ticking. (To hold on to life?) At the far right is a painting of a nude woman, representing perhaps the faded memories of his past concern with life when he was younger and his years were yet ahead of him. At any rate this is something of a symbolic portrait of himself, for in his old age Munch was in reality a hearty and vigorous-looking man rather than wan and feeble as in this portrait. It is the symbolic portrait of

age he is giving us here. It is how he felt if not how he looked.


THE late self-portrait shows a mature ability to use the "everyday life" for his symbolic material. Symbols are used, but couched in the familiar and more homely atmosphere of common life. In the self-portrait the picture as a totality is felt first. Only afterward are the symbols deduced. But in *The Cry* (1893, when Munch was only 30), the *symbolic* nature of the painting is of first importance and only afterward do the naturalistic features become apparent. The shoreline, the bridge, the receding figures in the background, the sky and especially the agonized figure in the foreground are all treated with a minimum of realism. They always remain essentially symbols, raw, stripped to essence.

During the early days of rather raw use of symbolism, Munch painted *Ashes* (1894) and *The Dance of Life* (1899-1900). *Ashes* dwells upon the powerlessness of the individuals, man and woman, to really communicate. The man and woman, though in love, live in different worlds of despondency and self-absorption (the man) and dream-like consciousness of physical sensations (the woman) but unable to share. *The Dance of Life* is one of the greatest pictures of the *Frieze of Life* series. Munch divided woman's life into three stages: youth-innocence; maturity-experience; and finally withdrawal or disillusionment with life. At each stage she is inaccessible to man, incomprehensible. The innocent youth stands at the far left (in the painting), not yet involved deeply in life; in the center are whirling couples: maturity and experience. But the involvement with each other is somehow only physical. They seem not really to share compassionately in life together. At the far right stands the woman of later maturity: disillusioned, withdrawn from life into herself—in fact she is in mourning black.

But Munch could also express the compassion in man-woman relationships and show love in its unifying value, its tenderness and depth. In his famous woodcut print, *The Kiss* (1897-1902), this facet of mutual compassion involved Munch and over several years he reworked the theme in painting and graphic medium many times. It seemed to hold an authentic and positive place in his own understanding and awareness of life, and to forcefully counter the dark visions of loneliness and hopelessness he saw in human relationships. But his great preoccupation was the deterministic gulf that separates the sexes, in spite of his awareness of some positive aspects of man's nature.

In the early part of the twentieth century Munch often painted landscapes and laborers, as in *Workmen*

*continued on page 27*



OSLO MUNICIPAL COLL.

SELF-PORTRAIT BETWEEN THE CLOCK AND THE BED OIL 1940






ASHES OIL 1894

NATIONAL GALLERY, OSLO

**Coming Home** (1915). This painting presents all the most dehumanizing aspects of growing industrialization which began to threaten the basic structure of society. In this picture some of the faces are even painted in a masklike fashion, symbolic of the sickness of conformity and mass culture. The stream of men at the right seems almost on an assembly line, like robots being turned out. The tired, haunted, empty faces of the men on the left express the violence an industrialized society suffers. They look like misplaced fishermen or farmers.

That these concerns of Edvard Munch are still the major problems of society and culture today is proof of Munch's genius. In his art he did far more than

simply diagnose mass or individual sickness. He was not merely reporting the times and stresses and changes. He unified them into a comprehensible vision of meaning. He searched out the significance and unity of the scattered pieces. He synthesized the psychological devastation—but he also affirmed life itself. He suffered *within* the situation and though he was never freed from it he added, in the way that Job adds, to the world's understanding of suffering by giving it back its monumental proportions and returning it to the heart of man's context of experience. In this way he was able to celebrate life—not just the good parts which are easy enough to celebrate and find meaning in, but the hard and confusing parts as well—affirming all life.



THE DANCE OF LIFE



NATIONAL GALLERY, OSLO

March 1962

OIL 1899-1900

29




THE KISS (Fourth state) WOODCUT 1897-1902





WORKMEN COMING HOME oil 1915

OSLO MUNICIPAL COLL.





SELF-PORTRAIT 1895



SELF-PORTRAIT OIL 1882

IN HELL (self-portrait) OIL 1895



STARRY NIGHT OIL 1923

# THE NATURE OF PERSONAL RELATEDNESS

BY PETER HOMANS

**a discussion of freud's concept of the transference as it is related to the subject - object theme in theology.**

THE task of all psychoanalytic investigation begins with the scrutiny of psychological phenomena, or mental processes, and specifically with the efforts to understand those processes as they are reflected in errors of speech (sometimes referred to as the psychopathology of everyday life). The study of the psychology of errors is the model for all further psychoanalytic investigation into any and all mental phenomena.

The investigator is faced with a situation in which a comprehensible and coherent sequence of mental events has been momentarily interrupted—i.e., the person during his conversation said something apparently quite different from, and unrelated to, what he intended to say and what others expected to hear. This "error" of speech appears to be arbitrary, meaningless and therefore unworthy of attention—at least according to ordinary assumptions, standards and attitudes. Freud's point here, and indeed, fundamentally speaking, his only point, is that there is meaning hidden in this psychic situation, in spite of any or all indications to the contrary. And he uses the word "meaning" synonymously with "tendency" and "intention."

Meaning has three characteristics. First, it suggests a concept of levels, surface and depth. The apparently arbitrary and accidental is superficial to a depth aspect which, when recognized, makes sense of the surface, and without which the surface remains meaningless. Depth, therefore, refers to that which is hidden from surface, a "something more" which opposes any

accidental, "nothing but" assumptions. Therefore we may refer to a *depth-relational* aspect of meanings.

Second, a meaning suggests a potentiality for direction in an apparently dead-end situation. The apparently random conceals an inherently voluntaristic element, for the human will is involved, although the superficial situation would not so indicate. This discernment of meaning is the discernment of what this person "is up to," or what he is trying "to get away with." Thus, a meaning has a quality of moral direction and intention to it—or a meaning is *dramatic*.

Third, a meaning suggests for Freud a clash of forces which denies either simple harmony or radical dissociation of forces. There is dynamic-energetic opposition (conflict) between surface and depth. So Freud speaks of "counterwills" and "counter-tendencies," in which psychic components are related through tensional opposition. This aspect of meaning is the dynamic-conflictual aspect.

Furthermore, to the extent that these three aspects are unrecognized in any psychic situation (if the superficial is considered to be the whole story) then the meaning is said to be unconscious. This is the basic meaning of the unconscious, the unconscious processes, and the repressed aspects of psychic life.

The error of speech is the model for the investigation of dreams, neurotic symptoms and the doctor-patient relationship (the transference relationship). Together these four constitute the four basic forms of psychic life with which psychoanalysis is concerned. Each has its superficial, apparently arbitrary aspect,

which is to be investigated and understood in precisely the same way—i.e., the meaning must be sought in each situation, and when found it will evince the same qualities.

In summary, psychoanalytic inquiry proceeds by means of the dialectical reconnection of surface and depth phenomena. "Dialectical" means that surface and depth are not independent and self-subsisting, but more likely resemble opposing sides of the same coin: each is necessary for a full understanding of the other. Whenever one or the other is neglected, mystery and preplexity obtain.

"Meaning" is therefore a term of generic order, used primarily to assert the fact that there is a relation between surface and depth. Freud, however, was more preoccupied with the ways in which such a relation occurred. "Transference phenomena" and "the transference" were his more consistently used terms for a distorted relationship between surface and depth. Such distortions have three characteristics: displacement, substitution and compromise.

**T**RANSFERENCE phenomena are, quite literally, a displacing or shifting of feelings, ideas, attitudes, energies or wishes from one focus or object to another. This is really the primary meaning of "transference," and is most evident in the analysis of dreams, in which the recalled images represent attitudes displaced from earlier "day-residues" (reality situations). Such displacements are also substitutive, for they function in a manner dynamically synonymous with the reality situation, i.e., the transference situation resembles the reality situation in certain aspects, but not in others. And there is always a compromise of some sort, because there is genuine forfeiture and gain by both surface and depth elements. Each is less than it was, but each is more than it might have been.

But the transference is not the only way in which depth and surface are related. There is a second way, free from distortions, in which, so to speak, depth is transparent to surface. Such a relationship is sometimes described as "developmental," "normal," "appropriate" or, as was more characteristic of Freud's language and terminology, "reality-oriented." His famous dictum, "where id was, let ego be," referred precisely to the discernment of meaning and the transformation of transference phenomena into "reality" phenomena. Associated with transference phenomena are such notions as repression, resistance, forgetting; associated with reality, or its emergence, are such notions as free-association, interpretation, insight, integration and recollection to mention but a few of the



OF

more important Freudian concepts.

While Freud's discussions of the transference are most consistently addressed to the four basic forms indicated above, these four transference phenomena serve as the basis for the interpretation and analysis of a whole series of secondary forms of psychic life—i.e., socio-historical and cultural phenomena which Freud interprets on the basis of his psychoanalytic theory and therapy. Such secondary forms are what I would call "Freudian dichotomies" or "Freudian antinomies." Again the transference is significant; and here we may learn the place Freud assigns to religious experience and to religious belief.

While Freud's discussions of the transference are most consistently addressed to the four basic forms indicated above, these four transference phenomena serve as the basis for the interpretation and analysis of socio-historical and cultural phenomena—i.e., Freud interprets history and culture on the basis of his psychoanalytic theory and therapy. And it is precisely at this point that we may learn the meaning Freud assigns to religious experience and to religious belief.

Freud interpreted religion in various ways—obsession, wish fulfillment, return of the repressed, illusion—but each of these was finally a transference phenomenon. Both the contents of religion—beliefs—and the dynamics behind their formation and maintenance, are the result of transference.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the conceptions of God which people hold, and their motives for holding such views, are to be interpreted through the basic methods of psychoanalytic inquiry.

**F**REUD was particularly critical of the conviction that an omnipotent and omniscient being existed in time and space, for the purposes of guiding, protecting and informing men about their life on this earth. Such a belief, he asserted, was an effort to ameliorate an unbearable infantile situation. It was, therefore, a transference phenomenon: a distortion of surface by depth forces. The task of science was to work through this now obsolete mode of relatedness, and permit a growth relationship to emerge between surface and depth. The reality principle served as the unique instrumentation of science.

Therefore, I believe it quite correct (although Freud himself does not speak of religion in precisely this way) to speak of the transference-god when referring to Freud's conception of religion. As we have seen, such a conception is closely connected with, and functions in relation to, internal psychic events. Both are functionally related to interpersonal situations.

In addition to his discussions of the transference in terms of internal psychic life and culture, Freud spoke of it as a clinical and interpersonal phenomenon, as a problem in psychoanalytic technique. His thoughts and admonitions on this phase of our subject generally

fall into two categories—the transference relationship as disease, and the transference relationship as cure.<sup>2</sup>

The transference relationship refers primarily to that aspect of the doctor-patient relationship, in which excessive—and therefore inappropriate—feelings and attitudes of affection and hostility are expressed by the patient toward the physician.

These attitudes and feelings arise from, and are currently sustained by, (repressed) memories of the patient's childhood. They were appropriate to that situation, but from the point of view of the current situation they are dated and obsolete. Hence the rather literal meaning of transference: attitudes and feelings carried over, or carried across onto the physician, such that in certain important ways the patient relates to him as if he were the earlier situation. This gives the doctor a good picture of the internal situation, provided he can discern the depth factors beneath the surface distortions.

Eventually, however, the relationship is no longer simply a reflection of the disease, but instead becomes the disease itself. Freud called this new relationship the transference neurosis, and was convinced that it was the basis of all successful therapy. On the other hand, he also specified that certain kinds of illnesses did not produce this kind of relationship, and were therefore beyond the curative power of (his) analytic therapy. This, however, was a point for technique, and not for basic dynamics; for he also indicated that the transference was ubiquitous—it applied to psychic

<sup>2</sup> This part of the discussion is drawn primarily from three papers: "Recollection, Repetition and Working Through"; "The Dynamics of the Transference"; and "Observations on Transference Love"; *The Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 2 (London: Hogarth Press, 1950).



SECURITY IS HARD TO COME BY

<sup>1</sup> A good example of this aspect of Freud's thought may be found in *The Future of an Illusion* (London: Hogarth Press, 1928).

problems of all ranges, both to "normal" and "institutionalized" persons.

One may very well ask, how can the disease be the cure? Such a notion is precisely Freud's point. The transference neurosis functions as the medium for the cure, and therefore the fate of this relationship is crucial: it represents the individual's heightened potentiality for both illness and health.

Cure is not effected through the preservation of this relationship; through its abolition; through the denial of it; or through ignoring it. Cure occurs through its "recollection," by means of the process of "working through," or on the basis of the destruction of the transference. The word "destruction" refers to Freud's martial imagery, to which he recurs frequently in discussing the subject. The physician battles the transference; he is armed with the weapons of interpretation and his knowledge of the unconscious; all of which permit him to render harmless and conquer the transference. Yet such overcoming is always "on-the-basis-of" that which is overcome. Any destruction is for the purposes of restructuring. In this sense there is an unacknowledged dimension of synthesis in all Freud's emphasis upon analysis.

This process penetrates to the currently latent core of the illness within the person, such that any changes in the relationship effect changes in both the internal and cultural situation. For the transference relationship is organically in touch with all transference phenomena. Therefore, changes here will be far-reaching, and will affect all aspects of the surface-depth situation.

Now we may move on to some theological considerations, keeping in mind this question: what is there in theological thought today, if anything, of relevance to our psychological consideration of personal relatedness; and what can each discussion contribute, if anything, to the other.

One way of discussing current theological thought in a way relevant to our concern is to focus upon theological analyses of "the subject-object relation." Much that is being said today in theology on the subject of personal relatedness is developed in terms of this topic, or, as it is sometimes alternately referred to, the subject-object "structure" or the subject-object "scheme." Such discussions I shall refer to as the subject-object theme in current theological thought.

The phrase "subject-object relation" and its alternative forms have a number of different referents.

It is sometimes a logical term; sometimes grammatical and syntactical; it serves as an epistemological distinction; sometimes it has a specifically ontological reference; and often it is used in a primarily personal or "existential" sense. Recognizing this variety of possible meanings, many of them in the same thought-system, this discussion is limited to the last—the

nature of personal relatedness and the subject-object relation.

Theologians generally discuss and define the subject-object relation in terminology characteristic of their own systems, yet they usually agree that there is a situation called the subject-object relation, which is by definition nontheological and/or nonreligious. Therefore, in order that this situation become theological and/or religious this relation must in some way or other be altered. The word "altered" is used here in a generic sense to include all the various things such theologians suggest must happen to this situation in order that it become theological and/or religious. For example: Martin Buber believes the subject-object relation must be overcome; Paul Tillich that it must be transcended; Reinhold Niebuhr that it must be dramatized (or "spirit-ized"); and Rollo May that it must be undercut.

What is this subject-object relation (conceived as a construct descriptive of personal relatedness)? What must happen in order that it may become theological and/or religious?

**T**HE subject-object relation has two characteristics, neither of which adequately defines or describes the total human situation. It invariably leads to one or both of two errors, objectivity or subjectivity, and both of these obscure the possibilities for genuine relatedness.

On the one hand, objectivity may be sought. If such is the case, then the relationship between subject and object generally has three characteristics: detachment, manipulation and generalization. "Detachment" means making every effort to remove any private feelings, attitudes or thoughts—for these will in all likelihood vitiate any "objectivity." There must be no involvement,



passion or participation. "Manipulation" suggests that being objective "uses" the object, fits it into a "means-end" scheme for the purposes of the subject, not primarily for purposes referable to the internal nature of the object. In manipulating one ignores any inherent intentionality by reducing the object to a function of one's own will for it. Thus one sees only that which is of value to his own intentions. "Generalization" indicates that the object is discerned only insofar as it is a "member of a series," insofar as it shares certain characteristics with other objects. In this sense nothing interior or private can be of concern, for objectivity means being part of a larger scheme of things, and therefore limited by this. Typing people, or grouping them in categories, is a form of generalization.

On the other hand, subjectivity may be sought. In such a case emphasis is given to feelings about the object, and the opposites of detachment, manipulation and generalization are sometimes commended. If so, these usually appear as subjective involvement; self-surrender (as opposed to forcing the object to surrender to oneself); and a good deal of emphasis upon uniqueness, individuality and the capacity of the private to exhaust any generalizing efforts.

Both subjectivity and objectivity, however, are finally insufficient, partial and incomplete. Neither of itself, nor both together are structurally capable of leading to full and genuine relatedness with the object in question. Something must be done, or something must happen to this existing situation, in order that genuine relatedness become possible. When and if this happens, the situation then becomes theological and/or religious.

The solution offered to this problem lies beyond the situation in question. The term for it which recurs most frequently is transcendence; this term is used as being representative. But whatever term is used, it will indicate the extent to which the altered situation in any way resembles the one it is changing, and the extent to which it is generally different. And so we are told that there must be union, but that it is a union which includes both detachment and involvement, while at the same time going beyond these. These must be mutuality, but it is a mutuality in which dominance and surrender are somehow reconciled without being simply denied. There must be centeredness, but it is a centeredness in which both generalizing and individualizing tendencies are possible, in which general characteristics and personal uniqueness and singularity can coexist each in some way supporting and being supported by the other. Genuine relatedness can occur only to the extent that one can "go beyond" the partialities of subjectivity and objectivity. At this point, the personal situation becomes theological and/or religious, for one must transcend the subject-object relation.

While such descriptions are always helpful they are somewhat elusive with respect to any experiential or

operational concreteness. They are addressed to the nature of personal life and relatedness, but it is difficult to get a clear picture of just what is actually happening—in the subject-object relation, and especially in its alteration or transcendence. Generally we are told not to expect an experiential description of that which transcends experience; but is it asking too much to expect an experiential description of that which gets transcended?

**A**T this point Tillich is helpful. From time to time he is willing to discuss this theme in more concrete, and in more dynamic terminology—although such descriptions are infrequent. Also, this theme is very much a part of his thought. Tillich, perhaps more than any other theologian today, urges that we transcend the subject-object relation, in order that genuine personal life and relatedness emerge. He describes the subject-object relation and its transcendence:

*The God of theological theism is a being beside others and as such a part of the whole of reality. He certainly is considered its most important part, but as a part and therefore as subjected to the whole. He is supposed to be beyond the ontological elements and categories which constitute reality. But every statement subjects him to them. He is seen as a self which has a world, and as an ego which is related to a thou, as a cause which is separated from its effect, as having a definite space and an endless time. He is a being, not being-itself. As such he is bound to the subject-object structure of reality, he is an object for us as subjects. At the same time we are objects for him as a subject. And this is decisive for the necessity of transcending theological theism.<sup>4</sup>*

<sup>4</sup> Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952, pp. 184-185.)



So far so good—i.e., this is what anyone who reads Tillich has learned to expect. However, his understanding of why things are this way is even more illuminating for our concern:

*For God as subject makes me into an object which is nothing more than an object. He deprives me of all my subjectivity because he is all powerful and all knowing. I revolt and try to make him into an object, but the revolt fails and I become desperate. God appears as the invincible tyrant, the being in contrast with whom all other beings are without freedom and subjectivity. He is equated with the recent tyrants who with the help of terror try to transform everything into a mere object, a thing among things, a cog in the machine they control. He becomes the model of everything against which Existentialism revolted. This is the God Nietzsche said had to be killed because nobody can tolerate being made into a mere object of absolute knowledge and absolute control.<sup>5</sup>*

What a dramatic account! If this is what the subject-object relation is really like, little wonder Tillich wishes

<sup>5</sup> Tillich, *loc. cit.*



to transcend it. In any case, we have here an instance of the engagement referred to above, and to which I have been moving from the beginning: this description of the subject-object relation is, from the (Freudian) psychoanalytic point of view, a transference relationship; and the transcendence of this relation is, from the (Freudian) psychoanalytic point of view, the destruction or working through of the transference.<sup>6</sup> Or, to put it in another way: Freud's conception of the transference and its destruction provides a psychological dimension to the theological discussion of the subject-object relation and its transcendence; and the theological discussions of the subject-object relation and its transcendence provide a theological dimension to Freud's psychological discussions of transference.

The above suggests further inquiry into the nature of the subject-object relation and its transcendence. The close connection which obtained between the transference and its being worked through or destroyed implies that the subject-object relation and its transcendence are not isolated states, or modes, but that each is equally necessary for the genuineness and integrity of the other. Thus the transcendence of "mere objectivity" or of "mere subjectivity" eventuates in a return to and an enrichment of the subject-object relation. Such enrichment will make any subsequent transcendence more simply possible. On the other hand, objectivity and subjectivity (as described above) in turn are the means of their own transcendence. Transcendence therefore occurs "on the basis of" subjectivity and objectivity, rather than through their denial, for example. Such a notion does not demand that either one be collapsed into the other, although there is always this danger. This implication may be further expanded.

It raises the question as to what, precisely, is so mistaken about manipulation and the means-end relationship generally, and it presses for further clarification as to just how this situation is transcended. It is my impression that these theological discussions are a great deal clearer in their urgency than they are in possible ways in which what is urged may be brought about.

This suggests that manipulation and using are the very stuff of their own transcendence, and that being objective about a person may very well be the beginning of transcendence rather than the obliteration of any possibility of it. It suggests that one can transcend manipulation only by becoming more involved in it, by taking it even more seriously than before. This does not guarantee transcendence; but there is none without this kind of "objectivity." Indeed, much of value which theologians contribute is accomplished in this mode—e.g., writing books about God.

<sup>6</sup> To put it strictly in the language of Tillich and Freud: the God above God emerges when and to the extent that the transference-god is destroyed; and the destruction or working through of the transference occurs when and insofar as the subject-object relation is transcended. Tillich almost says it himself: his "He is equated with the recent tyrants" might be rendered, "He is a transference from the recent tyrants. . . ."





evane

SUPPOSE I GAVE UP MY SECURITY AND STILL NO ONE LOVED ME

**E**QUALLY important, however, is the potential which such urgings have for opposing their own goals. "Do not play God; do not dominate; do not control"—so the message runs. However, these formulae may serve to obscure the knowledge of limitation which can only come from a concerted effort in the direction of manipulation. Such cautions, therefore, may serve to mask the very situation they seek to evoke, and frustrate their own intentions. Indeed, the condemnation of manipulation can very well be one of the more interesting forms of manipulation.

A second question raised by this implication is the extent to which things are defined as distinctly theological primarily because they are defined, albeit by negation, in relation to a certain view of science and/or psychology. The conception of science (and psychology, as a science) which is often assumed in these theological discussions is primarily that of behaviorism, animal psychology and stimulus-response learning theory. It is all very well to be told, as Tillich, for example urges, not to build one's theology in the dark spots of science; but one should be equally cautious about building a theology (wittingly or otherwise) in the dull spots of science—those areas which are being abandoned or are under revision.

The above theological discussions support Freud's assertions that the transference must be worked through or destroyed—up to a certain point. Also the reality principle, as the proper instrument of science, was his account of that which supported the process of working through. He set the reality principle in grim and unalterable opposition to religion and theology.

These theological discussions, however, raise a question, not with respect to its opposition to the transference, but to its claim that such opposition is properly and inevitably opposition to religion, and that it is an exhaustive account of religion. Such discussions do not insist that their assertion of the transcendence of the subject-object relation is exhaustive of the total situation. They do suggest, however, that the process of working through is to be viewed within a larger context. In this sense the reality principle is a principle of transcendence as well.

Freud identified the reality principle with science in order to protect and distinguish it from theology and religion.<sup>7</sup> As a particular strategic move in a particular cultural situation, it is perhaps understandable, although its wisdom remains a moot point—and will be argued for many years to come. However, his intent was not merely strategic, and his use of the word "scientific" was, from our theological point of view, ambiguous. He claimed the objectivity of science—but is this subject-object objectivity, as it has been defined above? or is it a different kind of objectivity, one which emerges as a result of transcendence? Our theological discussions suggest the latter. They suggest that the reality principle embodies and represents a different kind of objectivity, one which "transcends" the "mere objectivity" of science. And therefore they press for a more precise redefinition of both science and objectivity on the part of psychology.

<sup>7</sup> It is interesting to note the way in which Freud's insistent denial of the fruits of his discovery to theology and religion resembles the way the theological discussions sometimes deny genuine relatedness (and "objectivity") to the subject-object relation and to science.



WAILING WOMAN

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OTIS HUBAND, JR.

a theoretical dialogue between


# KIERKEGAARD AND CARL ROGERS

COMPILED BY WILLIAM R. ROGERS, JR.

## INTRODUCTION:

**I**N recent years increasing attention has been paid to existentialism—as a methodological, philosophical, and operational point of view—in its relation to psychotherapy. Some of the lines of this thought are particularly well represented in the book *Existence*, edited by Rollo May. In many ways, however, some of the primary foci of the existentialist point of view have been inherent in the client-centered approach to psychotherapy since its inception. This is an effort to explicate some of these common foci, as well as some points of differentiation: a dialogue between Soren Kierkegaard—an early and seminal, though only recently influential representative of existentialism—and Carl Rogers.

The dialogue is theoretical both in the sense that it involves mainly theoretical issues; and in the sense that it did not, of course, ever actually take place. There is a sense in which such a conversation is somewhat artificial. Aside from the time and cultural lag of approximately one hundred years between the two men, there is probably a more fundamental distortion in this projected dialogue from the side of each. For Kierkegaard I require an openness to look at his whole perspective and relate it within the context of discussion rather than through “indirect communication,” edifying discourse (preaching), or polemical argument (such as after 1848). For Rogers I require a similar awareness of an overview, and a degree of confrontation which at points of distinctiveness, while accepting Kierkegaard’s expression of the truth of his own experience, is willing to make clear his own outpost over against this.



#### DIALOGUE:

**Rogers:** I suppose a place we might start would be in recognizing the importance which each of us places upon the *individual person*.

**S. Kierkegaard:** Yes. I've frequently spoken of the category of "the individual" as "my category." My references to this may have been confusing at times, for at one point I thought of this as referring to "Regina"; but for the most part I have meant by it to point to the importance of every individual, especially concerning his own subjective appropriation of the faith—of his own awareness of sin, of his own awareness of Christ and forgiveness, of his own growing into authentic personal existence. It seems to me that far too little attention has been given to the uniqueness of every individual's personal decision and growth.

**R.:** Uh huh. Part of your concern has been to point up the individual aspects which you feel have been neglected.

**S. K.:** That's right. In many ways I owe a great deal to Hegel and other philosophers; but in terms of their idealism, generalizations, and abstractions, I find their work rather futile. To talk about men in general, or to talk to man in general, is both distorting and really dangerous. It is distorting, I think, because there is really no such general man. To make any abstractions or neat system regarding man is to overlook his unique reality in every instance—his individuality, his freedom, his concreteness, his personalness. One should

not try to dissolve all the existential dichotomies of individual existence, for in doing so, he dissolves the concrete character of existence itself. It is dangerous because a man may think that all the issues of his life are settled and there is no need of his involvement.

**R.:** I suppose a good deal of my own concern with the importance of recognizing the uniqueness of each individual and his perceptual field runs along the same lines. I, too, find that to generalize about men, while it may be helpful theoretically, never can get at the reality of an individual's own experience. Abstractions really cannot take seriously the concrete "reality" which makes up each person's perceptual frame of reference. Rather, every individual exists in a continually changing world of experience of which he is the center. What a person perceives and experiences is, for him, his world—and it stands as unique. Understanding a person from his own internal frame of reference is at once both the best vantage point for understanding behavior, I believe; and it is the most adequate approach in therapy where it permits a level of understanding and acceptance, allowing a person to assimilate with accurate symbolization more and more of his sensory and visceral experience without blockage from the self-concept.

**S. K.:** I'm not sure of all the terms you use there, but I can see that your concern for the individual is similar to mine. For me, however, it is not so much a question of this importance in terms of understanding other persons, as it is simply in being aware of my own existence, and asking others to have a similar concern with their own movement through despair and suffering to full personal existence. This is related to what I said a minute ago about the danger involved in generalizing about man. The danger is that he may feel everything is settled for him, that he has merely to draw on the affirmations of his tradition; or, so to speak, simply dabble in life without ever making commitments and decisions of his own. It is this internal struggle that I am concerned with.

**R.:** I think I sense this concern in all your writing—that you are speaking from your own experience, from this process of your own existence, and that you are challenging other men to an awareness of their own experience. Here is where the center of interest lies—with the individual, and anything *external* or *environmental* is only important as it is seen and responded to by the individual. On this point I would also be in agreement with you.


**S. K.:** Yes, with reference to the spirit or self of the individual, these objective factors are definitely of secondary importance. To fall in with what is commonly accepted and established in the culture would mean the dissolution of personal existence. Or on another level, to speak of objective truth or absolute morality would similarly be to restrict the ultimately personal with which God confronts man, and the unique demands which are made on us. True enough

we have to live in the world, and live life with other men and the institutions of our times; but the significant thing is that underneath this we have a life that we know is our own, that we are aware of as personal.

**R.:** I guess what you're saying in this latter is that *self-awareness* is an important part of individual existence, and in this I would again concur. The importance of a full awareness of oneself seems to be crucial to psychological health. For when there are feelings or experiences that one is not aware of, that cannot be admitted to awareness, it marks what I speak of as incongruity and is evidenced in various sorts of tensions, bound energy, blocked endeavors—and in general a feeling that one is not in touch with, and in control of, his life. Therapy might be defined in part as the achievement of a greater self-awareness and self-acceptance.

**S. K.:** Well, the awareness of my own existence, my own moments of despair, my own sense of inadequacy and separation I do see as significant. But simply to accept this is another thing to me.<sup>1</sup> I stand at these times of most awesome awareness of myself feeling most strongly the need of forgiveness and strength to

<sup>1</sup> I have some question myself of this sort of acceptance on Kierkegaard's part. To some extent the use of pseudonyms in his earlier writing seems to reflect more than a literary device—a way of not claiming as his own these aspects of his experience. Also in Rogers' terms, there seems to have been a considerably distorted symbolization on S. K.'s part of experiences such as that with Regina and the Corsair.



WHEN ARE YOU GOING TO SETTLE DOWN?

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pull me from my melancholy. Yet I should not give the impression that these are just moments; for I feel the occurrence and reoccurrence of these feelings of sin and the strength of God. Indeed I see a sort of movement of my whole life through stages of existence moving toward greater selfhood—a *movement in time*.

**R.:** The importance of time does seem to be significant to you; and I too have regarded time as movement or process. But there is another feature of our mutual time perspective which is also important as I see it. That is the significance of the *present*, the past and future holding importance only as they are drawn into the orientation of the present. Perhaps one might regard this as a view of history. I do not react to some absolute or historical reality, but to my present perception of this reality. It is this present perception, including both the past and the future, which is reality for me.

**S. K.:** Yes, I would say it much the same way. The past is not reality for me either, but only the contemporary. Only what you live with contemporaneously is reality. This is why, for instance, I see it as so important that a person know Christ contemporaneously; for if he is no more than history, or poetry, he is not real and present. With regard to the future, however, I would suppose I have a stronger thrust than you for I fervently anticipate immortal life with my Heavenly Father, for I pray I may someday dwell in his holy place above the vicissitudes of this life. Yet even this hope, I realize, is known now in a mirror darkly, from the present. My present existence, with all that this involves, is finally all that I can speak from.

**R.:** I guess what we have spoken of as the awareness of individual personal existence within this time perspective is also involved in what you refer to as *subjectivity as truth*. That which lies at the center of a person, giving him increasing identity and individuality is a personal truth—a truth of what he is.

**S. K.:** I think this is a very significant way to put it. Part of my concern in saying that subjectivity is truth, is a general reaction against rationalism and the idea of some objective, logical, mathematical truth which can be appropriated by the intellect. That is not to say that I don't make use of a logical dialectic myself, nor that I don't give a rational structure to my thought and writing. But it is to say that this sort of objective truth as reason is not the plane on which life is lived. I want to deny Hegel's notion that thought is to be identified with being. Rather my fundamental existence depends on a more personal sort of truth—a truth held with feeling, involvement, concern—a truth not to be argued but to be lived by, believed in passionately, assimilated in my whole being. The thing is to understand myself, to see what God really wishes *me* to do; the thing is to find a truth which is true *for me*, to find the idea for which I can live and die.

**R.:** This seems similar to what I have spoken of

as a person's self-concept, and perhaps including an ideal image. That a portion of myself gradually is differentiated as "me"—as the way I perceive myself. This is my integrity—my truth. Indeed sometimes I think the truth is really that which underlies even the self-concept. It is the "real self," in Karen Horney's terms. It is the full authenticity of genuine personal existence.

**S. K.:** I think this notion of a "self-concept" may be helpful; but it doesn't fully cover what I mean by a subjective truth—a truth that I have appropriated for which I can live and die. The only truth that is sufficient is that which becomes a paradox—which I can be committed to beyond any rational controls. That is, subjectively something is true because I can passionately believe in it, because I have appropriated it with my whole existence, even if, or rather *because*, the object of this belief is a paradox, and an absurdity. And the absurdity, the paradox, to which I am referring, of course, is Christ—the eternal in time, the God-man. This is the truth which alone can be that for which I live and die.

**R.:** In Christ you find the passionate kind of meaning necessary for life, necessary to free you as a self, necessary to establish a center of your existence?

**S. K.:** Yes. This does lie at the center of authentic personal existence; and until one finds this, I believe, he is living only on the *periphery* of life, the aesthetic mode of existence; or perhaps just inside the periphery in the ethical mode. I thought of this a bit ago when you spoke of the individual living in a world of experience of which he is the center. I think this is right if you are referring simply to the phenomenon of perception; that all experience is perceived from the self *as* a center. But it is not to say that the individual from the first *has* a center in himself, or is in touch with this center. I am referring here, so to speak, to the self center within the perceiving center. It is this self center, the inner integrity, the spirit of personal existence, that I am concerned with.

**R.:** I guess if we were to speak functionally, then, of the *goal* toward which personality should move—of *maturity*—you would see this in terms of what you call "personal existence"—individual existence with a religious truth at its center.

**S. K.:** That's right, the basic problem of life as I have known it is that of gaining personal existence, of becoming a Christian, of achieving an integration of life such that I can will one thing.

**R.:** Perhaps this is similar to my understanding of the goal, of maturity, in life. I have spoken of it in terms of becoming a fully functioning person. A person who can realize capacities and potentialities and live productively without the interferences of energy bound by not admitting personal experiences and urges to awareness. This, as I see it, does involve integrity—what I have called congruity—between a person's world of experience and his concept of him-

self. It involves knowing and accepting all of myself—and a willingness to be what I am.

**S. K.:** I sense, though, that there is some disparity here from what I have meant. You seem to be pointing to a recognition and acceptance of what you are; but I am stressing something that you aim toward, though never fully achieve. Another way to state the goal of personal existence is in terms of the "image of God." The movement is toward this "picture"; through imagination and will we move toward the image of the ideal self, as in Christ, of freedom, of selfhood, or spirit—though this is only finally accomplished, in so far as it is, through grace.

**R.:** Perhaps you do point to a distinction in our thought here—that I am concerned with a recognition of the real self while you are concerned with the pursuit of the ideal. Yet I would not exclude the element of an ideal image from a person's self-concept, and neither would I say the full recognition and acceptance of this concept is ever fully realized, or that anyone is ever "*fully* functioning." Also I sense from what you say that you could see this ideal image of God in man as the *reality* of at least what man is meant to be. You do, though, emphasize a striving toward what seems to be ultimately unrealizable; whereas the striving I speak of in terms of gaining knowledge and acceptance of one's self while perhaps never fully actualized either, at least seems more probable. In either case, though, it does seem difficult to know the self before it is experienced in reality. On this we would probably agree. And also I think we would agree that such a movement involves the concomitant *release from binding personality strictures* such as anxiety, despair, hopelessness, melancholy, isolation, meaninglessness, and so forth.

**S. K.:** Yes, perhaps these elements in a functional description of what happens to persons might be similar for us. Perhaps also the recognition of a resulting capacity for *self-governance* we would share. In the process of gaining personal existence, as I see it, there is a sort of reflexive relationship within the self, where-in the self relates itself to itself through a sort of self-objectification or infinite regression, giving an even fuller self-awareness, and freedom of activity. One feels more able to live in the sympathetic ambiguity of freedom; in fact it ceases to be conceived as so much of an ambiguity.

**R.:** You are right, I would definitely concur in the awareness of a higher degree of self-governance, of the development of a feeling of being in control of life—of not being so compelled by the evaluations and demands of others. There does seem to be increasing freedom in therapy for individuals to live their own lives—an increase of independence.

I am thinking also that in the way we are talking here about increase and development in the growth of a person we have touched on another perspective which we share. That personality is best understood

in terms of a *becoming* or a *process*. That there is genuine growth and change moving toward the achievement of what you term personal existence. It is in terms of a definite process that a person reaches these capacities of maturity of which we have been speaking here.

**S. K.:** Yes, I meant to indicate before that I understand the development of personal existence to be in terms of a process—of a movement in time. The life of the individual is not an entity, a static substance, an essence, or a thing; it is an existence, a dynamic synthesis of body and soul. Furthermore, as you point out, the development of selfhood also is to be seen in terms of a movement. This we referred to a bit ago when we were speaking of time as movement. In relation to my own experience I look on this process in terms of the stages on life's way. There seem to be

levels or modes of existence through which the individual must journey toward the realization of true selfhood. It is not a smooth continuum, but filled with jumps and leaps that carry one from one stage to the next as he is pushed by anxiety and despair, and lured by freedom and forgiveness.

**R.:** You see *anxiety* and *despair*, then, as playing a positive role in the achievement of personal existence?

**S. K.:** Yes, I think one could say that anxiety is the motive power of faith; and it is only in faith that one can fully achieve personal existence. In a sense Christ does appear as a lure; but one seems able to respond to this lure only when he has reached the depths of despair, when he stands without any hope in his own strength. Anxiety is valuable in that it does lead man to the point where he recognizes his sin. We have to be firm about this; one must nearly be led to hell to reach God. On the other hand, though, I do see anxiety as having negative aspects for it is involved in the sympathetic ambiguity that one feels in confronting his own freedom. He is afraid of being the same, and yet he is afraid of change. Man does want freedom, and yet he doesn't. He wants to know the saving experience, and yet he doesn't. Anxiety marks this sort of stalemate, as well as the positive motivation toward a healing faith.

**R.:** I think I see what you mean, though again I would put it a bit differently; I, too, think of anxiety as functioning positively for the individual, though at times it is of course a rather turbulantly static thing, churning rather than aiding meaningful movement for the individual. In my judgment, anxiety exists only when a denied experience is dimly perceived or is subceived. I think that in therapy the client who is in a safe relationship can come to perceive anxious feelings as a friendly help rather than as a disturbing enemy, troublesome though it may be. Seen in this light, the investigations of anxious feelings can lead to the discovery of the experience which has been denied and, hopefully, to the acceptance of that part of one's self. Hence, in my view too, anxiety *can* be a step on the road to becoming more fully functioning. In fact, moving a step behind its function in therapy, it may be one of the dominant feelings that leads a person to decide to enter therapy in the first place.

**S. K.:** I imagine so, and maybe that very process of *decision* is one that we might stop and look at for a moment. I'm sure you find that sort of decision very important in the individual's beginning to take responsibility for himself in the therapy process; and I am struck by the way this crucial capacity for decision about things that count emerges.

I think, for instance, that the first decision for the individual living in what I have called the aesthetic mode of existence, where he has only dabbled and tasted of life, is the decision to decide. Up to this point he has been living only from moment to moment, enjoying the feeling of life, not taking anything serious-



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ly, only living with fragmented and disintegrated interests. But then from the discontentedness and despair of this inner disorganization, comes the decision to risk being a different person, to make decisions, to take life seriously, to live under the universal laws and norms laid down for all human beings. This I have characterized as the ethical mode of existence. Beyond this the individual may eventually stand before God and realize that a unique demand has been placed upon him—which he can only face in fear and trembling. He stands as Abraham called upon by God to kill his son Isaac. One must surrender here even the most cherished of his relative commitments, and give absolute obedience and commitment to the Absolute alone, to the best of his power.

One is led to infinite resignation before God, for he knows the guilt of being unable to fulfill his unique ethical demand; and he knows suffering as he stands in the face of an insensitive world. At this stage one may be called a religious man; but this is only partial—I have called it Religiousness A. But only in Religiousness B does a man stand before the full transcendence of God and realize the sin of his own separation. He discovers that his frailty, guilt, and sin can only be overcome by Christ and thus all hope and belief are put in him. It is this belief in the God-man Christ—the paradox, the absurd—that man makes subjective the “truth” which engages the wholeness of his being. For here even reason can no longer stand apart and pass judgment. This then is the final leap of faith; and in it one knows the blessedness of forgiveness and freedom at last. This is to become a Christian. It is to become fully a self with an authentic personal existence.

**R.:** This is a very illuminating summary of the process of achieving personal existence as you know it; and I recognize that it grows out of an understanding of your own existential pilgrimage. As such I hold it in deepest respect. Yet there are two points here that touch off some apprehension with me. The first is that you seem to generalize your experience almost as *normative* for any person intent on becoming a Christian or a self. And the second is that you seem to *equate becoming a Christian and gaining selfhood*, or personal existence. Would you comment on this?


**S. K.:** Well, to your first question I think I would say that I really don't intend that the exact sequence of these stages on life's way as I have experienced them should be regarded as normative; although with the slightest effort, I believe you could recognize one or another of these modes of existence demonstrated in the life of any individual. What I would hold as normative is the importance of any individual's working through with decisive personal involvement toward a contemporaneous awareness of Christ and the truth which he brings to one's whole existence, for which one may well have to suffer, but which alone can bring real meaning to his life. The difficulty with

the majority of men is that they really don't take life seriously.

Christ is to them no more than past history, and thus they have not discovered a truth which is really their own—for which they could live and die. This is why, for instance, I am so outraged at the institution of the Church; for here where you would expect most of all to see men who had found this truth and were willing to stand up for it, it is difficult to find even one who is willing to suffer for it. They may know *about* the truth, but they don't know *of* it—subjectively, existentially.

**R.:** I see, what you're concerned with is a genuine, existential faith on which a person is willing to stake his whole life.

**S. K.:** That's right. And now for your second question regarding my equation of selfhood with becoming a Christian. To look at myself for a moment, I guess



COME BACK WHEN I'M NOT SO BUSY

CRANE



I could say that I do this simply because they do seem to me to be inextricably related. At least this is what I have known in my own experience. I can only understand my experience in terms of Christian categories, for I see my life primarily as a religious struggle,<sup>2</sup> and the overtones of this naturally enough run over into all facets of my existence.

I think I would go even further than referring to my own experience, though, in answering this question. For as I see it, the realization of what man is as sinner is revealed to him only in Christ, and what man is meant to be, that is of true personal existence or selfhood, since it has to do with approaching the image of God, is revealed to him also in the situation of faith and in relation to Christ. From the side of man, this involves the affirmation of the paradox of Christ; but from the side of God it is grace, enabling the individual to become a Christian. That is to say that to become a self, to gain genuine freedom, one must rely finally not on his own powers, but on the grace and forgiveness of God which alone is sufficiently powerful to rescue man from his sickness and bondage.

R.: I am tempted at this point to complain that your argument seems to be tautological—that you define being a Christian in psychological terms, and you define selfhood in Christian terms. Yet perhaps there is meaning in this; and at any rate such a judgment would be insensitive to your own awareness of your experience, and would really add little to our discussion. Rather, I would suggest that one of the things that lies at the root of our variance in understanding here is our understanding of the *inherent capacities of man* himself. You have just indicated your belief that man is really inadequate to deal with the perplexities of life—is incapable of coming to maturity, to selfhood, to freedom, to personal existence without the intervention of God through grace bringing forgiveness and renewed strength.

Over against this, I would hold that the individual *does* have within himself the capacity, latent if not evident, to understand those aspects of himself and of his life which are causing him dissatisfaction, anxiety, or pain and the capacity and tendency to reorganize himself and his relationship to life in the direction of self-actualization and maturity in such a way as to bring a greater degree of internal comfort. The human organism seems to have one basic tendency and striving—to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism. This belief lies at the root of much medical and psychological therapy; and I am constantly in awe of the way in which this potentiality for growth in a positive direction is evidenced in the process of therapy. At the times when the client seems almost utterly hopeless and despairing, the spark of this strength seems to break out and kindle a reorgani-

zation of the self with tentative feelings into a new life.

S. K.: This certainly is a fundamental sort of disagreement. And I see that in it we are clarifying something we said near the beginning about self-awareness. What is the self we are really aware of? For me it is an awareness of oneself as a sinner in need of grace, in need of God's saving activity, whether or not we see it as such at the time. It is an awareness of a self incapable of meeting the demands placed upon him, or of bridging the gap to God. For you it is an awareness of a self which no matter how desperate may be the circumstances, still has the potentialities as a human for regaining health and strength. Yet it seems that in phenomenological terms our understanding of the situation of man is somewhat the same, above this level of our regard for the extent of his capacities available for dealing with this situation. The suffering that you speak of in your clients—of anxiety, hopelessness, despair, incongruity, and the like—is certainly similar to the sort of despair, melancholy, estrangement, and dread I have known. And I also sense that we agree that an awareness of this situation is necessary before anything can be done about moving in the direction of release.

R.: You're right, and I find it interesting to note how similar your thinking is to mine on this descriptive level in reference to the feelings involved at an individual's greatest point of need. I have said that if I were to search for the central core of difficulty in people as I have come to know them, it is that in the great majority of cases they despise themselves, regard themselves as worthless and unlovable. Sometimes I have been criticized for this, even in relation to your own understanding of the self which has been said to maintain more of a balance between not thinking enough of oneself—or thinking too much. Here, though, I hear you reporting that you too have thought little of yourself. In fact, you say that a man must be driven hard to think little of himself before selfhood can be achieved, as you see it, through faith. You are saying what I have heard in many hours of therapy, that there comes an agony of despair in which it seems as though man has no capacity whatsoever to deal with life as it is any longer. And you say that you have only come from this deep despair through a saving experience of faith. In thinking of the experience in which man comes from this despair, I have concluded that it is only possible in a relationship where one is loved and accepted fully. Here the individual can begin to feel a dawning respect for, acceptance of, and, finally, even a fondness for himself. This is the kind of relationship I find in psychotherapy. But apparently you found this love and acceptance in a relationship to God and his forgiveness shown in Christ.

S. K.: I suppose it could be put that way. But I am still troubled about our basic disagreement as to

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps Kierkegaard might not be this self-conscious about his experience, though I think he might well be.



whether man has the inherent capacities for healing as you say, or whether this doesn't finally rest in the strength and grace of God. Couldn't you say that the relationship of therapy, particularly in these moments of healing when new hope and direction is taken out of deep despair, that this is really a situation inter-fused with the active grace of God? I, too, have often felt at the moments of change and release that it came from some decision, or affirmation, or leap that I had made. But looking back on these times I can see that it was really the activity of God working in me through grace.

**R.:** Perhaps you could speak of therapy in this way; and in fact a number of people have. But I just wonder what *operational difference* it would make or indeed *what meaning would be added* to speak of it in this way? In some sense, it seems to me that such an interpretation of psychotherapy may do no more than ask the questions it answers, or answer the questions it asks. That is, one may speak of it this way to satisfy certain assumptions about the redemptive nature of God. But I can't see that such a perspective is necessary to the process of psychotherapy itself.

**S. K.:** I find it somewhat difficult to speak to the kind of question you raise here since my own experiences are so much bound up in what we are speaking of. And to me, as I have said, these experiences are only understandable in Christian terms. I can hardly see what meaning it would have *not* to speak of it this way; rather than as you ask, what meaning is

added *by* speaking of the process in Christian terms involving the work of grace. Furthermore it would be difficult in any case to speak of the activity of God in one's saving experiences for it is surrounded by the mystery of the transcendent. There is something of the mystical involved here which is not translatable but known only in the experience itself. It is a self-validating sort of truth.

**R.:** I can see how it would be difficult to explain or validate the authenticity of such an experience.

**S. K.:** But perhaps I can say more than this. I have heard you speak of times in therapy when a client gains some perception into the root of his difficulties, when he may become aware of mixed feelings, or basic ambiguities in his own allegiances. And yet the mere knowledge of this doesn't help him to change, doesn't help him to cope with life in a more adequate way. Wouldn't you say then that he has reached the limit of his own powers, and stands at that point in need of the power and forgiveness of God through grace—the saving experience which can lead him into new life?

**R.:** Well, there are times like this in therapy but I would say that they do not represent the end point of a person's capacity to deal with this situation himself. In fact, if this is as far as therapy gets, it is not therapy. For as I see it the crucial point beyond the one you have described is the point at which the person is not only aware of his basic feelings, but comes to *accept* them—along with all his limitations as well as his potentialities as his own. We might say he comes to "own" his experience. Perhaps this acceptance may accompany the deepest awareness, but such an awareness, when it is real, does not leave the person helpless. For from this point, as difficult as it may be at first, he may grow in the capacity to live with himself and actualize those areas of interest in his life which he deems important—primarily, perhaps, in the realm of developing mature and meaningful relationships with other persons.

At these times when there is acceptance finally of oneself—even those parts which are hardest to look at—there is usually a sense of tremendous release, as if a great weight had been lifted. Such an experience might be closer to that in which you might see the grace of God to be operative; for sometimes it does appear to the person to have happened as a gift. Yet even in this instance I think the phenomena may be understood in terms of the individual's own homeostatic capacities or in terms of what I spoke of before as the organism's basic tendency to actualize, maintain, and enhance itself.

**S. K.:** I guess what you are suggesting is that this redemptive experience—when an individual gains new release and freedom and hope in the face of what has seemed to be utter despair and misery—that this experience can be understood either as the

work of God or as the actualization of inherent human potentialities. And that you really find greater meaning with the latter psychological explanation.

**R.:** Yes, though I would qualify the latter description to say the actualization of inherent human potentialities *in relationship* to an experience of deep understanding, acceptance, and love from another person, and that perhaps such an experience is indeed God moving in his world.

**S. K.:** Well, my response to that would be that there is no human relationship which *could* provide this degree of acceptance and love. It is only God in Christ who offers complete love to man—who is willing to lay down his life for him—who accepts and forgives and grants newness of life no matter how desperate and unlovable an individual is. It is for this reason that I must say the only way for such redemption and salvation to occur is through the work of God.

**R.:** I can certainly accept this as a testimony to your own experience. Yet I have the feeling from your descriptions of your own life that you never had the opportunity of knowing a human relationship of this sort. You have spoken particularly of the stern authoritarian character of your father, your slight relationship to your mother, and your unsatisfactory relationship with Regina. Even your friend Rasmus Nielsen, whom you thought you could confide in, finally caused you considerable embarrassment. To say this to you may sound judgmental on my part; yet I am seriously concerned that you don't rule out the possibility of such human relationships of love and acceptance simply on the ground that you never experienced these. For it seems to me that these healing experiences of love can and do occur within one's family, in marriage, in deep friendship, and, of course, in therapy, as I have experienced it.

**S. K.:** No, it seems to me that to make such claims for any human relationship, whether or not I have experienced such, would be to absolutize the relative and to relativize the absolute. It would be to elevate human relationships to a paramount value, or it would be to bring relationship to God onto an equal plane with human relationships. A man must stand in a relationship of faith before God—in confession and humility—open to God's forgiveness and redeeming power in order to be freed from his despair and guilt, and brought into the freedom of personal existence. This appears in an experience which one knows only in solitude before God.

**R.:** It looks as though we have reached a parting of the ways here; and I am thinking back to the point on which we began regarding the importance of the individual person. It seems that though we have equal regard for this, your tendency is to consider the "single one" particularly in his solitude; whereas I regard the individual, even in times of lonely struggle and healing, as being in necessary *relationship with other persons*. I realize you are active in the everyday

life and thought of your city, but I take it you cannot regard these relationships as having real depth—as involving concern and love for you as a person, or as permitting your acceptance and trust of the other. I can appreciate the misery that has come to you in these relationships, especially following the *Corsair* event. Yet for my part, I deeply value the depth potentiality of all relationships, even those expressing hostility. For where there can be acceptance and love and respect, there can be mutuality and openness which bring increasing satisfaction and health. The deepest meanings of life seem to be in human relationships.

**S. K.:** You are probably right. You do have more of a concern for relationships with other persons than I do. But I would still maintain that the only significant relationship is that of the individual who stands before God and his judgment and forgiveness. Only from such a relationship can true personal existence arise.

**R.:** I am wondering now also about your understanding of *freedom* in connection with this process. In a way you are saying that man doesn't achieve real selfhood in freedom and independence from God and his work of grace. That for salvation or renewal of life one is necessarily bound to the activity of God. At first glance this seems to cut much of the meaning from freedom. Yet I sense that you may be speaking of free-



FLIGHT FROM FEAR TO COMFORT

OTIS HUBAND, JR.

dom in a different fashion. Indeed to think of freedom as sheer individuality and independence, would be to inform me that I am not taking such freedom seriously either, since I point to the necessity of a loving and accepting relationship. Rather in speaking of freedom, I take it you are pointing to a freedom from confusion, guilt, bound energy, superficiality, drivenness, or fragmentation in life which characterize the earlier stages of the modes of existence as you have spoken of them. And with this freedom *from*, you seem to point to a freedom *toward* increasing self-determination, increasing centeredness, and integrity of life, and toward an increasing capacity to decide one's fundamental orientation to life.

**S. K.:** Yes, the latter is closer to what I am speaking of. It is what I have also spoken of in terms of increasing *self-governance*. This, I believe, comes about little by little as one comes to see the truth that lies at the center of his existence, such that all relative and fragmentary concerns may be discarded.

**R.:** In therapy I also see the increase of such freedom, of a deeper and more profound understanding of one's life from which increasingly meaningful behavior can take place. I see the growing sense that one is less driven, less compelled, less of the impression that he is being buffeted about by all sorts of persons and circumstances. And with this the increased consciousness of one's own control, of self-governance, and actualization based on the awareness and acceptance of one's real interests, feelings, energies, and concerns—an acceptance of his actual potentialities and limitations.

Yet I have serious difficulty seeing how the occurrence of this sort of freedom of self-determination and self-governance fit in for you with some of the other things you have said. I refer again to your continual recognition of the grace and will of God. At each point in a man's life, as you express it, it may *seem* that he is acting in freedom, making decisions, even choosing Christ—whose incognito revelation of God you are concerned to point out in order to accommodate still man's freedom. Or here it may *seem* that a person's life is self-determined or governed. But underneath in every instance, on looking back, you imply that there is the grace of God operative. To me it seems difficult to speak of genuine freedom, or self-determination, in this context. And to say that there is merely the feeling or appearance of such freedom is even more uncomfortable to me, although to you this may be an internally self-authenticating experience. Yet from my experience it seems far more accurate and clarifying to say that this freedom is real within the person, and that one truly can be self-governing to the degree that circumstances permit, once he has become aware of those driving energies and feelings which are his own

in connection with the organizing center of his self.

Along this line, also, I would be more willing than you to say that this center, this focal integrity, or this "truth," as we spoke of it earlier, has elements of uniqueness within every individual in terms of his own experiences. The fundamental meaning and commitment of every person I have known deeply has had its own distinctiveness, not necessarily being identified with Christ. I can see how that in your experience, the only truth which you see as ultimately compelling your commitment is the truth of Christ. Yet I think I would say that the meaning of even this truth has its distinctiveness for you in relation to others who may also see their truth as associated in some way with Christ. Still there are many persons who do not make such an association. And for these I would certainly not rule out the possibility of a fully functioning self-existence. The image of Christ may indeed provide for many the sort of unconditional love and acceptance which is necessary for healing, and for authentic personal existence; but there are as well, it seems to me, additional resources within the context of family, or deep friendship, or psychotherapy, such as I have known, in which the same sort of unconditional positive regard, understanding, and love make possible similar healing, and provide as well the context for discovering individual growth, meaning, and fulfillment.



# films in review

BY ROBERT STEELE

**A**RT objects from abroad have a history of bamboozling us. They are somewhat different and make us think. If they sail in with a grand reputation as being *nouvelle vague*, then we are ready to admire. If we have unquiet thoughts about whether they are really masterpieces, most of us are inclined to think we must be a bit stupid.

The Armory Show of 1912, which gave us our first encounter with European painting of the twentieth century so set us on our ear that we still hear about it. It made painting history in America. Marcel Duchamp's "Nude Descending a Staircase" became famous by being damned. It was described as a storm in a shingle factory. The storm threatens to outlive the importance of the painting. The intent of the painters to produce humor, fun, and mockery was not visible to us in their works. Many missed the boat.

London got around Lord Chamberlain's censorship of plays by calling the Comedy Theatre a theatre club. One paid five bob annually (less than a dollar) to get a card which had to be presented to purchase a ticket. *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*, *Tea and Sympathy*, *A View from the Bridge* were confined to the Comedy. Because the plays were American and had been refused permission to play in ordinary theatres, Londoners queued up, certain that a scandal was to be perpetrated. Miller must have shrieked if he ever heard or read that playgoers assumed the "problem of *A View from the Bridge* was Eddie's love for his niece's fiance rather than Eddie's overfondness for his niece! Frequently, what seemed to be clear, tame, and unshocking to an American concerning an American play managed to be so unperceived by a Londoner that he discovered dark and juicy solutions to what the play was *really* about.

From Idaho to Maine the shoe is now on the other foot. The shoes are French and Italian and the feet are those of soft and woolly Americans. Many of us are seeing European films for the first time, and their newness to us, the fanfare with which they are announced, their eroticism, and shock value swell theatre audiences. From one point of view this is very good. We think we are experiencing serious cinema of stature. We go happily to "think movies." Maybe this is great! This boom may be a way to get more European films shown at Grocers Corners, and, consequently, we may increase our ability to perceive and discriminate. We may learn what to support with our admission vote. From another point of view all is not a French-Italian "Hallelujah Chorus." Much of the so-called *nouvelle vague* is hornswooggling us.

Much of which is thought to be new is as old as the cinema itself. It is new to us because we haven't seen many good films. Because of the extent to which we are touched with sickness, we are not aware of sickness in these films. We are sucked in by torpedoed story-handling and cutting; thus, we are not bored, and, therefore feel entertained. Still waters run deep; thus, still and serious films must be deep even if we don't quite understand why.

For some there is a baffled malaise after exposure to some of these films. Even though we can't say why, we have amorphous misgivings. This is an important matter because the films can make us sicker. There are strange goings on in many of these films which can harm us, and, certainly, there is much to prevent our acclaiming them as film art.

The characters in many of these films are not worth watching. They are dull people with trivial problems;



they are sick and lost and find no cures. We are the poorer for having turned in our money and given up our evening. Instead of facing this possibility, we tell ourselves that there must be subterranean depths that have eluded us or resign ourselves to the feeling that films are metaphysical statements and few comprehend metaphysics. These films battle against man's predicament; they are neo-neo realist, anti-films, neo-existentialist artistic creations, and we refuse to see the threat of being drowned in their watery substance.

Many of the films are anti-man, anti-woman, anti-morality. They are provincial and small in their subject matter. They not only exacerbate hopelessness, they proffer hopelessness as being safe. They revel in tiredness; tiredness with life *in toto* and especially tiredness in sex. The values and solutions seem upside-down. They show boredom but make the artistic mistake of being boring. Irrelevant events and lightweight characters are emphasized. Everything is alien. Cynicism is their most natural outlook. Creating, striving, being are abdicated. Characters' feelings are insulated and they don't strive to evoke our feelings. The viewer's heart must be kept far away from his head. Films can't be too dramatic else nascent feelings be involved when only the intellect belongs in this film world.

**T**HE biggest hit of recent years has been *A Bout de Souffle* (*Breathless*) with Jean Seberg and Jean-Paul Belmondo, directed by Jean-Luc Godard, screenplay by Francois Truffaut, technical supervisor, Claude Chabrol. (These are some of the big names of the *nouvelle vague*.) The film is blessed for its spontaneity. We want and bless spontaneity, but it is self-conscious and labored in *Breathless*. It shows. Convincing spontaneity makes no show of itself. Disarming spontaneity is the consequence of superb control and masterful craftsmanship. The indifferent cutting in *Breathless*, rather than being a new form in the film, seems sloppy and unprecise, so that the film looks as if it is tacked together. Instead of getting a new form, we are getting formlessness or anti-form, or more probably non-form, because the film is the work of amateurs who wish to exploit their being amateurs. Because of its off-beat photography and cutting, viewers, the first time, are able to see photography and cutting. Because they are aware of it, they mistake their recognition for its goodness. Instead, photography and cutting are good to the extent that they are invisible. They are mere means to an end: the opportunity to re-create the experience of the characters in the film.

In *Breathless* we get a long look at a small scrounger who acts as if he is a French Humphrey Bogart. He kills a cop who is chasing him for speeding. He manages to get cars, money, and a woman without paying. He lies, smokes incessantly, and uses a Bogart gesture of rubbing his finger around his lips. He drives all the time he is not telephoning. He hunts for money

or the girl all the time. He goes nowhere, is nothing. But he is interesting and convincing. He is sufficiently absorbing to be worthy of a case study, so perhaps the film belongs in a clinic or classroom rather than a cinema.

His girl's cropped hair—there is no explanation for this—makes her look like a twelve-year-old boy. She is cold and matches Belmondo's coldness. She is a bit stronger than he is, but still she is anti-woman and anti-heroine. Both girl and man are excessively passive and let themselves be worked upon by social order and law. The encounter with these two vegetating human beings is a dulling one. One feels he has been trapped in a cinema of scorn that is not worth scorning.

**M**ICHELANGELO ANTONIONI, made famous in the States by his *L'Avventura*, also gives us passive men and women, dullness, stillness, and heroes and heroines who are not heroes and heroines. They are characters with whom it is hard to become involved. They are dull and empty. For a while we wonder why Sandro is this way. Then we get so tired we don't care—nothing could save him to make him worthy of attention. Finally, we find he carries a "great wound"; he gave up creative architecture to be a commercial success. The characters whom we follow most closely through this long (two and a half hours) film are ciphers at the beginning of the film, and even though it is impossible, they are *more* ciphers by the end. Antonioni has followers who end their reviews by mentioning a line such as the one about Sandro's "wound" which gives us a "glimpse into the deeper meanings" of the film. The meanings are not interpreted by the reviewer. Meaning is probably to be gotten from Antonioni's observation that "eroticism is the disease of our age." He is a part of it and is spreading it. In explaining his work he has said, "The conclusion at which my characters arrive is not moral anarchy." (Someone had said they were anarchists which if true would be to the good!) "They come at most to a shared pity. This, you may say, is nothing new. But without that, what is left to us?" A rejoinder might be: "Mercy, pity, peace, and love." This could be a *nouvelle vague*.

*Rocco and His Brothers* of Luchino Visconti starts out making us feel it will be an absorbing experience. The film opens with the dominating and magnificent Katina Paxinou as the mother. She remains interesting and strong, as does the prostitute heroine, but the four dull, stupid, unbelievable brothers take over more and more. One feels sorry for the women's having such stupes around. Alain Delon at the beginning is hopeful as an admirable and sensitive man, but he tries to turn himself into his wretched brother by taking over his professional boxing career and the prostitute.

Like the others Visconti at times has technical virtuosity, and is a man of talent who has gone wrong.

One thing wrong with him and Antonioni is their falling so in love with locations, that one feels the film pivots around a few outdoor locations that the directors have been itching to use for years. Backgrounds overpower characters. The intent of these directors seems divided, or else they lose their way somewhere in the production and resort burdening the film with clichés. The Hollywood cliché, formula film turns out to be the more honest film.

*Plein Soleil* (**Purpose Noon**) is hard to believe for two reasons. First, that René Clement could come to this. He is an old director and has done masterful work. Second, if the main characters can be defended as believable, then the Eiffel Tower is the Washington monument. This is another anti-men affair. The pretty girl, empty as a *haute couture* mannequin, is stronger than the men, but why anybody would go through what Delon goes through for her is hard to conceive. To think she could motivate a man to murder as the way to get her is nonsense. Again the worth of a novel, upon which the film is based, is perverted so that the film may be formularized in ways congenial to the *nouvelle vague*.

**A**LAIN RESNAIS' *Hiroshima Mon Amour* initiated the rage in the United States for the film that turns its back on social reality, immerses itself in complexities and obsessions of an intellectual world. The woman is bland and the man a nonentity. Both are "happily married," but not to each other, and are totally disengaged from their surroundings. The film has such polish that on a first viewing one isn't sure but that it might be an important film. On repeated viewings one discovers it is a bore and is dramatically misshapened. Scrutiny reveals that what eluded one on the first viewing is the fault of the film and not its pioneer handling of the space-time continuum by way of audacious cutting. Since the early works of D.W. Griffith (1915), we have become accustomed to having thought visualized on the screen. Therefore, when, for many minutes that seem like an hour and a half, the heroine walks the streets of Tokyo, goes into her hotel, walks up many steps, walks down a long corridor, enters her room, her bathroom, immerses her face in water, one thinks some great decision-making about her destiny is going on in her head. However, the divulgement of the problem that is occupying her when it is contributed by the narrating voice comes as a surprise. The film is said to be one of memory. If so, it is strange that it does not stay in one's memory which is always a good test for the excellence of form and content of a film or any work of art. This is an especially sad misadventure of Resnais, because his earlier film, *Nuit et Brouillard* set a high standard for

his work. This was made before he joined the *cinéma d'auteurs*. (New novelists have been working with new film makers. Marguerite Duras wrote the scenario and dialogue for *Hiroshima Mon Amour*. Alain Robbe-Grillet has written Resnais' *L'Année Dernière*. Nathalie Sarraut, another of the new novelists whose work seems to have an affinity with the *nouvelle vague* in films, has explained, "The new novel is suspicious of whatever the author's imagination suggests.")

About any way you look at it, *Les Quatre Cents Coups* (**Four Hundred Blows**) made in 1959 by Francois Truffaut, is surpassed by *Zero de Conduite* made in 1933 by Jean Vigo. Both present schoolboys headed for the reformatory and adults are blamed for the devilish behavior of the boys. While the film is poignant and superbly acted by Jean-Pierre Léaud, it smacks a bit of an old-fashioned Sunday school lesson. Truffaut got on the bandwagon of public opinion rather than being in the vanguard of his times—which by necessity the great artist is.

**C**LAUDE CHABROL'S *Leda* is the most beautifully colored and designed exercise in implausibility that we have had from France. So much effort and expense to result in characters who are dull and in the case of the real murderer, insane! *Leda* and *L'Ascenseur a l'Echafaud* (Frantic), wasting the galvanic Jeanne Moreau, make one glad that André Bazin, editor of *Cahiers du Cinéma*, where the *nouvelle vague* started, did not live to see this denigration.

Though one balks at joining the excessive praise for the new and allegedly young directors of France and Italy, we can be grateful for their works. They serve as a foil to enable us to see more clearly those directors who are sincere, have something to say, to reveal, who are superb craftsmen, and who know the great films of the past from which we are obligated to build.

As we see more and more films that appear to be made by individual men rather than factories, we will be less inclined to confuse the arty with art. We will begin to trust our judgment so that we may condemn vacuity no matter what language it is in. We will be able to discriminate between serious appearances and seriousness. We will learn to perceive the difference between the film that moves but is essentially immobile and the mobility that results from perfected film form and content. The essence of the great film is movement. As the immobile body is a corpse, the immobile film is dead. But great movement, movement that moves from within as well as without, does not emerge from poverty, emptiness, and amorality in life. It is movement toward that which makes life full—so full that, as in the words of Berdyaev, "It is a dramatic event in the divine life."

# BOOKS

## THE COUCH AND THE CIRCLE. A Story of Group Psychotherapy. By Hyman Spotnitz, M.D., Med. Sc.D. (274 pp. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. \$4.50.)

THE groups in which we grow up and live—family, school, community, profession and so forth—exert a profound influence on us, and we in turn, on them. Early in the twentieth century, the personal influence of individuals upon one another became explicitly defined as psychotherapy. It is therefore not surprising that psychiatrists and others have seized upon the idea of small groups as psychotherapeutic instruments. Thus, group psychotherapy was born.

Hyman Spotnitz, an authority on group psychotherapy, writes simply and clearly. The result is a frank, easily understandable account of a novel form of psychiatric activity, the social significance of which seems to be growing. Indeed, according to Dr. Spotnitz, group psychotherapy constitutes the Third Psychiatric Revolution—the previous two being symbolized by the achievements of Philippe Pinel (1745-1826), the French specialist in mental disease, and Sigmund Freud.

Although the scientific, and perhaps even the ethical, merits of any particular form of psychotherapy must be judged independently of the therapist's personality, in this case it is helpful for the reader to know what the author's personal reasons were for adopting his work habits. Functioning as a psychoanalyst, Dr. Spotnitz felt confined, even depressed. "In the group, I felt much more of a human being—a more sociable and lively one. The situation was more challenging. It required qualities of leadership."

Dr. Spotnitz' thesis, though clearly and enthusiastically pounded, is marred by serious flaws. The patients somehow never become persons; they remain "cases." Identified by fictitious first names, they move, like molecules tagged with radioactive isotopes, from page to page, carrying an assortment of human miseries with them.

In this reviewer's opinion, it is particularly unfortunate that the author chose to place group psychotherapy in the false perspective of an incorrect portrayal of psychoanalysis. Behind the couch the author felt as if he were in "a shady nook." He emerged into "the midday sun" when he became a group leader. He could then tell his patients: "Love and hate, and say so."

Whether psychoanalysis is good or bad theory, or effective or ineffective therapy, is not at issue here. What is at issue is the author's conception and portrayal of psychoanalysis. To him, it is the couch, the dimly lit room, the five-time-a-week interview, the analyst's relative inactivity and transference and resistance. In sum he conveys to the reader only the trappings of the analytic procedure, not its characteristic ethical, psychological and social features. The aim of psychoanalysis, as this reviewer understands it, is not to socialize the personality, but rather to enrich it with greater understanding and with responsibility for choice in the conduct of one's life.

According to the author, the "essential curative factor" in all forms of psychotherapy is the emotional relationship between therapist and patient. In the case of psychoanalysis, this is not so. Indeed, if we fail to distinguish between the traditional kinds of personal influences described in this book and those the psychoanalyst exerts on his patient, we shall have obliterated precisely that distinction that Freud tried so hard to illuminate.

Often institutions and people have noxious rather than therapeutic intentions toward one another. This includes psychotherapists and patients in group therapy. In every form of psychotherapy this danger should be openly recognized and the patient protected from it. While psychoanalysis may not be the most potent force for changing human behavior (nor is it intended to be), it provides effective safeguards for the patient's autonomy. Group psychotherapy does not. Of course, for many persons autonomy holds little value. For escapees from freedom and for other-directed personalities, group psychotherapy may well provide precisely that make-believe companionship and disguised guidance they desperately seek and can no longer find in the traditional religious faiths of the Western World.

—THOMAS SZASZ

## MIRRORS & WINDOWS: POEMS. By Howard Nemerov. (102 pages. University of Chicago Press, 1958, \$2.75)

## NEW AND SELECTED POEMS. By Howard Nemerov. (116 pages. University of Chicago Press, 1960, \$3.50)

Windows provide a view of the world around us; mirrors reflect an image of ourselves. These poems do both. Mr. Nemerov, a college professor (Bennington), is an observer who has an eye to see, an ear to hear, and a good recording hand. Five published volumes of poetry is a good record for a poet born in 1920. Add



"IT'LL NEVER WORK"

"BUT IS THERE A MARKET FOR IT?"

"WHAT HATH THE WONDERS OF SCIENCE WROUGHT?"

"A TRUE ALL DAY SUCKER"

"IF THAT'S A PENNY, WHAT'S A DOLLAR LIKE?"

"HOW DO YOU GET BACK UP THE HILL?"

"BUT WHAT GOOD IS IT?"



that he has also published three novels, a collection of short stories, two plays (one of which was commissioned by the Methodist Student Movement), and a variety of essays in many of our best magazines and reviews, and you begin to get some idea of how many irons he has in the fire. The surprising thing is that most of them are hot. It may be a wry commentary on the state of our culture that so prolific a writer must maintain his teaching position in order to supply the bread and butter, but I prefer to believe that he does so rather for the love of teaching. He wears many costumes, but it seems reasonable to assume that, like Hardy before him, he considers himself essentially a poet, who sometimes gets involved in other media.

From his earliest volume (*The Image and the Law*, 1947) to the present, he has concerned himself with the attempt to see things clearly and say them honestly. This he does with increasing success. One closes certain volumes of contemporary verse with the feeling that there are excellent poems here, if only the poet had written them—if only he had not evaded the obligation to impose an order. Nemerov does not evade. His material is under control; the order is realized, not simply potential.

This is also a day when the serious reader of poetry finds it easy to admire the work of many young poets for its gusto, or its attempt to relate poetry to life, or for its daring experimentation or something else, while at the same time finding it necessary to reject its assumptions and assertions as being socially, ethically, and morally untenable. The reader of these volumes will not find it necessary to rule sanity and decency out of court in order to appreciate. The general malaise of our times, with its anxieties and disillusionments, has affected all our artists. They would not be artists otherwise. But tragically, many poets have been torn loose from all moorings and driven before the winds of doubt and change, relinquishing their birthright of order and value and meaning for a mess of nihilistic pottage cooked up in the flesh-pots and seasoned with heroin and alcohol. Perhaps the crucial observation to be made about Mr. Nemerov is simply that he has not sold out. This is not to say that his poems are versified sermons. Far from it. Nor is it to say that he confronts the reader with a series of easy affirmations steeped in undiluted optimism. It is simply to say that he takes a long, hard, sane, intelligent look at experience; that he believes there is such a thing as value; that there is a moral order in the universe; that there is a side of human experience which transcends the physical and the mechanical. His poems probe and question about as often as they affirm, but these beliefs are implicit even in the questioning. He does not deal overmuch with the mystical and supernatural as such; it is this world which interests him, and in it he ranges widely both in time and space.

So much for generalizations. What are these poems like? We can get some notion of the range from a random sampling of titles: "The Town Dump," "A Clock with No Hands," "Lightning Storm on Fuji," "Student Dies in 100 Yard Dash," "Cloud Seeding," "To Lu Chi." The fifteen new poems which comprise Part I of *New and Selected Poems* are among the most interesting in either volume. The opening poem, "Moment," is a meditation on the "now," the instant of time in which we are forever caught, universally simultaneous:

*and the mind of God,  
The flash across the gap of being, thinks  
In the instant absence of forever: now.*

The longest of the new poems is composed of fifteen stanzas, all but the first having fifteen lines. The group is entitled "Runes," a title which suggests not only the general sense of "poems," but implies a secret, something mysterious. He prefaces the cantos with a quoted Augustinian paradox which translates into something like ". . . I was sick with health, and I was dying with life." I am happy to report that this is the only poem in either volume in which this mildly pedantic Eliotian foreign language-motto de-

vice is employed, and here it is clearly pertinent for those few readers whose Latin is in working order. The opening stanza tells us that the poem is "about the stillness in moving things" or "of thought and the defeat/ Of thought before its object." The consideration of these intangibles will frustrate both the paraphraser and the moral-hunter. Though his theme carries him from Ulysses to sunflowers to Conrad to Cain and back to Ulysses, the unifying thread is a kind of rosary composed of multifaceted images of seeds and water and stone. These images go a long way toward making concrete and graspable the abstract and elusive: the interdependence of life and death, the seen and the unseen, the appearance and the reality, the relation of man to his universe, of time to eternity. These are the real "runes," the secrets, and they can be approached only in poetry. They defy logic and science. Nemerov grapples with them, here and elsewhere, and we must not complain if the struggle to verbalize them takes the form of hints and guesses, of fleeting glimpses; for the central mystery cannot be fully revealed, even to the poet himself, and remain a mystery.

The poems as a whole sparkle with cleverness—one of those poetic assets which, unless rigorously controlled, can become a liability. There are spots where Nemerov cuts the safety margin dangerously, if enjoyably, thin. Take as an example his wry comment on a "dehydrated age/Nervously watering whisky and stock"; or the lines in the delightfully satiric comment on the current "boom" in religion, aptly titled "Boom!" Here he speaks of the time "when Francis worked a fourteen-hour day/Strictly for the birds." I cannot resist quoting a passage from this same poem to illustrate a fairly typical blend of the clever and the mock-serious to barb his satire:

*But now the gears mesh and the tires burn  
and the ice chatters in the shaker and the priest  
in the pulpit, and Thy Name, O Lord,  
is kept before the public, while the fruits  
ripen and religion booms and the level rises  
and every modern convenience runneth over . . .*

I should like to quote from many poems: from the one called "Going Away," which catches so perfectly the poignant finality of parting; or from his account of the accumulation of expendables which constitutes one view of the "life cycle of Common Man," but a view which must take into account man's constant need to verbalize his experience: "Telling the numberless tale of his untold Word." But these must be left for the reader to discover.

There is abundant technical variety in the forms employed. He is not a slave to set forms, nor is he afraid of them. The reader can find sonnets, blank verse, tercets, quatrains, and a variety of five- and six-line stanzas. There are many types of unrimed verse. The variety of form parallels the variety of tone and subject matter.

I have said little of flaws. They are far outweighed by the virtues, and I hate to quibble. One could note that "pedestals" is not a notably happy rime for "else," or that "infamozed" is an egregious coinage, or that "Drama" is just too precious for words, or that "Fables of the Moscow Subway" is obscurely allusive. These are more than balanced by the delicate pathos of "Death and the Maiden" or the charming "apology for poetry" in "To Lu Chi," in which he walks "Around the orchard, pretending to be a poet/Walking around the orchard." We like a man who can smile at himself. There may be few poems here of that rare sort which rock you to the foundations, but there are many which will shake you. I'm not sure why Mr. Nemerov chose to publish his new and selected poems together. When a poet starts giving us selections rather than new work, the impression may be created that the well is beginning to run dry. Let us hope for much more new work from this man with a genuine poetic gift of major stature. The collections can wait.

—RAY MIZER

## contributors

**VINCENT HARDING** is currently a peace worker in the South for the Mennonite Central Committee. He is a graduate of City College of New York, Columbia, and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago.

**ARTHUR L. FOSTER** is a transplanted Canadian who is assistant professor of pastoral theology and counseling at Vanderbilt Divinity School in Nashville. His B.A. and B.D. are from McMaster and he did his graduate studies at Chicago.

**MARJORIE L. FELDER'S** background includes an R.N., an A.B. in English from Agnes Scott College, an M.A. in Bible. She also had a stint at a children's home in a place called Barium Springs, North Carolina, then a B.D. at the University of Chicago. She is now a staff member of the Counseling Center at the University of Chicago, and working on her Ph.D. in Religion and Personality.

**WILLIAM R. ROGERS, JR.**, is also in the Chicago Counseling Center. A graduate of Kalamazoo College, he has had extensive teaching, clinical and research experience in the field of religion and personality. He would like to own a Morgan.

**DANE R. GORDON**, born in London, served in the Royal Navy, awarded degrees in history, theology and philosophy, and employed in jobs ranging from ditch digging to college teaching. Has received various national awards for his plays, one of which is "Too Little for Milo," which was chosen as a prize entry in the recent M.S.M. drama contest.

**ROBERT C. LESLIE** is professor of pastoral psychology and counseling at the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley. His B.A. is from DePauw and the S.T.B. and Ph.D. are from Boston. A recent sabbatical year was spent in Vienna working with Frankl.

**MARGARET RIGG** plays the subversive role in *motive's* life as art editor first of all and part time as writer, artist, and lay theologian. Symbols of the Christian faith are a special interest to Peg.

It is a matter of argument among some scholars whether symbols should ever be used by the church: are they a means of really admitting us into our experiences in a dynamic way—or are they actually standing between us and raw experience, capable of cutting us off from what we can experience? In short, are symbols alive or dead? Good question!

**PETER HOMANS** is a candidate for the Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. He has previous degrees from Princeton and Virginia Theological Seminary. His dissertation topic is "The Self, in Niebuhr and Freud."

**JOSEPH HAVENS** is a counselor and assistant professor of psychology at Carleton College. His M.A. is from the University of Southern California, and his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

Our book reviewers are **THOMAS S. SZASZ**, a native Hungarian, now professor of psychiatry at the State University of New York and author of *The Myth of Mental Illness*; and **RAY MIZER** who is an associate professor of English at DePauw.

**ROBERT STEELE'S** first article on films which appeared in the February issue has received enthusiastic response from *motive* readers.

His reviews will be a regular part of *motive* hereafter. He is an assistant professor at Boston University.

**ROLLO MAY** is a practicing psychotherapist in New York. He began his psychotherapeutic studies in Vienna and completed his doctorate in psychology and his psychoanalytic training in New York. In addition to his clinical practice, he is a member of the faculty of the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and Psychology.

### ARTISTS IN THIS ISSUE:

**OTIS HUBAND, JR.**, Richmond, Virginia, is interested in the young person in his growth toward maturity, and in expressing inner emotions. His woodblock prints make fascinating use of the wood grains, to give a sense of light and dark.

**JEAN PENLAND**, Nashville, Tennessee, has become intrigued with the human figure in relationships and communication. Her contributions this month are ink transfer monoprints.

**JIM CRANE**, East Lansing, Michigan. Nothing is as appropriate to a special issue of *motive* on psychology and theology as Jim's cartoons. Somehow he always combines the two disciplines in such a fresh way that we can smile in healthy recognition and response.

**JACK MORSE**, Rochester, N.Y., is teaching art. His own ink drawings are expressionistic in approach to reality—the personal dimensions rather than the objective facts are focused upon.

**KATI CASIDA**, Madison, Wisconsin. Mrs. Casida has done many bulletin covers for the L.S.A. (Lutheran Student Association) in Madison, and we are glad to reprint one of them in this issue, by permission.

**T. T. BLADE**, St. Cloud, Minnesota, is a senior at St. Cloud State College, and a convincing young printmaker. Tim is majoring in art and minoring in psychology, ". . . a good combination," he says, "for finding insights into human behavior and emotion. My reason for (usually) choosing biblical subjects is because the scriptures tell so well of all these universal emotions." His work is bold and worth watching.

**ROBIN JENSEN**, Oxford, Ohio, another cartoonist with keen human understanding and a conviction that laughter is good for the soul as well as the psyche, a necessary dimension of our wholeness.

**KARL MORRISON**, Cheney, Washington. "KM," as he signs his work, is chairman of the Art Department at Eastern Washington State College. His woodcut print came from a collection the faculty made into a calendar and printed themselves, multilith. We are delighted to have more West Coast art.

**OPAL FLECKENSTEIN** (at home, Mrs. Fred Fleckenstein) is another of the six-person art staff at Eastern Washington State College.

**CAM JONES**, Richmond, Virginia, is artist and editorial assistant for *Presbyterian ACTION* Magazine. Now that she has done a cover for *motive* (October, 1961), we hope to see more of her work in our pages.

**JOHN BIGELOW**, Seattle, Washington, is a student who is interested in cartooning as a way of life. His cartoon (page 51) struck us as being such fun it had to go in this month whether it fit or not.



PENSIVE

OTIS

WOODCUT BY OTIS HUBAND, JR.

## the man who was put in a cage

BY ROLLO MAY

ONE evening a king of a far land was standing at his window, vaguely listening to some music drifting down the corridor from the reception room in the other wing of the palace. The king was wearied from the diplomatic reception he had just attended, and he looked out of the window pondering about the ways of the world in general and nothing in particular. His eye fell upon a man in the square below—apparently an average man, walking home at night, who had taken the same route five nights a week for many years. The king followed this man in his imagination—pictured him arriving home, perfunctorily kissing his wife, eating his late meal. . . .

And a sudden curiosity seized the king which for a moment banished his fatigue, "I wonder what would happen if a man were kept in a cage, like the animals at the zoo?"

So the next day the king called in a psychologist, told him of his idea, and invited him to observe the experiment. Then the king caused a cage to be brought from the zoo, and the average man was brought and placed therein.

At first the man was simply bewildered, and he kept saying to the psychologist who stood outside the cage, "I have to catch the tram, I have to get to work, look what time it is, I'll be late for work!" But later on in the afternoon the man began soberly to realize what was up, and then he protested vehemently, "The king can't do this to me! It is unjust, and against the laws." His voice was strong, and his eyes full of anger.

During the rest of the week the man continued his vehement protests. When the king would walk by the cage, as he did every day, the man made his protests directly to the monarch. But the king would answer, "Look here, you get plenty of food, you have a good bed, and you don't have to work. We take good care of you—so why are you objecting?" Then after some days the man's protests lessened and then ceased. He was silent in his cage, refusing generally to talk, but the psychologist could see hatred glowing like a deep fire in his eyes.

But after several weeks the psychologist noticed that more and more it now seemed as if the man were pausing a moment after the king's daily reminder to him that he was being taken good care of—for a second the hatred was postponed from returning to his eyes—as though he

were asking himself if what the king said were possibly true.

And after a few weeks more, the man began to discuss with the psychologist how it was a useful thing if a man were given food and shelter, and that man had to live by his fate in any case and the part of wisdom was to accept his fate. So when a group of professors and graduate students came in one day to observe the man in the cage, he was friendly toward them and explained to them that he had chosen this way of life, that there are great values in security and being taken care of, that they would of course see how sensible his course was, and so on. How strange! thought the psychologist, and how pathetic—why is it he struggles so hard to get them to approve of his way of life?

In the succeeding days when the king would walk through the courtyard, the man would fawn upon him from behind the bars in his cage and thank him for the food and shelter. But when the king was not in the yard and the man was not aware that the psychologist was present, his expression was quite different—sullen and morose. When his food was handed to him through the bars by the keeper, the man would often drop the dishes or dump over the water and then be embarrassed because of his stupidity and clumsiness. His conversation became increasingly one-tracked: and instead of the involved philosophical theories about the value of being taken care of, he had gotten down to simple sentences like "It is fate," which he would say over and over again, or just mumble, "It is."

It was hard to say just when the last phase set in. But the psychologist became aware that the man's face seemed to have no particular expression: his smile was no longer fawning, but simply empty and meaningless, like the grimace a baby makes when there is gas on its stomach. The man ate his food, and exchanged a few sentences with the psychologist from time to time, his eyes were distant and vague, and though he looked at the psychologist, it seemed that he never really saw him.

And now the man, in his desultory conversations, never used the word "I" any more. He had accepted the cage. He had no anger, nor hate, nor rationalizations. But he was now insane.

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